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ABSTRACT 
Perceived connections between security concerns and migration are a central preoccupation of our 
time.  This dissertation explores how the preoccupation has played out in the Canadian context and 
asserts that a basic and common infirmity of administrative decision-making in this domain is a 
lack of justification.  The dissertation commences by exploring foundational debates within 
immigration theory about borders, exclusion, the rule of law and the role of justification in decision-
making in liberal democracies, particularly in times of perceived emergency.  From there, the 
dissertation moves on to an exploration of immigration inadmissibility determinations in Canada, 
with particular attention to the emergence of security concerns as a primary ground of 
inadmissibility.  Central to this exploration is a quantitative analysis of inadmissibility 
determinations rendered by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, pursuant to s34 of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA].   
 
The results of the quantitative analysis challenge the perception that migrants within Canada pose 
an exceptional security threat to the state, as the provisions related directly to Canadian national 
security and public safety have essentially never been invoked in s34 cases.  Rather, the majority of 
those found inadmissible to Canada on security grounds tend to be asylum-seekers or Convention 
refugees from countries of the Global South that have undergone periods of domestic political 
turmoil.  This fact raises important questions about the obligations of the Canadian state with 
respect to the principle of non-refoulement, obligations that can only be met, it is argued, through 
appropriately deliberative processes.  
 
To help explain the results of the quantitative data and to identify ways of enhancing security-
related decision making, the dissertation proceeds to a body of scholarship on international law 
that places the concerns of individuals from the Global South at the centre of its analysis.  This 
approach – referred to as the Third World Approaches to International Law movement (TWAIL) – 
emphasizes the importance of history, context and individual experience when confronting legal 
domains, such as the security-inadmissibility context, that affect people from the Global South.   
 
The dissertation then concludes by pairing the TWAIL analysis with an approach to administrative 
law that posits that legitimacy and justification in administrative decisions are contingent upon 
good faith exercises of dialogue between decision-makers and those who are affected by their 
decisions.  In combining this approach to administrative law with TWAIL, the dissertation closes by 
putting forward a number of proposals for reform that would enhance the quality, justification and 
legitimacy of decisions in the security-inadmissibility context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On a snowy day in February, 2010, Habtom Kibreab a young and well-liked 
refugee claimant living in Halifax, Nova Scotia walked to the woods in Clayton Park 
and took his life.  He was scheduled for an interview the next day with the Canada 
Border Services Agency to discuss arrangements for his removal to Eritrea, where 
he firmly believed he would immediately be placed before a firing squad.  In the 
days before his suicide, Canadian authorities had found Habtom to be inadmissible 
to Canada for his participation in an organization that sought Eritrea’s liberation 
from what was universally recognized as a shockingly oppressive Ethiopian regime. 
 
Almost three years later in December, 2012, Hossein Blujani, another young and 
by all accounts equally liked man walked to the railroad tracks near Vancouver’s 
downtown eastside and also committed suicide.  Despite what was described as 
Hossein’s “compelling” and “credible” testimony about his coerced childhood 
recruitment into an Iranian opposition group and despite a finding by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that he was a Convention refugee, the 
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board found that he was a member of a terrorist 
organization and ordered him to be deported. 
 
Hossein and Habtom were from different continents and they settled in opposite 
ends of their adopted country.  In between these differences, however, their 
narratives followed remarkably similar, and similarly tragic, arcs.  Both men came 
from fractured societies.  Both experienced the dislocation of conflict and a palpable 
fear of persecution in their homelands.  Both became associated with armed groups 
that sought to displace undemocratic and repressive regimes.  Both men were 
survivors, having traversed thousands of kilometres, many countries and 
considerable danger to arrive in a place where they thought they would find peace 
and safety.  But they were both mistaken.  Upon arrival in Canada, Hossein and 
Habtom were flagged as potential security threats.  They were interrogated and 
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cross-examined.  Their past actions were scrutinized and while no allegations were 
ever made that either of them personally took part in activities giving rise to 
security concerns, both were ultimately deemed inadmissible to Canada because of 
their affiliations with their respective groups.  Confronted with this reality, both 
Hossein and Habtom chose to take control of their demise, rather than ceding it to 
either their country of supposed refuge, or the despotic regimes to which they 
feared they would be returned. 
 
Hossein and Habtom’s stories are at the very heart of this dissertation, in which I 
examine perceived connections between migration and security, with particular 
reference to the Canadian legal landscape.  In the pages that follow, I first examine 
the role of migration in Western states and trace the ways in which it has always 
occupied an exceptional legal category in liberal legal regimes.  In doing so, I briefly 
descend into one of the central debates that has dominated discussions amongst 
migration scholars for the past thirty years – that is, whether acts of outsider 
exclusion are constitutive of or in conflict with liberal first principles.  More 
specifically, I examine the work of Joseph Carens who has long argued that, from a 
moral perspective, most restrictions on the movement of peoples sit in tension with 
universalist liberal ideals of equality.  I contrast Carens’ position with the work of 
others, namely John Rawls and Michael Walzer, whose well-known ideas are 
premised on the notion of closed communities.  Along the way, I also devote 
considerable attention to other scholars, most notably Seyla Benhabib and 
Catherine Dauvergne, both of whom have forged their own responses to the 
question of how liberal states respond to the rule of law challenges posed by non-
citizens.     
 
Moving on to the question of security, I next consider the scholarship of those 
who query whether, and how, rule of law principles can be upheld, particularly by 
administrative law bodies, in times of perceived emergency.  Drawing on Catherine 
Dauvergne’s observations about the securitization of migration, I then examine the 
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contributions of David Dyzenhaus, who recognizes that exceptional approaches to 
administrative law – that is, approaches that are inconsistent with important rule of 
law principles – exist, but rejects the notion that they are either necessary or 
ordained.  The challenge, for Dyzenhaus, is in fact to banish such “grey holes”, as he 
calls them, from the legal order.  Others, including Adrian Vermuele, insist that 
Dyzenhaus’ challenge is in fact a Sisyphean one, doomed to failure because 
administrative law, in its proximity and subordination to the executive, is always 
susceptible to raw expressions of executive power, particularly during periods of 
perceived exception.   
 
I do not pretend to emerge from these debates having resolved them.  While 
attracted to Caren’s application of liberal egalitarian principles to the realm of 
migration, there can be little debate that exclusionary impulses have defined liberal 
democracies, as they have virtually every other political tradition.  While 
understanding the nature of the equality-exclusion debate is central to 
understanding immigration law, I extricate myself from the impasse of these 
competing views by noting that essentially all approaches view as permissible, and 
perhaps inevitable, the exclusion of  those who threaten the security of the very 
community that they seek to join.  And as the principal focus of this dissertation is 
not on migration itself, but rather on the intersections between migration and 
security, I note in this first chapter that any problems in the security domain are not 
necessarily with the concept of security itself, but with the decision-making 
processes carried out in its name. 
 
With this in mind, in the second chapter I look to the example of Canadian 
migration law, its history of exclusion on various grounds and its growing concern 
with matters related to security.  I refer to the current migration-security regime as 
a telling example of Dyzenhaus’ legal grey holes, given the extraordinary breadth of 
the security-inadmissibility apparatus.  I also suggest that this grey hole is one of 
increasing concern given a surge in security cases over recent years.  Moving from 
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the general to the particular, I then examine data that I have collected over the past 
four years on security related inadmissibility decisions rendered by the Immigration 
and Refugee Board of Canada.  More specifically, I look at the decisions rendered by 
the Board pursuant to s34 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,1 which 
renders inadmissible those found to have engaged in espionage, subversion or 
terrorism, those found to be members of organizations that engage in such activities 
and those found to constitute a threat to Canadian security.  While the numbers of 
security cases may not, at first blush, appear high, they are nevertheless significant 
when considering the stakes involved and the individual impacts that these 
proceedings have, as most troublingly illustrated by the experiences of Habtom and 
Hossein.   
 
In analyzing the data, four important facts became apparent: 1) there has been a 
sharp increase in security-related inadmissibility cases over recent years; 2) the 
cases predominantly involve those who have asserted a fear of persecution in their 
countries of origin or have already been found to be Convention refugees; 3) the 
cases almost exclusively relate to individuals, like Habtom and Hossein, whose 
impugned activities involved membership in locally oriented struggles in the Third 
World, typically against oppressive regimes; and 4) no cases involved allegations of 
actual security threats against Canada.  The analysis of the data in this chapter 
provides an empirical sketch of the problem that I seek to address in this 
dissertation.  The problem, as I see it, relates to an overly expansive security regime 
that produces at best arbitrary, but at worst prejudicial outcomes against 
individuals from the developing world, most of whom assert a fear of persecution in 
their countries of origin.  Given that Canada is a signatory to the Refugee Convention 
and further considering that the Canadian security scheme can result in the removal 
of Convention refugees, the importance of this topic comes into sharp focus, for it 
directly implicates one of Canada’s core international human rights obligations.  In 
                                                        
 
1 SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. 
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the remainder of the dissertation, I explore two distinct areas of legal inquiry – 
emanating from international law and administrative law – that I argue could help 
to reconcile concerns over security with respect for the core rights of non-citizens. 
 
Having empirically outlined how the security-inadmissibility process appears 
skewed against those who have taken part in discrete conflicts in the Global South, 
in the third chapter, I move on to examine the relevance of international law to 
inadmissibility determinations.  In doing so, I assert that a reoriented conception of 
this area of law – more specifically, a Third World conception of international law – 
could assist decision-makers in separating legitimate security threats from those 
whose life circumstances merely situated them closely to armed conflicts.  The 
burgeoning Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement 
emphasises several themes that I argue would facilitate improved decision-making 
in the security sphere – these include a focus on historical processes, a related 
emphasis on context and an orientation towards examining the ways that law 
affects individual lives, particularly those from the Global South. 
 
In the fourth, and final, substantive chapter of the dissertation I take a step away 
from international law and focus instead on domestic administrative law principles, 
with a view to understanding how the process of administrative discretion could 
help to implement some of the substance behind my earlier TWAIL critique of the 
inadmissibility regime.  I do this by first examining applicable principles of 
administrative law, exploring the emergence of, and controversies surrounding, 
discretion as a key tool in the modern state.   In short, these controversies revolve 
around the key question of whether discretion amounts to a lawless space in need of 
constant corralling by the judiciary, or whether it is an important regulatory feature 
of the administrative state, one that can bring nuance to the sometimes blunt force 
of the law.   
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Once again, I do not necessarily view it as my task to resolve this question.  
Referring back to the first chapter, I note that discretion will likely always factor 
into migration law, particularly on matters of security, which governments view as 
requiring wide latitude in confronting.  If discretion is here to stay, the question 
becomes how it should be wielded and it is on this question that I devote 
considerable attention.   I do this by exploring and applying the work of scholars 
who have articulated a conception of administrative discretion as a communicative 
process based on principles of dialogue.  These scholars do not dispute that 
discretionary power emanates from the executive or question that there is 
frequently a considerable power imbalance in discretionary relationships.  They 
suggest, however, that for discretionary decisions to be legitimate, they must be 
democratically legitimate.  And democratic legitimacy, in turn, requires that those 
individuals who are affected by state decisions be afforded meaningful forms of 
engagement in the decision-making process.  Bringing this back around to the 
security context, I first expose, in part through the narratives of individuals subject 
to the inadmissibility regime, how the current regime is one largely devoid of 
genuinely dialogical principles.  The process in its current state is a classic example 
of a top-down projection of power over individual lives. 
 
I then argue that a reformulated and dialogical approach to discretion in the 
security context would, by almost necessary implication, incorporate many of the 
TWAIL principles that I outlined in the previous chapter.  In the process, I conclude, 
security-related decisions would shed much of their prejudice, replacing it instead 
with a nuance and legitimacy that they currently lack.   
 
I view this dissertation as being situated in, and contributing to three distinct 
areas of legal inquiry.  The first relates to the burgeoning literature on security and 
migration, specifically in the Canadian context.  In the years since 2001, the 
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increased preoccupation with terrorism has been accompanied by a corresponding 
increase in commentary on the intersections between migration law and security.2  
In Canada, this commentary has tended to focus on either the security certificate 
regime created under the IRPA3 or on the application of the exclusion clauses of the 
1951 Refugee Convention to domestic refugee determination.4  The security 
certificate regime engages extraordinary powers of detention and the use of secret 
evidence.  It is a matter of serious concern for both academics and practitioners, 
particularly given the ways in which it defines the contours of state power at its 
outer limits.  This said, while the constitutionality of the security certificate regime 
has been winding its way up and down the courts for over a decade, it has been 
applied to a mere five individuals since 2001 and has not been invoked since a 
                                                        
 
2 For an important recent contribution to this commentary, see the special issue of the Queen’s Law 
Journal entitled “Crimmigration, Surveillance and Security Threats” edited by Sharryn J. Aiken, David 
Lyon and Malcolm Bruce Thorburn: (2014) 40 Queen’s Law Journal 1.  See also Idil Atak and François 
Crépeau, “National Security, Terrorism and the Securitisation of Migration” in Chetail, Vincent and 
Céline Bauloz, Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (London: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2014); Sharryn J. Aiken, “Of Gods and Monsters: National Security and Canadian Refugee 
Policy” (2001) 14 Revue Québécoise de droit international 1.  See also François Crépeau & Delphine 
Nakache, Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada - Reconciling Security Concerns with Human Rights 
Protection, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1516626   and Philippe Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration 
(New York: Routledge, 2011). For an important contribution rooted primarily in the realm of 
international political sociology, see Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2009). 
3 IRPA, ss 76-87.2.  The security certificate process is invoked in relation to allegations of 
inadmissibility under ss34-37.  It is not an entirely different inadmissibility regime, but rather 
engages a separate decision-making process in respect of inadmissibility cases deemed to be of 
particular concern from a national security perspective.  For examples of the literature see: James 
Stribopoulos, “Charkaoui: Beyond Anti-Terrorism, Procedural Fairness, and Section 7 of the Charter” 
(2007) 16 Const Forum 15; Colleen Bell, “Subject to Exception: Security Certificates, National 
Security and Canada’s Role in the War on Terror” (2006) 21 Can J Law Soc 63; Kent Roach, 
“Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some Implications for Anti-Terrorism Policy and Dialogue between Courts 
and Legislatures” (2008) 42 Supreme Court Law Review 281; Hamish Stewart, “Is Indefinite 
Detention of Terrorist Suspects Really Constitutional?” (2005) 54 Univ New Brunswick LJ 235; Rob 
Aitken, “Notes on the Canadian exception: security certificates in critical context” (2008) 12:4 
Citizenship Studies 381. 
4 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, UNTS 189 [Refugee Convention].  See 
Asha Kaushal & Catherine Dauvergne, “The Growing Culture of Exclusion: Trends in Canadian 
Refugee Exclusions” (2011) 23:1 Int J Refug Law 54; James Simeon, “Complicity and Culpability and 
the Exclusion of Terrorists From Convention Refugee Status Post-9/11” (2010) 29 Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 104; Joseph Rikhof, “Complicity in International Criminal Law and Canadian Refugee Law” 
(2006) J of Int’l Criminal Justice 702; Pia Zambelli, “Problematic Trends in the Analysis of State 
Protection and Article 1F (a) Exclusion in Canadian Refugee Law” (2011) 23 Int’l J of Refugee Law 
252. 
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certificate was issued against Adil Charkaoui in 2003.  By contrast, and as we shall 
see in the second chapter, the security-related inadmissibility regime has been 
invoked with much greater, and increasing, frequency over the past decade.  Yet 
despite this fact, it has remained almost entirely unscrutinised in the Canadian 
immigration law literature.   
 
As I also demonstrate in chapter two, the lack of commentary on the application 
of the security-related inadmissibility scheme is of particular concern given the fact 
that the majority of individuals on whom it is brought to bear are those who have 
asserted a risk of persecution if removed from Canada.  This is also the case for 
those who are subject to the Refugee Convention’s exclusion clauses and it is for this 
reason that the existing commentary on these clauses is vitally important.  But it is 
an essential feature of Canada’s inadmissibility regime that those found to be 
inadmissible for, amongst other things, security reasons are deprived of the right to 
even assert a claim to refugee status.5  Such being the case, the lack of any sustained 
legal analysis on the application of s34 of the IRPA represents a significant gap in 
the refugee law literature, one that this dissertation aims to fill. 
 
The second contribution relates to international law and, specifically, to the call 
of TWAIL scholars to transpose TWAIL analyses into all areas in which the interests 
of Third World peoples and matters of international law intersect.6  While there 
already exists an elucidating body of TWAIL scholarship on security, terrorism and 
international law7 and on the international refugee law regime8 there has been, to 
                                                        
 
5 Through the combined operation of ss 101(1)(f) and 104(1)(b) of the IRPA. 
6 See in particular, Makau Mutua, “What is TWAIL?” (2000) 94 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 31 at 38, who 
argues that the reconstructive nature of TWAIL means that all processes (even ones seemingly 
related to domestic law) “that create, foster, legitimize, and maintain harmful hierarchies and 
oppressions must be revisited and changed.”  See also Karin Mickelson, “Taking Stock of TWAIL 
Histories” (2008) 10 Int Community Law Rev 355 at 357-358. 
7 Upendra Baxi, “The War on Terror and the War of Terror: Nomadic Multitudes, Aggressive 
Incumbents, and the New International Law - Prefactory Remarks on Two Wars” (2005) 43 Osgoode 
Hall Law J 7; Ikechi Mgbeoji, “The Bearded Bandit, the Outlaw Cop, and the Naked Emperor: Towards 
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my knowledge, no study that brings these areas together in the context of a 
particular immigration scheme.  As I shall set out in the third chapter, an important 
aspect of the TWAIL agenda is to identify and expose structures that “marginalize 
and dominate” third world peoples.9  Given my observation that the security-
migration apparatus is one such structure, I view this dissertation as making a 
helpful contribution to this aspect of TWAIL’s normative agenda. 
 
The final way in which I suggest that this dissertation contributes to ongoing 
legal debates relates to the unique vantage point provided by security-related 
decision-making on administrative law and, more specifically, on the rich body of 
literature on deliberative and dialogical approaches to administrative law.  While 
this area of inquiry has a well-established pedigree, I argue in the fourth part of this 
dissertation that the security-migration nexus provides a particularly illuminating 
perspective on administrative law because of the strong executive impulse in this 
domain to engage in top-down exertions of state power.  In proposing that dialogical 
decision-making approaches be adopted even in matters related to national security 
concerns, I seek to expand the scope of commentary on dialogue and legitimacy in 
discretionary decision-making.   
 
In short, I view this examination of migration and security to be a worthy topic 
in itself, but also one that helps to illuminate other domains: the scope of refugee 
rights; the intersections between domestic and international law; the limits of 
executive authority and the content of decision-making in liberal democracies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
a North-South (De)Construction of the Texts and Contexts of International Law’s (Dis)Engagement 
with Terrorism” (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law J 105. 
8 B.S. Chimni, “Reforming the International Refugee Regime: A Dialogic Model” (2001) 14:2 Journal of 
Refugee Studies 151. 
9 See the TWAIL vision statement, as reproduced in Karin Mickelson, “Taking Stock of TWAIL 
Histories,” supra note 6 at 357-8. 
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There are, of course, numerous other dimensions to this topic that are not 
addressed in this dissertation, perhaps most notably the roles played by both 
gender and race in conceptualizing security concerns and implementing border 
control.10  As I discuss in Chapter Four, discretionary decision-making processes 
tend to reflect the social norms and values of the society from which they emanate 
and, consequently, they can also act as a conduit for the expression of 
discriminatory impulses.  The security realm is certainly not immune to this reality, 
as is perhaps most articulately illustrated by the recent decision of the Canadian 
government to prioritize women, families and children over single men in the 
processing of Syrian overseas refugee resettlement applications.11  There is, to be 
sure, much about both gender and race to unpack from this decision.  However, in 
an effort to remain focused on the issues that I do explore in this project, I leave 
much of that unpacking for another day. 
 
Before commencing, it is important to both situate myself in this research and 
comment on my methodological approach.  Prior to my graduate work, I was (and 
remain) a lawyer with a practice dedicated to immigration and refugee law.  Indeed, 
it was over the course of my practice that I and several colleagues began to notice an 
uptick in refugee cases that were suspended, and ultimately terminated, on grounds 
of security-related inadmissibility.     
 
As advocates, we were troubled by these cases.  We were prepared to address 
questions as to our clients’ backgrounds in the context of their refugee cases and to 
confront allegations that they may be subject to one of the Refugee Convention’s 
                                                        
 
10 For illuminating explorations of these domains, see for example Sherene Razack, ed., Race, Space, 
and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002) and Alison 
Gerard and Sharon Pickering, “Gender, Securitization and Transit: Refugee Women and the Journey 
to the EU” (2014) 27 J of Refugee Studies 338. 
11 The Guardian, “Canada to turn away single men as part of Syrian refugee resettlement plan”, The 
Guardian (23 November, 2015) online: Guardian  <http://www.theguardian.com>. 
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exclusion clauses.12  But this was something new, something that appeared to be an 
attempt by state authorities to circumvent the refugee claim process entirely.   
 
Refugee law is an intimate and delicate area of practice, one that probes deeply 
into the lives of those who seek its protection.  I came to know my clients and their 
families well and was, frankly, as mystified as they were when we received 
allegations that they were inadmissible on security grounds.  I had represented 
other clients with profiles that were essentially identical to those who were now 
being streamed into the inadmissibility process, with no explanation as to why they 
were suddenly of concern.  My mystification was soon replaced by a sense of 
foreboding, a feeling that a blunt instrument of state power was descending on my 
clients and that, given the breadth of the security provisions, there was very little 
that I could do, legally, for them.  At the same time, I was contemplating a return to 
graduate work, and it seemed that unpacking the many layers of what I was 
observing in the security realm would make for a fascinating research project.  In 
retrospect, I can identify four key objectives that have animated my research.  My 
first objective was really a curiosity: that is, I wanted to find out whether my 
personal and anecdotal sense of an increase in security cases was borne out 
empirically.  And if such was the case, a second and related objective was to examine 
on whom these cases were being brought and why.  My third objective was, more 
generally, to explore the place of security concerns in immigration matters and to 
query whether what I perceived as the impersonal and heavy-handed nature of the 
inadmissibility regime is a necessary and justifiable reflection of post-9/11 security 
concerns.  Finally, given the gaps in the literature to which I referred above, my 
fourth objective was to shed light on the inadmissibility regime and to illustrate 
how, despite its relative subtlety, it is an area as worthy of critical examination as 
                                                        
 
12 The Refugee Convention, supra note 4, has several exclusion clauses which were intended to serve 
as a closed list of grounds for which refugee claimants could be disqualified from protection, 
notwithstanding the fact that they may otherwise meet the refugee definition.   
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either the security certificate regime or the exclusion of refugees under the Refugee 
Convention. 
 
I do not view this dissertation as an act of advocacy, though I certainly cannot 
pretend to have commenced it having shed my view that there is something 
troubling about how, and on whom, the security apparatus is applied.  Rather, I 
consider my starting place as one informed by several years of a different sort of 
field research, research that took place in the day to day grind of a legal practice that 
was, for lack of a better phrase, ground zero of the security migration regime.  By 
this I do not mean to suggest that my legal practice bore any direct connection to 
this research project, but rather, it provided me with a baseline of knowledge and an 
orientation toward the security regime that I have drawn upon throughout this 
project. 
Methodology 
 
This base of experience and knowledge also informed the methodology that I 
chose to adopt in embarking on my research.  While I sought to take a step back and 
look at some of the more theoretical debates that surround immigration and refugee 
law, the theory I explore is for a very particular purpose, one that is rooted in 
conversations about how law actually operates and how it may be reformed to 
operate differently. 
 
As a result, while substantial components of this dissertation involve traditional 
doctrinal and theoretical approaches, I also look to both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods – the former in Chapter Two, the latter in Chapter Four – to assist 
in examining the anachronistic state of decision-making in immigration-security 
matters.  It is my hope that this mixed methodological approach provides both a 
thorough and multi-faceted perspective on the Canadian security-inadmissibility 
regime. 
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The Quantitative Data 
 
As noted above, the quantitative aspect to this dissertation is based on 
numerous Access to Information Requests that I have submitted over the past four 
years.  These range from several requests seeking data on numbers and various 
other data points related to security cases, to data on Ministerial waivers of 
inadmissibility, to training manuals and internal memoranda on the operation of 
s34 of the IRPA.  As I set out in detail in the second chapter, the disclosure that I 
received came to several thousands of pages of information and it has been 
illuminating in several different ways.  There is, however, one gap in the data that is 
important to consider.  Inadmissibility determinations under s34 arise, for the most 
part, in one of two ways: they can be made by Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
officers to refuse status to foreign nationals, either in Canada or abroad, or they can 
be invoked to revoke any status that may already have been obtained.  As I set out in 
greater detail in Chapter 2, these latter determinations are typically made by the 
Immigration and Refugee Board following a referral from the Canada Border 
Services Agency.  For reasons related largely, in my view, to government 
obfuscation, this study is limited to the latter set of decisions on inadmissibility – 
those rendered by the Immigration and Refugee Board.  The IRB responded to ATIP 
requests promptly and typically provided complete (if redacted) records related to 
the requested data.  The response of Citizenship and Immigration Canada was 
profoundly different.  My requests were first met with what I viewed as improper 
demands for what would amount to thousands of dollars of research time and 
database access fees.  Upon challenging the imposition of these fees, I was informed 
that the request would be re-examined, which was followed by many months of 
delays.  At one point I was informed that the data I requested could not be captured 
by CIC’s databases and would, instead, require a manual review of every relevant 
file.  Finally, I was instructed that my requests were being refused because the 
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information sought would be held on individual client files and was thus exempted 
from disclosure pursuant to s19(1) of the Access to Information Act.13   
 
I have not stopped in my attempts to obtain this data, but for the purposes of 
this dissertation, I made the decision to confine my results to those provided by the 
Immigration and Refugee Board.  While I would have preferred to incorporate CIC 
data into my research, I do not think that its absence affects the validity of the 
disclosure that has been provided.  Beyond this, as I note in my conclusion, the lack 
of CIC data on security cases leaves open a further project in my research agenda.  
The Qualitative Interviews 
 
Originally, my intention was to interview individuals from all sides of the 
security regime: CBSA officers, lawyers and individuals caught in the process.  
Through my connections in the field, I was able to conduct interviews with the latter 
two groups of individuals, but unfortunately I was unable to gain formal access to 
interview CBSA staff.  While I have spoken informally with former CBSA officers, I 
was asked that comments made in those conversations not be incorporated into this 
research project.  I have respected that request.14 
  
My objectives in relation to the interviews that I did conduct were modest.  It 
was not my intent with this dissertation to prepare a comprehensive qualitative 
research project.  My goals, rather, were twofold: first, as noted in the literature on 
mixed methods research, combining personal narratives with quantitative data 
analysis can help to explain and interpret the findings of the latter in frequently 
                                                        
 
13 RSC, 1985, c A-1. 
14 I discuss at subsequent points in the dissertation the importance of examining institutions in 
context to understand the decisions they make.  The literature on New Institutionalism is particularly 
interesting in this respect, see for instance, Mary Brinton and Victor Nee, The New Institutionalism in 
Sociology (New York: Russell Sage, 1990) and K O Hawkins, Law as last resort: prosecution decision-
making in a regulatory agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). 
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articulate ways.15  My second goal was related to my above observation that the 
migration-security apparatus in Canada has been under-reported in the literature.  
Part of the fallout of this under-reporting is that the voices of those individuals who 
must navigate the security-inadmissibility process have not been heard.  I wanted to 
remedy this in some small way by carving out space for at least some of these 
individuals to both share their experience of the security regime and to articulate 
their observations of it.  As I set out in Chapter Four, security decisions generally 
take the form of top-down expressions of state power that leave little to no room for 
the participation of those who become enmeshed in it.  In conveying the experiences 
of these individuals, I also suggest that we might capture a glimpse of a more 
participatory approach, one that I contend would yield more legitimate results.   
 
Seeking narrative voice as a supplementary way of understanding social forces 
has a long pedigree in qualitative research and, more specifically, in the 
multidisciplinary fields of forced migration research.  As Eastmond notes,  
In the field of forced migration, narratives have also 
been important to researchers, not seldom relied upon 
as the only means we have of knowing something about 
life in times and places to which we have little other 
access. With the more interpretive approach, narratives 
have become interesting also for what they can tell us 
about how people themselves, as ‘experiencing 
subjects’, make sense of violence and turbulent 
change.16 
 
The interviews were open-ended and took the form of informal conversations.  I 
had known a few of the participants as prior clients, or as colleagues, while others 
were unknown to me prior to this research.  Some of the refugees who I interviewed 
were actively advocating their cases in the public sphere, while others were 
                                                        
 
15 Nataliya V Ivankova, John W Creswell & Sheldon L Stick, “Using Mixed-Methods Sequential 
Explanatory Design: From Theory to Practice” (2006) 18:1 Field Methods 3 at 10. 
16 Marita Eastmond, “Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research” (2007) 
20 J Refug Stud 248 at 249. 
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resigned to observing (and waiting) as their various applications and legal cases 
played out.  That said, and as I describe in Chapter four, what all of the individuals 
had in common was a sense of surprise that their cases had taken this path, a 
corresponding notion that they were inaccurately described as posing a security 
threat and , as a consequence, a firm conviction that the system was acting unjustly 
on them. 
 
While I view this mixed methodological approach as providing a well-rounded 
vantage point on the security regime, it is not without its limitations and my 
research should not be taken as either an exhaustive quantitative analysis or a 
devoted legal ethnography.  It is, at root, a legal and theoretical exploration of the 
issues, but I contend that both the data I analyze and the stories I convey assist in 
interrogating the intersections between security and migration in this era. 
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CHAPTER ONE: IMMIGRATION, SECURITY AND 
INADMISSIBILITY IN LIBERAL STATES 
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1.1 Introduction 
The connection, or lack thereof, between security and migration is a central 
preoccupation of our time.  In the pages that follow, I explore how this 
preoccupation has played out, with particular reference to the Canadian context, 
and more broadly, to examine what it reveals about administrative decision-making 
in liberal democracies and its interaction with international law.   
 
I have already sketched out that my objective in this project is to explore the 
arbitrariness – or worse, the prejudice – that I suspect pervades decision-making in 
the migration-security realm.  I further hypothesized in my brief introduction that 
alternative approaches to administrative decision-making, combined with a more 
nuanced understanding of international law might, taken together, provide both a 
procedural and normative basis for improving decision making in this area.  For the 
present moment, however, I will for the most part leave aside these responses to the 
problem of migration and security and instead focus on the nature of the problem 
itself.  What is migration and why is it viewed in exceptional terms by liberal 
democracies?  Why is it that both law and decision-making in the migration realm 
appear to depart so palpably from basic rule of law principles?  Correspondingly, 
what is the nature of a security threat and why are such threats similarly treated as 
representing an exception to the normal legal order?  
   
In examining these questions, I argue that responding to concerns over 
migration and security in exceptional ways is not necessarily ordained and nor is it 
principled.  While acknowledging that the very idea of the liberal state is 
intertwined with notions of insider and outsider, I argue that this fact does not, in 
itself, lead inexorably to the kinds of exceptional approaches to which migrants and 
perceived security threats are generally subjected.  This is at least in part because of 
another set of principles that are equally woven into the fabric of liberal 
democracies – the cosmopolitan conception of the equal moral worth of all 
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individuals.  Flowing from this principle, I will suggest that exclusion requires 
justification and justification, in turn, requires communicative processes of 
participation for immigrants and refugees.  In the fourth chapter, I will explore one 
form that such communicative processes may take – that being an interpretation of 
administrative discretion as a mechanism for two-way dialogue between the state 
and those who are affected by its decisions.   
 
In the coming chapters, I will also trace the increased use of security 
inadmissibility measures in Canada and elsewhere, to further explore the position of 
migrants who are perceived, or at least are labeled, as posing threats to security.  In 
addition to exploring how administrative law could be reframed along dialogic lines, 
I also intend to explore whether different understandings of international law, 
particularly that which has emanated from the Third World Approaches to 
International Law school would similarly enhance the legitimacy of inadmissibility 
decisions.  For now, however, I turn to an examination of the literature on the 
preliminary issues.   
 
Before doing so, however, a brief disclaimer.  Virtually all of the thinkers to 
whom I refer below are worthy of exploration in much greater detail than is 
possible here.  The works of many of them could be (and have been) the subject of 
entire dissertations.  My intent here is not to exhaustively detail the complex and 
multiple contours of their work, but rather, to tease out the ideas from each of them 
that I have found helpful in furthering my understanding of migration, security and 
the perceived intersections that tie them together.   
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1.2 Migration in Liberal States 
The refugee should be considered for what he is, that is, 
nothing less than a border concept that radically calls 
into question the principles of the nation-state and, at 
the same time, helps clear the field for a no-longer-
delayable renewal of categories.1 
 
Giorgio Agamben places the refugee at the very centre of conversations about 
sovereignty, the nation state and legal order.  Sovereignty, that is, the demarcation 
of sovereign territory and the corresponding demarcation of citizens and non-
citizens is, after all, frequently viewed as the very concept that creates and 
perpetuates the notion of the refugee.  And to the extent that the concept of the 
refugee, or to use broader language, the migrant, provides an illustration of an 
exception to the normal legal order, it also provides a window into the legal order 
itself.  As we shall see in the coming pages, Agamben is not alone in identifying the 
migrant as both a subject of exceptional politics and a conceptual device with which 
to examine modern states.  Almost thirty years ago, Peter Shuck observed the 
unique position of immigration within the larger (in this case, American) legal 
regime: 
Immigration has long been a maverick, a wild card, in 
our public law. Probably no other area of American law 
has been so radically insulated and divergent from 
those fundamental norms of constitutional right, 
administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate 
the rest of our legal system. In a legal firmament 
transformed by revolutions in due process and equal 
protection doctrine and by a new conception of judicial 
role, immigration law remains the realm in which 
                                                        
 
1 Giorgio Agamben, "We Refugees" Symposium. 1995, No. 49(2), Summer, Pages: 114-119, English, 
Translation by Michael Rocke. http://www.egs.edu/faculty/giorgio-agamben/articles/we-refugees/  
accessed 03 April 2012. 
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government authority is at the zenith, and individual 
entitlement is at the nadir.2 
 
The string that ties together the bulk of the literature to which I will refer is the 
already apparent dichotomy between insider and outsider and the essential 
question posed by Schuk’s observation of the maverick status of migration law; 
namely is this an innate and natural state of affairs in liberal democracies or, rather, 
a chosen course based on particular policy choices that could, with some degree of 
effort and will, be altered?  
 
1.2.1 Between a Locke and a Rawls Place –The Traditional view of Liberalism 
and Migration3 
People must recognize that they cannot make up for 
failing to regulate their numbers or to care for their land 
by conquest in war, or by migrating into another 
people’s territory without their consent.4 
 
It is, of course, trite to suggest that liberalism and its corresponding ideals of 
freedom and equality for all, is the dominant ideology of our time.  Liberalism is a 
term with which one can play fast and loose, but for the time being I use it  to denote 
an ideology that at least formally espouses universal notions of freedom, equality, 
basic human rights to life, liberty and property and the view that the rule of law 
should prevail over absolutism in government. 
 
                                                        
 
2 Peter H Schuck, “Transformation of Immigration Law, The” (1984) 84 Columbia Law Rev 1 at 85–
86. 
3 I choose here to examine migration through the lens of liberal theory for three principal reasons: 
first, because at present it represents the mainstream and dominant strand of legal and political 
philosophy; second because as we shall see, it aspires to universalist notions of moral equality which 
make questions about inclusion and exclusion particularly interesting; and lastly because it is liberal 
democracies that, for the most part, drive the global migration law regime. 
4 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) [Rawls, “The Law of 
Peoples”] at 8. 
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Liberal theory has always confronted something of a paradox.  On the one hand, 
liberal values are frequently described in universalist language, as above.  The basic 
rights and liberties associated with liberalism are said to inhere in all people by 
mere virtue of their existence.  Indeed, underpinning liberalism is a core assertion of 
the moral equality of all persons.  Since the end of the Second World War, this 
notion of equality has also been promulgated on the international level, particularly 
in the language of universalist human rights instruments, which explicitly recognize 
that people, in addition to states, are the proper subjects of international law. 
 
On the other hand, classical approaches to liberal theory have, from the outset, 
been based on a profound distinction between peoples; on a presupposition,  that is, 
of a closed community within which principles of liberal justice may be elaborated.  
This is apparent in the writing of one of the earliest proponents of the liberal ethos, 
John Locke, who stated in his Two Treatises of Government that one of the principal 
concerns of government was to “secure the community from inroads and invasion.” 
Indeed, to Locke, those within the bounded liberal community were perfectly 
justified in viewing those on the outside as if they were still in a state of nature.  This 
is not to say that Locke was against the naturalization of foreigners; indeed he 
viewed the addition of resourceful individuals to the community as providing 
almost unlimited benefit.  The point is that he viewed questions of admission as 
being aside from notions of equality and entirely within the prerogative of the pre-
defined community. 5 
 
                                                        
 
5 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited, with an introduction, By C.B. McPherson 
(Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Pub., 1980) at 60, accessed at 
http://epublish.biz/pdf/Two_Treatises_of_Government.pdf, on May 4, 2012.  See also, Mark Goldie 
(ed). “For a General Naturalization,” in John Locke, Political Essays.  (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1997) at 324.  
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As we shall see, the tension – between a theory that notionally aspires to treat all 
similarly, but implicitly draws distinctions between those on the inside and those on 
the outside – has been addressed in various ways.   
 
As mentioned, one of the central notions of classical liberal theory is that the 
formation or definition of community is conceptually prior to conversations about 
the content of liberal ideas; the boundary of the community is already in place and 
questions of justice relate solely to those on the inside.  Justice, in other words, is a 
relational concept – justice as between whom – and theories about justice can only 
take place once the “whom” is clearly defined.  The rise of liberalism is closely tied 
with the rise of the modern nation state and classical liberal theorists often take the 
two as being inseparable: liberal conceptions of justice involve a social contract 
between individual and state.  As such, the very notion of liberalism presupposes the 
existence of a defined, and to some closed, state.  Dworkin’s frequently cited passage 
from Law’s Empire puts it most clearly: 
We treat community as prior to justice and fairness in 
the sense that questions of justice and fairness are 
regarded as questions of what would be fair or just 
within a particular political group.6 
 
But even more than Ronald Dworkin, it is John Rawls who is most commonly 
associated with confining theories of liberal justice to a closed system.  Described as 
“arguably the greatest political philosopher of the twentieth century and the most 
important academic exponent of liberalism since John Stuart Mill,” Rawls was 
particularly vociferous in his insistence that one could not discuss liberal theory 
without starting from the position of a defined and relatively set group.7  Rawls’ 
great insight, set out in detail in his seminal work, A Theory of Justice, is in 
developing the idea that the principles of justice are those everyone would accept 
                                                        
 
6 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001) at 208. 
7 Stephen Macedo, “What Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One Another: Universalism, Diversity, and 
the Law of Peoples” (2003) 72 Fordham Law Rev 1721 at 1722. 
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and agree to from a fair position. 8  He does this primarily through the use of a 
conceptual device in which all members of a given community are put in the same 
position, the original position, and are then left to determine the principles of justice 
on which to base membership in the group.  The trick, however, is that these 
decisions on what is just must be made with incomplete information as to the 
position that any particular individual will come to occupy in the community; this is 
what Rawls terms the “veil of ignorance.”9   
 
Behind the veil of ignorance, no one knows their social position, their wealth, 
their intelligence, their attraction or aversion to risk or even which generation they 
come from.10  Indeed, essentially the only thing that those behind the veil of 
ignorance do know, according to Rawls, is that “their society is subject to the 
circumstances of justice and whatever this implies.”11  For our purposes, the most 
important part of this passage is of course Rawls’ use of the words “their society,” 
for implicit in Rawls’ conception of the veil of ignorance is the assumption that those 
behind it also know that they are part of the same, closed collectivity.  What 
emerges, Rawls theorizes, is something of a lowest common denominator approach 
to justice – not knowing what social position any one person will occupy, the group 
will arrive at a mode of social organization in which all members are treated as 
fairly as possible.  More specifically, Rawls suggests that those placed behind the veil 
of ignorance, at least as he configures it, would arrive at two distinct yet related 
conclusions: first, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others; and second, social and economic 
inequalities are permissible only to the extent they are of benefit to the least well off 
                                                        
 
8 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971) at 12. 
9 Ibid, at 136. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. at 137, emphasis added. 
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members of the community; and tied to this, that offices and positions must be open 
to everyone under fair conditions of equal opportunity.12 
 
But significant debate and critiques have arisen over the years as to precisely 
what information is placed behind the veil of ignorance because, in many respects, it 
is this consideration that determines the principles of justice that arise from it.  And 
again, for our purposes, Rawls’ most significant decision was to provide that those 
cast behind the veil would be aware that they are all members of the same 
community; Rawls opted, in other words, to remove the question of nationality from 
behind the veil of ignorance.  This was no oversight on Rawls’ part, it was integral to 
the project; it was in many senses the project – to explore how a closed group of 
individuals would come up with an idealized version of liberal justice.  Rawls states, 
I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a 
reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure 
of society conceived for the time being as a closed 
system isolated from other societies.13 
 
 Beyond this, Rawls has little more to say in A Theory of Justice about the 
movement of people away from or into the bounded community of persons about 
which he theorizes.  Later, in The Law of Peoples, which was essentially Rawls’ effort 
to transpose his ideas about social justice onto the international plane, he expounds 
in some, albeit still limited detail on the place of migrants in his conception of 
justice.14  In it, Rawls argues that boundaries, while often arbitrary in their origins, 
are nevertheless essential ingredients of a people’s government and one of the key 
                                                        
 
12 These are famously referred to by Rawls as the two principles of justice, see Ibid at 60.  The two 
principles have faced considerable criticism over the years, most notably and most recently by 
Amartya Sen whose pluralist approach rejects the “transcendental” nature of the principles.  See 
Amartya Sen, The Idea Of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009). 
13Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 8, at 8. 
14 Rawls, The Law of Peoples supra note 4. 
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functions of government, as agent of a people, is to be the guardian of its territory.15  
Reiterating the idea that opens this chapter, Rawls goes on to suggest that peoples 
need to recognize that they cannot make up for their irresponsibility in caring for 
their territory “by conquest in war or by migrating into other people’s territory 
without their consent.”16  Rawls also notes that peoples (those in migrant receiving 
states) have at least a “qualified right to limit immigration”.17  These passages, which 
appear somewhat indifferent to the role that some peoples – some nations – have 
played in the degradation and suffering of others, flows directly from one of Rawls’ 
central and, to my mind, startlingly oversimplified, observations: that a country’s 
own political culture is the “crucial element” in determining how it will fair.18   
 
Bad governments, that is, governments that persecute their people or that do 
not adequately provide for them, generate emigration.  To Rawls, the response to 
this (rather narrowly construed) fact is not for good governments to open 
themselves up to immigration, but to recognize an obligation to provide institutional 
support for “burdened societies.”19  To Rawls, migration is merely a symptom of 
larger institutional problems in burdened societies – fix the problems and the 
phenomenon of the movement of peoples will largely disappear: “The problem of 
immigration is not, then, simply left aside, but is eliminated as a serious problem in 
a realistic utopia.”20 
 
This statement gets to the crux of Rawls’ view of migration – it is quite simply 
not a topic of concern to the discourse on liberal justice; on the contrary, it is a 
                                                        
 
15 Ibid, at 38-39.  As shall be seen, while Rawls very purposefully uses the term “peoples” instead of 
“states,” his views on the governments formed by peoples aligns very closely with traditional notions 
of sovereignty under international law and particularly in the elevation of sovereign territories, 
rather than individuals as the basic building blocks of international relations.  
16 Ibid, at 39.   
17 Ibid, at 39, note 48.   
18 Ibid, at 117. 
19 Ibid, beginning at 105.  
20 Ibid, at 9. 
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distraction that disappears when the larger puzzle of achieving justice is solved.  
And this, in my view, reveals at least in part why the rights of migrants within liberal 
democracies are frequently viewed in exceptional terms.21  That the migrant is not a 
participant in conversations about justice is deeply embedded in the ethos of the 
modern liberal state.  The question is whether migrants are similarly extraneous to 
the very logic of the liberal state.  The work of Rawls would seem to support this 
view.  Others, however, have not been so quick to dismiss migration as a subject of 
concern for theories of liberal justice.  I turn now to explore the insights of some of 
the theorists who have examined the question of migration in more detail.   
1.2.2 Responding to Rawls – Joseph Carens and Open Borders 
If people want to sign the social contract, they should be 
permitted to do so.22 
 
Rawls has of course been immensely influential in developing liberal theories of 
justice and in the immigration sphere, scholars have responded to him in a number 
of different ways.  One approach, most notably developed by Joseph Carens, is not to 
flatly reject the reductionism of Rawlsian thinking, but on the contrary, to expand 
the parameters of Rawls’ original position to include all of humankind.23  At the 
outset of his enormously provocative and influential article, “Aliens and Citizens: 
The Case for Open Borders,” Carens articulates the traditional view of the 
relationship between migration and sovereignty.  He states: 
The power to admit or exclude aliens is inherent in 
sovereignty and essential for any political community. 
                                                        
 
21 This is not, of course, to suggest that migrants are not also subjected to exceptional approaches in 
“non-liberal” states, but I confine my comments here to liberal states that define themselves, at least 
formally, with universalist notions of justice and equality.  
22  Joseph H Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” (1987) 49:2 Rev Polit 251 at 
251 [Carens, "Aliens and Citizens"]. 
23 Carens certainly wasn’t the first to put forth a global view of the original position.  As Carens 
acknowledges, the most notable early proponent of such an alteration to Rawls’ approach was 
Charles Beitz in Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1979).  Carens can be credited, however, with applying such an approach specifically to the 
question of global migration.   
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Every state has the legal and moral right to exercise that 
power in pursuit of its own national interest, even if 
that means denying entry to peaceful, needy foreigners. 
States may choose to be generous in admitting 
immigrants, but they are under no obligation to do so.24 
 
 In the next sentence, Carens boldly asserts that his aim is to “challenge that 
view.”  While his focus is predominantly on Rawls, Carens develops his position by 
also referring to other streams of liberal theory, most notably utilitarianism and the 
theoretical approach proposed by Robert Nozick.25  Carens’ claim is that each of 
these streams when applied to the topic of migration and followed through to their 
logical conclusions produces the same result: open borders and relatively free 
movement of peoples.  Given the sharp distinctions between these theories in other 
areas, Carens concludes that their convergence on the topic of migration lends 
support to his argument.   
 
At the outset, Carens rejects the proposition that the logic of liberalism is 
inherently and indivisibly connected to the concept of the bounded state.  While 
liberalism may have emerged with the modern state, Carens disputes the assertion 
that liberal conceptions of justice can only take place within the framework of a 
closed society.  He states: 
Some may feel that I have wrenched these theories out 
of context. Each is rooted in the liberal tradition. 
Liberalism, it might be said, emerged with the modern 
state and presupposes it. Liberal theories were not 
designed to deal with questions about aliens. They 
assumed the context of the sovereign state. As a 
historical observation this has some truth, but it is not 
clear why it should have normative force. The same 
wrenching out of context complaint could as reasonably 
have been leveled at those who first constructed liberal 
                                                        
 
24 Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 22 at 251. 
25 As was most clearly articulated in Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 
1974). 
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arguments for the extension of full citizenship to 
women and members of the working class. Liberal 
theories also assumed the right to exclude them.26 
  
If a closed society is not the foundation on which liberalism rests, what then 
does it stand upon?  To Carens, the answer to this question lies in the principles to 
which I earlier referred, specifically the foundational (and cosmopolitan) ideal of the 
equal moral worth of all persons.  Closed communities are not prior to liberalism, 
Carens asserts, but what is prior, and what all liberal theories have in common, is 
the assumption of the equal moral worth of all individuals: 
Each of these theories begins with some kind of 
assumption about the equal moral worth of individuals. 
In one way or another, each treats the individual as 
prior to the community.27  
  
 With this as a given, Carens sets out to consider how migration fits into the 
puzzle of liberal justice, and to do this, he incorporates a globalized version of 
Rawls’ original position.  He does this, in my view, for precisely the same reasons 
that Rawls himself first conceived of the original position as a strategy for moral 
reasoning.  As noted by Carens, part of the appeal of the veil of ignorance to Rawls 
was that it stripped away “the effects of specific [and often arbitrary] contingencies 
which put men at odds,” contingencies such as wealth or social status, and enabled 
one to think about how people would order themselves from a purely moral point of 
view.28  In this sense, the veil of ignorance enables one to think about a topic 
without being biased by “self-interested or partisan considerations” and without 
allowing historical injustices (if any) to “warp our reflections.”29  And to Carens, 
citizenship status is the very definition of one of the arbitrary contingencies referred 
to by Rawls.  Indeed, as Carens puts it, 
                                                        
 
26 Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 22 at 265. 
27 Ibid, at 252. 
28 Ibid, at 255, citing Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 8 at pp. 136, 72. 
29 Ibid. 
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Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the 
modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited 
status that greatly enhances one's life chances. Like 
feudal birthright privileges, restrictive citizenship is 
hard to justify when one thinks about it closely.30 
 
 With this in mind, Carens proceeds to his analysis assuming a global view of 
the original position.  Those in the original position would not know their place of 
birth or their membership (i.e. citizenship) in one society or another.  And it is from 
this position that Carens questions the liberal legitimacy of virtually all border 
restrictions.  He does not suggest, however, that relatively autonomous states would 
be prohibited, but state sovereignty would be constrained by the principles of 
justice.31  And because one approaches the veil of ignorance from the perspective of 
those who would be most disadvantaged by restrictions on liberty, i.e. the potential 
immigrant, Carens concludes that the right to migrate would be included as a basic 
liberty.  To Carens, this liberty is really no different than the uncontroversial 
freedom that people possess to move to a different territory within their given 
state.32   
 
In arriving at this conclusion, Carens addresses (and rejects) what he considers 
to be one of the few principled theoretical objections to open borders: the 
communitarian approach articulated by Michael Walzer.  Walzer argues that people 
who, through a shared common history, have developed a distinctive culture and a 
common understanding about justice may justifiably restrict entry into their 
territory.33  As with Rawls, Walzer presupposes that principles underlying 
distributive justice must be formulated within the context of particular (and closed) 
communities.  Justice is an internal matter and as such questions of entry into the 
                                                        
 
30 Ibid at 252. 
31 Ibid at 258. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 
1983). 
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political community are not particularly constrained by larger principles that 
transcend the community itself.  Community is itself a good, a necessary ingredient 
in the aspiration for equality and as such, the exclusion of outsiders is justified by 
the right to self-determination.34   
 
In rejecting this argument, Carens again refers to the open borders which 
surround cities, states and provinces.  These smaller political units often contain a 
shared common history and frequently have profoundly distinctive cultures.  And 
yet, these entities have no capacity to limit immigration, and indeed, are frequently 
sites of considerable influxes of people.  Carens does not assert that such influxes 
have no impact on the character of the communities in which they take place, but 
suggests that, in the domestic context, mobility rights are viewed as taking priority.  
But this understates the point – Carens rightly asserts that restricting mobility 
rights within a political community is generally viewed as being anathema to the 
very concept of a free state.35  This being the case, Carens questions the basis on 
which restrictions on freedom of movement across states can be justified.  Adopting 
Walzer’s own logic, Carens suggests that finding such justification would require a 
stronger case for the “moral distinctiveness” of the nation-state as a form of 
community than that of the smaller political units that Walzer discusses.  It is 
implicit in this suggestion, of course, that no such case can be made out.   
 
Numerous other authors, both before and after Carens, have arrived at similar 
conclusions, questioning the legitimacy of liberal justifications for restrictive 
migration policies.  In her work, Linda Bosniak directly confronts 
                                                        
 
34 This claim draws an interesting parallel to my larger dissertation in which I will explore the rights 
of states to render inadmissible those who themselves have participated in self-determination 
struggles.  The issue then becomes whether states can legitimately exclude, on self-determination 
principles, those who have asserted their own right to self-determination and, as a result, have been 
forced to flee their respective states. 
35 Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 22 at p. 267.  This fact is clearly illustrated in constitutional 
mobility rights provisions, such as s6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) [Charter], c 11. 
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Rawlsian/Walzerian notions of bounded national identities and their claims to 
universalism that extend only so far as the border of the community.  Describing 
such approaches to membership as being “hard on the outside, soft on the inside,” 
Bosniak sets out to establish that in a world of porous borders, the concept of 
citizenship is more complicated than the traditional approach would imply.36 
 
Much earlier, Bruce Ackerman, provocatively asserted that “I cannot justify my 
power to exclude you without destroying my own claim to membership in an ideal 
liberal state.”37  Philip Cole, meanwhile, has suggested that "liberal theory cannot 
provide a justification for membership control and remain a coherent political 
philosophy.”38  And in another passage worth citing at length, Peter Schuck sums up 
what, in his estimation, a truly liberal approach to immigration would look like: 
Liberalism has never satisfactorily answered these 
questions and probably never will. It regards any fixed 
or exclusive definition of community with profound 
suspicion. Indeed, in a truly liberal polity, it would be 
difficult to justify a restrictive immigration law or 
perhaps any immigration law at all. National barriers to 
movement would be anomalous. Criteria of inclusion 
and exclusion based upon accidents of birth, criteria 
that label some individuals as insiders and others as 
outsiders, would be odious. Wealth, security and 
freedom would not be allocated on such grounds, 
especially in a world in which the initial distribution of 
those goods is so unequal. Instead, individuals would 
remain free to come and go, to form attachments, and to 
make choices according to their own aspirations, 
                                                        
 
36 Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton UP, 2006) at 4.  Bosniak goes on to refer to the migrant as illustrating the problem with the 
traditional liberal conception of the community; in some ways non-citizens living spatially within a 
community remain in many respects excluded outsiders: “the border effectively follows them inside.”  
In other respects, however, non-citizens in most liberal democracies are treated as “citizenship’s 
subjects.”  The essential point is that the taken for granted notions of insider-outsider that lie at the 
core of classical liberal theory are, and probably always have been, problematic. 
37 Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale UP, 1980) at 93. 
38 Phillip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 2000) at 202.   
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consistent with the equal right of others to do likewise. 
No self-defining, self-limiting group could deny to non-
members the individual freedom of action that 
liberalism distinctively celebrates.39 
 
All of this being said, Carens does acknowledge one principal restriction to his 
open border proposition: a limitation that flows directly from Rawlsian theory, and 
which has direct bearing on the intersection between migration and security.  
According to Rawls, all liberties depend on public order and security, and as a 
consequence, any actions which may threaten public order and security may be 
prohibited.40  Liberty, in other words, may be restricted for the sake of liberty.  
Carens applies this logic to the immigration context:  
Suppose that unrestricted immigration would lead to 
chaos and the breakdown of order. Then all would be 
worse off in terms of their basic liberties. Even adopting 
the perspective of the worst-off and recognizing the 
priority of liberty, those in the original position would 
endorse restrictions on immigration in such 
circumstances. This would be a case of restricting 
liberty for the sake of liberty and every individual 
would agree to such restrictions even though, once the 
"veil of ignorance" was lifted, one might find that it was 
one's own freedom to immigrate which had been 
curtailed.41 
 
 Carens was explicit that, as national security is one form of public order, 
states are entirely justified in refusing entry to people whose goal is “the overthrow 
of just institutions.”42  Of relevance to our later discussion, it is interesting to note 
that Carens does not specify whether this national security exception would be 
                                                        
 
39 Schuck, supra note 15 at 85–86. 
40 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 8 at 212-213.  It should be noted, however, that the tradeoff 
between public order and liberty is as old as liberalism itself.  Much of Locke’s Second Treatise, in 
fact, explores his view of the state of nature as being one of inherent insecurity; thus the role of civil 
government is explicitly to provide public order so that individual freedoms may be realized.  I 
discuss this “classic tradeoff” in more detail in my discussion of Catherine Dauvergne, below.   
41 Carens, Aliens and Citizens supra note 22 at 259. 
42 Ibid, at 260. 
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limited to those who seek only to overthrow institutions in the receiving state or, 
more generally, to those who may participate in such activities abroad but pose no 
threat to the country in which they seek entry.  Given that the rationale of the 
restriction is the security of the receiving state, however, it can safely be assumed 
that Carens was only referring to the former scenario. 
 
Both Carens and Rawls were clear, however, about the potential for abuse of the 
“public order exception” and emphasized the need for it to be narrowly construed; 
any such restriction, according to Carens, has to be minimally intrusive and based 
on “evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all.”43  But what precisely does 
this mean?  While the assertion that liberal states can limit immigration where there 
is evidence that a person may pose a threat to national security certainly appears 
both coherent and justified, upon closer analysis, it succumbs to some of the very 
criticisms that Carens levels at other border restrictions.  That is, according to 
Carens, states are justified in excluding foreigners where there is evidence to 
suggest they may pose a threat to security.44  But clearly citizens of those states, who 
may pose a similar threat, are not subject to any restrictions until they have actually 
committed, conspired to commit or attempted to commit a criminal act.  There is of 
course a sharp distinction, a lack of equality if you will, between suspicion that 
someone may commit an act and prosecution for actual acts committed.   
 
This fact is not lost on Carens, who refers to it as an asymmetry in the treatment 
between citizens and foreigners.  It is curious, however, that even liberal egalitarian 
concepts of open borders are not immune to the tensions that arise in balancing 
sovereignty and individual liberty interests.  This fact has also led some to question 
the coherence of the liberal egalitarian approach to immigration and, more broadly, 
                                                        
 
43 Ibid, citing Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 8 at pp. 212. 
44 Ibid at 260.  Carens further elaborates on the public order and national security restrictions to 
open borders in “Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective”, in B. Barry and R. 
Goodwin (eds.), Free Movement: Ethical Issues in Transnational Migration of People and Money 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) at p. 28. 
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to question whether liberalism in any of its streams can rationally accommodate 
what I refer to here as the “membership/equality conundrum.”45   
 
In much of his later work, Carens has attempted to address this conundrum and, 
more specifically, the question as to whether his open borders argument reveals “a 
deep moral problem with the exclusionary practices of liberal states or the 
limitations of abstract liberal theory.”46   In the end, he concludes that the answer to 
this question is a little bit of both.  This has led him into something of a “halfway 
house,” to use his words, somewhere in between the open borders approach and the 
more orthodox understandings of bounded liberal communities, albeit he remains 
much closer to the former than the latter.  What he proposes, then, is:  
a version of liberalism that takes rights seriously 
without making them absolute and that retains the 
fundamental liberal commitment to human freedom 
and equality, but is more pluralistic and open-ended in 
its understanding of the human good, and more 
sensitive to context and history.47 
 
 In the subtle softening of Carens’ position on open borders, one gets a sense 
of the state of paralysis that such an argument can lead us into.  As he acknowledges, 
either the argument remains coherent and reveals in our current political 
arrangements a deep moral problem that will not, indeed cannot, foreseeably end or 
                                                        
 
45 See for example Phillip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration, 
supra note 37.  On the latter point, see Catherine Dauvergne, “Beyond Justice: The Consequences of 
Liberalism for Immigration Law” (1997) 10 Can J Law Jurisprud 323.  Others have opined, in direct 
contrast to Carens, that Rawlsian liberalism can rest comfortably on a closed borders formulation, 
see for example Donald Galloway, “Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration” (1993)18 Queen's LJ 
266.  To Galloway, justifying state control over immigration is not simply a convenient defence of the 
status quo, such control is in fact immanent to liberal theory.  While it is impossible here to do justice 
to Galloway’s nuanced critique of Carens’ position, for present purposes, it is sufficient to note that 
even on his conception of a principled liberal rejection of open borders, there is a recognition that in 
certain circumstances, states will be compelled to allow entry to foreigners, see Galloway, above, at 
298. 
46 Joseph H Carens, “A Reply to Meilaender: Reconsidering Open Borders” (1999) 33:4 Int Migr Rev 
1082 at 1082. 
47 Ibid at 1083 and see Joseph Carens, Culture, Citizenship, and Community (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000). 
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it reveals the incapacity of liberal theory to contemplate questions of membership.48  
The challenge for many immigration law scholars is how to both acknowledge and 
move beyond this puzzling conundrum.  Taking a minimal approach, I suggest that 
Carens’ argument establishes that important liberty interests are invoked in matters 
involving migration.  Even less radical interpretations of liberalism than that first 
put forward by Carens have to take seriously the moral (and, as a result, legal) 
claims of people who wish to join or remain in a political community.  Exclusion may 
in many situations be appropriate, but it has to be justified.  Others have formulated 
this proposition in the form of presumptions and burdens – because there is always 
a presumption against restricting the freedom of individuals, the burden is on those 
who would restrict movement to demonstrate that such limitations are justified.49 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I intend to extricate myself from the 
theoretical quagmire outlined above by, for the most part, sidestepping it.  I suggest 
that I can do this for two reasons, ones which would, I think, be acceptable to both 
Rawls and Carens and, consequently, to advocates of both closed and open borders.  
The first relates to my primary focus on issues of national security.  As we have seen, 
while the open borders debate remains very much alive, it has become relatively 
uncontroversial that states may restrict access to those deemed to pose security 
threats.50  As we wind our way through my analysis of inadmissibility, international 
and administrative law, I accept this premise, though devote considerable attention 
to interrogating how and on whom security-related decisions are made.  The point 
for present purposes is that, at least as a lowest common denominator, states may 
legitimately restrict admission in order to preserve internal security. 
 
                                                        
 
48 Ibid at 1082. 
49 See for example Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees (London: Routledge, 2001) at pp. 
46-57 and Bas Schotel, On the Right of Exclusion: Law, Ethics and Immigration Policy (Oxon: 
GlassHouse, 2012). 
50 I say relatively here because, as described above, even Carens’ modified open borders approach 
has been critiqued for its asymmetrical treatment of citizens and foreigners who pose threats to 
security.   
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At the same time, and as I shall set out in detail in the following chapter, the vast 
majority of security-related cases that I assess in this study involve asylum seekers 
or Convention refugees.  Even on Rawls narrow conception of the place of migration 
in and across states, it is clear that legal obligations do arise in respect of individuals 
seeking refugee status.  Some have argued that Rawls himself makes this admission 
when he acknowledges that the right of peoples to limit immigration is “qualified”.51  
But whether this is what Rawls meant or not, the fact of the matter is that states 
have willingly and voluntarily assumed obligations under the rubric of international 
refugee law.  And if such is the case, if we can all agree in other words that states 
may limit migration on security grounds, but simultaneously bear some obligations 
toward the persecuted, then the analysis shifts to the question of decision-making 
and, ultimately, to the question of whether individual decisions on entry and 
removal are justified.  Justification in liberal states, as I shall later argue, requires 
not only the participation of those affected by state decision-making, but also good 
faith dialogue.  Dialogue and engaged deliberation also inform the writing of Seyla 
Benhabib and I turn now to explore her ideas on migration and democracy. 
1.2.3 Seyla Benhabib – Refugees, Community and Deliberative Democracy 
 
In her writing on migration, Seyla Benhabib frequently begins with the assertion 
that the movements of people have been ubiquitous throughout human history, and 
it can fairly be said that her critique of Rawls and other closed borders approaches 
flows directly from this point.  Hers is a decidedly cosmopolitan conception of the 
relationship between the movement of peoples and state sovereignty which has, at 
                                                        
 
51 Rawls, The Law of Peoples supra note 4 at 39, note 48.  See, for example, Caleb Yong, “Migration 
and Rawls's Law of Peoples: Problems of Non-Ideal Theory” (15 August 2011), online: Academia.edu 
http://academia.edu.  See also Donald Galloway, “Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration”, supra 
note 45. 
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its roots, a deep connection to democratic theory and the Kantian principle of 
universal hospitality.52 
 
At the outset, Benhabib identifies the membership/equality conundrum, carving 
out what is essentially a middling position.  On the one hand she recognizes that 
political inclusion is the key to individual equality, but she also acknowledges the 
unsatisfactory alternative of completely open borders, or at least what is to her its 
necessary corollary, a global polity.  In the end, however, Benhabib arrives at the 
conclusion that liberal democratic legitimacy demands that participatory 
mechanisms be instituted for non-citizens.    
 
Benhabib takes as her starting point the Kantian (and deeply cosmopolitan) 
view that “if the actions of one can affect the actions of another, then we have an 
obligation to regulate our actions under a common law of freedom which respects 
our equality as moral agents.”53  This said, Kant’s cosmopolitanism was deeply 
imbued with the existence of a global political order made up of states and he was 
both conscious and suspicious of the potentially homogenizing effects of a world 
polity.  With respect to the movement of people, the tension between claims to 
universal moral equality and the existence of demarcated boundaries was resolved 
by the law of hospitality.  As Benhabib notes, hospitality was not a question of 
philanthropy, but of right, flowing directly from principles of equality: 
In other words, hospitality is not to be understood as a 
virtue of sociability, as the kindness and generosity one 
may show to strangers who come to one's land or who 
become dependent upon one's act of kindness through 
                                                        
 
52 This principle is one of the “Definitive Articles” which Kant asserted would provide both a 
cessation of hostilities and a foundation for perpetual peace: "The law of world citizenship shall be 
limited to conditions of universal hospitality.”  See Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical Sketch (Ted Humphrey trans.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003) 1795. 
53 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (West Nyack NY: Cambridge UP, 
2000 at 104) [Benhabib "Rights of Others"].  See also “The Law of Peoples, Distributive Justice, and 
Migrations” (2003) 72 Fordham L Rev 1761 at 1780. [Benhabib, “Law of Peoples”] 
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circumstances of nature or history; hospitality is a right 
which belongs to all human beings insofar as we view 
them as potential participants in a world republic.54 
 
This said, the duty of hospitality was not an argument for open borders and Kant 
certainly did not contemplate it conveying the right of anyone to live anywhere for 
any length of time.  What the duty granted, however, was the right of non-citizens to 
enter into a political community, the right not to be turned away if it would signify 
their destruction, the right to “associate” and, to extrapolate only somewhat, the 
right to be considered as a potential entrant into the polity.  To Benhabib, then, the 
right of hospitality “occupies that space between human rights and civil rights” or 
put differently, between the rights enjoyed by all as individual moral agents and the 
rights that accrue specifically to citizens as members of republics.55 
 
As noted above, Kant clearly qualified the right of sovereign states to turn 
foreigners away, particularly where to do so would cause that person’s destruction.  
Benhabib rightly points to this principle as being a precursor to the contemporary 
regime of international refugee protection and she sees the constraints that it places 
on sovereign states vis-à-vis the individual rights of non-citizens as a part of the 
“watershed” moment that Kant’s Perpetual Peace reflected.  This moment marked 
the transition between two conceptions of sovereignty, between what she terms the 
old "Westphalian sovereignty" and the new "liberal international sovereignty”.  In 
the classical Westphalian regime of sovereignty, Benhabib notes, states “enjoy 
ultimate authority over all objects and subjects” within their territory and they 
regarded "cross-border processes as a 'private matter' concerning only those 
immediately affected."56  By contrast, Benhabib continues,  
                                                        
 
54 Benhabib, Rights of Others at 26. 
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56 Ibid at 40, citing David Held, Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty, 8 Legal 
Theory 1, 5 (2002).  See also, Benhabib, The Law of Peoples, supra note 53 at 1786. 
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[I]n conceptions of liberal international sovereignty, the 
formal equality of states is increasingly dependent upon 
their subscribing to common values and principles such 
as the observance of human rights and the rule of law 
and respect for democratic self-determination. 
Sovereignty no longer means ultimate and arbitrary 
authority; states who treat their citizens in violation of 
certain norms, who close borders, prevent freedoms of 
market, speech and association and the like are thought 
not to belong within a specific society of states or 
alliances; the anchoring of domestic principles and 
institutions in principles shared with others like oneself 
becomes crucial.57 
 
In this observation we can see a cosmopolitan conception of migrant rights 
begin to percolate through the western legal paradigm.  Over 200 years after Kant’s 
death, Benhabib certainly goes much further than Kant did in characterizing states’ 
ethical and legal obligations toward non-citizens, but the Kantian balance between 
democratic processes rooted in the state and obligations toward foreigners can still 
be discerned.  While Kant recognized an early form of asylum and temporary rights 
of sojourn, he nevertheless kept one foot planted in Westphalian sovereignty, 
recognizing the legal prerogative of the state not to extend such temporary sojourn 
to full membership.   
 
By contrast, Benhabib argues that the “right to membership of the temporary 
resident must be viewed as a human right, which can be justified along the 
principles of a universalistic morality.”58 The terms and conditions under which long 
term membership can be granted remain the prerogative of the state, but even this 
prerogative is subject to human rights constraints such as non-discrimination and 
the right of the immigrant to due process.59  In the chapters that follow, I will 
attempt to illustrate how, over the past decade, security procedures have been 
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58 Ibid at 42. 
59 Ibid at pp 42-43.  This balancing of sovereign interests and human rights is precisely what 
Benhabib considers to be the “paradox of democratic legitimacy.” 
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applied to non-citizens in a manner that defies these constraints and has replaced 
them with virtually untrammeled expressions of sovereign power.    
 
But what is the source of these rights to which Benhabib refers?  As I alluded to 
above, Benhabib (unlike Carens and similar to Walzer) views the existence of some 
form of boundaries as constitutive of democratic communities.  “We the people” 
refers to a particular community and not to all people in all places.  And moments 
will arise when the will of the people, on questions of entry for example, may be 
legitimate, in a democratic sense, but unjust.    At the same time, modern 
democracies act in the name of universal principles which must constantly be 
“reactualized and renegotiated” within actual polities as “democratic intentions.”  
This tension, between the prerogative of the democratic state and universal human 
rights, Benhabib terms “the paradox of democratic legitimacy.”60 
 
In this context, conversations about membership in the demos are always 
“flanked” by human rights concerns on the one side and commitments to 
sovereignty on the other.61  While this paradox is integral to democracies, Benhabib 
argues that questions of membership can be renegotiated and reiterated.  This is 
because the principle of popular sovereignty – “that those who are subject to the law 
are also its authors” – is not necessarily anchored to territorial sovereignty.  
Benhabib observes in this regard: 
While the demos, as the popular sovereign, must assert 
control over a specific territorial domain, it can also 
engage in reflexive acts of self-constitution, whereby the 
boundaries of the demos can be readjusted. The politics 
of membership in the age of the disaggregation of 
citizenship rights is about negotiating the complexities 
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of full membership rights, democratic voice, and 
territorial residence.62 
 
The disaggregation to which Benhabib refers has arisen from globalization 
processes which have both frayed and complicated traditional notions of political 
membership.  Notwithstanding this fraying, or perhaps because of it, Benhabib 
argues that democracies need to engage in acts of reinvention with the recognition 
that in today’s world, more than ever, actions taken within the state have effects that 
reverberate around the world.  Unlike Rawls, and indeed unlike other cosmopolitan 
theorists, Benhabib further argues that a theory of international justice cannot be 
confined to notions of just distribution on a global scale, but must also incorporate 
notions of just membership.  This does not necessarily call for a world with no 
borders, but rather, for a world of “porous” borders.63  The concept of porous 
borders again represents Benhabib’s attempt at a conceptual midway point between 
open borders and absolute state prerogative in respect of migration.  It calls for an 
openness to varied forms of political membership, such as municipal voting rights 
for non-citizens, and for a recognition of peoples’ fluid and multiple allegiances in a 
globalized world.     
 
In addition to porous borders, just membership requires recognizing the moral 
claim of refugees to first admittance; and, in a nod to Hannah Arendt, “the 
vindication of the right of every human being ‘to have rights,’ that is, to be a legal 
person, entitled to certain inalienable rights, regardless of the status of their 
                                                        
 
62 Ibid at 48.  Other democratic theorists take a different view of the constitution of the demos. 
Abizadeh, for instance, argues that the “demos of democratic theory is in principle unbounded, and 
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Justification, put simply, is owed to all those subject to state coercion, see Arash Abizadeh, 
“Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders” 
(2008) 36 Political Theory 37. 
63 Benhabib, Rights of Others, supra note 53 at 3, 211. 
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political membership.”64 Inclusion, furthermore, must be accommodated by 
practices that are “non-discriminatory in scope, transparent in formulation and 
execution, and justiciable when violated by states and other state-like organs.”65 
 
Building on these neo-Kantian, cosmopolitan ideals, Benhabib turns to discourse 
ethics to further elaborate her position on questions of inclusion.  The foundational 
principle upon which discourse ethics is structured (and against which other 
principles must be tested) is described by Habermas as follows:  “only those norms 
and normative institutional arrangements are valid which can be agreed to by all 
concerned under special argumentation situations named discourses.”66 
 
This “metanorm,” as Benhabib calls it, is in turn built on the presupposition of 
principles of “universal moral respect” and “egalitarian reciprocity.”  She explains:  
 Universal respect means that we recognize the rights of 
all beings capable of speech and action to be 
participants in the moral conversation; the principle of 
egalitarian reciprocity, interpreted within the confines 
of discourse ethics, stipulates that in discourses each 
should have the same rights to various speech acts, to 
initiate new topics, and to ask for justification of the 
presuppositions of the conversations.67 
 
Since discourse theory begins from a universalist moral standpoint, Benhabib 
continues, it cannot limit the scope of the moral conversation only to those who 
reside within bounded political communities.  The moral conversation, or in 
Habermasian terms, the opportunity for communicative action, must extend to 
every person who has interests and who may be affected by the actions of others.  In 
another passage worth reproducing, Benhabib elaborates on this ethical position: 
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66 Ibid, citing Jürgen Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans. by Christian 
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I have a moral obligation to justify my actions with 
reasons to this individual or to the representatives of 
this being. I respect the moral worth of the other by 
recognizing that I must provide them with a justification 
for my actions. We are all potential participants in such 
conversations of justification.68  
 
In other words, moral beings capable of engaging in a dialogue have a 
fundamental right to justification where their freedoms are being restricted.  And 
such restrictions may only be imposed through “reciprocally and generally 
justifiable norms which apply equally to all.”69   And it is at this point that we can see 
a parallel to the conclusions that Carens has also arrived at in his more recent 
writing.  First, there is something of a convergence between Carens’ later position 
on (mostly open) borders and Benhabib’s argument for porous borders.  Both 
conclude that borders should be permeable, but that certain forms of exclusions are 
permitted.  This said, all exclusions must be justified through respect for 
fundamental rights and through processes of communicative action, dialogue and 
engagement. 
  
As I explore in detail in Chapter Three, one basis for exclusion that cannot be 
easily justified, but which appears common in the migration-security realm is a 
disproportionate preoccupation in designating as security threats those who seek 
admission from conflict zones in the Global South. 
 
And as I shall further explore in Chapter Four, theoretical approaches 
emphasizing justification and communication have helped to inspire another body 
of literature emanating from law scholars and social scientists on the role of 
discretion in administrative law.  Recognizing the fundamental nature of the rights 
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frequently at stake in administrative proceedings, this literature calls for an 
approach to decision-making that has communicative processes at its core.  In the 
end, I assert that in combining a view of immigration in which acts of exclusion 
require justification with an approach to administrative law in which justification is 
derived from dialogue, a model for decision-making in the immigration-security 
setting can be created that would enhance both the legitimacy and fairness of the 
process.   
 
For the time being, however, I move on to a discussion of how the conundrum of 
liberal democracies – the membership/equality conundrum – is closely tied to  
exceptional approaches to the regulation of migration, particularly where elements 
of security are added to the mix. 
1.3 The Exception and the Rule of Law in Immigration and Security 
 In the preceding section, I attempted to briefly sketch out the difficulty that 
liberal democracies have in conceptualizing the place of migration.  Continuing on 
with this theme, in this section I will explore how these difficulties have crystallized 
in particular ways.  First, I will turn to Catherine Dauvergne and her ideas on the 
“making of illegality.”  More specifically, I will look at how Dauvergne’s views on 
globalization and liberalism suggest that exceptional approaches to decision-making 
in immigration-security matters are an entrenched feature of liberal states.  I will 
also explore her prescription for this diagnosis, which calls for extricating the rule of 
law from its domestic home, and placing it into the realm of the global.   
 
 Following this, I will conclude by examining (through the work of David 
Dyzenhaus and his foil on this issue - Adrian Vermuele) the intersections between 
the rule of law and exceptional approaches to legality in times of perceived 
emergency.  Again, the discussion will explore the issue of whether exceptional 
approaches and unchecked executive action are indeed endemic to liberal states 
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and, more specifically, to administrative decision-making, with specific reference to 
the immigration realm. 
1.3.1 Catherine Dauvergne and the Making of Illegality 
In the twenty years since Joseph Carens wrote that birth 
in a prosperous state is the modern equivalent of feudal 
privilege, his statement has become truer than ever as it 
travels through time to the cusp of a postmodern world. 
This truth comes from the shifting nature of sovereignty 
under the pressures of globalization, and from the 
resulting transformation in migration laws that 
undercuts the individual equality of liberal legalism 
with a rigid hierarchy of entitlement.70 
 
Catherine Dauvergne has written extensively on the question of migration and 
liberal democracies, but it is not this body of work that I intend to focus on at the 
moment.71  Rather, I turn to her more recent work on globalization, migration and 
illegality, though it must be acknowledged that, for reasons I will touch upon below, 
this work flows directly from Dauvergne’s earlier conclusions on migration and the 
liberal state.72   
 
Before delving into Dauvergne’s observations on the security-migration nexus, it 
is important to explain in some detail the larger context in which these observations 
take place.  Like Benhabib and Carens, Dauvergne’s viewpoint is a cosmopolitan one 
and she also begins with the reminder that migration has long been a ubiquitous 
social force.  But whereas Benhabib explores the ways in which studies in migration 
yield interesting insights into contemporary liberal democracies, Dauvergne’s 
project in Making People Illegal is to explore the connections, and the interstices, 
between migration, globalization and the rule of law. 
                                                        
 
70 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008) [Dauvergne, Making People Illegal] at p. 169. 
71 See for example, Catherine Dauvergne, “Amorality and Humanitarianism in Immigration Law” 
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 597 [Dauvergne, “Amorality”]. 
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Dauvergne’s central argument is that, as states have ceded more and more 
control over domestic policy to globalization processes, they have increasingly 
turned to migration laws as a “last bastion” of sovereign control.73  To Dauvergne, 
this effort on the part of states to exert control, in one of the few remaining areas 
where they can still do so, is revealed in several different sites of contact between 
insiders and outsiders.  Much of her work in Making People Illegal is in examining 
these sites of contact (or “core samples” as she calls them), which include labor 
migration, refugee law, human trafficking and smuggling, national security, and the 
nature of citizenship.  These core samples, Dauvergne suggests, provide interesting 
raw material with which to explore the contours of globalization and law.   To 
Dauvergne, globalization and the resulting “push-back” of states in the area of 
migration are largely responsible for the recasting of migration as an act of illegality, 
criminality and deviance.    
 
Another central theme in Making People Illegal is precisely what is implied in its 
title – the manufacturing of illegality through law. “However it is defined,” 
Dauvergne rightly suggests, “illegality is a creation of the law.”74  It is not, of course, 
a novel proposition to suggest that the act of defining that which is legal also (and 
simultaneously) defines that which is illegal.  Notwithstanding the fact that 
migration laws have always created insider/outsider distinctions, Dauvergne 
suggests that legislative changes and political machinations over the past two 
decades have created a sharp edge of illegality to these distinctions.  For a legal 
scholar such as Dauvergne, then, the question that emerges is whether law itself can 
be mobilized to help alleviate this illegality.75 
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Her response to this question is a qualified and tentative “yes” but only under 
certain conditions.  At the outset, she strongly asserts that neither domestic nor 
formal international legal mechanisms are up to the task.  Drawing on the work of 
De Sousa Santos (though substantially diverging from it), Dauvergne sets out two 
main conditions for the realization of law’s “emancipatory potential.”  First, the rule 
of law needs to be “unhinged” from its domestic sources and replaced by a sort of 
transnational version of the rule of law that is rooted in the global.  And by global, 
Dauvergne does not mean international legal treaties or anything of the kind, but 
rather, a rule of law that emerges from “an existent ethics of a community of law.”76   
And this leads to the second condition, which is that gains will only be made upon a 
“thick” conception of the rule of law; a conception, in other words, of a rule of law 
based on principles of equality, freedom and impartiality that is “imbued with 
process rights so strong they form a platform of human dignity at the core of the law 
itself…”77  Dauvergne states: 
Here the question is raised of the potential of a thick 
version of the rule of law overlapping the boundaries of 
national legal systems. In recent transformations of 
migration laws, this emerges in my view as the sole 
location for the emancipatory potential. As I illustrate… 
an assessment of any progressive potential of migration 
law is discouraging from the perspectives of 
international law (especially international human rights 
law) and domestic law. But almost in the spaces 
between these texts, there is the hint of something else. 
This is what is so intriguing about exploring the 
globalization of law in this context. If what can be 
glimpsed here is a thick and unhinged…rule of law, we 
are indeed on the cusp of a paradigmatic shift in 
thinking about the law. If what is making this possible is 
a “regardful community of law,” a new faith may 
emerge. 
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According to Dauvergne, it is really only through basic principles of law, 
unhinged from the distorting pressures of domestic legal contexts, that a substantial 
rethinking of the illegalization of migration can occur.  A globally situated rule of law 
would proceed, for example, on the presumption that the law and the protections 
contained within it apply to all persons.  In the exceptional realm of migration law, 
this would already indicate a paradigmatic shift.  It would also imply that all 
persons, regardless of their immigration status, would be entitled to certain basic 
rights, such as the right to be heard, a meaningful system of review and, presumably, 
the right to receive reasons for decisions that may have a fundamental impact on 
one’s rights.  Foreshadowing what will become a central theme of this dissertation, 
what would be required, in other words, is a process of justification in which the 
persons affected by a given decision would be communicatively engaged in the 
process. 
  
But more fundamentally, what is this version of the rule of law of which 
Dauvergne speaks?  This is a matter of some opacity in Making People Illegal and 
Dauvergne has been critiqued for failing to specify with precision what she means 
by the term. 78  It is clear that Dauvergne is referring to something more substantive 
than the narrow set of procedural rights afforded the undocumented in many 
receiving states, but is she simply calling for more procedure, for more “law 
measured by volume,” as she puts it or is there something more radical in her 
approach?79     
  
Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, Dauvergne’s globalization/migration thesis 
is an intriguing one, in part because it flows naturally from our earlier discussion on 
the place of migration in liberal states.  Unlike Carens, Dauvergne is largely on board 
with Rawls and Walzer in her diagnosis of the relationship between migration and 
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liberal states – in essence, there is no necessary relationship.80  To Dauvergne, the 
liberal state may very well be built on the foundational presupposition that “the 
borders to the community are, or at least can morally be, closed.”81  And if, as Walzer 
suggests, the question of membership is a prior ideal to those of justice or equality 
then it is membership itself that becomes the “primary good that a community 
bestows.”82  Closure therefore is the presumed starting point and any openings 
remain the prerogative of the community, a prerogative that is mediated in today’s 
world through migration law, though crucially, the rule of law is also implicated: 
In order for the community to operate against an 
assumption of closed borders, there must be a way of 
closing them, of identifying who has a right to cross 
them, and of providing for enforcement of their closure.  
Although ultimately the coercive power of the state 
provides these things, it is the rule of law that 
legitimates them and makes them part of the liberal 
state.83 
 
The result is that, by necessary implication, people are ‘made’ illegal.  This said, 
while Dauvergne may share the views of classical liberal theorists on these points, 
she likely differs with them greatly on the prescription that follows the diagnosis.  
This is because, unlike the majority of classical liberal theorists, Dauvergne appears 
normatively uncomfortable with her observations and so she traverses global legal 
and political developments in search of a new source of law that, to her mind, would 
produce better, more just results.  As a mere extension of domestic priorities, 
Dauvergne rejects international law (with the possible exception of refugee law) as 
a site of progressive potential.  And this is why, in the end, we arrive back at 
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Dauvergne’s call for an unhinging of the rule of law from its domestic base and a 
grafting of it onto an ethical (and ethereal) community of law.   
 
With all of this in mind, I turn (at last) to Dauvergne’s examination of the 
connections between security and migration, though to do so I remain within the 
realm of liberal theory for another couple of moments.  While Dauvergne suggests 
that community is prior to individual rights, it is security, or at least a desire for it, 
that both precedes and inspires the creation of community in the first place.  This is, 
after all, at the very core of the liberal bargain: 
The classic bargain of the liberal state is that between 
the perils of individuated life without the protection of a 
collectivity on the one hand and loss of individual 
liberty to the state on the other. Whether this balance 
involves an abject state of nature and a Leviathan, a 
social contract, or an original position, its basic 
structure is the same. The fulcrum of this balance is 
security – staying safe is the reason for the trade, 
constituting a community is the result. As a central 
construct of the liberal state, this balancing act is 
replicated in diverse settings. Contemporary 
contestation of security and migration is a key 
illustration.84 
 
 Given her premise that security and (bounded) communities form two of the 
pillars of the modern liberal state, it is not surprising that Dauvergne begins her 
analysis of migration and security with the uncontroversial observation that the two 
have essentially always been paired together.  Others have made, and provided a 
critique of, the same observation.  Elspeth Guild, for example, suggests that 
undocumented migrants are deemed security threats not because they pose an 
individualized threat to citizens of the host country, but because “the remit of the 
state is reconfigured,” that is, migrants are deemed a threat because they call into 
question the sanctity of the state as the central superstructure organizing human 
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relations.85  It is also because migration and security are viewed as threats to the 
liberal way of being that state responses to them have tended towards the 
exceptional.  Dauvergne continues: 
In the migration realm, security is more easily 
understood in the terms of newer constructivist and 
critical scholarship that tell us that when something is a 
security issue, both threat and exceptional politics are 
to be expected. These newer understandings of security 
focus on how states, nations, peoples, or others come to 
understand something as an important threat to their 
existence or way of being. In response to this threat, 
they are then prepared to take actions that are in some 
way extraordinary, suspending, or circumventing what 
counts as “normal” decision making. “Normal” involves 
the rule of law; when one is jettisoned, the other often 
goes with it. This way of understanding security issues 
helps us make sense of reactions that would seem 
nonsensical without the elements of both threat and 
exception.86 
 
It can fairly be said that one of Dauvergne’s central objectives in her writing on 
migration and security is to unsettle the relationship between the two.  That she 
views the relationship between security and migration as tenuous is immediately 
apparent; the chapter on security begins with a description of the calls for 
immigration reform that followed the 2005 London terrorist bombings, 
notwithstanding the fact that it was British citizens, born and raised, who planned 
and executed the attacks.  Dauvergne is certainly not alone in this endeavour.  As 
noted above, Elspeth Guild devotes considerable attention to debunking the 
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security-migration nexus in her work.87  It is also central to the scholarship of 
Canadian scholar Sharryn Aiken, who notes that: 
Numerous studies confirm that the overall impact of 
refugee flows on the crime rate and internal security of 
receiving countries tends to be misjudged and 
overestimated.  In Canada refugees and immigrants are 
actually less likely to commit major crimes than the 
native-born, and are under-represented in the national 
prison population.  Nevertheless, in both Canada and the 
United States, refugees and immigrants have been 
criminalized and "securitized" in efforts to assuage 
conditions of turmoil and anxiety.88 
 
Notwithstanding the long, if dubious, pedigree of the security-migration nexus, 
Dauvergne points to an increasing tendency to cast migration as a security issue 
throughout the 1990’s, followed by a profoundly sharpened focus on such tactics 
following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September, 2001.  Dauvergne 
identifies three of the ways in which the immigration landscape has changed since 
9/11.  First, and most important for our purposes, Dauvergne rightly notes that the 
past decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of discretionary measures 
that the executive has at its disposal to regulate migration.89  Such measures provide 
the executive (often, but not always through decision-makers) a margin of 
manoeuvre within which to operate and are relatively manipulable because of the 
broad statutory language in which they are frequently couched.90   
 
The consequence is that security measures can be quickly ratcheted up to 
respond to perceived threats, even in the absence of legislative change.91  The 
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concentration of power within the executive is a common, if not natural, tendency in 
times of danger – it represents a shift in the balance of the classic bargain referred 
to above – more security in the form of unchecked executive power, but less 
freedom.  There has been an explosion of commentary on these exceptional 
approaches to decision-making in matters that touch on security and I will explore 
at least one stream of it in greater detail below, in the writing of David Dyzenhaus.   
 
The second change that Dauvergne identifies is the creation of new specialized 
government agencies that have, as their very raison d’etre, the security-migration 
nexus.  As examples of this phenomenon, she points to the fact that the United States 
Immigration and Naturalization Service was “swallowed whole” by the Department 
of Homeland Security and the creation in Canada of the Canada Border Services 
Agency (CBSA), under the auspices of the Minister for Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness.92   
 
In a very tangible way, these organizational changes serve to embed the 
connection between security, public safety and immigration.  But the changes have 
much more than just a symbolic importance.  As Dauvergne notes, they also have the 
effect of moving government decision-making on many immigration matters into an 
organizational structure with a “differing governing ethos” – an ethos, that is, of 
enforcement and security.93   Agencies such as the CBSA do not foster inclusion; on 
the contrary, one might view inclusion as the very antithesis of their raison d’ètre.  
Where they are involved in decision-making, therefore, they operate within an 
organizational ethos in which removal is the end-game of immigration.  They are, I 
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think Dauvergne would agree, the embodiment of what she views as the liberal 
presumption against open borders.94 
 
The final change that Dauvergne identifies is the increasing cooperation and 
information sharing amongst Western states in matters of both immigration control 
and security.  In making this observation, Dauvergne relies heavily on the nascent 
security studies discipline, and particularly on the so-called “Copenhagen School,” 
which is commonly credited for coining the term “securitization.”  The Copenhagen 
School espouses the idea that security is not an objective fact, but rather a “speech 
act” aimed at moving a topic away from the political (and the legal) and into the 
domain of the exceptional: “Traditionally, by saying ‘security,’ a state representative 
declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are 
necessary to block a threatening development.”95  Dauvergne describes the 
approach as follows: 
This [call for greater government intelligence gathering 
and information sharing] corresponds well with the 
Copenhagen School’s analysis of the “grammar” of a 
security speech act: a plot with an external threat, a 
point of no return, a possible way out. It is the notion of 
a way out that makes the speech act a call for 
securitization. This way out means that there is 
something that can address the threat provided the 
actors involved are willing to move beyond the limits of 
normal politics. Without the possibility of a way out, 
                                                        
 
94 The notion that the character, evolution and sociology of institutions play an important role in 
decision-making is well developed in the literature, particular that relating to New Institutionalism.  
See, for example, K O Hawkins, Law as last resort: prosecution decision-making in a regulatory agency 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002); Mary Brinton and Victor Nee, The New Institutionalism in 
Sociology (New York: Russell Sage, 1990); and in the specific context of immigration law see Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar, “The Political Economies of Immigration Law” (2012) 2 UC Irvine LR 1. While 
exploring the sociology of the CBSA as a decision-making institution would certainly be illuminating, 
I do not explore it in detail here, primarily because of the difficulties in accessing institutional players 
that I earlier described. 
95 See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: 
Boulder, 1998) at 21, 33 [Buzan, “Security”]. 
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there is no securitization because there is no call to 
action.96 
 
In further adopting and adapting the Copenhagen approach, Dauvergne next 
moves onto a phenomenon she terms “fact-resistance.”97  She uses the term to 
indicate a state of being whereby once something (or someone) has been identified 
as a security threat and transported into the realm of the exceptional, facts take on 
an ever-diminishing importance.  In the language of the Copenhagen School, this is 
an example of the “intersubjectivity” of the securitization process.  As mentioned 
above, securitization in this approach is not a question of an objective threat, but 
nor is it merely a subjective perception of risk.  It is, rather, a public act of 
acquiescence to the language of security.98  Once something, such as migration, has 
successfully been cast as a security issue, fact-resistance kicks in, analysis stops, 
scrutiny turns off like a light, and exceptional expressions of executive power come 
in through the dark.  
 
Closely connected to fact-resistance is the racialization and “othering” of the 
security setting.  Dauvergne suggests that an image of “foreign-ness” is central to the 
security narrative; it provides a clear, if inaccurate, reason for attacks and provides 
the (at least illusory) comfort in knowing who the threats are.99  One of the central 
findings of the empirical investigations that I have undertaken (outlined in detail in 
Chapter Two) is that while security-migration legislation is broad enough to capture 
enormous swaths of people from many (including Western) countries, the actual 
cohort of those subjected to inadmissibility determinations represents a far 
narrower set of countries.  This fact would appear to bear out the “othering” process 
of which Dauvergne speaks.  
                                                        
 
96 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, supra note 70 at 98, n. 16, citing Buzan, Security, supra note 94 
at 33. 
97 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, supra note 70 at 99. 
98 Buzan, Security, supra note 95 at 25. 
99 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, supra note 70 at 101. 
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After reviewing the ways in which the migration-security nexus has played out 
in the jurisprudence of several states, Dauvergne moves on to several concluding 
observations, two of which are worth mentioning here.  The first flows from another 
observation of the Copenhagen School, that the securitization of migration has 
become, in large measure, normalized, which in turn causes the exceptional 
approaches of the security setting to become normal.  Channelling Giorgio Agamben, 
Dauvergne suggests that this state of exception means that it is “more and more 
normal to treat migration, particularly of asylum seekers, as a policing matter rather 
than a question of economic redistribution, social composition, or 
humanitarianism.”100  And indeed, since Making People Illegal was published, we 
have seen, at least within the Canadian context, a striking increase in exceptional 
and enforcement-minded approaches to migration.    
 
When the exceptional becomes normal and the normal exceptional, Agamben 
has (now famously) observed that examples of “bare life” can be expected to 
emerge.101  While Agamben’s prototypical example of bare life is that which existed 
inside the concentration camps and his contemporary example is Guantánamo Bay, 
other less extreme examples of bare life can emerge from the exceptional practices 
of the executive, one of which, I assert, is the indefinite and potentially unwarranted 
state of limbo experienced by those labelled as security threats.102  
 
                                                        
 
100 Ibid at 113-114. 
101 See generally, Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford 
U.P., 1998); Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: U. Chicago P., 2005). 
102 As I believe will become apparent in the coming chapters, the near permanent state of limbo that 
arises for many refugees and asylum seekers subject to the security inadmissibility process results in 
precisely the kind of ‘bare life’ scenarios described by Agamben.  One articulate illustration of this 
can be found in a report I co-authored for the Canadian Council for Refugees, From Liberation to 
Limbo: A Report on the Impact of Immigration Security Inadmissibility Provisions on the Eritrean 
Communities in Canada, and Recommendations for Reform, (Canadian Council for Refugees, 2010) 
accessed at http://ccrweb.ca/en/liberation-limbo-0 on June 7, 2012. 
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The second of Dauvergne’s concluding observations relates to the rule of law, 
and the marginalization of law, in the exceptional politics of security.  Security 
politics, Dauvergne suggests, “thrive on exception, the defined antithesis of the rule 
of law.”103  Clearly Dauvergne is of the view that the pendulum has swung too far in 
the direction of security and that the classic tradeoff between rights and security 
needs to be recalibrated.  The question is how to reel back the “jettisoned” rule of 
law and the answer, to Dauvergne, is to find its source in a location other than that 
which shed it in the first place – the state.   
 
While I find much of value in Dauvergne’s engaging analysis, I hesitate to accept 
entirely the determinism of her claims regarding the nature of the liberal state vis-à-
vis outsiders.  The empirical validity of her observations on the securitization of 
migration and the resort to exceptional policies is unassailable; and whether or not 
exclusion is inherent to liberal communities, they have certainly acted as if this were 
the case throughout much of recent history.  This said, where I differ with 
Dauvergne is in the degree to which the exception is ordained.  In this respect, I 
agree with Jeremy Webber who, in a critique of Agamben, provides: 
Agamben's is not my argument. His theory carries with 
it a structural determinism that I do not accept, creating 
the reciprocal relation of exception and insider as 
universal, engrained within the logic of the state. In 
doing so it lets our governments off the hook. States do 
define themselves in significant measure through their 
policies on membership, including their immigration 
and refugee policies.  But Agamben's presumption that 
the definition necessarily involves stark differentiation 
between those within the sphere of the state's concern 
and those without is excessively Manichean. Nor is it 
borne out in practice, where even those states that seek 
to establish hermetic boundaries find themselves drawn 
into broader spheres of interaction, many states 
interact more positively with their would-be entrants, 
                                                        
 
103 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, supra note 70 at 115. 
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and within the Australian context in particular many 
individuals advocated a very different role for law. 
States sometimes do pursue policies that seek to 
establish their identity against a demonized and 
rigorously excluded other. If that is the aim, asylum 
seekers are easy targets, unable to fight back. States 
sometimes embrace executive action and dismantle 
legal constraints in their rush to confront that other. 
They embrace, in other words, both a Schmittian 
tendency to create clear enemies and a Schmittian 
constitutional ethos. But neither is necessary. Neither 
should be able to rely on our acquiescence.104 
 
What resonates most to me about the above passage is Webber’s refusal to 
accept the membership/equality conundrum as a stark either-or proposition, but 
rather as a site of tension and negotiation within the liberal state.  President Barack 
Obama’s recent decision to halt deportations of young, long term illegal residents is 
one, albeit minor, example of the nuance and complexity of executive action.105  
Dauvergne would likely suggest that this measure represents itself a legally 
exceptional measure intended to counteract the most troubling aspects of a legally 
exceptional immigration regime.  While this may be true on some level, it is at the 
same time an expression of the view that at least some non-citizens have certain 
moral (if not legal) claims that are difficult to ignore.106   
 
                                                        
 
104 Jeremy Webber, “National Sovereignty, Migration and the Tenuous Hold of International Legality: 
The Resurfacing (and Resubmersion?) of Carl Schmitt” in Oliver Schmidtke (ed.) Of States, Rights, and 
Social Closure: Governing Migration and Citizenship (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) at p.p.69-
70. 
105 Of interest, the issue of amnesty has recently been taken up by Joseph Carens, who argues that, 
even conceding that states have a right to control their borders, the right to deport those without 
status does not extend to long term residents who, by virtue of their social membership in the liberal 
community, have obtained a moral claim to stay: see Joseph Carens, Immigrants and the Right to Stay 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010). 
106 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children” (4 July, 2012), online: 
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-
came-to-us-as-children.pdf.  
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There may always be a temptation for the executive to descend into the realm of 
the exceptional, but the descent can be averted and restraint is possible.  David 
Dyzenhaus has wrestled precisely with these issues and I turn now to something of 
a debate between him and Harvard professor Adrian Vermeule on the role of law, 
administration and the judiciary in responding to exceptional executive action.   
1.3.2 Black and White and Read All Over – David Dyzenhaus and Legal Grey 
Holes 
What we have is the growth of governmental power, so 
that law becomes the vehicle by which the government 
delegates back to itself the power to make policy for 
which it will be accountable only at the next election. 
Rather than legislative supremacy, we have executive 
supremacy.107 
 
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not 
increase granted power or remove or diminish the 
restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. 
The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave 
emergency. Its grants of power to the federal 
government and its limitations of the power of the 
States were determined in the light of emergency, and 
they are not altered by emergency. What power was 
thus granted and what limitations were thus imposed 
are questions which have always been, and always will 
be, the subject of close examination under our 
constitutional system.108 
  
I believe I am on firm ground in stating that both David Dyzenhaus and 
Catherine Dauvergne call for a legal regime based on a thicker version of the rule of 
law, and that judges have an important role to play in this project.  This being said, 
they differ significantly on the avenues by which this version of the rule of law may 
                                                        
 
107 David Dyzenhaus, “Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and the Adjudication 
of National Security” (2003) 28 Aust J Leg Philos 1. 
108 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) at 425. 
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come about.  They have the same destination in mind, if you will, but they disagree 
fundamentally on the questions of where we are and how to get there.   
 
As noted above, Dauvergne is of the view that matters of migration are beyond 
the borders of what the liberal state can contemplate.  This being the case, any 
domestic conception of the rule of law cannot, at least in any sustained way, be 
counted upon to benefit non-citizens, particularly where matters of security are 
involved.  As a result, Dauvergne argues that the rule of law must be extricated from 
its domestic source, and placed into the realm of a global community of law.   
 
 While Dyzenhaus does not focus on migration, he has written extensively 
about the rule of law, executive authority and administrative law and his views on 
these subjects can quite easily be grafted onto the migration context.  In short, 
Dyzenhaus is not of the view that exceptional approaches are inherent to liberal 
states, but rather, where they arise, they represent “embedded mistakes” in the legal 
order.109  The goal for Dyzenhaus then, is not to situate the rule of law elsewhere, 
but to use the law in an attempt to correct the mistake.  In Dyzenhaus’ words, the 
aim is to “banish the exception from the legal order.”110 
 
 The last decade has witnessed a remarkable, if somewhat off-putting 
renaissance.  Since the events of September 11, 2001, and more particularly since 
states responded to the terrorist attacks of that date, there has been a renewed 
interest in the writing of the Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt.  The interest arises 
from Schmitt’s commentary on how states respond to perceived emergency 
situations and his views continue to be a polarizing phenomenon.  In both “Schmitt 
                                                        
 
109 David Dyzenhaus, “Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency inside or outside the Legal Order” 
(2005) 27 Cardozo L Rev 2005 at 2035  [Dyzenhaus, "Schmitt v. Dicey"], citing terminology 
developed by Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1978) at 81, 121-22.  
See also  David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality In a Time of Emergency (New York: 
Cambridge UP, 2006) [Dyzenhaus, “Constitution of Law”]. 
110 Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey, ibid at 2029. 
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v. Dicey”, an article published in the Cardozo Law Review, and his later work, “The 
Constitution of Law: Legality In a Time of Emergency,” Dyzenhaus takes up the 
challenge of addressing and unseating the Schmittian perspective on legality in 
times of emergency.  Schmitt’s perspective is neatly conveyed in what is 
undoubtedly the most cited line from his body of work: "Sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception."111  Shortly after this remark, Schmitt further elaborates 
on its meaning: 
There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a 
legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, 
and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this 
normal situation actually exists…All law is "situational 
law." The sovereign produces and guarantees the 
situation in its totality. He has the monopoly over this 
last decision. Therein resides the essence of the state's 
sovereignty, which must be juristically defined 
correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but 
as the monopoly to decide. The exception reveals most 
clearly the essence of the state's authority. The decision 
parts here from the legal norm, and (to formulate it 
paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law it 
need not be based on law.112 
 
 Perhaps the central idea in Schmitt’s writing is the inherent contradiction 
that he saw in the notion, common in constitutional democracies, that states of 
emergency – the suspension of law – can be brought about by law.  To Schmitt, this 
view is not only something of a logical fallacy, but it also represents a fundamental 
misapprehension of the fact that political authority is not ultimately constituted by 
law; it is prior to law.  The source of sovereign authority, in other words, comes 
from outside of the legal order.113  Moreover, the legal order itself, or at least the 
                                                        
 
111 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters On The Concept Of Sovereignty (George Schwab 
Trans., 1985) (1922) at 1. 
112 Ibid at 13. 
113 Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey, supra note 109 at p. 2007.  It is important to recall that Schmitt’s 
conception of the sovereign is, quite literally, “he who decides.”  As this is the only important 
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application of it, is based on a sovereign decision and not on a legal norm.  In this 
structure, argued Schmitt, the state retains the power necessary to act decisively in 
times of existential crisis, in part because it gets to decide when such crises arise 
and recede.  Legal norms are well and good in normal times, but in emergencies, the 
sovereign must have the capacity to act in an unfettered manner and need not find 
authority to do so from the law.  All law is situational law.  More to the point, the 
existence of law is contingent on the will of the sovereign, for in times of emergency, 
the polity becomes a lawless space, a legal black hole, of which Guantanamo Bay is 
the most prominent current example.114   
 
 While Dyzenhaus takes issue with the term “black hole” – he prefers “a space 
beyond law” – he nevertheless coins a similar term to describe a parallel 
phenomenon, “legal grey holes.”  Unlike legal black holes, which explicitly operate in 
a realm in which the rule of law is eviscerated, legal grey holes are much more 
common and they arise in subtler circumstances.  A legal grey hole involves the use 
of a veneer of legality to cover over what is, in reality, a draconian act of executive 
power.  Veneer is an apt analogy here, for the rule of law principles that are used to 
justify such grey holes are remarkably thin.  In this scenario, it is not in fact rule of 
law that governs, but rather, rule by law.  The difference, to Dyzenhaus, is crucial: 
“rule of law” is a substantive framework of norms that serve to constrain executive 
action.  Rule by law, by contrast, implies a thin conception of the rule of law, one 
which permits grey holes to arise.  Dyzenhaus describes grey holes in this way: 
While it is relatively rare to find a position that 
articulates so stark a view, it is quite common to find 
positions that are comfortable with grey holes, as long 
as these are properly created. A grey hole is a legal 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
definitional feature of the sovereign, it can take on many different forms: dictator, president and 
executive being the first to come to mind. 
114 In describing American responses to 9/11, Johan Steyn is generally thought to have coined the 
term “legal black hole,” see Johan Steyn, “Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole” (2004) 53 Int’l & 
Comp LQ 1. 
 64 
 
space in which there are some legal constraints on 
executive action-it is not a lawless void-but the 
constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well 
permit government to do as it pleases. And since such 
grey holes permit government to have its cake and eat it 
too, to seem to be governing not only by law but in 
accordance with the rule of law, they and their 
endorsement by judges and academics might be even 
more dangerous from the perspective of the substantive 
conception of the rule of law than true black holes.115 
 
 Dyzenhaus’ description of the difference between black and grey holes is 
reminiscent of the way that many people describe the difference between Jim Crow 
era racial segregation and the lingering, though hidden from view racism that 
persists: less overt, but more insidious and probably harder to eliminate.  In another 
passage worth citing directly, Dyzenhaus notes 
Another way of making my point is to say that grey 
holes are more harmful to the rule of law than black 
holes. As I have indicated, a grey hole is a space in which 
the detainee has some procedural rights but not rights 
sufficient for him effectively to contest the executive's 
case for his detention. It is in substance a legal black 
hole, but it is worse because the procedural rights 
available to the detainee cloak the lack of substance. It is 
of course a delicate matter to decide when the 
blackness shades through grey into something that 
provides a detainee with adequate rule of law 
protection-when, that is, on the continuum of legality, 
the void ceases to be such. But for the moment I want 
simply to establish that minimalism is too close to the 
black hole end of the continuum for comfort. A little bit 
of legality can be more lethal to the rule of law than 
none.116 
 
It is my suspicion that much of migration law in Western states, and particularly 
that which relates to security concerns, takes place within legal grey holes.  Few 
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would argue that migrants within Western states have no legal rights.  This said, the 
legal rights that are granted to non-citizens tilt to the thin end of the spectrum, often 
being confined to the most basic of procedural rights.  And even these rights tend to 
be minimal: participatory rights are circumscribed, appellate rights are limited and 
access to legal representation is, at best, scattershot. 
 
 As with Jeremy Webber, Dyzenhaus does not deny that both black and grey 
legal holes can arise, but he does reject the notion, Schmitt’s notion, that they are 
structurally determined.  In doing so, he looks to the work of three of the most 
influential legal scholars of the past 100 years: A.V. Dicey’s treatises on the rule of 
law, Lon Fuller’s writing on the inner morality of law and Hans Kelsen’s Identity 
Thesis: the thesis that the state is totally constituted by law. 
 
According to Dyzenhaus, a (slightly modified) Diceyan conception of the rule of 
law responds directly to the two-pronged challenge posed by Schmitt – first, the 
courts must retain the authority to decide whether the government has a justified 
claim that there is an emergency; and second, the courts must also assess whether 
the actual  responses to the emergency are legal.117  In other words, Dyzenhaus 
argues that law must retain a role during exceptional times, and that the rule of law 
should be understood as “a rule of fundamental constitutional principles which 
protect individuals from arbitrary action by the state.”118 
 
What about constitutionally authorized emergency clauses? Dyzenhaus suggests 
that the existence of such clauses is an unnecessary concession to Schmitt, even if 
one maintains that derogations from the rule of law under emergency situations 
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must be justified under a parallel legal order.119  Indeed, at the very centre of 
Dyzenhaus’ understanding of the rule of law is the notion that legal order is unitary, 
admitting of no parallel or exceptional circumstances.  And this is where Dyzenhaus 
refers to Hans Kelsen’s identity thesis: 
According to that thesis, when a political entity acts 
outside of the law, its acts can no longer be attributed to 
the state and so they have no authority. Dicey, on my 
understanding, subscribes to the same thesis, and 
differs from Kelsen only in that he clearly takes the 
claim that the state is constituted by law to mean that 
the law that constitutes the state and its authority 
includes the principles of the rule of law. This has the 
result that a political entity acts as a state when and 
only when its acts comply with the rule of law. There 
will of course be thicker and thinner versions of the 
Identity Thesis, and Dicey's is much thicker, or more 
substantive, than Kelsen's.120 
 
 If Dicey and Kelsen help to establish that all executive actions, even those 
taken in the most dire of circumstances, must be subjected to the rule of law, it is 
Lon Fuller who assists Dyzenhaus in providing thick substantive content to those 
rule of law principles.  To Fuller (and Dyzenhaus) the rule of law is more than mere 
compliance with whatever duly enacted positive laws there happen to be; in 
Dyzenhaus’ words, this would be “rule by law.”  By contrast, the rule of law under 
Fullerian principles imposes substantive requirements on laws to be recognized as 
such; laws, in other words, must comport with a broader set of principles of legality, 
which Fuller set out in his seminal The Morality of Law.121   
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While beyond the scope of what I intend to undertake in this study, Fuller’s 
principles of legality provide that laws must be: (1) sufficiently general; (2) publicly 
promulgated; (3) sufficiently prospective; (4) clear and intelligible; (5) free of 
contradiction; (6) sufficiently constant through time so that individuals can order 
their behavior accordingly; (7) not impossible to comply with; and (8) administered 
in a way sufficiently congruent with their wording so that individuals can abide by 
them.  In the chapters that follow, I will seek to demonstrate that the security-
migration scheme has failed to comply with these basic principles of legality, but for 
now I simply flag them as an integral part of Dyzenhaus’ approach to banning 
exceptional practices from the legal order.  
 
 Another important principle that arises in Dyzenhaus’ work is one that has 
woven itself throughout this brief review of the literature – that of justification.  
According to Dyzenhaus, a Diceyan interpretation of the rule of law, as applied to 
emergency situations, is sufficiently flexible to permit officials to respond to 
emergencies, but also requires them to “justify to an independent tribunal their 
decisions as both necessary and made in good faith.”122  The tribunal proceedings 
must be independent and must take place on a full evidentiary record, and in 
proceedings involving a perceived security threat, the onus of establishing that an 
individual does pose such a threat must lie with the state.  These measures, 
undertaken within the context of a robust conception of the rule of law, achieve a 
dual goal – they provide a statutory basis for official decisions and, perhaps more 
importantly, they ensure that decisions are made in a “spirit of legality.”123 
 
 The effect of this requirement for justification is that it provides decision-
makers with a basis on which to evaluate the legitimacy of government action and 
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carries with it the potential to limit the harmful effects of legal grey holes.  At the 
very least, it enables the judiciary to bring legal grey holes into the light of day: 
And to the extent that holes created by statute are grey 
rather than black, judges, as long as they are not 
minimalists, can use the legal protections provided as a 
basis for trying to reduce official arbitrariness to the 
greatest extent possible. In doing so, they challenge the 
government either to make clearer its intention that 
detainees should be placed outside the protection of the 
law or to come up with some better way of fulfilling its 
claim to be committed to the rule of law.124 
  
Elsewhere, Dyzenhaus has elaborated more fully on the role of justification in his 
conception of the rule of law, most notably in commenting on the work (both 
judicial and academic) of the late South African jurist Etienne Mureinik.  Dyzenhaus, 
also a South African, was deeply influenced by Mureinik and, presumably, by the 
experience of growing up in a place defined by the most notorious of executive 
abuses.  In adopting much of what Mureinik called for during Apartheid, Dyzenhaus 
argues that the “the constraints of legality are the constraints of adequate 
justification.”125  The rule of law requires that public officials provide reasons for 
their actions, even during emergencies, and these reasons must be consistent with 
the fundamental principles of legal order.126  Mureinik himself put it this way: 
If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture 
of authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It 
must lead to a culture of justification - a culture in 
which every exercise of power is expected to be 
justified; in which the leadership given by government 
rests on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its 
decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its 
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command. The new order must be a community built on 
persuasion, not coercion.127 
 
 A culture of justification is a discursive culture, one based on the exchange of 
ideas, arguments and persuasions.  In Chapter Four, I will elaborate on what this 
means in the migration-security context, but in brief, I suggest that a culture of 
justification requires that dialogue take place between government officials and 
those who are affected by their decisions.  To borrow from Lorne Sossin, this in turn 
means that that such dialogue must take place in a manner in which all parties are 
“equally empowered to be persuasive,” so that decision-makers are motivated “by 
the force of a better argument,” rather than the whims of the executive.128  
 
 With this in mind, I now turn very briefly to criticism of Dyzenhaus’ 
approach, as articulated by Adrian Vermeule. 
 
1.3.3 Adrian Vermuele and Administrative Law – Inherently Schmittian? 
 
I look to the approach of Adrian Vermuele, not because I adopt it as my own, but 
because Vermuele responds to Dyzenhaus’ effort to “banish the exception from the 
legal order” in the specific context of administrative law, which is of course highly 
relevant to immigration matters.  According to Vermuele, administrative law is 
structurally riddled with processes, practices and decisions that either explicitly or 
implicitly exempt the executive from legal constraints; that create, in other words, 
legal black and grey holes.  These exceptional approaches cannot, realistically at 
least, be banished from administrative law as “they are necessarily built into its 
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fabric.”129  This being the case, efforts to extend legality to eliminate these black and 
grey holes – what Dyzenhaus refers to as the rule of law project – are both 
impracticable and “hopelessly utopian.”130 
  
Ironically, one person who may have agreed with Vermuele was the very person 
who Dyzenhaus enlists in support of his argument for the banning of the exception – 
A.V. Dicey.  Dicey was notoriously suspicious of administrative law as a true form of 
law given its proximity to the executive, and while he certainly did not use the 
language of black and grey holes, his concern was clearly that such phenomena 
would arise under an administrative regime.131 
 
Vermuele’s view of administrative law as inherently Schmittian is, in many 
respects, an empirical one.  His conclusions rest on numerous examples in which 
legally exceptional approaches have been taken in the administrative realm, and 
takes these examples as proof-positive that such exceptions are inevitable.  His 
proposition is essentially that because black and grey holes have existed, they must 
inevitably exist.  The examples he provides of “law-free zones” and “sham review” 
are “themselves the facts to be established” and their mere existence is sufficient to 
establish that administrative law is “substantially Schmittian.”132 
 
One of the main reasons why such exceptions have existed and always will exist 
is, according to Vermuele, because of the inherently unpredictable nature of 
                                                        
 
129 Adrian Vermeule, “Our Schmittian Administrative Law” (2008) 122 Harv L Rev 1096 at 1104. 
130 Ibid at 1097. 
131 Dyzenhaus explicitly contemplated this fact: “He [Dicey] thought that the administrative state is 
an affront to the rule of law precisely because a state in which officials are given vast discretionary 
powers to implement legislative programs necessarily places such officials beyond the reach of the 
rule of law.  Put more generally, Dicey was deeply opposed to the administrative state.” (Dyzenhaus, 
Schmitt v. Dicey, supra note 109 at p.2034).  This said, Dyzenhaus does not confront this potential 
contradiction in any significant detail.  For further on Dicey and administrative law, see below at 
4.2.1. 
132 Vermuele, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, supra note 129 at 1107. 
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emergency situations and the unwillingness of legislatures to bind the hands of the 
executive in responding to the unexpected.  Vermeule states in this regard: 
Emergencies cannot realistically be governed by ex 
ante, highly specified rules, but at most by vague ex post 
standards; it is beyond the institutional capacity of 
lawmakers to specify and allocate emergency powers in 
all future contingencies; practically speaking, legislators 
in particular will feel enormous pressure to create 
vague standards and escape hatches -  for emergencies 
and otherwise -  in the code of legal procedure that 
governs the mine run of ordinary cases in the 
administrative state, because legislators know they 
cannot subject the massively diverse body of 
administrative entities to tightly specified rules, and 
because they fear the consequences of lashing the 
executive too tightly to the mast in future emergencies. 
As we will see, all of these institutional features are 
central to our administrative law, and they create the 
preconditions for the emergence of the legal black holes 
and legal grey holes that are integral to its structure.133 
 
As Scheureman intimates, however, the fact that law cannot necessarily predict 
the nature of undefined future emergencies does not mean it cannot govern them – 
indeed, this is the very point of the kind of common law constitutionalism proposed 
by Dyzenhaus.134 
 
In addition to the fact that states seek to marginalize the courts in times of 
emergency by adding layers of exception to the laws they create, Vermuele also 
argues that the courts themselves want no part of emergency situations.  They “dial 
down” the intensity of judicial review in times of emergency and in matters of 
national security and dial it back up again when the emergency has dissipated or on 
                                                        
 
133 Ibid  at 1101. 
134 William E. Scheuerman, “Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law After 9/11” (2006), 14 J Pol Phil 
61 at 65-66. 
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matters not touching on the security of the nation.135  To Vermuele, the general 
parameters for judicial review, such as review for arbitrariness or capriciousness 
are adjustable in a manner that creates grey holes in exceptional times.  These 
“adjustable parameters,” he continues are inherent to administrative law and they 
inevitably lead to judges applying different standards at different times.  In 
developing this argument, Vermeule again points to examples (in this case 
jurisprudential ones) of exceptional practices as proof of his assertion.  He sums up 
this prong of his argument as follows: 
Nor do judges of any party or ideological bent want to 
extend legality so far, partly because they fear the 
responsibility of doing so, partly because they 
understand the limits of their own competence and fear 
that uninformed judicial meddling with the executive 
will have harmful consequences where national security 
is at stake, and partly because it has simply never been 
done before.136 
 
There is no doubt some validity to Vermeule’s observations.  Administrative law, 
and more acutely the realm of administrative discretion, both contemplate and 
permit exceptional approaches.  And as Dauvergne has observed, the ratcheting up 
of both discretionary action and deference in the post-9/11 world have palpably 
contributed to the security climate in which we live.  But again, the question is not 
whether this is the case, but whether this should be the case.  Dyzenhaus, of course, 
would readily agree that exceptional practices exist and even that they have become 
endemic in matters of national security.  But in this sense, I suggest that Vermuele 
overly focuses on the symptoms of our present system, without properly 
considering either Dyzenhaus’ diagnosis or his prescription for addressing a 
perceived excess of executive power.  In the process, Vermuele confuses the 
aspirational with the utopian.  Furthermore, while much of Vermuele’s argument 
                                                        
 
135 Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, supra note 129 at 1118. 
136 Ibid, at 1133. 
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has the appearance of neutrality – he says that he takes no position on the question 
of whether legal black and grey holes are desirable – at other times, he clearly 
descends into normative arguments about their necessity.137 
 
To his credit, Vermuele confines his arguments to the United States, given his 
quasi-empirical approach and his acknowledgment that all of the examples of legal 
exceptionalism to which he refers take place in the context of U.S. administrative 
law.  This said, he strongly suggests that his observations are generalizable, and he 
does so for good reason.  For if there are examples of administrative regimes that 
have not followed a Schmittian agenda, it undercuts, indeed refutes, his assertion 
that such an agenda is a patent inevitability.  And if other jurisdictions are not 
Schmittian, there is no reason (aside perhaps from American exceptionalism) that 
the United States must be.  This, in part, is where Vermeule’s argument comes short.  
In failing to refer to examples where a robust and thick conception of the rule of law 
has been utilized, some of which were discussed by both Dauvergne and Dyzenhaus, 
Vermuele comes across as wishing them away.  But to the extent that they do exist, 
they undermine his assertion, not that grey holes exist, but that they must exist.   
 
                                                        
 
137 See for example the following passage at p.1133, where Vermuele appears to stake out both his 
neutrality and his normative position in the same paragraph: 
However, the main point I want to suggest is not that black and 
grey holes are desirable; it is that they are inevitable. Black holes 
arise because legislators and executive officials will never agree to 
subject all executive action to thick legal standards, because the 
inevitability of changing circumstances and unforeseen 
circumstances means they could not do so even if they tried -  one 
of Schmitt's points – and because the judges would not want them 
to do so in any event. There are too many domains affecting 
national security in which official opinion holds unanimously, 
across institutions and partisan lines and throughout the modern 
era, that executive action must proceed untrammeled by even the 
threat of legal regulation and judicial review, no matter how 
deferential that review might be on the merits. 
 
 74 
 
Conclusion 
In this somewhat brief theoretical exploration of themes related to borders, 
security, legality and the rule of law, I have attempted to outline some of the key 
debates that lie at the very root of immigration matters, particularly the subset of 
immigration decision-making that relates to questions of national security.  One 
thread that has emerged over these pages and that will continue to be woven into 
this study is that of the importance of justification, discourse and dialogue between 
states and those affected by their decisions, including migrants.  Justification is 
important to Carens, at least in his later work, and is central to that of Benhabib, 
Dauvergne and Dyzenhaus.   
 
I turn now to a detailed exploration of security-migration decision-making in the 
context of Canadian law and to an empirical analysis of some of the problematic 
trends that I contend have emerged in recent years.  As I do, however, it is important 
to keep in mind the contributions of the scholars that I have referred to in this 
chapter, as they provide an important theoretical context for the increasingly 
exclusionary nature of Canadian immigration law.  The themes that I have described 
above also help to inform the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, in which I set 
out an argument that a Third World perspective on international law, paired with a 
dialogical approach to administrative law could foster decision-making in the 
migration-security context that complies with core rule of law principles, that takes 
seriously the lived experiences of those subject to security decisions and that is, in 
the end, both intelligible and justifiable. 
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CHAPTER TWO: SECURITY INADMISSIBILITY IN 
CANADA – A CASE STUDY 
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2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I set out how the security-migration nexus plays out, in practical 
terms, within the framework of immigration law.  More particularly, using the 
example of the Canadian security-inadmissibility apparatus, I intend to explore how 
both legislative over-breadth and the discretionary decisions that undergird the 
security inadmissibility process give rise to situations reminiscent of Dyzenhaus’ 
legal grey holes.   
 
At the outset, I will provide a background to the current legislative framework, 
and then proceed to an analysis of the current law on security-inadmissibility, 
noting along the way its bearing on refugee protection and Canada’s obligations 
under international law.   I will also explore in some detail the jurisprudence as it 
has unfolded under the current inadmissibility regime and finally, I will turn to an 
empirical exploration of data that has been collected on inadmissibility decisions 
made over the past decade.   
 
The vast breadth of the security-inadmissibility legislation will be immediately 
apparent in this analysis.  The breadth of discretion afforded immigration officials 
should be equally apparent.  More subtly, I contend that decisions on immigration 
security are suffused with a North-South chauvinism that, in combination with the 
breadth of both legislation and discretion, has yielded unfortunate results.  More 
specifically, I intend to illustrate how the security-inadmissibility regime has come 
to be preoccupied with a very particular kind of individual, namely those with any 
perceptible association with armed conflict in the Global South.  Such individuals, I 
further contend, seem to pose little actual concern to Canadian national security.    
 
Ironically, however, for reasons which I elaborate upon below, I observe that 
this skewing of inadmissibility findings to those who have taken part in conflicts 
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emanating from the Global South has probably also played a role in preserving the 
law by concealing its plainly untenable reach.   
 
The other irony to which I make reference is that, for those who flee conflict 
situations in the South, the law on inadmissibility effectively limits refugee 
protection to the archetypal victim – to those whose personal narrative discloses 
passivity in situations of repression, rather than to those who, often at greatest risk 
of persecution, have resorted to active resistance. 
 
Liberal democracies (and indeed all states) reserve to themselves the authority 
to exclude from their midst those perceived to pose a threat to national security.  As 
I described in the previous chapter, most commentators, even those advocating an 
open-borders approach, refrain from arguing that this authority should not exist.  
The issue becomes, therefore, how decisions about security and inadmissibility are 
made.  In this chapter, I examine this question from the perspective of Canadian law, 
demonstrating how security matters are tilted toward those from the global south.  
In the chapter that follows, I will look at the same issues from the perspective of an 
academic movement that aims to place the interests of Third World peoples at the 
centre of processes that affect them.  And finally, in the last chapter I will examine 
one aspect of the Canadian security regime – its reliance on administrative 
discretion – and argue that it, together with an infusion of Third World perspectives, 
could help to bring a sense of justification to a process currently defined by its 
absence.  For now, however, I move on to an exploration of the Canadian security-
inadmissibility regime.  
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Many Shades of Black: A brief background to the security-migration 
nexus1 
2.2.1 Introduction 
 
In our previous discussion about Catherine Dauvergne and the making of 
illegality, recall that the links between migration and (in)security have a long 
pedigree.  To borrow Dauvergne’s words again, if security is the fulcrum of the 
balance between individual and community, it is perhaps inherent to any 
conversation about immigration, even if any actual connection between security 
threats and migration is of dubious empirical validity.2  Indeed, it is almost trite to 
note that national security has always played a large role in immigration and 
refugee policy, but it is only relatively recently that scholars, practitioners and 
others have come to scrutinize the rationale underlying the connection.3 
 
While the events of 9/11 exponentially intensified the attention paid to the 
security-migration nexus, as Audrey Macklin points out, terrorism provisions within 
immigration law were already commonplace.  This was in contrast to the criminal 
law which, to that point, did not tend to identify terrorism as a distinct category of 
criminal act.  To Macklin, the import of this approach to dealing with terrorism 
solely within the confines of immigration law was evident: 
Locating terrorism exclusively in immigration 
legislation institutionalized in law the figure of the 
                                                        
 
1 The Raconteurs, “Many Shades of Black” from the album Consolers of the Lonely, released August 25, 
2008.  
2 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008) [Dauvergne, “Making People Illegal”] at p. 103. 
3 Such commentators have observed that notions of security, particularly in relation to migration, are 
not so much about safety, per se, as they are about identity, group identity, and shared narratives 
about what constitutes the state – see for example Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Boulder, 1998) at  120-121 [Buzan, “Security”]. 
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immigrant as archetypal menace to the cultural, social, 
and political vitality of the nation. The myriad tropes of 
the foreign Other - as vector of disease, agent of 
subversion, corrupter of the moral order and debaser of 
the national identity - all trade on the exteriorization of 
threat and the foreigner as the embodiment of its 
infiltration. Canadian immigration history is replete 
with examples, ranging from the exclusion of racialized 
groups on grounds of inferiority and degeneracy, to the 
deportation of foreign-born labour and social activists 
in the inter-war years, to the persistent stereotype of 
immigrants as distinctively crime-prone.  In this 
symbolic order, the border of the state is akin to the 
pores of the national corpus, and expelling the foreign 
body serves to restore the health of the nation.4 
 
Some may balk at the imagery invoked by Macklin, but even the most cursory 
examination of the history of Canada’s immigration-security provisions confirms its 
accuracy.  It should also come as no surprise that immigration law has long provided 
the legal bulwark against perceived security threats, given the latent suspicion of 
foreigners as being the source of such threats and the stripped down set of 
procedural rights that accrue to non-citizens.  This combination of factors – 
suspicion of foreigners and the ease with which they may be controlled in legal grey 
holes – has made immigration law the dominant site at which to address national 
security concerns.  With this in mind, I turn now to a brief historical sketch of the 
intersections between national security and immigration in Canadian law. 
2.2.2 National Security in Canadian Immigration Law 
To the extent that immigration law demarcates the line between inclusion 
and exclusion, it also provides an interesting lens with which to examine societal 
views on migrants, migration and the threats they are often perceived to pose.  It 
should come as no surprise that immigration laws have frequently engaged in the 
broad characterization of entire classes of people as being “undesirable” or 
                                                        
 
4 Audrey Macklin, “Borderline Security” in Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach, eds. The 
Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: UofT Press, 2001) at 392. 
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“unsuitable”.  Immigration law has, for over a century, included “prohibited classes” 
of persons who were excluded because they were considered a danger to public 
health or safety.5   
In 1919, the federal government amended the Immigration Act, for the first 
time adding provisions specifically related to national security concerns.  The 
provisions prohibited from entrance into Canada those involved in subversive 
activities and espionage.  The law provided in part: 
3. No immigrant, passenger, or other person, unless he 
is a Canadian citizen, or has Canadian domicile, shall be 
permitted to enter or land in Canada, or in case of 
having landed in or entered Canada shall be permitted 
to remain therein, who belongs to any of the following 
classes, hereinafter called “prohibited classes”:  
 
… 
 
(n) Persons who believe in or advocate the 
overthrow by force or violence of the Government 
of Canada or of constituted law and authority, or 
who disbelieve in or are opposed to organized 
government, or who advocate the assassination of 
public officials, or who advocate or teach the 
unlawful destruction of property; 
 
(o) Persons who are members of or affiliated with 
any organization entertaining or teaching disbelief 
in or opposition to organized government, or 
advocating or teaching the duty, necessity, or 
propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any 
officer or officers either of specific individuals or of 
officers generally, of the Government of Canada or 
of any other organized government, because of his 
or their official character, or advocating or teaching 
the unlawful destruction of property; 
 
                                                        
 
5 In 1910, the government introduced certain “prohibited classes” of immigrants, which included 
“idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons, and persons who have been 
insane at any time previously” Immigration Act, SC 1910, c 27, s 3.   
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… 
 
(q) Persons guilty of espionage with respect to His 
Majesty or any of His Majesty's allies;6 
 
As Trebilcock and Kelley document, the 1919 Act also contained a provision 
authorizing the Cabinet to “prohibit any race, nationality, or class of immigrant by 
reason of 'economic, industrial, or other condition temporarily existing in Canada'; 
or because such immigrants were unsuitable, given the social, economic, and labour 
requirements of the country; or simply because of their 'peculiar habits, modes of 
life and methods of holding property' and their 'probable inability to become readily 
assimilated or assume the responsibilities and duties of Canadian citizenship within 
a reasonable time.”7  Treblicock and Kelley further note that the Cabinet shortly 
thereafter invoked these new powers to prohibit the immigration of enemy aliens as 
well as several ethno-religious groups including Mennonites, Hutterites, and 
Doukhobors.8 
The exclusionary provisions contained in the 1919 Immigration Act remained 
relatively static until 1952 when, amongst other things, the concept of subversion 
was introduced into the list of prohibited classes, as was, for the first time, provision 
for a discretionary Ministerial exemption of inadmissibility: 
5. No person…shall be admitted to Canada if he is a 
member of any of the following classes of persons: 
 
…  
 
                                                        
 
6 An Act to Amend the Immigration Act, SC 1919, c 25, ss 3, 3(n), 3(o), 3(q). 
7 Ninette Kelley and M. J Trebilcock. The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration 
Policy. 2nd ed. (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 187. 
8 Ibid.  Ironically, given the discussion that will ensue below, Trebilcock and Kelley go on to observe 
that these groups were in all likelihood singled out for inadmissibility because of their refusal to take 
up arms in their respective countries during the First World War. 
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(l) persons who are or have been, at any time before 
or after the commencement of this Act, members of 
or associated with any 'organization, group or body 
of any kind concerning which there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that it promotes or advocates 
or at the time of such membership or association 
promoted or advocated subversion by force or 
other means of democratic government, institutions 
or processes, as they are understood in Canada, 
except persons who satisfy the Minister that they 
have ceased to be members of or associated with 
such organizations, groups or bodies and whose 
admission would not be detrimental to the security 
of Canada.9 
Over the next 25 years, there were considerable policy debates over the 
“modernization” of the immigration program, debates that included deliberation 
over national security and, for the first time, responding to terrorism.10  While the 
Immigration Act, 1976 made no explicit reference to terrorism, the inadmissibility 
provisions on espionage and subversion were supplemented to include a new 
ground of inadmissibility related to potential acts of violence.  It is interesting to 
note, however, that the new provision only related to anticipated future acts of 
violence against persons in Canada.  Paragraph 19(1)(g) of the Immigration Act, 
1976 provided: 
19. (1) No person shall be granted admission who is a 
member of any of the following classes: 
 
… 
 
(g) persons who there are reasonable grounds to 
believe will engage in acts of violence that would or 
might endanger the lives or safety of persons in 
Canada or are members of or are likely to 
                                                        
 
9 Immigration Act, SC 1952, c 42, ss 5, 5(l), consolidation in Immigration Act, RSC 1952, c 325. 
10 See Canada, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, White Paper on Immigration, (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1967) [White Paper] and Canada, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, A report 
of the Canadian immigration and population study: The Immigration Program, (Ottawa: Information 
Canada, 1974) at 37-49.  
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participate in the unlawful activities of an 
organization that is likely to engage in such acts of 
violence;11 
 
Further changes to immigration legislation in 1992 led to the first explicit 
reference to admissibility by reason of terrorist activity.  In the 1992 legislation, s 19 
of the Immigration Act was amended to create a category of inadmissibility for those 
who will or had, on a reasonable grounds to believe standard, engaged in 
terrorism.12  The changes also rendered inadmissible those found to be members of 
organizations that will engage, or have engaged, in terrorism.13     
 
In 2002, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act14 came into force.  In the 
IRPA, the various grounds of inadmissibility were segregated into their own 
respective sections, as follows: 
? Section 34 –Security 
? Section 35 – Human or international human rights violations 
? Section 36 –Criminality 
? Section 37 – Organized criminality  
? Section 38 – Health Grounds  
? Section 39 – Financial reasons  
? Section 40 – Misrepresentation 
 
                                                        
 
11 Immigration Act, 1976, SC 1976-77, c 52. 
12 Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c I-2, ss 19(1)(e)(iii), 19(1)(f)(ii), as amended by An Act to Amend the 
Immigration Act and other Acts as a Consequence Thereof, SC 1992, c 49, s 11.  The reasonable 
grounds to believe standard, which remains applicable to inadmissibility decisions, appears to have 
first been introduced in the 1952 Immigration Act, supra note 7 at s 5(1)(m). 
13 Ibid at ss 19(1)(e)(iv)(C) and 19(1)(f)(iii)(B).  
14 SC 2001, c. 27 [“IRPA”].  The IRPA came into force roughly nine months after the events of 
September 11, 2001.  While much of the Act had been drafted before the attacks and already 
reflected a recalibration of immigration law towards a greater emphasis on security, the events of 
9/11 resulted in several amendments which further entrenched security interests in the final text of 
the legislation. 
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Sections 34, 35 and 37 were also accompanied by their own Ministerial relief 
provisions, granting the Minister the (non-delegable) discretionary authority to 
essentially waive inadmissibility on the basis that the person’s presence in Canada 
would not be detrimental to the national interest.  Section 34 provided: 
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is 
inadmissible on security grounds for 
 
(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of 
subversion against a democratic government, 
institution or process as they are understood in 
Canada; 
 
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by 
force of any government; 
 
(c) engaging in terrorism; 
 
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada; 
 
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might 
endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or 
 
(f) being a member of an organization that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged 
or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), 
(b) or (c). 
(2) The matters referred to in subsection (1) do not 
constitute inadmissibility in respect of a permanent 
resident or a foreign national who satisfies the Minister 
that their presence in Canada would not be detrimental 
to the national interest. 
 
Also of note, the IRPA implemented a subtle but important change in the 
treatment of refugee claimants found to be inadmissible for, amongst other things, 
security reasons.  Under the previous iterations of the Immigration Act refugee 
claimants thought to pose a threat to security would be deemed ineligible to pursue 
their claims if two conditions were met: first they had to be found by an adjudicator 
to be a person described in the security-admissibility provision; and second, the 
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Minister would have to prepare a report indicating that she or he was of the opinion 
that it would be contrary to public interest to have the claim determined.15  Under 
the IRPA, the second condition was eliminated, such that a finding of inadmissibility 
for security grounds now results in automatic ineligibility to make a refugee claim.16  
Claims that have already been initiated will be suspended pending an 
inadmissibility hearing and, if the person is found to be inadmissible, the claim will 
be terminated.17 
 
In many ways, the IRPA came to reflect and emphasize growing concerns over 
public safety, border integrity and security.  In an early decision considering the 
shift in orientation contained within the new legislation, the Supreme Court of 
Canada noted: 
The objectives as expressed in the IRPA indicate an 
intent to prioritize security. . . . Viewed collectively, the 
objectives of the IRPA and its provisions concerning 
permanent residents, communicate a strong desire to 
treat criminals and security threats less leniently than 
under the former Act.18 
 
In perhaps the clearest indication of the increased emphasis on security, in the 
years immediately following 9/11, the government created an entirely new federal 
department – the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness – 
whose sole mandate was to coordinate the activities of the various security-related 
agencies that were placed under its control, including the newly formed Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA).19  Under the auspices of the CBSA, the government 
                                                        
 
15 Immigration Act, 1985, supra note 12 at s 46.01(1)(e)(ii). 
16 IRPA, supra note 14, s 101(1)(f) 
17 Ibid, s 103(1)(a) and s 104(2)(a).  It should be noted that, the termination of an individual’s refugee 
claim does not result in their immediate or automatic removal.  Such individuals may still access a 
circumscribed “Pre-Removal Risk Assessment” pursuant to s112 of the IRPA [PRRA].  If such 
individuals are found to be at risk, they may obtain a temporary stay of removal. 
18 Medovarski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51, at para 10. 
19 See the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, SC 2005, c 10 and the Canada 
Border Services Agency Act, SC 2005, c 38. 
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created an “Immigration Intelligence Branch” to enhance security screening for 
persons suspected of terrorism, organized crime and war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.  The government also intensified the screening of visa applicants abroad 
and began a front-end security screening process for all inland refugee claimants 
immediately after a claim is made.  These and other changes were discussed in a 
comprehensive 2004 statement of the Federal Government’s national security 
policy.  The report, which articulated the country’s core national security interests 
and proposed a “framework for addressing threats to Canadians”, focused on three 
particular concerns: protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad, ensuring 
Canada was not a base for threats to its allies, and contributing to international 
security.20  The report further revealed a new weapon in the immigration-security 
arsenal – the deploying of “migration integrity officers” around the world to prevent 
illegal migration and block security threats before they arrive in Canada.  The report 
claimed that, over the previous six years, these officers had stopped more than 
40,000 people with improper documents from boarding planes bound for North 
America.21 
 
As I noted earlier, the symbolic and substantive importance of bringing 
significant aspects of immigration decision-making into an organizational matrix 
dominated by national security concerns cannot be overstated.  Symbolically, the 
move helped to embed the connection between security, public safety and 
immigration.  Substantively, the move handed discretionary decision-making 
authority over many immigration-related matters to an organizational structure 
with a “governing ethos” of enforcement and security.22   This is not a particularly 
controversial view - as former Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Peter 
Harder recently noted, there is now a "total preoccupation” with border security, 
                                                        
 
20 Canada, Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, (2004), 
online: Privy Council Office www.pco-bcp.gc.ca at vii, 5-6.   
21 Ibid, at 42. 
22 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, supra note 2 at pp 96-97.   
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and while there used to be a balance between the imperatives of compassion and 
enforcement, that balance has been jettisoned in the organizational culture that has 
been cultivated at CBSA.23 
 
Among the many changes brought about with the creation of the Department of 
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness was a transfer of authority to the public 
safety Minister of several aspects of the security-inadmissibility process.  Subsection 
4(2) of the IRPA now provides:   
(2) The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness is responsible for the administration of 
this Act as it relates to 
 
(a) examinations at ports of entry; 
 
(b) the enforcement of this Act, including arrest, 
detention and removal; 
 
(c) the establishment of policies respecting the 
enforcement of this Act and inadmissibility on 
grounds of security, organized criminality or 
violating human or international rights; or 
 
(d) determinations under any of subsections 34(2), 
35(2) and 37(2).24 
 
The scheme of the IRPA is such that, if an officer suspects that an individual is 
inadmissible, he or she may write a report outlining the perceived inadmissibility, 
pursuant to s 44(1) of the Act.  That report is then referred to a Minister’s Delegate 
who, pursuant to s 44(2) of the IRPA may then refer the matter to the Immigration 
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) for an admissibility hearing.  
The result of section 4 of the IRPA, above, is that in cases involving security, 
organized criminality or human or international rights violations, it is the CBSA that 
                                                        
 
23 See Debra Black, “Canada's immigration system lacks heart, critics say”, The Toronto Star (28 June 
2013) online: The Toronto Star < http://www.thestar.com>.  
24 IRPA, supra note 14.  
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has responsibility for the discretionary s 44 tasks of identifying and referring cases 
of suspected inadmissibility to the IRB. 
 
Further changes to the security-inadmissibility scheme were brought about with 
the recent promulgation of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act.25  This Act, 
which received Royal Assent in June, 2013, implemented several changes to the 
inadmissibility regime under the IRPA, three of which are directly related to the 
security provisions under s 34.  First, the FRFCA segregated s 34(1)(a) into two 
different sections, the first changing the espionage provision such that it will now 
only lead to an inadmissibility finding if the acts of espionage in question are 
“contrary to Canada’s interests”, while the second preserved and moved the pre-
existing subversion prohibition into a new provision – s 34(1)(b.1).26 
 
Second, the FRFCA repealed the Ministerial exemption of inadmissibility located 
at s 34(2) of the IRPA (as well as identical Ministerial exemptions under sections 35 
and 37), and relocated a blanket exemption clause for all three sections under a 
newly created, and narrowly defined, s 42.1.27 
  
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the FRFCA amended s 25 of the IRPA, 
which provides for general discretionary exemptions from the requirements of the 
Act on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, eliminating access to this 
provision for those found inadmissible under sections 34, 35 and 37.28 
 
                                                        
 
25 SC 2013, c 16 [FRFCA]. 
26 FRFCA, s 13. 
27 Ibid at s 18.  While the wording of the relief provision is similar to the former s 34(2), the 
amendment also contains a virtually incomprehensible interpretive clause which seemingly limits 
the scope of the term “national interest” to matters related to national security, see the new s 42.1(3), 
discussed in greater detail below. 
28 Ibid at ss 9, 10. 
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The evolution of Canadian immigration-security legislation culminates (at least 
for now) with the recent passage of changes to Canadian citizenship law.29  The 
changes now permit the government to commence citizenship revocation processes 
against dual national Canadian citizens who have, inter alia, been convicted of 
terrorism-related offences, either in Canada or abroad.30 
 
This has been a relatively cursory exploration of the history of the legislative 
intersections in Canada between immigration and security.  It is sufficient, however, 
to make some broad observations.  While provisions related to national security 
have always been broadly framed, earlier legislation tended to be oriented to other 
forms of inadmissibility.  The 1910 Immigration Act, for example, contained a list of 
21 different “prohibited classes,” the majority of which related to mental health 
bars;31 physical health bars32 or socio-economic bars33.  While many of the above 
categories continue to exist, albeit in more benignly worded language, the scope of 
security related inadmissibility has clearly expanded.34   
 
This having been said, it would appear that the far more profound changes that 
have taken place in the migration-security sphere are not those related to the 
legislation itself, but to the bureaucratic infrastructure that surrounds it.  
Immigration law has always broadly defined entire categories of persons as being 
either undesirable or dangerous.  The difference is that, by transferring 
                                                        
 
29 Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, SC 2014, c 22. 
30 Ibid, at s 10(2)(b).  The Act was widely criticized and is already subject to constitutional challenge, 
see Debra Black “Court challenge slams new Citizenship Act as ‘anti-Canadian’”, Toronto Star (20 
August 2015) online: http://thestar.com.  
31 “Idiots, imbeciles, feeble minded persons,” those with “constitutional psychopathic inferiority” and 
alcoholics, see Immigration Act, 1910, supra note 5 at ss 3(a), (k), (l).  
32 Those with tuberculosis or any other “loathsome disease” and those who were “dumb, blind, or 
otherwise physically defective,” Ibid, at s 3(b), (c). 
33 Prostitutes and pimps, “professional” beggars or vagrants, the indebted, those likely to become a 
public charge and “illiterates,” Ibid, at s 3(e), (f), (g), (h), (j), (m). 
34 One can point to several examples of the expanded scope of more recent security provisions.  
These include: 1) the inclusion of terrorism grounds; 2) the addition of a subversion provision that 
applies to any government, as opposed to a democratic government; 3) the shift away from 
provisions that refer to the security of Canada and toward security concerns more generally. 
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responsibility for administering the inadmissibility provisions to an institution with 
a narrow enforcement mandate, increasing the capacity of the authorities to identify 
and remove inadmissible persons has become a clear priority.   
 
This is demonstrated perhaps most articulately by reference to recent staffing 
trends within the federal government.  According to the Parliamentary Budget 
Office, staffing at the Canada Border Services Agency increased, in absolute terms, 
more than any other government agency or department between 2005 and 2012.  In 
total, the Agency grew by 5200 employees, or 54.6 percent in those years.  
Additionally, the Canadian Security Establishment, which handles various 
intelligence services grew by 42 percent, while FINTRAC — the Financial 
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada which, amongst other things, 
tracks suspected terrorist financing, increased staffing levels by 88 percent.  At the 
same time, however, staff levels at Citizenship and Immigration, decreased by 8.3 
percent.35 
 
The creation of the Canada Border Services Agency and its rapid expansion is 
very much in keeping with the commentary, referred to above, on the securitization 
of immigration regulation.  It is also in keeping with the expanded use of security 
inadmissibility provisions to exclude non-citizens, particularly refugee claimants, 
from obtaining status in Canada, a topic to which I will turn further on in this 
chapter.  First, however, I provide a detailed exploration of the security-
inadmissibility provisions in Canadian law, together with an analysis of the 
jurisprudence that has interpreted it. 
 
                                                        
 
35 Parliamentary Budget Officer, Federal Employee Classification Dataset (2013) online: 
Parliamentary Budget Officer < http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/en/>, reported in “Budget watchdog data 
shows bureaucracy grew under Harper”, Canadian Press (29 June 2013) online: CBC News < 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/>.  
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2.3 Casting the Dragnet – Canadian Law and Jurisprudence on 
Security Inadmissibility  
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
As I set out above, the main security related inadmissibility provision in 
Canadian law renders inadmissible not just those thought to pose a security threat 
to Canada, but a significantly broader ambit of individuals.36  In the pages that 
follow, I will explore some of the principal themes that have emerged in the 
jurisprudence on s 34 of the IRPA over the past decade. 
2.3.2 The Evidentiary standard 
 
Section 33 of the IRPA sets out an overarching interpretive clause in respect of 
sections 34-37: 
33. The facts that constitute inadmissibility under 
sections 34 to 37 include facts arising from omissions 
and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have 
occurred, are occurring or may occur.  
 
As such, inadmissibility under s 34 of the IRPA is made out where the Minister 
establishes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the individual 
                                                        
 
36 For ease of reference, s 34 of the IRPA provides: 
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for 
(a) engaging in an act of espionage that is against Canada or that is contrary to 
Canada’s interests; 
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government; 
(b.1) engaging in an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as 
they are understood in Canada; 
(c) engaging in terrorism; 
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada; 
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in 
Canada; or 
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has 
engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (b.1) or (c). 
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concerned has engaged or will engage in the kinds of activities enumerated in the 
provision.  In Mugesera, the Supreme Court affirmed that the reasonable grounds 
standard applies solely to facts and requires more than suspicion, but less than the 
civil standard of balance of probabilities.  In essence, the court concluded, 
reasonable grounds will exist where there is an objective basis for the belief which 
is based on compelling and credible information.37 
 
This interpretation was consistent with the oft-cited earlier decision of the 
Federal Court of Appeal in Chiau, wherein the court stated: 
As for whether there were “reasonable grounds” for the 
officer’s belief, I agree with the Trial Judge’s definition 
of “reasonable grounds” as a standard of proof that, 
while falling short of a balance of probabilities, 
nonetheless connotes “a bona fide belief in a serious 
possibility based on credible evidence.”38 
 
2.3.3 Sections 34(1)(a) and (b) Espionage and Subversion of Governments 
 
While, as noted above, the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act has bifurcated 
s 34(1)(a) of the IRPA into two sections, separating the concepts of “espionage” and 
“subversion”, jurisprudential interpretation of the terms has arisen more or less in 
tandem, and so I consider them together here, notwithstanding the recent legislative 
changes.  I also include in this analysis paragraph 34(1)(b), as it too relates to the 
meaning of “subversion”.   
 
                                                        
 
37 Mugesera v Canada (MCI), 2005 SCC 40, para 114 
38 Chiau v Canada (MCI) [2001] 2 FC 297, para 30.  In my review of all Immigration Division decisions 
on s 34, elaborated upon below, I observed that it was this passage, more than any other, that was 
relied upon by the board in setting out the applicable evidentiary standard.  This is perhaps because 
the applicable immigration manual used by CBSA officers in evaluating inadmissibility incorporates 
the “bona fide belief in a serious possibility” language utilized by the Federal Court of Appeal in Chiau 
– see Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “ENF 2 Evaluating Inadmissibility” (2009) online: 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada http://www.cic.gc.ca.   
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The term “subversion” in the immigration context has been considered 
somewhat sparingly and never with appellate finality.  In an early analysis, the 
Federal Court in Shandi provided the following analysis of the term, interpreting it 
in strikingly broad terms:  
Espionage and subversion are not limited to the actual 
act but to be engaged in these activities the words 
envisage participation by one who assists or facilitates 
the objective as one who commits the actus reus. Any 
act that is intended to contribute to the process of 
overthrowing a government is a subversive act. It 
perplexes me that so much has been written about 
subversion, or that the word should not be used 
because it runs contrary to a person's rights under the 
Charter to be a dissident. Certainly CSIS investigators 
must be aware of the difference (which may not always 
have been the case), but subversive acts are not difficult 
to distinguish from acts of protest that should not be 
subject to investigations. For example, if funds are 
raised or guns sent to the I.R.A. from Canada, is that not 
clearly subversion? However, vocal comment or written 
treaties on the "Struggle” are clearly protected under 
the Charter. Examples of subversive acts are difficult to 
find.39 
 
The courts soon pulled back from this rather simplistic view of subversion, 
noting in Al Yamani that the terminology used by Justice Cullen in Shandi was 
“remarkably broad” and would encompass virtually any form of non-violent, lawful 
political opposition.40 
 
In Al Yamani I, the applicant challenged the constitutionality of the use of the 
term subversion as it appeared in the former Immigration Act, arguing that his 
removal under the applicable security certificate scheme would constitute a 
deprivation of his liberty in a manner that was not in accordance with the principles 
                                                        
 
39 Shandi (Re) (1992), 51 F.T.R. 252, at para 17 
40 Al Yamani v Canada (MCI), [2000] 3 FC 433, para 49 [Al Yamani I] 
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of fundamental justice and was therefore a violation of s 7 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.41  Specifically, he argued that the use of the term “subversion” 
had little definable meaning, was overly broad and unconstitutionally vague.  In 
taking into account the variable meanings ascribed to the term, including the earlier 
analysis of Justice Cullen in Shandi, the court agreed that previous interpretation of 
subversion provided no means by which to distinguish it from lawful dissent and 
that the use of the term “subversion” in the Act was unconstitutionally vague in that 
it was "...incapable of framing the legal debate in any meaningful manner or 
structuring discretion in any way."42 
 
Having so concluded, however, the court took the rare measure of concluding 
that the otherwise unconstitutionally broad use of the term subversion was saved 
under section 1 of the Charter as its use could be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society.  It should be noted that earlier jurisprudence (not cited by 
the court in Al Yamani I) had found that infringements of section 7 will typically only 
be saved by the constitutional override of section 1 in situations “arising out of 
exceptional conditions, such as natural disasters, the outbreak of war, epidemics, 
and the like…”43  By finding that the infringing use of the term “subversion” in the 
Immigration Act was saved by section 1, the court thus firmly, if perhaps 
unwittingly, equated the objective of identifying those who have engaged in 
subversion with the seemingly more “exceptional” conditions listed above.   
 
The analysis undertaken by the court under s 1 of the Charter is interesting from 
an immigration perspective because it required, in a legal setting, precisely the kind 
of insider/outsider balancing that moral philosophers (Carens), immigration 
scholars (Dauvergne) and liberal theorists (Rawls) all discuss from the confines of 
                                                        
 
41 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
42 Al Yamani I, supra note 40, at para 62, citing R v Morales [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711. 
43 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 518. 
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the academy.  The s 1 analysis involves a very practical contemplation of the 
membership/equality conundrum; that is, a balancing of state (and collective) 
interests in security (and exclusion) with the individual liberty interests of non-
citizens.   The court in Al Yamani I clearly indicated that for individuals suspected of 
having participated in the subversion of foreign governments, the rights of the latter 
should give way to the interests of the former.   
 
Shortly after the decision in Al Yamani I, the Federal Court of Appeal in Qu 
explored the meaning of subversion and espionage against a "democratic 
government, institution or process," as it appeared at section 19(1)(f) of the 
Immigration Act, the predecessor to section 34(1)(a).44  The case involved a Chinese 
Master’s student at Concordia University in Montreal who participated in the 
activities of a student group that, amongst other things, engaged in human rights 
and pro-democracy work.  The student passed along information about the activities 
of the group to the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, which came to the attention of a visa 
officer after the student had applied for Canadian permanent residence.  As a result, 
the visa officer refused the student’s application on the basis that he had engaged in 
acts of espionage and/or subversion against a democratic government, institution 
or process.  On judicial review of that decision, the Federal Court found that while 
there was no doubt that the appellant had engaged in espionage or subversion, it 
could not conclude that the student group he was trying to subvert was a 
democratic government, institution or process.   
 
The applications judge reviewed the jurisprudence and legislation on the 
meaning of the terms espionage and subversion and concluded as follows: 
“Espionage" is simply a method of information 
gathering--by spying, by acting in a covert way. Its use 
in the analogous term "industrial espionage" conveys 
                                                        
 
44 Qu v Canada (MCI), 2001 FCA 399. 
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the essence of the matter -- information gathering 
surreptitiously. 
"Subversion" connotes accomplishing change by illicit 
means or for improper purposes related to an 
organisation.45 
 
The applications judge further defined "democratic government" in terms of 
political governance, as a system by which citizens govern themselves and in which 
elected representatives make laws; the executive branch administers those laws and 
is responsible for the way it does so. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal did not question the Trial Division's 
understanding of the terms espionage or subversion, but concluded that the 
applications judge had adopted an overly narrow definition of the "fabric" of 
democratic governments, institutions or processes.  In overturning the decision of 
the Trial Division, the court found that the applications judge had erred in 
interpreting the expression "democratic government, institutions or processes" to 
be restricted to institutions and processes involving political, state-based 
governance.46  The expression also encompasses, the court continued, institutions 
and processes which although non-governmental, are integral to the democratic 
fabric of Canada.  Later, the court provided its own broader definition of the 
provision, finding that it merely invokes a “structured group of individuals 
established in accordance with democratic principles with preset goals and 
objectives who are engaged in lawful activities of a political, religious, social or 
economic nature.47 
 
While few would deny that non-governmental organizations can play an 
essential role in the “fabric” of democracy, the open-ended and extremely broad 
                                                        
 
45 Qu v Canada (MCI), [2000] 4 FC 71 (T.D.) at paras 48-49. 
46 Qu v Canada (MCI), 2001 FCA 399 at para 35. 
47 Ibid at para 50. 
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interpretation of democratic institutions in the security-inadmissibility context 
means that “subversion” of virtually any organization with a democratic operating 
structure – from chess clubs to Chinese dissident groups  – could, notionally at least, 
lead to a finding of inadmissibility.  What this means, of course, is that immense 
discretionary power is placed in the hands of first-level decision makers to 
distinguish between the disgruntled member of a local cultural organization and the 
sleeper agent who foments subversion of a foreign government.   The expansive 
scope of judicial interpretation of s 34, together with the correspondingly vast 
discretionary powers conferred on decision-makers, is, as we shall see, a theme to 
which we will repeatedly return. 
 
Recall that under the security inadmissibility regime, there are two separate 
grounds of inadmissibility in relation to subversion, which are, in a sense, mirror 
images of each other.  The first, discussed above, renders inadmissible those who 
have engaged in any form of subversion against a democratic government, while the 
second establishes inadmissibility only for those who have engaged in subversion 
by force, but as against any form of government. 
 
In the case of Oremade,48 the court considered whether a 'bloodless coup' 
amounts to subversion by force.  The applicant, a former Nigerian army officer, was 
found to have engaged in the subversion by force of the Nigerian government 
because of his participation in the planning of a coup which never took place and 
which was planned to be brought about without the use of military force.   
 
A central issue on judicial review of the finding of inadmissibility was whether, 
for the purposes of s 34(1)(b) of the IRPA, the individual concerned need have 
formed the intention of actually using force in subverting a government.  The court 
concluded that while the intention of an individual alleged to have taken part in the 
                                                        
 
48 Oremade v Canada (MCI), 2005 FC 1077 (Oremade I). 
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subversion by force of a government is a relevant consideration, so too is the 
perception of others as to whether the subversion may be  supported by the threat 
of force.  To the extent that the tribunal had found that the issue of intention was 
irrelevant, the court found that it had erred and ordered a new hearing.  However, in 
further finding that s 34(1)(b) is not confined to the actual use of force, the court 
noted: 
However, this intent to subvert by force is not to be 
measured solely from the subjective perspective of the 
Applicant. It may well be that there was a hope or 
expectation that the coup would be bloodless but it is 
also reasonable for persons on the street to assume 
upon seeing armed soldiers occupying lands and 
buildings that force could or would be used if thought 
necessary. 
I agree with the IAD's conclusion that the term "by 
force" is not simply the equivalent of "by violence". "By 
force" includes coercion or compulsion by violent 
means, coercion or compulsion by threats to use violent 
means, and, I would add, reasonably perceived potential 
for the use of coercion by violent means.49 
 
It is important to take a step back for a moment to consider some of the 
implications of the above passage.  In it, we can observe a tendency, common in 
immigration-security matters, to graft criminal law principles onto what Legomsky 
refers to as the procedurally stripped-down “civil regulatory model of immigration 
law.”50  While the Oremade case incorporates the criminal law concept of intent into 
                                                        
 
49 Ibid at para 27.  Because the Federal Court concluded that the tribunal had erred in its finding that 
the applicant’s non-violent intentions were irrelevant, the matter was sent back to a differently 
constituted Immigration Appeal Division member, who confirmed the board’s earlier finding.  This 
finding was later upheld by the Federal Court: Oremade v Canada (MCI), 2006 FC 1189 (Oremade II).  
In that decision, the court referred approvingly with the rationale of the earlier Oremade decision, 
and further confirmed that s 34(1)(b) applies to subversion by force as against all governments, even 
despotic ones: see para 12.  Later, in Suleyman v Canada (MCI) , 2008 FC 780, the court again found 
that the question as to whether the use of force may be justified as a last resort against tyranny is 
essentially irrelevant to the analysis of subversion under s 34(1)(b). 
50 Stephen H Legomsky, “The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal 
Justice Norms” (2007) 28 Immigr Natly Law Rev 679 at 682.  See also Pratt’s discussion of the 
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the analysis of subversion, a measure that would generally be thought to increase 
the legal protections afforded non-citizens, it does so in the context of a low 
threshold of proof and in a manner that essentially hollows it of any meaning.  By 
expanding the meaning of subversion by force to include the “reasonably perceived 
potential for the use of coercion by violent means”, the court casually broke the link, 
essential in criminal law, between the accused’s actions and intentions and replaced 
it with a subjective (“perceived”) and conditional (“potential”) standard, to be 
assessed from the perspective of, well, that is left unsaid.  Is it the reasonably 
perceived potential for the use of force from the perspective of the despotic ruler?  
Or is it the perspective of the general populace that is most relevant?  Or is it simply 
an assessment to be made from the perspective of the immigration officer?  We are 
left to wonder, but it is no surprise that on rehearing the matter based on the 
guidance of the Federal Court, the tribunal again found Mr. Oremade to be 
inadmissible, nor that this decision was subsequently upheld on judicial review.51   
 
In another theme to which we will repeatedly return in this discussion, the court 
in Oremade recognized (and sidestepped) the vast and potentially overreaching 
scope of s 34: 
There is no doubt that paragraph 34(1)(b), had it been 
in force at the relevant times, could have had potentially 
startling impact on historical, and even contemporary 
figures. Arguably such revered and diverse figures as 
George Washington, Eamon De Valera, Menachem Begin 
and Nelson Mandela might be deemed inadmissible to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
concept of ‘immigration penality,’ most notably in "Immigration Penality and the Crime-Security 
Nexus: The Case of Tran Trong Nghi Nguyen" in Karim Ismaili, et al (eds), Canadian Criminal Justice 
Policy: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012) at 276 and “Wanted by the CBSA” in 
Deborah Brock, et al (eds)  Criminalization, Representation, Regulation: Thinking Differently About 
Crime (Toronto: UofT Press, 2014) at 286-7. 
51 Following Oremade, the Minister has attempted to expand the scope of subversion even further, 
arguing (unsuccessfully) in Minister of Public Safety v X (2010), A3-00236 (Immigration and Refugee 
Board) [“IRB”], for example, that subversion equals merely opposition. 
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Canada. With respect, the sweep of paragraph 34(1)(b) 
is not particularly relevant to this applicant.52 
    
As in numerous other decisions, the court noted firstly that Parliament clearly 
intended the provision to have the broad sweep it describes and then concluded 
that it does not lead to “unreasonable” or “ludicrous” results because of the 
availability of the Ministerial override found at s 34(2) of the IRPA.53  As we shall see 
in the coming pages, however, while the intentional overbreadth of s 34(1) has 
remained intact, the scope of the override provision designed to rectify this 
overbreadth has been narrowed. 
 
In considering the ambit of sections 34(1)(a) and (b), it should be noted that the 
court has also on occasion emphasized that first-level decisions must set out with 
some specificity the alleged acts of subversion or espionage and the individual's 
involvement in them.  In Alemu,54 the court found that for decisions under s 
34(1)(a), an officer must engage in a two-step analysis, first to determine whether 
the government, institution or process spied against or subverted should be 
considered a democratic one.  Second, the act of espionage or subversion should be 
specified to make the reasons intelligible.  Under s 34(1)(b), the analysis is "less 
demanding," since engaging in or instituting the subversion by force of any 
government does not require an evaluation of the democratic quality of the 
government subverted.55  This said, a decision-maker rendering a decision under 
this provision must nevertheless specifically identify how the individual concerned 
is alleged to have engaged in subversion.  
 
                                                        
 
52 Oremade I, supra, note 48 at para 17. 
53 Now s 42.1 of the IRPA, ibid at para 18. 
54 Alemu v Canada (MCI), 2004 FC 997. 
55 Ibid, at para 31.  See also the discussion below at section 3.2.4 on Najafi v Canada (MPSEP), 2013 FC 
876 [Najafi], affm’d 2014 FCA 262. 
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2.3.4 Section 34(1)(c): Terrorism 
 
As with many other terms incorporated into the text of s 34, the IRPA provides 
no definition of terrorism and for years it seemed the Federal Courts were hesitant 
to provide any definitional form to the term, preferring to determine on a case by 
case basis whether inadmissibility findings appeared reasonable on the facts.56  The 
hesitancy on the part of the courts to define terrorism stemmed from the inherently 
variable and political meaning of the term, but it did come to be defined in 
international law, most particularly in the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.57 
 
This Convention provides both a "functional" and a "stipulative" definition of 
terrorism.  The functional definition includes an annexed list of treaties which relate 
to acts considered to be terrorist in nature, while the stipulative definition provides 
a more general description of the kinds of acts which may constitute terrorist 
activity.  Article 2(b) of the Convention sets out the stipulative definition: 
Any ... act intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an 
active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act. 
 
In Suresh,58 the Supreme Court adopted the view that the term terrorism could 
be legally defined, if not exhaustively, at least sufficiently to set the proper 
boundaries for legal adjudication.  In finding that the term is subject to intelligible 
definition, its use in the former Immigration Act was found not to be 
unconstitutionally vague and did not violate the Charter.  The court stated: 
                                                        
 
56 See for example Re Baroud, (1995), 98 F.T.R. 99 (T.D.). 
57 GA Res 54/109, Dec. 9, 1999.   
58 Suresh v Canada (MCI), 2002 SCC 1 (Suresh I). 
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In our view, it may safely be concluded, following the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, that "terrorism" in s. 19 of the 
Act includes any "act intended to cause death or serious 
bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not 
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization 
to do or to abstain from doing any act". This definition 
catches the essence of what the world understands by 
"terrorism". Particular cases on the fringes of terrorist 
activity will inevitably provoke disagreement. 
Parliament is not prevented from adopting more 
detailed or different definitions of terrorism. The issue 
here is whether the term as used in the Immigration Act 
is sufficiently certain to be workable, fair and 
constitutional. We believe that it is.59 
 
In addition, s 83.01 of the Canadian Criminal Code now contains a definition of 
terrorist activity and s 14 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 
dovetails with the Code by providing that the findings of fact set out in a criminal 
proceeding regarding terrorism are to be considered conclusive findings of fact by 
decision-makers in the context of s 34 inadmissibility proceedings.   It is notable that 
the definition of terrorism elaborated in the Code includes acts which cause 
property damage, provided that the other essential elements of a terrorist act are 
present. 
 
Following on the heels of the Suresh I decision, the Federal Court in Fuentes,60 
overturned the decision of an adjudicator, in part based on the fact that the 
adjudicator's interpretation of the meaning of terrorism did not coincide with the 
Supreme Court's emphasis on the targeting of civilians as a pre-condition to a 
                                                        
 
59 Ibid at para 98. 
60 Fuentes v Canada (MCI), [2003] 4 F.C. 249. 
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terrorist act.  Similarly, in Zarrin,61 the court overturned another decision, because it 
did not coincide with the clear guidance provided by the Supreme Court as to the 
meaning of terrorism.  The court noted: 
In my view, pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada's 
decision in Suresh, as well as the recent decision of this 
court, Fuentes, the respondent's department now has 
judicial guidance, including particular criteria, that 
should be used in determining whether an organization 
is indeed one that engages or engaged in terrorism. 
Such reasoning should have formed part of the officer's 
decision. [citations omitted] 
 
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Suresh I, cases considering the issue 
of terrorism under s 34 tend to focus on whether decision makers: a) adequately set 
out their understanding of the meaning of the term terrorism; and b) adequately 
apply this understanding to specific events or incidents, in which the individual 
concerned is alleged to be implicated.  In Jalil,62 the court held that the assessment of 
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that an organization has engaged 
in acts of terrorism involves a two-step analysis.  The first step involves a factual 
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
organization in question committed the acts of violence attributed to it. At the 
second step of the analysis, a determination is made as to whether those acts 
constitute acts of terrorism. The officer must provide the definition of terrorism 
relied upon and explain how the listed acts meet that definition. 
 
In Naeem,63 the Federal Court emphasized the need to properly and explicitly 
characterize the acts in question as terrorism, noting that "[a]cts such as 
kidnapping, assault and murder are undoubtedly criminal, but are not necessarily 
acts of terrorism. It was incumbent on the officer to explain why she viewed them to 
                                                        
 
61 Zarrin v Canada (MCI), 2004 FC 332, para 14. 
62 Jalil v Canada (MCI), 2007 FC 568. 
63 Naeem v Canada (MCI), 2007 FC 123. 
 104 
 
be terrorist acts.”64  On this note, it is interesting, if not surprising, that the definition 
of terrorism provided by Citizenship and Immigration Canada in its manual for 
decision-makers on inadmissibility is at the broader end of the spectrum established 
internationally and in the jurisprudence, and, as with the Criminal Code of Canada, is 
not confined to acts carried out against civilians.  The Manual states: 
“terrorism” relates to activities directed toward or in 
support of the threat or use of acts of violence against 
persons or property for the purposes of achieving a 
political objective; an act intended to cause death or 
serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person 
not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to 
compel a government or an international organization 
to do or to abstain from doing any act.65 
 
Following Suresh I, the jurisprudence on terrorism under s 34(1)(c) has focused 
almost entirely on determining whether first-level decisions have complied with an 
almost checklist-like approach to considering the “who”, “what”, “when”, “why” and 
“where” of alleged terrorist acts.  In other words, in the immigration context, the 
courts have not substantively revisited the lawfulness of the terrorism provision, 
but as we shall also see, the focus in the jurisprudence under 34(1)(c) has arisen 
almost entirely within the context of allegations of membership in a terrorist 
organization pursuant to s 34(1)(f) of the IRPA, rather than the actual commission 
of terrorist acts.  It is perhaps for this reason that the substantive jurisprudence on 
terrorism under s 34(1)(c) has been sparse.   
 
 
                                                        
 
64 Ibid, at para 46. 
65 Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, ENF 1 “Inadmissibility” (2008) online: Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada: www.cic.gc.ca at 9. 
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2.3.5 Sections 34(1)(d) and (e): Danger to the Security of Canada or Danger 
to Persons in Canada 
 
In Suresh I, the Supreme Court also considered whether the term 'danger to the 
security of Canada' was unconstitutionally vague.  In finding that the term was not 
overly vague, the court found that the term must be given a broad interpretation.  
Recognizing that the term is difficult to define, is largely context-specific and is 
“political in a general sense,” the court found that a broad and flexible approach is 
required, combined with a highly deferential standard of judicial review.  Provided 
the Minister is able to point to some evidence that reasonably supports a finding of 
danger to the security of Canada, the courts should not interfere with the Minister's 
decision.66 
 
In noting the serious consequences attached to deportation, the court also 
cautioned that, to survive constitutional scrutiny a threat to the security of Canada 
must be a serious one and in providing guidance to first-level decision-makers, the 
court provided the following broad definition of the term: 
These considerations lead us to conclude that a person 
constitutes a "danger to the security of Canada" if he or 
she poses a serious threat to the security of Canada, 
whether direct or indirect, and bearing in mind the fact 
that the security of one country is often dependent on 
the security of other nations. The threat must be 
"serious", in the sense that it must be grounded on 
objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and 
in the sense that the threatened harm must be 
substantial rather than negligible.67 
 
Since Suresh, however, s 34(1)(d) has remained a rarely invoked provision and 
consideration of the term “danger to the security of Canada” has been almost 
entirely confined to a small number of  individuals subject to Canada’s national 
                                                        
 
66 Suresh I, supra note 58 at para 85. 
67Ibid at para 90. 
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security certificate regime and to the usage of the term under s 115 of the IRPA, 
regarding the removal of Convention refugees.68  Section 34(1)(e) of the IRPA, 
which creates a further ground of inadmissibility for those “engaging in acts of 
violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada,” has 
been invoked even less frequently and has received essentially no jurisprudential 
analysis. 
2.3.6 Section 34(1)(f): Membership 
 
Section 34(1)(f) of the Act creates a further ground of inadmissibility for those 
who have not personally committed proscribed acts, but who are, or have been 
members in an organization that has engaged, or will engage in the acts referred to 
in sections 34(1)(a)-(c).  This membership category has proven to be the most 
commonly invoked, hotly contested and controversial security provision.  An 
analysis of inadmissibility under s 34(1)(f) involves two separate assessments.  
First, the decision-maker must determine whether there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the organization in question engages, has engaged or will engage in acts 
referred to in s 34(1)(a)-(c).  Second, the decision-maker must consider whether the 
individual in question is (or was) a member of such an organization, once again on 
the reasonable grounds to believe standard set out at section 33 of the IRPA. 
 
The courts have repeatedly adopted a broad interpretation of the meaning of 
membership as it appears in s 34(1)(f).  The rationale for such a broad and 
unrestricted definition relates, at least in part, to the importance of protecting the 
Canadian public from perceived security threats and to the difficulties associated 
with defining membership in what are often loosely-structured and informal 
organizations.  In an oft-cited passage, future Supreme Court Justice Rothstein (then 
of the Federal Court) framed the issue of membership in the following terms: 
                                                        
 
68 See for example, Canada (MCI) v Harkat, 2014 SCC 37; Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 3; Zûndel, Re, 2005 FC 
295; Mahjoub v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 171; Jaballah v Canada (MCI), 2006 
FCA 179; Nagalingam v Canada (MCI), 2008 FCA 153. 
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The provisions deal with subversion and terrorism. The 
context in immigration legislation is public safety and 
national security, the most serious concerns of 
government. It is trite to say that terrorist organizations 
do not issue membership cards. There is no formal test 
for membership and members are not therefore easily 
identifiable…I think it is obvious that Parliament 
intended the term "member" to be given an unrestricted 
and broad interpretation.69 
 
Similarly, in another Suresh decision, the Federal Court rejected the applicant's 
argument that he was not a member of a terrorist organization because he had not 
taken a membership oath.  Essentially, the court found that, as the applicant had 
participated in other activities that could be considered indicia of membership, he 
was lawfully considered a member for the purposes of determining admissibility.  
The court noted: 
I am satisfied that one can reasonably conclude that an 
individual is a "member" of an organization if one 
devotes one's full time to the organization or almost 
one's full time, if one is associated with members of the 
organization and if one collects funds for the 
organization. This is the case of Suresh. He is known to 
the leadership of the LTTE and has continual contacts 
with them. Whether he took an oath administered by 
the LTTE or not or whether he carries with him a 
cyanide tablet is immaterial. An oath may be required 
today for a person who joins the LTTE for the purpose 
of "fighting" for the LTTE with guns and ammunition 
but one can still be considered a member without taking 
an oath or carrying on his or her person a cyanide 
tablet. 
Membership cannot and should not be narrowly 
interpreted when it involves the issue of Canada's 
national security. Membership also does not only refer 
to persons who have engaged or who might engage in 
terrorist activities.70 
                                                        
 
69 Singh v Canada (MCI) (1998), 151 F.T.R. 101 (T.D.) at para 52. 
70 Suresh v Canada (MCI), 1997 CanLII 5797, at paras 21-22 (Suresh II). 
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At roughly the same time, the court in Chiau found that neither actual or formal 
membership nor active participation in unlawful acts is required to establish 
membership for the purpose of s 34(1)(f).71 
 
Following these decisions, the jurisprudence came to incorporate an 
exceptionally broad approach to considering membership, detaching it entirely from 
any temporal connection to proscribed activity and providing little by way of 
detailed analysis as to what an “unrestricted and broad” interpretation of 
membership should mean.72  As the Federal Court noted in Ugbazghi, “subsection 
34(1) was intended to cast a wide net in order to capture a broad range of conduct 
that is inimical to Canada’s interests.”73 
 
As noted, beyond the fact that membership in proscribed organizations should 
be given a broad interpretation, the courts also found that the term should not be 
bound by any temporal limitations.  Thus in Al Yamani, the court found that even if 
an organization had not engaged in terrorist acts over the course of an individual's 
membership, if the organization later turned to violence the individual may be 
found to be inadmissible.74  Justice Snider of the Federal Court stated in this regard: 
Quite simply, and contrary to the arguments made by 
Mr. Al Yamani, there is no temporal component to the 
analysis in s. 34(1)(f). If there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that an organization engages today in acts of 
terrorism, engaged in acts of terrorism in the past or 
will engage in acts of terrorism in the future, the 
organization meets the test set out in s. 34(1)(f). There 
is no need for the Board to examine whether the 
                                                        
 
71 Chiau v Canada (MCI), [1998] 2 FC 642 (TD), affm’d on other grounds, Chiau, supra note 38. 
72 For but a few examples, see Gebreab v Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 1213, affm’d 2010 FCA 274; 
Kanendra v Canada (MCI), 2005 FC 923; Qureshi v Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 7; Kozonguizi v Canada 
(MCI), 2010 FC 308. 
73 Ugbazghi v Canada (MPSEP), 2008 FC 694 at para 47. 
74 Al Yamani, 2006 FC 1457 [Al Yamani II]. 
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organization has stopped its terrorist acts or whether 
there was a period of time when it did not carry out any 
terrorist acts. 
Membership by the individual in the organization is 
similarly without temporal restrictions. The question is 
whether the person is or has been a member of that 
organization. There need not be a matching of the 
person's active membership to when the organization 
carried out its terrorist acts.75 
 
While this result may have appeared harsh, the Justice concluded that the 
exemption clause under (the then) s 34(2) of the IRPA allowed the Minister to 
excuse from inadmissibility those whose membership in a terrorist organization 
may have been innocent.  The assertion that there is no temporal dimension to the 
security-inadmissibility analysis has been the prevailing wisdom in the 
jurisprudence for several years76 and, at least for now, remains good, if not 
unquestioned, law.77  The result, at times, borders on the bizarre.  It means that past 
                                                        
 
75 Ibid, at paras 11-12. 
76 Gebreab v Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 1213, affm’d 2010 FCA 274: the s 34(1)(f) analysis requires no 
“matching up” of periods of membership with periods of proscribed activity; Tjiueza v Canada (MCI), 
2009 FC 1260 confirming that s 34(1)(f) applies if (in that case) subversion by force occurred prior 
to, during, or even after an individual ceases to be a member; Monge Contreras v Canada (MCI), 2010 
FC 246 reiterating that inadmissibility may arise, on the reasonable grounds to believe standard, for 
future acts of terrorism that an organization may carry out. 
77 Recently in El Warfalli v Canada (MPSEP), 2013 FC 612, the Federal Court expressed some 
misgivings about the notion that the timing of an individual’s membership in an organization is 
entirely irrelevant to the s 34(1) analysis.  The applicant was a Libyan physician who worked for a 
Saudi charitable organization in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. Several years after he left the organization, 
the UN placed the Bosnian branch of the organization on a terror watch list because of events that 
took place after the applicant had left the organization. This later led to a finding that the applicant, 
who had been found to be a Convention refugee in Canada, was inadmissible to Canada pursuant to s 
34(1)(f) of the IRPA.  In what may prove to be a shift from the Al Yamani II line of jurisprudence, the 
court concluded that it was an error for the board to have found the applicant inadmissible for 
membership in a terrorist organization when the organization had not taken part in any terror-
related activities until after the applicant had left it. Justice Mandamin found in this respect (at para. 
62): 
The difficulty arising from the Board's interpretation of's. 34(1)(f) 
is to associate individuals with future terrorism retroactively to the 
period of their membership, without any regard to honest and 
lawful participation at the time of the membership. In effect, any 
permanent resident or foreign national who is a member of any 
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membership in an organization that has never engaged in proscribed activity, but 
takes up such activity after the period of membership has ended results in 
inadmissibility.  It similarly means that membership in an organization that, at 
virtually any period in history, engaged in subversion or that committed even a 
single act of terrorism can result in an inadmissibility finding, even if that 
organization disavowed the use of violence decades before the individual in 
question became a member.   
 
Also in contrast to other contexts, the courts in security-inadmissibility 
proceedings have rejected arguments that minors should be exempt from 
inadmissibility for membership in terrorist/subversive organizations.  In Poshteh, 
the Federal Court of Appeal upheld a finding of inadmissibility despite the fact that 
the appellant was a minor at all relevant times of his (informal) membership in an 
Iranian group known as the MEK.  The court noted that the IRPA specifically bars 
inadmissibility findings against minors who have committed criminal offences and 
have been convicted under Canada’s Youth Criminal Justice Act.  The lack of any 
similar reference to minors in the security context suggested to the court that no 
categorical distinction was to be made between adults and minors.  Rather, the 
court found that an individual's status as a minor is “simply a further consideration” 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
organization, by this interpretation of's. 34(1)(f), has a Sword of 
Damocles suspended indefinitely over his or her head should the 
organization they once had been a member [of] become engaged in 
terrorist activities in the future. 
 
In considering the wording of s.34(1)(f), which clearly contains a future component to it (will engage 
in terrorism), the court found that the reasonable grounds to believe standard must be considered 
from the time at which an individual was a member.  This approach, Justice Mandamin concluded, 
provides for a nexus between membership and future organizational activity associated with 
terrorism. It provides for the requisite national security and public safety objectives. Importantly, it 
does not include within s 34(1)(f) individuals who are themselves innocent of the conduct of the 
organization in the future : para. 78.  
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to be made in the individualized assessment of membership made under s 
34(1)(f).78   
 
Furthermore, flowing from the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Suresh I, 
the Minister has argued that even non-voluntary acts, i.e. those made under coercion 
or duress, are sufficient to attract liability under s 34(1)(f) if the acts themselves 
constitute membership under the broad and unrestricted definition of the term.  In 
such situations, the Minister has contended, the involuntariness of the individual’s 
actions is only relevant to an application for relief of inadmissibility under s 34(2) 
(now s 42.1) of the IRPA.79 
 
Beyond the broad statutory language and expansive jurisprudence associated 
with the definition of membership under s 34(1)(f), it is also of note that the mere 
fact of employing membership as a form of proscribed activity is viewed in other 
(even immigration) contexts as a legally and empirically dubious proposition.  
Imposing sanctions against individuals for membership in an organization is 
typically a form of third party liability.  It is not the membership, per se, that is of 
concern, but rather the criminal actions of other members of that collectivity that 
give rise to liability.  However, in international criminal law and the law of refugee 
exclusion mere membership in an organization that has committed international 
crimes is never sufficient in and of itself to attract legal liability.80  Beyond 
membership, there must be some evidence that the individual contributed, not just 
                                                        
 
78 Poshteh v Canada (MCI), 2005 FCA 85 [Poshteh] at para 45. 
79 See Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness v. X, Immigration and Refugee Board, 
Immigration Division, ID File No. B0-00824 (April 14, 2011) at para 29, citing Suresh I, supra note 55 
at para 110 and Canada (MPSEP) v Agraira, 2011 FCA 103 at para 64, affm’d (on other grounds), 
2013 SCC 36. 
80 For a recent, comprehensive review of developments in the law of complicity vis-à-vis both 
international criminal law and refugee law, see Ezokola v Canada (MCI), 2013 SCC 40; R (JS) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 15 at 42-44 and 55; Xu Sheng Gao v. United 
States Attorney General, 500 F.3d 93 (2007) and Attorney-General (Minister of Immigration) v. Tamil X 
[2010] NZSC 107 at paras 58-70. 
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to the organization itself, but to the criminal purpose of the organization to attract 
some form of liability.81 
 
Imposing consequences for membership alone amounts to a form of absolute 
liability that requires, in some senses, neither actus reus, nor mens rea in any 
unlawful activity.  While this approach may appear unproblematic when considering 
organizations with, in the language of Canadian refugee law, a “limited and brutal 
purpose,” the reality is that the vast majority of organizations implicated in 
allegations of terrorism and subversion are multifaceted organizations with a 
myriad of distinct purposes, some social, some humanitarian, some political and 
some violent.  Membership alone in a death squad may well give rise to legitimate 
concerns, but the moral implications of membership in large and varied 
organizations are infinitely more complex.  It is for this reason that the Supreme 
Court of Canada recently affirmed in Ezokola that any analysis of complicity in 
international crimes cannot result in the exclusion of refugee claimants for mere 
membership or for a failure to dissociate from a multi-faceted organization which 
has committed war crimes.82  Rather, the evidence must indicate that, beyond 
membership, the individual has made a substantial contribution not simply to the 
organization, but to the criminal element within the organization.  The Supreme 
Court stated in Ezokola: 
In sum, the foregoing approaches to complicity all 
require a nexus between the individual and the group’s 
crime or criminal purpose.  An individual can be 
complicit without being present at the crime and 
without physically contributing to the crime.  However, 
the UNHCR has explained, and other states parties have 
recognized, that to be excluded from the definition of 
refugee protection, there must be evidence that the 
                                                        
 
81 Ezokola, ibid, at paras 8, 29, 36. 
82 Ezokola, ibid, at para 74. 
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individual knowingly made at least a significant 
contribution to the group’s crime or criminal purpose.83 
 
The recent findings of appellate courts around the world on the application of 
the exclusion clauses to those accused of international crimes84 all flow more or less 
directly from a surge of developments on the issue of complicity in international 
criminal law.  These developments, tied to the ad hoc war crimes tribunals for 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the promulgation of the Rome Statute85 and the creation of 
the International Criminal Court, provide varying analyses as to when third parties 
will be found responsible for international crimes, but they all coalesce around the 
consensus that mere association is not sufficient to ground liability.  There is 
agreement, in other words, that individuals are simply not responsible for the 
crimes of others by sole virtue of their common membership in a given collective.  It 
is not a particularly controversial assertion to suggest, therefore, that the security-
inadmissibility regime is a clear outlier in the manner in which it attributes both 
responsibility and legal consequence to those deemed to belong to organizations 
that have engaged in terrorism or subversion. 
 
Following on the heels of the Ezokola decision, one Federal Court justice raised 
the question as to whether the Supreme Court’s analysis of complicity in the context 
of the Refugee Convention could find application to the question of membership 
under s 34 of the IRPA.  In Joseph, Justice O’Reilly stated: 
In my view, while Ezokola dealt with the issue of 
exclusion from refugee protection, the Court's concern 
that individuals should not be found complicit in 
wrongful conduct based merely on their association 
with a group engaged in international crimes logically 
extends to the issue of inadmissibility. At a minimum, to 
exclude a person from refugee protection there must be 
                                                        
 
83 Ibid at para 77. 
84 Supra note 80. 
85 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, art 25. 
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proof that the person knowingly or recklessly 
contributed in a significant way to the group's crimes or 
criminal purposes (at para 68). Similarly, it seems to me 
that to find a person inadmissible to Canada based on 
his or her association with a particular terrorist group, 
there must be evidence that the person had more than 
indirect contact with that group.86 
 
These obiter comments opened the door to more fulsome arguments in 
subsequent cases on the implications of the Ezokola decision on the membership 
analysis conducted under s 34.87  The door was soon closed.  Other justices on the 
Federal Court disagreed with the stance of Justice O’Reilly in Joseph, concluding that 
the Ezokola complicity analysis was essentially irrelevant to the assessment of 
membership under s 34.  And in Kanagendren, the Federal Court of Appeal 
unambiguously endorsed this view.88  More specifically, the court found that while 
the Ezokola decision does have direct bearing on the interpretation of 
inadmissibility under s 35(1) of the IRPA, the same cannot be said for the 
interpretation of s 34(1)(f), which neither requires nor contemplates a complicity 
analysis in the context of determining membership.89  In arriving at this conclusion, 
the court acknowledged that the other provisions of s 34 related to the actual 
commission of acts could engage a consideration of complicity, but as I shall 
illustrate below, this is of little practical effect as the vast majority of s34 cases 
involve allegations of inadmissibility based on membership.90 
 
The use of membership alone as a basis for inadmissibility exponentially 
increases the scope of the security regime.  As indicated, it captures not only the 
perpetrators of international crimes, and not only those who have furthered the 
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2014 FC 85; Haqi v Canada (MCI), 2014 FC 1167. 
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90 Ibid at para 25. 
 115 
 
illicit goals of subversive or terrorist organizations, but also a broad swath of 
individuals whose relationship to such organizations is both marginal and 
innocuous.  As noted above, when combined with the broad definitions of terrorism 
and subversion, the reach of the security-inadmissibility regime metastasizes, 
extending to an ambit of individuals who most would agree are of no concern from a 
national-security perspective.   
 
To again borrow the words of Peter Shuck, it also makes the realm of security-
inadmissibility something of a maverick even within the larger maverick of 
immigration law, “radically insulated and divergent from those fundamental 
norms…that animate the rest of our legal system.”91  Or, to channel Dyzenhaus once 
more, the striking breadth of the security inadmissibility regime, together with the 
steadfast refusal of the courts to reign it in, has given rise to a gaping legal grey hole.  
Recall for a moment what Dyzenhaus’ means by the term.  Legal grey holes arise in 
situations where “there are some legal constraints on executive action…but the 
constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it 
pleases.”92  In other words, legal grey holes exist within legal domains, but are 
governed by a razor thin conception of the rule of law that confers virtually 
unlimited authority on the executive. 
 
The incontrovertible fact of the security-inadmissibility regime is that it doesn’t 
just capture those who have taken part in unlawful coups d’etat and terrorism, and 
it is not even limited to “George Washington, Eamon De Valera, Menachem Begin 
and Nelson Mandela,” to refer back to the decision of the Federal Court in Oremade I.  
Notionally at least, the scope of s34 extends to any present, former or future 
member of the militaries of, for example, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, 
Russia, France, Australia and Poland, all of which have engaged in the subversion by 
                                                        
 
91 Peter H Schuck, “The Transformation of Immigration Law” (1984) 84 Colum L Rev 1 at 1. 
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force of governments; to anyone affiliated with the current ANC government in 
South Africa; to every Russian former member of the Communist Party; and the list 
goes on, almost ad infinitum.  In other words, the security-inadmissibility regime 
more or less permits the government to “do as it pleases” in the precise manner 
described by Dyzenhaus.  The reality of course is that s34 is not generally applied to 
such individuals and this fact, combined with an examination of the kinds of persons 
who are subjected to s34 proceedings, lies at the very core of this dissertation. 
 
Of all the jurisprudence on the application of s34(1)(f), perhaps no case 
highlights its anachronistic nature more than that which arose around a planned 
visit to Canada of British Member of Parliament George Galloway.  In 2010, the 
controversial Galloway was invited to Canada to speak about his spearheading of aid 
caravans to the Gaza Strip.  As a citizen of a visa-exempt country, Galloway was not 
required to obtain an entrance visa prior to entering Canada, but some two weeks 
before his planned visit, Galloway was informed that a preliminary assessment had 
been conducted in relation to his admissibility to Canada. The assessment suggested 
that he might be inadmissible under s 34 of the IRPA because of his donations to the 
Hamas-led government of the Gaza Strip.  At the same time, however, it was 
abundantly clear from the record that the only reason why the admissibility 
assessment was conducted in the first place was at the instigation of political 
officials in the Minister of Citizenship's office.  
 
As a result of the assessment, Galloway cancelled his planned trip and instead 
addressed his audiences by way of a video link.  Galloway, together with the 
organizations and individuals who had invited him then sought judicial review of 
the “decision” that had been communicated to him.93  Leave was granted in respect 
of the judicial review, but the application was ultimately dismissed on the basis that 
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the correspondence to Mr. Galloway was not a decision subject to judicial review.  
Despite this finding, the court proceeded to conduct a review of the preliminary 
admissibility assessment, in the event that it had erred in finding that it was not a 
reviewable decision. In this respect, the court noted that it was "clear that the efforts 
to keep Mr. Galloway out of the country had more to do with antipathy to his 
political views than with any real concern that he had engaged in terrorism or was a 
member of a terrorist organization."94  In addition, the individuals who had initiated 
the effort to find Mr. Galloway inadmissible appeared to have given "no 
consideration…to the interests of those Canadians who wished to hear Mr. Galloway 
speak, or the values of freedom of expression and association enshrined in the 
Charter..."95 
 
In considering the inadmissibility assessment on its merits, the court further 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Galloway 
was a de facto member of a terrorist organization or had engaged in acts of 
terrorism.  It was, therefore, unreasonable for the Minister to rely on those grounds 
to deem him inadmissible to Canada. In particular, the court noted that the 
donations made by Mr. Galloway were clearly for humanitarian purposes and, as 
such, were not sufficient to bring him under the rubric of inadmissibility under s.34 
of the IRPA. While donations to a government led by an organization such as Hamas 
may be sufficient to ground an inadmissibility finding, the intention behind the 
donations was found (at least in this case) to be a relevant factor that was not 
considered in the assessment. In this regard, the court noted: 
The Court is not so naïve as to believe that Hamas is 
above taking advantage of the goodwill of others who 
contribute funds to them for humanitarian reasons. To 
suggest, however, that contributions to Hamas for such 
purposes makes the donor a party to any terrorist 
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crimes committed by the organization goes beyond the 
parliamentary intent and the legislative language. The 
purpose to which the funds are donated must be to 
enhance the ability of the organization to facilitate or 
carry out a terrorist activity. Absent such a purpose, the 
mere assertion that material support was provided to 
such an organization is not sufficient. To hold otherwise 
could ensnare innocent Canadians who make donations 
to organizations they believe, in good faith, to be 
engaged in humanitarian works.96 
 
The Toronto Coalition to Stop the War case is instructive on a number of levels.  
First, as I shall illustrate below, it is one of the very few s34 security cases involving 
an individual from a “Western” country and it is, of course, notable that the 
inadmissible conduct in question relates to support for an organization (albeit one 
designated as engaging in terrorism) from the Global South.  Second, the somewhat 
embarrassing facts that came to light in the course of the litigation in the case reveal 
both: a) the vulnerability of the s 34 process to executive manipulation; and b) the 
central role that discretion plays in the determination as to who will, and who will 
not become subject to s34 proceedings.   
2.3.7 Ministerial waivers of inadmissibility – Section 42.1 (Formerly Section 
34(2)) 
 
As noted above, persons who would otherwise be inadmissible to Canada 
pursuant to s 34(1) of the IRPA may nevertheless be permitted to enter (or remain 
in) the country if the Minister concludes that their presence in Canada would not be 
detrimental to the national interest.97  The existence of an exemption clause has 
                                                        
 
96 Ibid, at para 110 
97 See s 42.1 of the IRPA.  The relevant Minister is the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness and the decision-making authority is non-delegable: see s 6(3) of the IRPA .  These 
national interest decisions have repeatedly been found to be highly discretionary in nature, in part 
owing to the national security concerns involved and the Minister’s relative expertise in this area: see 
Miller v Canada (Solicitor General), 2006 FC 912, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1164, at para. 42; and Al Yamani v 
Canada (MPSEP), 2007 FC 381 at paras. 38-39; Tameh v Canada (MPSEP), 2008 FC 884 at paras. 34-
36.  
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both protected the security provisions from constitutional scrutiny and justified a 
broad interpretation of inadmissibility under s 34(1).   
 
In Suresh I, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld what was essentially the 
predecessor to s 34(1) in the former Immigration Act, at least in part because of the 
existence of a national interest exemption clause.  The court stated: 
We believe that it was not the intention of Parliament to 
include in the s.19 class of suspect persons those who 
innocently contribute to or become members of 
terrorist organizations.  This is supported by the 
provision found at the end of s. 19, which exempts from 
the s. 19 classes "persons who have satisfied the 
Minister that their admission would not be detrimental 
to the national interest". Section 19 must therefore be 
read as permitting a refugee to establish that his or her 
continued residence in Canada will not be detrimental 
to Canada, notwithstanding proof that the person is 
associated with or is a member of a terrorist 
organization.  This permits a refugee to establish that 
the alleged association with the terrorist group was 
innocent.  In such case, the Minister, exercising her 
discretion constitutionally, would find that the refugee 
does not fall within the targeted s. 19 class of persons 
eligible for deportation on national security grounds.98 
 
This passage has been cited by the lower courts in rejecting arguments that s 
34(1)(f) violates constitutionally protected equality rights, liberty interests and 
rights to freedom of expression.99  The availability of an exemption has also 
provided perhaps the single greatest justification for the expansive interpretation of 
s 34(1) with the courts adopting the view that the security provisions are to be read 
as an integrated whole with the national interest waiver always running in the 
background to remedy any injustices that may arise as a result of an overly broad 
                                                        
 
98 Suresh I, supra note 58, at para 110. 
99 See Al Yamani II, supra note 74 at paras 41-57. 
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approach to the s 34(1) process.100  In theory, this may be an understandable 
assertion; the empirical reality, as I shall set out below, tells a starkly different story.  
 
In any event, because the prevailing view was that the national interest waiver 
constituted a safeguard against a (potentially) overbroad security provision, it too 
was implemented broadly, taking into consideration a wide range of factors.  The 
Minister's role was not to reassess the s 34(1) decision, but was rather aimed at 
determining, notwithstanding an applicant’s inadmissibility under s 34(1), whether 
it would be detrimental to the national interest for that person to remain in Canada.  
This being the case, the assumption for many years was that the national interest 
determination needed to take into consideration several factors, including any 
evidence that: a) contextualized the facts underlying the individual’s inadmissibility 
finding; b) established that the individual no longer posed a threat to national 
security or public safety; and c) demonstrated that the person has contributed 
productively to Canadian society.101  The relevant Citizenship and Immigration 
training manual, until recently, set out the following relevant considerations:  
 
? Will the applicant's entry into Canada be offensive to the Canadian 
public? 
? Have all ties with the regime/organization been completely severed? 
? Is there any indication that the applicant might be benefiting from 
assets obtained while a member of the organization? 
                                                        
 
100 Singh, supra note 69 at paras 49-52.  In 1992, officials with what was then known as the 
Department of Employment and Immigration testified before a parliamentary committee that the 
intent in drafting the national interest exemption (then found at subparagraph 19(1)(f)(iii)(B) of the 
Immigration Act,  RSC 1985 c29 was to "define broadly with a discretion" to exclude from 
inadmissibility those whose presence in Canada, in the Minister's opinion, would not be detrimental 
to the national interest, see Singh, supra note 69 at para 50. 
101 See for example Momenzadeh v Canada (MPSEP), 2008 FC 884 and (yet) another decision 
concerning the Palestinian Issam Al Yamani: Al Yamani v Canada (MPSEP), 2007 FC 381 (Al Yamani 
III). 
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? Is there any indication that the applicant may be benefiting from 
previous membership in the regime/organization? 
? Has the person adopted the democratic values of Canadian society?102 
 
This prevailing view about the scope of the national interest waiver was shared 
by the courts, immigration counsel and the Minister until a somewhat bizarre 
sequence of events commenced with the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Agraira.103  Muhsen Agraira was a citizen of Libya who claimed to fear persecution 
in that country because of his participation in the Libyan National Salvation Front 
(LNSF), an anti-Gadaffi (and CIA backed) organization that, at some points, was also 
alleged to be aligned with Libyan Islamic opposition groups, who in turn were 
thought to have links to Al Qaeda.  The Immigration and Refugee Board disbelieved 
his story and rejected his claim to refugee status, largely on credibility grounds.  
Later, Mr. Agraira married a Canadian citizen who attempted to sponsor him for 
permanent residence.  The application was refused under s 34(1)(f) of the IRPA, 
somewhat ironically, on the basis of Mr. Agraira’s affiliation with the LNSF.  Agraira 
then submitted a request for Ministerial relief which was also eventually refused, 
the refusal decision consisting entirely of the following: 
After having reviewed and considered the material and 
evidence submitted in its entirety as well as specifically 
considering these issues: 
? The applicant offered contradictory and 
inconsistent accounts of his involvement with 
the Libyan National Salvation Front (LNSF). 
                                                        
 
102 Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, ENF 2 - Evaluating Inadmissibility, (2009) 
online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada www.cic.gc.ca at para 13.6; also found at Canada, 
Department of Citizenship and Immigration, IP 10 Refusal of National Security Cases\Processing of 
National Interest Requests Guidelines (2009) online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
www.cic.gc.ca at Appendix D.  Note, however, that due to subsequent jurisprudential events 
discussed below and legislative changes, these sections of the immigration manuals have been 
expunged. 
103 Canada (MPSEP) v Agraira, 2011 FCA 103. 
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? There is clear evidence that the LNSF is a 
group that has engaged in terrorism and has 
used terrorist violence in attempts to 
overthrow a government. 
? There is evidence that LNSF has been aligned 
at various times with Libyan Islamic 
opposition groups that have links to Al-
Qaeda. 
? It is difficult to believe that the applicant, 
who in interviews with officials indicated at 
one point that he belonged to a “cell” of the 
LNSF which operated to recruit and raise 
funds for LNSF, was unaware of the LNSF’s 
previous activity. 
It is not in the national interest to admit individuals 
who have had sustained contact with known terrorist 
and/or terrorist-connected organizations. Ministerial 
relief is denied.104 
 
On judicial review of this decision, the Federal Court found that the Minister's 
decision "turned on the simplistic view that the presence in Canada of someone who 
at some time in the past may have belonged to a terrorist organization abroad can 
never be in the national interest of Canada.”105  The court criticized the circular 
reasoning of the Minister, which amounted to a finding that an individual who 
commits an act described in s 34(1) cannot secure Ministerial discretion because he 
committed the very act that confers jurisdiction on the Minister to exercise 
discretion under then s 34(2).  This analysis, the court concluded, renders the 
exercise of Ministerial discretion in these cases meaningless.  In granting the 
application for judicial review, the court certified a question of general importance 
for consideration by the Federal Court of Appeal,106 which had earlier been certified 
                                                        
 
104 Ibid at para 20. 
105 Agraira v Canada (MPSEP), 2009 FC 1302, para. 27, citing Kanaan v Canada (MPSEP), 2008 FC 241, 
para 8.  
106 Immigration matters that come before the Federal Courts in Canada are subject to a unique set of 
procedural measures, all aimed at circumscribing appeal rights.  Interlocutory matters may not be 
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in a different case, that of Abdella, 2009 FC 1199.  The certified question sought to 
clarify the specificity with which the Minister was required to refer to and consider 
the broad factors for Ministerial relief set out in the relevant guidelines and referred 
to above.107 
 
On appeal by the Minister, the Federal Court of Appeal rendered a decision in the 
Minister’s favour, but based on reasons that had not been raised by either of the 
parties.  At the outset of its decision, the court noted this was the first case to come 
before it on the topic of Ministerial relief since the promulgation of the IRPA and, 
more importantly, since the subsequent transfer of responsibility for rendering 
relief decisions from the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to the Minister of 
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.  The court found both the increased 
emphasis on security under the IRPA and the transfer of decision making authority 
to the Minister of Public Safety to be relevant in determining the function and nature 
of the relief provision. The court emphasized that the burden in ministerial relief 
cases is squarely on the applicant, and that the overriding consideration for the 
Minister to consider is that of public safety.  Other factors, such as those listed in the 
immigration manual and factors related to the personal situation of the applicant 
were found by the court to be not particularly relevant to relief applications and, the 
court concluded, are more appropriately raised in an application to the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration for humanitarian and compassionate relief under s 25 
of the IRPA.  In response to the argument that the decision under appeal simply 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
appealed and for any final decision to be appealed, the applications judge who presides over the case 
must state and certify a question of general importance: see s 74(d) of the IRPA.  While clearly 
outside the scope of this work, an appellate regime in which a first instance judge is tasked with 
determining whether his/her own decision may be appealed is itself a startling example of the 
exceptional or “maverick” status of immigration law in the larger legal order. 
107 The specific question was this: 
When determining a ss. 34(2) application, must the Minister of 
Public Safety consider any specific factors in assessing whether a 
foreign national's presence in Canada would be contrary to the 
national interest? Specifically, must the Minister consider the five 
factors listed in the Appendix D of IP10? 
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reiterated the original inadmissibility determination, rendering the relief provision 
redundant, the court found that such provisions still have a role, but ostensibly only 
when membership in a proscribed organization was innocent or unknowing.108 
 
This interpretation of the role of the Ministerial relief provision in the statutory 
scheme of the IRPA appeared to come as a surprise to all parties.  It explicitly 
rejected the approach taken by the Minister himself (as articulated in the 
immigration manuals) and provided a striking illustration of the securitization of 
immigration decision-making.  Above I spoke of the important symbolism attached 
to the shift of certain immigration matters to an agency responsible for enforcement 
and security.  The Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Agraira, however, went far 
beyond symbolism, adding interpretive meaning to the shift in a manner that not 
even the Minister of Public Safety had contemplated. 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Agraira raised another interesting question as 
to whether the narrowed threshold for obtaining Ministerial relief would actually (if 
unintentionally) become easier to meet, given that the only relevant factor in 
considering whether to grant Ministerial relief now appeared to be that of public 
safety.  Put another way, if the sole criterion on Ministerial relief applications was 
now public safety, would an individual necessarily qualify for relief if it were 
established that he/she posed no threat to Canadian society?  This was the implied 
finding of the Federal Court in Khalil,109 a case that arose shortly after the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Agraira.  As a result, the government quickly introduced the 
amended version of the national interest exemption, now found at s 42.1 of the 
IRPA, which appears to both codify the Federal Court of Appeal’s interpretation of 
the national interest exemption and simultaneously to retreat from its unanticipated 
                                                        
 
108 Agraira, supra note 103 at paras 61-65. 
109 Khalil v Canada (MPSEP), 2011 FC 1332. 
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consequences.  The result borders on the unintelligible; s42.1(3) of the IRPA now 
states: 
In determining whether to make a declaration, the 
Minister may only take into account national security 
and public safety considerations, but, in his or her 
analysis, is not limited to considering the danger that 
the foreign national presents to the public or the 
security of Canada.110 
 
The meaning of this provision is, on its face, difficult to discern, but read in 
context, it appears to be aimed at prohibiting applicants from raising humanitarian 
and compassionate considerations in a Ministerial relief application, while 
preserving the ability of the Minister to deny applications of individuals who clearly 
do not pose a threat to national security.  As noted above, the Federal Court of 
Appeal found that the personal circumstances of an applicant for Ministerial relief, 
i.e. factors not directly related to public safety or security, were more appropriately 
considered under the separate humanitarian and compassionate decision-making 
process established under s 25 of the IRPA.  Of interest, however, is that, as noted 
above, another significant change brought about by the Faster Removal of Foreign 
Criminals Act was the elimination of access to s 25 for those found to be inadmissible 
pursuant to, amongst other provisions, s 34.111  That which the court giveth, the 
government taketh away.   
                                                        
 
110 FRFCA, supra note 22 at s 18 
111 Ibid at s 9, 10.  The newly amended s 25(1) of the IRPA states:  
25. (1) Subject to subsection (1.2), the Minister must, on 
request of a foreign national in Canada who applies for 
permanent resident status and who is inadmissible — 
other than under section 34, 35 or 37 — or who does 
not meet the requirements of this Act, and may, on 
request of a foreign national outside Canada — other 
than a foreign national who is inadmissible under 
section 34, 35 or 37 — who applies for a permanent 
resident visa, examine the circumstances concerning 
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In yet a further wrinkle, the day after the FRFCA came into force, the Supreme 
Court of Canada issued its decision in the appeal of the Agraira case, and while it 
ultimately upheld the Minister’s refusal to grant relief, it also overturned the Federal 
Court of Appeal’s holding on the narrow scope of the (now repealed) relief 
provision.112  The court questioned the reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal on 
the significance of the transfer of responsibility for Ministerial relief applications 
from the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to the Public Safety Minister.  In 
rejecting the view that the transfer essentially eliminated all concerns other than 
those related to national security in determining national interest waivers, the court 
found that incorporating a transfer of Ministerial responsibility into an analysis of 
statutory meaning would represent a new and “perplexing” principle of 
interpretation.113 The court also made reference to the key concern of the Federal 
Court, namely that an interpretation of the waiver provision that focuses only on 
security renders it entirely illusory for those already found inadmissible for security 
concerns.  At the very least, such an approach would make it categorically 
impossible for individuals found inadmissible under certain categories of s 34(1) to 
obtain relief, leading the court to conclude that this was an “absurd interpretation 
which must be avoided.”114  What remains to be seen, however, is how the new s 
42.1 will be interpreted, given that it codifies into law the precise absurdity referred 
to by the Supreme Court.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
the foreign national and may grant the foreign national 
permanent resident status or an exemption from any 
applicable criteria or obligations of this Act if the 
Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by 
humanitarian and compassionate considerations 
relating to the foreign national, taking into account the 
best interests of a child directly affected. 
112 Agraira v Canada (MPSEP) 2013 SCC 36 [Agraira SCC]. 
113 Ibid at para 74. 
114 Ibid at para 83. 
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In any event, the (curiously-timed) result of the Court’s decision is, at least on 
this point, relatively moot, given the changed wording of the Ministerial relief 
provision and the now explicitly narrow scope provided under s 42.1(3).  What is 
not moot, however, is the actual bulk of the court’s decision which, as with a surfeit 
of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, transcended the substantive issues on 
appeal and became something of a meditation on judicial deference and 
administrative action.115 
 
While the Supreme Court in Agraira acknowledged that it was not able to 
“determine with finality” the actual reasoning of the Minister, it looked instead at 
the reasons that could have been offered for the Minister's decision.116  In 
embarking on this search for a possible rationale, the court found that, implicit in 
the Minister's brief decision, was an interpretation of the national interest that 
related “predominantly to national security and public safety, but does not exclude 
the other important considerations outlined in the Guidelines or any analogous 
considerations.”117  The court then noted that the Minister was entitled to deference 
in regard to this attributed interpretation and concluded that the decision was 
reasonable.   
 
An analysis of the increased emphasis on deference emanating from the 
Supreme Court of Canada is, at least for present purposes, outside the scope of this 
discussion.  This said, as we move on to an analysis of decisions made under both s 
34(1) and the national interest exemption, it is important to recall that, increasingly, 
                                                        
 
115 See for example: Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 
SCC 53, [2011] 3 SCR 471 [Mowat]; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and 
Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 SCR 708 [Newfoundland Nurses]; Alberta 
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 SCR 
654 [Alberta Teachers]; Smith v. Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2011 SCC 7, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160 [Smith] and 
Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 SCR 
364 [Halifax]. 
116 Agraira SCC, supra note 98 at para 58, citing Alberta Teachers, Ibid. 
117 Ibid at paras 63-64. 
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these decisions will be the final word on whether a person is or is not deemed an 
inadmissible security threat.  In the exceptional realm of the security-migration 
nexus, which combines high stakes rights interests and low-grade procedural 
protections, the retreat of the court is of concern, calling to mind the now infamous 
(and lamentable) words of the United States Supreme Court in the Chinese exclusion 
case: 
If, therefore, the government of the United States, 
through its legislative department, considers the 
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, 
who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its 
peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed 
because at the time there are no actual hostilities with 
the nation of which the foreigners are subjects…[and in 
such cases] its determination is conclusive upon the 
judiciary.”118 
   
Before turning to the empirical data, however, I turn now to a brief exploration 
of the human rights principles at stake in these proceedings to illustrate why these 
decisions matter so profoundly to those subject to them. 
2.3.8 Why Inadmissibility Matters: Section 34 and Refugee Status 
 
As I have discussed above, immigration has historically, and persistently, been 
viewed as a matter of the receiving state’s prerogative.  Countries may, at least in 
theory, legitimately choose who to admit and how narrowly or broadly to exclude 
those who have taken part in foreign conflicts.  The commonly accepted exception to 
state discretion regarding admission is in the area of asylum where the majority of 
states have agreed to limit their sovereignty to allow those at risk of persecution in 
their respective countries of origin the right to assert a claim for asylum and to 
receive protection from persecution.119   
                                                        
 
118 Per Justice Field in the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
119 See the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150, entered into 
force April 22, 1954, [Refugee Convention], but even before the Refugee Convention came into 
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The obligation not to return refugees to persecution, the principle of non-
refoulement, is firmly entrenched in international discourse and has become, at least 
according to some commentators a jus cogens principle of international law, from 
which no derogation is permitted.120  Recognizing the limits to state’s willingness to 
accede to this regime, the drafters of the Refugee Convention incorporated into it 
exceptions – known as the exclusion clauses – for those involved in: i) war crimes, 
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity; ii) serious non-political crimes; 
and iii) acts “contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”121  The 
Refugee Convention also contains provisions for national security during times of 
exception, most notably the following: 
Article 9  
Provisional Measures  
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting 
State, in time of war or other grave and exceptional 
circumstances, from taking provisionally measures 
which it considers to be essential to the national 
security in the case of a particular person, pending a 
determination by the Contracting State that that person 
is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such 
measures is necessary in his case in the interests of 
national security.  
Article 32  
Expulsion  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
existence, the inalienable right to be free of persecution was entrenched in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810, 1948,Article 14 
of which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution…”  
120 See for example J. Allain, “The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement”, 13 Int’l J Refugee Law 
(2001) 533-558; A. Farmer, “Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures that 
Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 Georgetown Imm LJ, (2008) 2-43.  The assertion, however, is 
controversial, with other commentators (and several courts) maintaining that non-refoulement 
remains a norm of customary international law which has not attained jus cogens status. 
121 Refugee Convention, supra note 119, respectively Articles 1F(a), (b) and (c). 
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1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee 
lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national 
security or public order.  
… 
Article 33  
Prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”)  
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) 
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.  
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, 
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is, or who, having 
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of 
that country.122  
  
In Canada, the exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention have been directly 
incorporated into the IRPA.123  Sitting parallel to these clauses, however, is the 
inadmissibility regime, which in certain circumstances, bars individuals from 
consideration as to whether or not he/she is a Convention refugee, let alone from 
the protections that are afforded same.  Pursuant to s 100 of the IRPA, consideration 
as to whether an individual meets the threshold criteria for eligibility to initiate a 
refugee claim is suspended if an officer has exercised her/his discretion to refer the 
individual for an admissibility hearing.  Section 103 of the IRPA provides for the 
suspension of an already existing refugee claim if an officer later refers the matter to 
an inadmissibility hearing.  Section 101 of the IRPA clarifies that, upon a finding of 
inadmissibility for, amongst other things, national security, a refugee claim is 
                                                        
 
122 Refugee Convention, supra note 119. 
123 IRPA, supra note 14 at s 98. 
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ineligible for consideration, while section 104 sets out the notice process associated 
with the termination of a claim.  Finally, s 112 of the IRPA bars consideration as to 
whether or not an individual who is inadmissible for, amongst other things, national 
security grounds, will face persecution in the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment process, 
which is intended to provide a final risk screening for those subject to removal.  
However, largely to ensure compliance with the Convention Against Torture, such 
individuals are entitled to a consideration as to whether their removal will subject 
them personally to a risk of torture, a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment.124  For perceived security threats, even this 
scaled-down risk assessment is subject to a balancing process, wherein an official of 
the Public Safety department determines whether an individual’s application should 
be refused, notwithstanding any risks, because of the “nature and severity of acts 
committed by the applicant or because of the danger that the applicant constitutes 
to the security of Canada.”125  Finally, to make matters completely clear, the IRPA 
also explicitly states at s 115(2) that Canada’s commitment to the principle of non-
refoulement does not apply to those found inadmissible on grounds of, amongst 
other categories, security if, in the opinion of the Public Safety Minister, the person 
should not be allowed to remain in Canada “on the basis of the nature and severity 
of acts committed or of danger to the security of Canada.” 
 
All of this is a rather technical way of illustrating the high stakes process 
associated with Canada’s security-inadmissibility regime.  It charts a course of 
removal for those deemed threats, circumventing entirely the refugee protection 
process, while maintaining minimal protections only for those at risk of the most 
severe forms of harm if removed.  To be sure, not all persons who are subject to the 
security-inadmissibility regime are Convention refugees or even assert a risk of 
harm if removed from Canada.  As we shall see below however, refugee claimants, 
                                                        
 
124 IRPA, supra note 14 at s 112(3) and s 113. 
125 Ibid at s 113(d)(ii). 
 132 
 
Convention refugees and permanent residents who had previously been found to be 
refugees make up the vast majority of s 34 cases, at least for those that have arisen 
in Canada over the past decade.126   When this fact is combined with the vast 
breadth of the security-inadmissibility regime what comes into focus is not only a 
legal process defined by legal grey holes, but one that has the potential to expose 
significant numbers of individuals to a palpable risk of harm.   
2.4 Feeling Insecure: Data on Security and Inadmissibility in Canada 
Democracy don't rule the world, 
You'd better get that in your head; 
This world is ruled by violence, 
But I guess that's better left unsaid.127 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
The extraordinary reach of the Canadian security-inadmissibility regime raises a 
panoply of interesting questions.  Given the notional reality that the security 
provisions capture broad swaths of the populations of many countries, decisions are 
clearly made by immigration and public safety officials about what constitutes a 
security threat; about categories of persons who may be of concern and, on the 
flipside, about which cases warrant the discretionary turn of a blind eye.   
 
Recall that security inadmissibility cases are generally initiated in Canada by 
immigration or public safety officials through the process set out at s 44 of the IRPA.  
This process involves two separate discretionary decisions.  First, if an officer 
suspects that an individual is inadmissible, he or she may write a report outlining 
the perceived inadmissibility, pursuant to s 44(1) of the Act.  That report is then 
                                                        
 
126 In making this claim, I don’t mean to minimize the impact that the security-inadmissibility process 
can bring to bear on those who make no claim to personal risk in their country of origin.  The effect of 
an inadmissibility finding, particularly one related to allegations of terrorism and/or security, can be 
profound.  The process can lead to stigma, isolation, bars on the ability to work and permanent 
separation from immediate family.   
127 Bob Dylan, “Union Sundown” from the album Infidels, released October, 1983. 
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referred to a Minister’s Delegate who, pursuant to s 44(2) of the IRPA, may then 
refer the matter to the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board 
(IRB) for an admissibility hearing.  The admissibility hearing is a quasi-judicial, 
adversarial process involving a civil servant decision-maker, a counsel for the 
Minister of Public Safety and counsel for the individual alleged to be inadmissible (if 
they choose, and are able, to exercise their right to counsel). 
 
In this chapter, I assess and analyze the outcomes of decisions from the 
Immigration Division on security-inadmissibility cases arising under s 34 of the 
IRPA.128  The Immigration Division decisions provide interesting information in 
their own right, but because the cases that come before it are initiated through the 
discretionary decision-making process of the Public Safety Minister, they also 
provide insight into the concerns and priorities of the Federal government in the 
security-migration regime.  The initial questions I sought to address in analyzing 
these cases were basic ones, including:  
? Who is being referred for admissibility hearings under s 34?   
? From what countries are individuals referred for inadmissibility 
hearings?  
? Why, i.e. under which particular head of inadmissibility under s34, 
are individuals referred for inadmissibility hearings? 
? Since the outset of the IRPA, are there any trends in the number of 
referred cases? 
 
Before I turn to a description of the methodology that I have used in analyzing 
these cases, I should provide a brief note of disclosure.  My interest in looking at 
                                                        
 
128 Note that s 34 decisions are not only rendered by the Immigration Division.  Overseas immigration 
applications and in-Canada applications for permanent residence (in certain situations) are 
determined by immigration officers and, in the course of their determination, they may find 
(generally in conjunction with a centralized national security intelligence unit) that a person is 
inadmissible under s 34.  Access to Information Requests have also been submitted in respect of 
these decisions but, to date, they have not been fulfilled.   
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these cases arose, at least in part, from my legal practice and my representation of 
individuals who were referred for security-related inadmissibility hearings.  My 
anecdotal sense, from both my own experience, and from talking with other 
lawyers, was that such hearings were increasing in frequency and that they were 
becoming something of a preferred method for addressing individuals of particular 
backgrounds, as opposed to addressing them through the exclusion clauses 
associated with the refugee process.  These views were based on more than mere 
speculation, but at the same time, they were not based on any empirical data, a 
problem that this study seeks to address.  To my knowledge, no empirical studies on 
the application of s 34 have been conducted.  While the data collected in relation to 
this aspect of this project cannot answer all of the questions that arise, it does 
provide interesting insights into the security-migration regime under s 34 of the 
IRPA.   
 
2.4.2 Methodology 
 
Immigration Division (ID) decisions are only sporadically published in online 
legal databases, such as the open-access CanLII database and other fee-based 
services such as LexisNexis and Westlaw.  To obtain a full record of ID decisions on 
national security, therefore, Access to Information Requests were submitted seeking 
disclosure of all decisions issued by the ID related to admissibility hearings 
conducted under the provisions of s 34(1) of the IRPA from the date of enactment of 
the IRPA (June 28, 2002).  An initial request provided data on 158 cases, to 
December, 2011.129  A follow-up Access to Information Request yielded 37 further 
                                                        
 
129 Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information (ATIP) Request #A-2011-00094 (10 April 
2012).  I am very grateful to Professor Sharryn Aiken of Queen’s University who was able to fund the 
fulfilling of this access request and to lawyer Catherine Bruce, who joined in the submission of the 
request to assist her in preparing a challenge to the provisions of s 34(1).  The disclosed material is 
all on file with the author.   
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cases, updated to May, 2013.130   A total of 195 decisions, amounting to over 3700 
pages of reasons have now been disclosed.131   
 
As I set out above, the existence of a national interest exemption clause is 
commonly referred to, by both the courts and the Public Safety Minister alike, as a 
legal justification for the extraordinary reach of the security-inadmissibility 
provisions.  In order to assess the empirical validity of this assertion, further 
information was obtained on decisions rendered by the Public Safety Minister under 
the national interest exemption found, until recently, at s 34(2) of the IRPA.132 
 
Following disclosure of the 195 s 34 cases, the next stage in the analysis was to 
manually review them, coding various categories of information in each decision,133 
including the following:  
? Year of decision 
? Country of origin of the person concerned (PC) 
? Name of person134 
? IRB File Number and Location (Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal) 
                                                        
 
130 ATIP Request #A-2013-00352 (10 October 2013). 
131 Though disclosure of the cases was provided in full, redactions were made to many of the 
decisions, typically because the proceedings were held in camera.  The redactions did not, however, 
prevent the collection of the relevant data for this study. 
132 This data was initially obtained by lawyer Chantal Desloges, pursuant to Access to Information 
Request #A-2011-00189 (11 May 2011), in relation to a challenge to the constitutionality of another 
national interest exemption clause, this one dealing with organized criminality under (then) s 37(2) 
of the IRPA.  This request was updated by way of a separate request by the author: A-2013-02797 
(25 June 2013). 
133 Not all of the categories coded will be directly used in this study.  The coding process is a 
relatively laborious one, and in the interests of efficiency it made sense to review the decisions once, 
even if not all of the below categories are relevant for present purposes. 
134 Immigration Division hearings are public proceedings, except, pursuant to s 166(c.1) of the IRPA, 
which provides that proceedings before the Division must be held in the absence of the public if they 
concern a person who is the subject of a proceeding before the Refugee Protection Division or the 
Refugee Appeal Division that is pending or who has made an application for protection to the 
Minister that is pending.  As a high percentage of s 34 inadmissibility cases involve refugee claimants, 
or persons already found to be Convention refugees, the names of many of the individuals were 
withheld.  Furthermore, to protect the privacy of all of the persons whose cases were disclosed, I will 
refer to all cases by file number, rather than by name, even where it has been disclosed.    
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? Specific s 34 allegations (34(1)(a)-(f) – espionage, subversion, 
terrorism, etc.) 
? PC’s alleged organizational affiliation 
? Organization type (as characterized in the decision, i.e. government 
agency, political movement, separatist movement, etc.) 
? Outcome 
? Refugee Claimant (i.e. has the person initiated a refugee claim, been 
found to be a Convention refugee or become a permanent resident 
following a successful refugee claim)135 
? Identity of the Board Member  
? Counsel (and indicates where individual was unrepresented) 
? Information regarding judicial review136 
2.4.3 A Steady Rise: Section 34 cases by year 
 
While the overall number of inadmissibility cases may, at first glance, appear 
small, two factors are important to consider.  First, as discussed above, the 
consequences of a finding of security-inadmissibility are profound, most notably 
because they include the possibility of removing individuals to known risks of 
persecution.  And beyond the individual rights at stake, Canada’s record of 
compliance with international human rights norms is also clearly implicated in the 
security-inadmissibility process.  Less than 200 prisoners remain imprisoned at 
                                                        
 
135 This coding category was determined in a couple of different ways.  First, as mentioned above, 
given that Immigration Division decisions are to be held in public, except in relation to matters 
involving refugee claimants, the withholding of names in ATIA disclosure decisions was in itself a 
strong indicator that the person concerned had made a refugee claim.  The stronger indicator, 
however, was typically provided in the content of the decisions themselves which virtually always 
provide at least an outline of the individual’s circumstances, including whether they have made a 
refugee claim.  
136 As I shall set out in greater detail below, for individuals found to be inadmissible to Canada under 
s 34, the only means of challenging the inadmissibility decision is by way of an application for judicial 
review at the Federal Court.  Furthermore, immigration matters at the Federal Court are subject to a 
leave requirement in order to obtain judicial review, a process which has long been criticized, see 
Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 38:1 
Queen’s LJ [Rehaag, the Luck of the Draw].   
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Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, yet notwithstanding this relatively small number of 
remaining prisoners, their ongoing detention remains a significant human rights 
and public policy issue in the United States.  Second, as illustrated below, while 
modest, the number of cases determined by the Immigration Division under s 34 has 
been steadily increasing in virtually every year since 2002, from only two cases in 
that year to an average of over 30 cases per year from 2010-2012.   This increase 
was most notable between 2008 and 2009 when the number of cases more than 
doubled from previous years.   
 
What is also notable for these years is that, while the numbers of inadmissibility 
cases steadily rose, the number of refugee claimants (who, as will be set out below, 
make up a large proportion of the s 34 cases before the ID) sharply declined, from 
almost 44,000 cases in 2001, to less than 20,000 per year in more recent years.137  
The number of claims has continued to diminish following the major overhauls to 
the refugee determination system that have occurred since 2011, to the point that 
they are now at “historical lows.”138   As such, the increase in security-related 
inadmissibility cases does not appear to be attributable to any increases generally in 
the pool of individuals from whom inadmissibility concerns typically arise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
137 Canada, Parliament of Canada, Canada's Inland Refugee Protection System, (2008) online: 
Parliament of Canada http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/bp185-e.htm#C-
Pushpanathan at Appendix A and  Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Claims - 
Statistics, Trends and Projections, (2013) online Immigration and Refugee Board http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/Eng/RefClaDem/Pages/RefClaDemStat.aspx.  
138 Canada, Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, (2014) online: 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/annual-report-2014.pdf at 9. 
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Table 1: Number of s 34 cases per year (2002-2011) 
 
Year No. of Cases 
2002 2 
2003 8 
2004 10 
2005 13 
2006 8 
2007 13 
2008 12 
2009 26 
2010 32 
2011 34 
2012 27 
2013* 10 
TOTAL (2002-2012) 195 
 
* Incomplete year 
2.4.4 Inadmissibility by Country of Origin 
 
The disclosed cases reveal an interesting, if not entirely surprising, 
concentration on a relatively small number of countries.  Of the 195 cases, slightly 
more than half are represented by just four countries: Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India and 
Iran.  Furthermore, roughly 96% (187) of the cases involved individuals from 
countries of the Global South, with the lone exceptions coming from the former 
Soviet Bloc (alleged KGB and Stasi operatives), the former Yugoslavia (a single case 
from Macedonia), Spain (alleged Basque separatists) and a single case from the 
United States (alleged membership in the Earth Liberation Front). 
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It is also not surprising that the vast majority of cases involve nationals of 
countries that have experienced protracted situations of violence and conflict, but it 
is notable that the majority of these conflicts are entirely internal in nature, from the 
civil wars of Sri Lanka and Colombia, to liberation movements in Eritrea, Namibia 
and Sudan.   
 
Finally, it is notable that, because of the atemporal nature of the s 34 analysis, 
inadmissibility proceedings in respect of several countries arise, not because of the 
current situation, but because of historic, and long since passed, conflicts.139  
Table 2(a): Section 34 cases by country of origin (2002-2013) (sorted by 
number of cases) 
 
Countries Number of cases 
 
Sri Lanka 45 
Pakistan 30 
India* 16 
Iran** 16 
Nigeria 13 
El Salvador 8 
Ethiopia 7 
Colombia 6 
Lebanon 6 
Sudan 6 
Eritrea 5 
                                                        
 
139 El Salvador, Eritrea and some of the Iranian cases are three examples. 
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Palestinian territories 4 
Afghanistan 3 
Democratic Republic of Congo 3 
Russia 3 
Iraq 2 
Namibia 2 
Spain 2 
Turkey 2 
Angola 1 
Bangladesh 1 
Cameroon 1 
China 1 
German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany) 
1 
Jordan 1 
Liberia 1 
Libya 1 
Macedonia 1 
Mongolia 1 
Niger 1 
Not stated 1 
Peru 1 
Philippines 1 
Tunisia 1 
United States 1 
Total 195 
Total No. of Countries 34 
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Table 2(b): Section 34 cases by country of origin (2002-2013) (sorted 
alphabetically by country) 
 
Countries Number of cases 
 
Afghanistan 3 
Angola 1 
Bangladesh 1 
Cameroon 1 
China 1 
Colombia 6 
Democratic Republic of Congo 3 
El Salvador 8 
Eritrea 5 
Ethiopia 7 
German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany) 
1 
India* 16 
Iran** 16 
Iraq 2 
Jordan 1 
Lebanon 6 
Liberia 1 
Libya 1 
Macedonia 1 
Mongolia 1 
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Namibia 2 
Niger 1 
Nigeria 13 
Not stated 1 
Pakistan 30 
Palestinian territories 4 
Peru 1 
Philippines 1 
Russia 3 
Spain 2 
Sri Lanka 45 
Sudan 6 
Tunisia 1 
Turkey 2 
United States 1 
Total 195 
Total No. of Countries 34 
* One case involved a national of India, but the allegations against him were in 
respect of espionage in Pakistan. 
** One case involved a dual national of the Netherlands and Iran, but the 
allegations against the individual were in respect of membership in the Iranian MEK 
organization. 
 
2.4.5 Distribution of s 34(1) inadmissibility findings by paragraph  
 
Given that persons can be found inadmissible under s 34(1) for a broad range of 
activity, the Immigration Division decisions were also coded according to the 
 143 
 
specific ground(s) of inadmissibility that arose in each case.140  Two interesting and 
distinct facts emerged from the data when approached from the perspective of the 
alleged grounds of inadmissibility.  First, there is a striking reliance on membership  
as the primary or sole ground of inadmissibility.  Of the 195 cases, only two cases 
did not raise membership as at least one of the grounds of inadmissibility.141  A few 
other cases, six in total, raised membership as a ground of inadmissibility, but also 
alleged that the individual in question had been directly involved in espionage, 
subversion or terrorism.142  This leaves a remainder of 186 cases that were 
determined on the basis of membership.  Because the membership allegations can 
only be brought forward in conjunction with an allegation that the organization in 
question has engaged in the acts set out at s 34(1)(a), (b) or (c), the membership 
cases can take on several different forms.143  The essential point, however, is that 
over 95% of security cases before the Immigration Division were decided on the 
basis of membership in an organization, rather than on allegations of direct 
involvement in subversion, espionage or terrorism.  What is fascinating about those 
few cases that involve allegations of direct involvement in the acts described at s 
34(1)(a)-(c) is that the majority of them (five out of 9) involved individuals from the 
Global North.  Recall from above, that there were only a total of seven individuals in 
the disclosed materials who originated from Northern countries.   
 
                                                        
 
140 The coding process in this respect was somewhat challenging, given that the provisions can be 
overlapping and many cases involved multiple allegations.  Allegations in relation to membership 
under s 34(1)(f), furthermore, can only be made by way of further reference to the other ground of 
inadmissibility that is alleged to have been carried out by the organization in question.  Finally, there 
are cases in the disclosure that do not clearly articulate the particular ground of inadmissibility on 
which it relied. 
141 See Minister of Public Safety v X (2009), A8-01297 (IRB) and Minister of Public Safety v X (2004), 
A4-00251 (IRB), both on file with the author. 
142 Minister of Public Safety v X (2008), A5-01959 (IRB); Minister of Public Safety v X (2005), A4-
00550 (IRB); Minister of Public Safety v X (2006), A4-00778 (IRB), Minister of Public Safety v X 
(2009), A9-00033 (IRB); and Minister of Public Safety v X (2008), A7-00636 (IRB). 
143 For example, a clear majority of the membership cases (113) were based on allegations that the 
organization in question had engaged in acts of terrorism alone.  13 cases alleged that the 
organization in question had committed acts listed at s 34(1)(a), (b) and (c), while 35 cases involved 
allegations that the organization had engaged in acts listed at s 34(1)(b) and (c).     
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Second, and perhaps more striking, is that the two provisions that relate directly 
to Canadian security – s 34(1)(d) and 34(1)(e) – have been essentially unused since 
the IRPA came into effect over a decade ago.  Specifically, s 34(1)(d) (being a danger 
to the security of Canada) was raised in only one case, and in that matter the 
Immigration Division rejected the Minister’s allegations.144  To date, s 34(1)(e) 
(engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of 
persons in Canada) does not appear to have ever been invoked in proceedings 
before the Immigration Division. 
2.4.6 Organizations that give rise to inadmissibility under s 34(1)(f) 
 
Keeping in mind that virtually all security-inadmissibility cases relate to 
membership in organizations, the organizational affiliation of the individual 
concerned in each case was recorded.  While it is beyond the scope of this study to 
engage in a detailed analysis of the nature of these organizations, it can be said that 
the vast majority of them are political in nature and that their objectives are 
relatively narrowly construed to political change within the nation state in which 
they act.  Some are strictly political in nature, advocating (often with violence) a 
sharp or radical political change in their country.  Others seek to achieve political 
change, but are more properly construed as either separatist or liberation 
movements.  Regardless of how these organizations are characterized, however, 
virtually all of them tended to have local aims, centred around destabilizing the 
(often repressive) regimes within their respective countries. 
 
It is also notable, given prevailing views about the sources of insecurity in the 
contemporary world, that only nine cases, or less than 5% of the total, were 
organizations with a strong religious orientation.145 
 
                                                        
 
144 Minister of Public Safety v X (2009), A8-01297 (IRB). 
145 Several of these organizations have multiple agendas, for example, Hamas in the Palestinian 
territories, Amal in Lebanon and Al-Haramain, which has operated in several countries. 
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Consistent with the fact that certain countries of origin were highly represented 
in the data set, a few organizations from those countries also appeared very 
frequently.  21 cases involved allegations of inadmissibility for membership in the 
Pakistani Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM – formerly known as the Muhajir 
Qaumi Movement).  Nine cases related to membership in the Iranian Mojahedin-e-
Khalq (MEK) organization, while 42 cases involved the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).   
 
It is also notable, though again not surprising, that several of the groups were 
ostensibly advocating for the protection of human rights and democratic values and 
were supported in their objectives by the West.  The Iraqi Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan, for example, was founded and led by the current U.S. backed President of 
Iraq, Jalal Talabani.  Similarly, the Angolan UNITA organization was actively 
supported by the United States in the drawn out Angolan civil war and both the 
Eritrean ELF and EPLF groups were commonly recognized as engaging in a justified 
struggle for political independence from almost unspeakably repressive Ethiopian 
regimes, as was most clearly illustrated in Eritrea’s admission into the United 
Nations, an initiative that was sponsored by both Canada and the United States.146  
Overall, what emerges from the data is that, while many of the groups under 
scrutiny have engaged in various degrees of political violence, they have tended to 
do so in the context of discrete civil conflicts, often involving repressive and violent 
ruling regimes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
146 Angus Grant, Catherine Bruce & Catherine Reynolds, “Out of the Fire and into the Pot: The Eritrean 
Liberation Movement, the Right to Self-Determination and the Over-Breadth of North American 
Immigration Security Provisions” (2010) 25 Georgetown Imm Law J 859 at 870. 
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Table 3: Section 34 cases by country of origin and organization (2002-2013) 
 
Countries 
 
Number 
of cases 
Organizations (No. of Cases)* 
Afghanistan 3 Muslim World League (1), Mujahadeen (1), Taliban (1) 
Angola 1 União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
(UNITA) (1) 
Bangladesh 1 Bangladesh Freedom Party (1) 
Cameroon 1 South Cameroon Youth League (SCYL) (1) 
China 1 East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) (1) 
Colombia 6 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) (3),  
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) (2), M19 (1) 
Democratic Republic of Congo 3 Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo 
(AFDL) (1), Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) 
(2) 
El Salvador 8 Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) (8) 
Eritrea 5 Eritrean Liberation Fron (ELF) (4),  
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) (1) 
Ethiopia 7 Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) (4),  
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) (1),  
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) (1), Eritrean People’s 
Patriotic Front/Coalition for Unity and Democracy 
(EPPF/CUD) (1) 
German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany) 
1 Ministry for State Security (STASI) (1) 
India 16 Bhindranwala Tigers Force of Khalistan (BTF) (2),  
All India Sikh Students Federation/International Sikh Youth 
Federation ( AISSF/ISYF) (9),  
Babbar Khalsa (BKI) (2),  
Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) (1) 
Iran 16 Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) (9),  
Fedayan-e Khalq (1),  
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Basji Forces (2),  
Mahdaviyat (1);  
Komala (1) ,  
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) (1), Kurdish 
Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) (1) 
Iraq 2 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (2) 
Jordan  1 Arab Liberation Front (1) 
Lebanon 6 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (1),  
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)(1), 
Amal Movement (2), 
Hezbollah (1), 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party in Lebanon (SSNP) (1) 
Liberia 1 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) (1) 
Libya 1 Al-Haramain (1) 
Macedonia 1 Albanian National Army (1) 
Mongolia 1 Government Intelligence Agency (1) 
Namibia 2 Caprivi Liberation Army (1),  
Caprivi Liberation Movement (1) 
Niger 1 Movement of Niger. For Justice (1) 
Nigeria 13 Movement for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD) (1),  
Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC)(1);  
Niger Delta Force (1);  
Niger Delta Vigilantes (1);  
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of 
Biafra (MASSOB) (7) 
Not stated 1 Redacted 
Pakistan 30 Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) (21);  
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) (4);  
Imamia Students Organization (ISO) (2);  
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (2);  
The Pakistan Muslim League (PML)(1) 
Palestinian territories 4 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (2); 
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Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)(1); 
Hamas (1) 
Peru 1 Shining Path (1) 
Philippines 1 New People’s Army (NPA) (1) 
Russia  3 KGB (3) 
Spain 2 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (2) 
Sri Lanka 45 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (41);  
Tamil National Alliance (TNA) (2);  
World Tamil Movement (WTM) (1)**; 
Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) (1) 
Sudan 6 Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) (2);  
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (1);  
Justice & Equality (2);  
Beja Congress (1) 
Tunisia 1 Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) (1) 
Turkey 2 Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, (HADEP) (1); 
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) (1) 
United States 1 Earth Liberation Front (1) 
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* Organizational information may be redacted from record, so when added together 
may not total the sum in the previous column 
** TNA and WTM both found to have links to LTTE 
 
2.4.7 Status of those subject to admissibility hearings 
 
In the pages above, I have indicated that the majority of persons subject to 
inadmissibility proceedings under s 34 are either recognized Convention refugees, 
or individuals who are in the process of making a refugee claim, having asserted a 
risk of persecution if returned to their country of origin.  While it was impossible to 
determine the status of each person referred for an admissibility hearing with total 
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precision, the data certainly confirms that a vast majority of these individuals have 
engaged in the refugee process.  Twenty six of the cases involved persons who had 
already been found to be Convention refugees.  Eight cases involved persons who 
had already been denied refugee status.  It appears that there were only seven cases 
involving individuals who had never made a refugee claim, compared with 131 
cases in which the individuals had made a refugee claim and were still at some stage 
in the refugee claim process.  There were, finally, 23 cases in which it could not be 
known whether the individual had made a refugee claim, although several of them 
had had their inadmissibility determined in camera, which, as noted above, strongly 
suggests that they had initiated a refugee claim.  Even using a conservative 
approach, taking into consideration only those known cases in which the persons 
concerned had either initiated a refugee claim or had been found to be a refugee, 
157 cases, or 81% of the dataset involved persons who asserted that they would be 
at risk of persecution if removed from Canada. 
2.4.8 Inadmissibility Rates 
 
The data was also coded with respect to outcome.  In essence, there are really 
only two options available to the Division in reaching a conclusion in each case.  On 
the reasonable grounds to believe standard, the Division must simply determine 
whether the individual is admissible or inadmissible under s 34.  If it finds the 
person inadmissible, the Division must issue a deportation order.147  If it concludes 
that the allegations against the person have not been made out, it must conclude as 
such and the person maintains the status that he or she had prior to the 
inadmissibility hearing.  There is no discretion and there are no further remedies 
available to the Division.   
 
                                                        
 
147 See sections 45(d) of the IRPA, supra note 14 and 229(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. 
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Overall, when the Minister refers a matter to the Immigration Division for an 
admissibility hearing under s 34, the referral is found to be well-founded (on the 
reasonable grounds to believe standard) and a deportation order is issued in 
roughly 67% of cases.  In 33% of cases, then, the referral is found to be without 
merit and the person retains whatever status he/she had prior to the 
commencement of the proceedings.   
Table 4: Section 34 cases by outcome 
 
Year No. of Cases Admissible (%) Inadmissible (%) 
2002 2 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 
2003 8 4 (50%) 4 (50%) 
2004 10 6 (60%) 4 (40%) 
2005 13 6 (46%) 7 (54%) 
2006 8 2 (25%) 6 (75%) 
2007 13 3 (23%) 10 (77%) 
2008 12 3 (25%) 9 (75%) 
2009 26 6 (23%) 20 (77%) 
2010 32 6 (19%) 26 (81%) 
2011 34 18 (53%) 16(47%) 
2012 27 6 (22%) 21 (78%) 
2013 10 4 (40%) 6 (60%) 
TOTAL (2002-2013) 195 65 (33.3%) 130 (66.6%) 
 
Two facts are of note in looking at the data from the perspective of outcomes.  
First, after an initial few years in which the inadmissibility rate hovered around the 
fifty percent mark (albeit over a small sample size) the rate jumped up to the mid-
seventy percent range for the next several years.  While it is perhaps impossible to 
establish with certainty the cause of this increase in inadmissibility findings, it is 
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notable that this timeframe coincides precisely with several oft-cited Federal Court 
and Federal Court of Appeal decisions that asserted the breadth with which s 34 is 
to be interpreted.148   
 
Second, the inadmissibility rate for 2011 sharply dropped, from an average rate 
of 78% for the preceding 5 years to 47% in 2011.  This drop is almost certainly 
attributable to the government’s response to the arrival of the MV Sun Sea vessel in 
2010, which carried with it 492 Tamil asylum seekers.149  18 of the 34 cases for 
2011 were former Sun Sea passengers, only a third of whom (six) were found to be 
inadmissible.  When the 2011 figures are examined with these cases adjusted out of 
the mix, the inadmissibility rate for the year closely resembles that of previous years 
(75%).  What is fascinating about the Sun Sea cases and what likely explains the low 
success rate on the part of the CBSA in bringing these cases forward for 
admissibility hearings is the aggressiveness with which officers were instructed to 
approach them; what is interesting, in other words, is the narrowing of officers’ 
discretion as to whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Sun Sea 
asylum seekers were inadmissible under s 34.  Recall that in 2009 another migrant 
vessel, the MV Ocean Lady arrived in Canada carrying 76 Tamil asylum seekers.150  
In response to this arrival, and after intelligence reports indicated that the Sun Sea 
was in transit to Canada, a senior CBSA official drafted a memorandum entitled 
Marine Migrants: Program Strategy for the Next Arrival that was intended to outline 
CBSA strategy for responding to the next mass arrival of asylum seekers by boat.  In 
addition to noting that CBSA would take “maximum advantage” of detention as an 
“effective tool against those who circumvent immigration processes,” the report also 
advised that CBSA would be “aggressive” in bringing admissibility hearings forward 
                                                        
 
148 See most notably Poshteh, supra note 78; Al Yamani II, supra note 74, but also Ugbazghi, supra note 
73; and  Kanendra, supra note 72. 
149 “Documents: The Sun Sea Investigation”, The National Post (13 February 2011) online: National 
Post www.nationalpost.com. 
150 Petti Fong, “76 illegal migrants found on ship seized off B.C.”, The Toronto Star (18 October 2009). 
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against many of the Sun Sea passengers.151  In keeping with this memorandum, the 
CBSA have dealt with the Sun Sea passengers with unusual zealousness, resulting in 
the referral of many admissibility cases to the Immigration Division that appear to 
have had little merit.   
2.4.9 Appeals and Judicial Review 
 
Another example of the “maverick” status of immigration law is the asymmetry 
in appeal rights granted to the Minister, as compared to those found to be 
inadmissible for security purposes.  Pursuant to s 63(5) of the IRPA, the Minister has 
access to a full, fact-based administrative appeal of Immigration Division decisions 
to the Immigration Appeal Division of the IRB.  Judicial review may also be sought 
from a decision of the IAD.  Persons found to be inadmissible under s 34 (and those 
described by section 35, a subset of s 36 and s 37) are, by contrast, precluded from 
appealing to the IAD and must rely solely on the more circumscribed judicial review 
process.152  In April, 2014, a further Access to Information Request provided data on 
appeal and judicial review outcomes of the previously disclosed s 34 Immigration 
Division decisions.153  The ATIP response provided data indicating that some sort of 
review (either Ministerial appeal to the IAD and/or judicial review) was sought in 
79 cases.   
 
                                                        
 
151 Obtained pursuant to Access to Information Request No. A-2013-03486(10 September 2013).  
Disclosed material was obtained by the Canadian Council for Refugees and is on file with the author.   
152 Which is itself set out at s 72 of the IRPA.  The differences between an appeal to the IAD and 
judicial review are myriad.  To cite but two of them: i) IAD parties may adduce new evidence, 
whereas judicial review proceedings are based solely on the record before the Immigration Division;  
and ii) the IAD may substitute its own decision upon hearing the appeal and either granting it and 
issuing the applicable removal order, or dismiss it and uphold the Immigration Division decision.  
The Federal Court’s jurisdiction is generally confined to remitting successful applications back to the 
Immigration Division for reconsideration. 
153 Immigration and Refugee Board, ATIP request # A-2013-01798 (9 April, 2014).  Because of 
disclosure delays, this request related to the slightly more limited dataset initially disclosed under 
ATIP request # 2011-00094 and thus relates to 158 decisions rather than the full dataset of 195 
cases.  The Access to Information response provided data on several different possible outcomes: 
Minister’s Appeals to the IAD; judicial review leave applications (of both the Minister, from the IAD 
and of inadmissible individuals); and judicial review decisions, upon leave being granted. 
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The overall success rate for inadmissible persons seeking leave and judicial 
review of Immigration Division decisions was low.  While the vast majority of 
Federal Court decisions (on both leave and judicial review) related to individual 
(rather than Ministerial) applications, in only 3 of 56 applications were individuals 
successful in having Immigration Division decisions quashed.154  By contrast, in 19 
appeals determined on their merits by the Immigration Appeal Division, the 
Minister’s appeal was granted in 12 cases.  Appeals were dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction in the remaining four cases.155  Of the cases decided on the merits, then, 
the Minister was successful in over 63% of cases. 
 
The low success rates of individuals seeking review of their inadmissible status 
comes as no surprise; the Federal Court is generally deferential of IRB decisions156 
and as I outlined above, the broad interpretation of the security provision has been 
endorsed (and to a significant extent developed) by the courts themselves.  Put 
simply, if there is a problem with the overreach of s34, the problem does not lie in 
the decision-making of the Immigration Division, but in the exceptionally broad 
wording of s34 and, as I argue in the final part of this study, in a misuse of 
administrative discretion.  In the absence of their own discretionary powers, 
decisions of the Immigration Division involve a somewhat mechanical application of 
law to fact, and given that many if not most individuals fleeing conflict zones may 
come under the notional rubric of s34, it is of little surprise that the Division’s 
decisions in these cases are by and large found to be reasonable.  With this in mind, I 
turn briefly to an area of decision-making that does involve a large measure of 
                                                        
 
154 In two other cases, IAD decisions granting Ministerial appeals were overturned by the court: see 
PS v Canada (MCI), 2014 FC 168 and B074 v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 1146.  There was one further 
application in which an inadmissible individual prevailed: in Canada (MCI) v Qureshi, 2007 FC 1049, 
the Minister unsuccessfully sought judicial review of an appeal that the IAD had earlier dismissed. 
155 I presume these were situations in which individual applicants sought to appeal Immigration 
Division decisions, rather than seeking relief from the Federal Court. 
156 In the context of the Refugee Protection Division of the IRB, see Rehaag, The Luck of the Draw, 
supra note136 at 9. 
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discretion – that being the Ministerial waiver of inadmissibility located at s42.1 of 
the IRPA. 
 
2.4.10 Section 34(2) (now 42.1) exemptions 
 
As I have mentioned above, the existence of a discretionary Ministerial 
exemption from the application of s 34 has been at once a recognition of its broad 
application and a constitutional salve to its potential overbreadth.  For years, 
however, it has been viewed by refugee advocates as a largely illusory mechanism, 
in part because it was seen as being virtually impossible to convince a political 
figure (the Public Safety Minister) to sign off on a waiver of inadmissibility for 
someone already found to be a security threat.   
 
The process also came to be viewed as a hollow one because it has been mired in 
delays, the length of which would likely be viewed as unconstitutional in virtually 
any other context.157  Recent data from access to information requests tend to 
confirm these views.158  In the almost eleven years between 2002 and the first half 
of 2013, 293 applications for relief were submitted under s 34(2) and over that 
period of time, only 95 decisions were made, many of which related to applications 
submitted under the regime that preceded the IRPA.159  On average, then, the Public 
Safety Minister issues roughly 8 decisions on s 34(2) applications per year.  With a 
current (though constantly increasing) backlog of 223 applications, this means that 
the timeframe for determining the pending applications is just under 28 years and 
                                                        
 
157 Indeed, in the context of Canadian criminal trials (in which the rights at stake are similar to those 
associated with immigration proceedings, particularly those involving refugees) accused individuals 
have a constitutionally entrenched right to a trial within a reasonable time – see s 11(b) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  While there is no rigid formula for determining whether a 
delay has become unreasonable, as we shall see below, the timeframes for obtaining a decision under 
s 34(2) are completely outside the range of periods considered to be unreasonable in the criminal 
context, see for example R. v. Azkov, [1990] 2 SCR 119, 1990 CanLII 45 (SCC). 
158 Access to Information Request #A-2011-00189 (11 May 2011); Access to information request A-
2013-02797 (25 June 2013), both on file with the author.   
159 Access to Information Request #A-2011-00189 (11 May 2011). 
 155 
 
individual applications can take upwards of a decade to complete.160  Furthermore, 
while the government previously held permanent residence applications in 
abeyance pending the outcome of Ministerial relief applications, a change in policy 
implemented in 2013 ended this practice.  The impact of this change in policy has 
had immediate effect, resulting in the refusal of permanent residence applications of 
numerous Convention refugees and an ensuing risk of removal.161 
 
Given the stigma associated with security-related inadmissibility, given the 
omnipresent spectre of removal and family separation, and finally, given that those 
found inadmissible are ineligible for healthcare coverage and frequently cannot 
work, the situation is a virtual archetype of the “justice delayed is justice denied” 
axiom.   
2.4.11 Further Observations and Analysis 
 
Numerous conclusions can be drawn from the above data, some of them 
tentatively, given the relatively small cohort of cases, but others with confidence.  
First, security-related inadmissibility is an increasingly utilized tool for Canadian 
public safety officials.  Second, and perhaps most strikingly, these security cases are 
overwhelmingly based on membership in groups perceived as having taken part in 
violence, rather than allegations of actual participation or complicity in violence.  
                                                        
 
160 Ibid.  The 28 year figure was derived by simply dividing the total number of outstanding 
applications by the average number of decisions rendered per year.  This assumes that the rate at 
which the Minister renders decisions on Ministerial relief will remain constant.  The assertion that 
applications can take over a decade to be determined is borne out by the data released, but was also 
related to me by various refugee lawyers.  It confirms my own experience in representing clients who 
have submitted these applications.  The delays in decision-making have also been documented in 
mandamus applications that have been brought before the Federal Court, see for example: Sencio 
Hechavarria v Canada (PSEP), 2010 FC 767; John Doe v Canada (MCI), 2006 FC 535. 
161 This information was shared with me by several lawyers, who unexpectedly received a spate of 
refused permanent residence applications for their Convention refugee clients.  See Canada, 
Citizenship and Immigration “Operational Bulletin 524”, on file with the author.  The question as to 
whether those who had submitted permanent residence applications prior to the change in policy 
had a legitimate expectation that such applications would be held in abeyance pending the outcome 
of their Ministerial relief applications was considered (and rejected) in Omer v Canada (MCI), 2015 
FC 494. 
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This focus on membership cases, furthermore, would appear to have arisen as a 
result of the “broad and unrestricted” interpretation of the term, as has been 
developed in the jurisprudence.  This interpretation is essentially sui generis to the 
inadmissibility context and stands in direct contrast to other immigration contexts 
where membership, in and of itself, is never seen as being sufficient on its own to 
attract sanction.  In the wide-open realm of security-inadmissibility, the data 
demonstrates that membership is the ultimate catch-all. 
 
Indeed, over the course of the period under study, the cases on inadmissibility 
directly reflect the ever-increasing, court-mandated scope of membership.  
Consider, for example, the following statement from the Immigration Division prior 
to the Federal Court decision in Al Yamani II which found the definition of 
membership under s 34 to have unlimited temporal application: 
The JKLF did engage in terrorist activities in Indian-held 
Kashmir, but at a time that pre-dated Mr. Syed's 
membership in the organization. There is no evidence 
before me that the JKLF committed terrorist acts in 
Indian-held Kashmir after April 1993 or before 
December 1995, the time period during which Mr. Syed 
was a member. 
… 
I consider the time period during which the activities of 
the organization are relevant to be that time during 
which Mr. Syed was learning about the organization and 
was a member of the organization. I have concluded 
that IRPA cannot intend that a person can be held 
responsible for the conduct of an organization after the 
person has severed their membership or association 
with that organization. Similarly, if a person becomes a 
member of an organization which has substantially 
changed in nature and character, that person could not 
reasonably be held responsible for activities 
undertaken by the ·organization before the person's 
membership. In other words, to be found inadmissible I 
consider a person would have to have been a member 
while the organization was engaged in terrorism. To 
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find otherwise would not be in accordance with the 
stated objectives provided in section 3 of IRPA. I do not 
see how a person who was a member of an organization 
at a time that organization was not engaged in terrorist 
activity could be said, on the basis solely of membership 
and nothing more, to threaten the security of Canadians, 
or to generally be a security risk.162 
 
Now, compare this statement to the following passage from an Immigration 
Division decision that post-dated the Al Yamani decision: 
The other factor that is important in looking at your 
membership is that according to the case of Aliamani 
[sic] there is no temporal component to my analysis. It's 
irrelevant that the period of your membership in the 
EPRP did not coincide with the terrorism and 
subversion by force that the EPRP committed. When I 
say it's irrelevant I mean it's irrelevant in my analysis. 
Or course, in reality it's relevant but in terms of 
paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act the case law says it's irrelevant.  There is 
no temporal component. 
 
This passage reveals, not surprisingly, the trickle down influence of the Federal 
Court’s broad interpretation of membership.  But more interestingly, it also appears 
to reveal a sense in the decision-maker that the law related to membership has been 
ruptured from the reality of what, presumably, the member understands to be the 
“everyday” meaning of the term.  It seems, in other words, that the decision-maker 
recognized a tension between the legal consequences he felt obliged to impose in 
the circumstances and the absence of morally sanctionable conduct on the part of 
the individual.  Without making too much of this small passage, the rupture between 
law and “reality” recognized by the member reveals something profound about the 
place of legality in the immigration realm and represents a clear, if unintentional 
articulation of Dyznehaus’ legal grey holes.   
                                                        
 
162 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v X (2005), A4-00685 (IRB). 
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Another related observation that can be made from the data is that, contrary to 
the primary legal justification for the broad scope of s 34(1), the provision has 
rarely been invoked in relation to any kind of actualized concern over Canadian 
security.  As noted above, in a passage routinely cited by the Immigration Division 
the Federal Court in Suresh II articulated the justification for the breadth of s 34 by 
reference to Canadian security: “[m]embership cannot and should not be narrowly 
interpreted when it involves the issue of Canada's national security.”163  So far as it 
goes, this justification is one on which there is a reasonably broad consensus.  Recall 
that even most open, or “porous” border advocates recognize the legitimacy of 
inherent limitations on migration for those who present some kind of threat to the 
liberal legal order of the host country.  It should also be acknowledged that 
Canadian courts have (not unreasonably) suggested that domestic security 
concerns, broadly construed, may also incorporate threats to international security.  
As the Supreme Court noted in Suresh I: 
These considerations lead us to conclude that a person 
constitutes a “danger to the security of Canada” if he or 
she poses a serious threat to the security of Canada, 
whether direct or indirect, and bearing in mind the fact 
that the security of one country is often dependent on 
the security of other nations.  The threat must be 
“serious”, in the sense that it must be grounded on 
objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and 
in the sense that the threatened harm must be 
substantial rather than negligible.164 
 
The data suggests, however, that s 34 cases rarely invoke, at least explicitly, the 
security of Canada, even under this broad interpretation of the term.  This is of 
course most clearly articulated by the fact that the provisions built into s 34 
(sections 34(1)(d) and (e)) that relate directly to Canadian security are essentially 
                                                        
 
163 Suresh II, supra note 70 at para 22. 
164 Suresh I, supra note 58 at para 90. 
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never invoked.  Those implicated on the other grounds, furthermore, were generally 
individuals with (often tenuous) affiliations to inward-looking and parochial 
organizations whose aims tend to be localized political change, often in the context 
of repressive state regimes. This fact should not be taken as a defence of, or 
justification for, the violent means adopted by some of these organizations, but it 
should inspire reflection as to the classes of persons who are subjected to security-
inadmissibility procedures and those for whom a blind eye seems to be turned.  
Why is it, for example, that membership in the obscure Namibian Caprivi Liberation 
Movement165 is of greater concern, from a Canadian security perspective, than 
membership in the United States military?  It is a firmly established fact that both 
organizations have engaged in the subversion of governments, and yet nominal 
membership in the “CLM” triggers inadmissibility procedures, while senior 
command control in U.S. military units directly involved in government subversion 
does not appear to raise any concern.   
 
This asymmetry in the application of the law is concerning.  It may very well 
offend the guarantee against nationality-based discrimination found in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,166 but on a more basic level it also calls into 
question the integrity of the legal regime.  It is, after all, a basic principle of legality 
that laws should be implemented as promulgated and that it must be capable of 
guiding the behaviour of its subjects.167 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
165 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v X (2009), A8-02764 (IRB). 
166 Supra note 41, s15, which guarantees all persons equal treatment under the law without 
discrimination on the basis of, amongst other things, national or ethnic origin. 
167 See generally Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1979) and Lon Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1969). 
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Conclusion 
If it is true, as Bob Dylan suggests, that “Democracy don't rule the world” but 
that it is rather “ruled by violence” the question for our purposes is why some 
violence is disregarded by immigration inadmissibility proceedings, while other 
forms of resistance attract sanction.  The answer, I argue in the coming chapters, lies 
in a certain kind of chauvinism toward the Global South, in a disregard for the role of 
Western democracies in the conflicts of the South and in a failure, I contend, to view 
immigration law through the prism of those in the South who have been forced to 
flee from upheaval.  The solution, I later argue, lies in a reformulated view of 
administrative discretion in inadmissibility matters, one that incorporates as 
integral components both a dialogical approach to decision-making and a sensitive 
understanding of Third World perspectives on conflict, the use of force and the 
movement of peoples. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RETHINKING SECURITY FROM 
THE OUTSIDE IN: MIGRATION, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE THIRD WORLD 
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3.1 Introduction 
Thus far, we have situated the place that immigration occupies in liberal theory and 
examined how the immigration-security regime identifies and excludes those alleged to 
have participated in subversion, espionage and terrorism.  We have also witnessed how the 
broad language of the security regime seems to be used to capture not all of those 
described in the words of the legislation, but rather particular kinds of individuals from 
particular parts of the world who have engaged in particular kinds of activities.  With this 
in mind, I now move to an examination as to why this might be the case; about why it is, in 
other words, that so much of Canada’s immigration-security apparatus appears to be 
directed toward those who have taken part in relatively obscure and decidedly localized 
Southern conflicts.  To understand why it is that people originating from the Global South 
seem to be disproportionately targeted for exclusion under the immigration-security 
regime, I turn to an approach to the study of law, specifically international law, which 
places the Global South at the very centre of its analysis.   
 
I begin this chapter by describing the somewhat uneasy relationship between domestic 
migration control and international law, which I then follow with an explanation as to how 
decision-making in the immigration-security regime directly, if sometimes unwittingly, 
implicates several key areas of concern to international law.  These include, but are not 
necessarily limited to, the principles of self-determination and territorial contiguity, the use 
of force, international human rights norms and the international refugee law principle of 
non-refoulement.  Immigration decision-making is, to be sure, a domestic, state-based 
practice – indeed there are ways in which it is an exceedingly inward-looking process.  This 
said, decisions about who may enter a state and who may legitimately be excluded from it 
are equally about the nexus between the domestic and the international, and it is these 
points of contact and intersection that I highlight in this section.  In addition, I demonstrate 
how the lack of a nuanced and explicit engagement with international law has led to the 
arbitrariness of immigration-security decisions explored in the previous chapter.   
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With this in mind, however, in the next section I acknowledge that even a more 
fulsome understanding of the place of international law in the migration-security regime 
does not fully capture, or adequately explain, why decision-making in this area remains 
fixated on individuals from the Global South.  In short, I argue, mere knowledge of 
international law will not be sufficient to ensure that balance is brought to migration-
security decision making.  In addition to a more ‘nuanced and explicit’ engagement with 
international law, I contend that decisions in this realm must also be suffused with an 
understanding of the history and context from which those typically found to be 
inadmissible come.  
 
To do this, I turn to the writing of several individuals who, to varying degrees, self-
identify as scholars of the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) 
movement.  I commence, not surprisingly, by describing the TWAIL approach, tracing its 
history and contributions to our understanding of international law.  I then look to a 
TWAIL perspective on those areas particularly relevant to the immigration-security 
regime, such as subversion, terrorism and self-determination.  From this vantage point, I 
look to a number of specific examples of cases, within the Canadian context, that illustrate 
both the problems that arise when immigration law is applied in a vacuum, devoid of the 
context of subaltern realities, and the potential that a TWAILian perspective may bring to 
the process.     
3.2 Immigration and International Law 
Laws defining and enforcing borders lie, by their very nature, at the intersection 
between the domestic and international.  At the same time, regulating inflows of people has 
always been characterized as a matter of pure state prerogative and states remain 
profoundly reticent to cede control over their immigration programs to anything 
resembling an international legal regime.  Immigration, to many, is one of the clearest 
expressions of sovereignty and it therefore remains sacrosanct as a matter of internal state 
discretion, except to the extent that international law may reinforce this notion.  The 
(misplaced) perception amongst many Northern states that they bear the brunt of 
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immigrant, and particularly refugee, inflows, together with the fact that international legal 
frameworks cannot take root without the acquiescence of such states means that an 
international and binding regime for immigration, as opposed to border control, has never 
gained traction.1 
 
However, there are ways, albeit tentative ones, in which domestic immigration law 
recognizes at least the relevance of international norms to its processes and the language of 
international law can, not infrequently, be found  in immigration decision-making.  Below I 
sketch out three distinct ways in which international legal norms interact with domestic 
immigration law in Canada:  1) they inform the interpretation of domestic law; 2) 
international law is, in certain circumscribed categories, directly incorporated into 
domestic law; and 3) migration law has become a key cite for interpreting the content of 
international human rights norms. 
3.2.1 International law as interpretive guide 
 
In Canada, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act makes reference to 
international law, specifically international human rights instruments, requiring that the 
Act be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with it.2  As a dualist country, however, the 
hard edge of international law is not realized in Canada without direct and explicit 
incorporation into Canadian law.3  This said, the degree to which domestic immigration and 
refugee law implicates international law and international legal obligations has been the 
subject of considerable judicial commentary, most notably perhaps in the seminal decision 
                                                        
 
1 Though several have proposed such an international regulatory regime, particularly liberal economists, see 
for example Howard F Chang, “The Economics of International Labor Migration and the Case for Global 
Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory” (2008) 41 Cornell Int Law J 14. 
2 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), s 3(3): 
This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that… 
(f) complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory. 
3 For an overview of the monist and dualist modes of incorporating international law domestically, see J.H. 
Currie, Public International Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 199-201.  See also Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J 
Toope, “A Hesitant Embrace: The Application of International Law by Canadian Courts” (2002) 40 Canadian 
Yearbook of Intl Law 3 at 21. Also found in David Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public Law (Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2004) at 357 [Brunnée and Toope, “Hesitant Embrace”]. 
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of the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker.4  In Baker, the court adopted the principle first 
established elsewhere that international human rights law represents, at the very least, a 
key body of content with which to identify, interpret and resolve ambiguity in domestic 
legislation.5  The court in Baker also noted that international human rights norms have a 
“critical influence” on the interpretation of the rights included in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, including the scope and applicability of such rights to non-citizens.6   
 
Mavis Baker was a Jamaican woman who entered Canada on a visitor's visa in 1981 
at the age of twenty-six.  She worked as a live-in domestic worker for eleven years, during 
which time she gave birth to four children who were, by virtue of their birth in Canada, 
Canadian citizens.  She applied for permanent residency on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds, based on the hardship she would endure if forced to return to 
Jamaica, given her current need for psychological care and on the impact that her 
departure would have on her Canadian-born children.  A senior immigration officer refused 
the application, stating that there were insufficient humanitarian and compassionate 
reasons to warrant an exemption to the general rule that applications for permanent 
residency be processed outside Canada.  On judicial review to the Federal Court, Baker 
argued that, as a signatory to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. 
T.S. 1992 No. 3, Canada was obliged to make the consideration of the best interests of her 
children a primary consideration and that the responsible officer had not fulfilled this 
obligation.  The court dismissed this argument, but did certify the following question of 
general importance: “Given that the Immigration Act does not expressly incorporate the 
language of Canada’s international obligations with respect to the International Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, must federal immigration authorities treat the best interests of 
the Canadian child as a primary consideration in assessing an applicant under s. 114(2) of 
                                                        
 
4 [1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker].   
5 Ibid, at para 70, following Tavita v. Minister of Immigration, [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA), at p 266; Vishaka v. 
Rajasthan, [1997] 3 LRC 361 (SC India). 
6 Ibid, citing Slaight Communications Inc. v Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R 1038; R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
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the Immigration Act?”7  The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court decision, finding that 
the best interests of the children need not be given primacy in assessing such an 
application.  On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that the law, as 
constructed, did not mean that the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the affected 
children’s best interests were determinative8 of an application for permanent residence on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds, but Canada’s signing of the Convention was an 
important interpretive factor in determining how such applications are to be determined:  
[F]or the exercise of the discretion to fall within the standard 
of reasonableness, the decision-maker should consider 
children’s best interests as an important factor, give them 
substantial weight, and be alert, alive and sensitive to 
them.  That is not to say that children’s best interests must 
always outweigh other considerations, or that there will not be 
other reasons for denying an H & C claim even when children’s 
interests are given this consideration.  However, where the 
interests of children are minimized, in a manner inconsistent 
with Canada’s humanitarian and compassionate tradition and 
the Minister’s guidelines, the decision will be unreasonable.9 
 
Of interest, while the minority judgment adopted the bulk of Justice Claire 
L’Heureux Dube’s majority reasoning in Baker, it dissented on the question of the 
application of international law to domestic decision-making, finding that the primacy 
accorded to children’s considerations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child was 
“irrelevant unless and until such provisions are the subject of legislation enacted by 
Parliament.”10 
 
                                                        
 
7 The Canadian approach to judicial review and appeals of immigration matters provides an articulate 
example of how such matters are dealt with in legally exceptional ways – applications for judicial review of 
immigration decisions are subject to a leave requirement, while appeals are barred unless the judge who 
determines the judicial review certifies a question of general importance: see IRPA s 74(d).  Challenges to this 
sui generis appellate structure have not been successful: see Huynh v Canada, [1996] 2 F.C. 976, leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, [1996] SCCA No. 311.  
8 For further on this, see also Legault v Canada (MCI), 2002 FCA 125. 
9 Baker, supra note 4 at para 75. 
10 Ibid at para 81. 
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The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which was passed into law in 2002, and 
the corresponding requirement that the Act be interpreted in a manner that complies with 
international human rights instruments, codified and arguably expanded the majority 
ruling in Baker, making international human rights requirements the lynchpin in resolving 
ambiguity in the IRPA.  This said, judicial decision-making on the relationship between 
domestic and international law has remained somewhat inconsistent, at times treating the 
latter simply as one part of the interpretive matrix to be considered, while at other times 
presuming it to be determinative, unless the international source is patently inconsistent 
with the statutory text.11 
 
The Federal Court of Appeal leaned towards this latter approach in the case of de 
Guzman, which involved a challenge to a regulation that permanently bars the sponsorship 
of any family member who has not been listed on a permanent resident’s own immigration 
application.  The appellant argued, inter alia, that this provision offended the guarantees to 
non-interference with family life, as enumerated in both the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Noting the mandatory 
language of s3(3)(f) of the IRPA, the court asserted that decision-makers are to attribute 
more than mere persuasive or contextual significance to relevant international human 
rights instruments in the interpretation of the Act.12  Indeed, the court concluded that the 
jurisprudence, together with the plain words of s3(3)(f) signify that the IRPA is to be 
interpreted and applied consistently with Canada’s international human rights obligations, 
unless, on the modern approach to statutory interpretation, this is impossible.13  In other 
words, because the international human rights instruments on which the appellant relied 
in de Guzman create binding legal obligations, s3(3)(f) makes them “determinative of the 
meaning of the IRPA, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intention to the 
contrary.”14  In a neat judicial sleight of hand, however, the court further reasoned that the 
                                                        
 
11 Brunnée and Toope, Hesitant Embrace, supra note 3 at 6-7. 
12 de Guzman v Canada (MCI), 2005 FCA 436 at para 75. 
13 Ibid at para 83. 
14 Ibid at para 108. 
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impugned regulation was not to be examined in isolation, but in the context of the entire 
legislative regime.  Considering that the regime provides the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration with the discretionary capacity to override on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds any decision that may offend Canada’s international legal 
obligations, the court concluded that the regulation does not make the IRPA non-compliant 
with Canada’s obligations under international law.  More of course could be said about the 
soundness of this reasoning, but for the sake of my argument, the court’s conclusions on 
the merits are not as important as the emphasis it placed on integrating international legal 
obligations with the domestic sphere of Canadian immigration decision-making.   
 
The same can be said for the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Okoloubu, in 
which the court held that immigration officers deciding cases on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds must bear in mind not only the values enshrined in Canada’s 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but also those found in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.15  The court then went on to enumerate various provisions of the 
ICCPR – the principles of non-interference in family life (Article 17), the importance of a 
family unit and protection thereof by society and the state (Article 23), as well as children’s 
rights (Article 24) – as being amongst those interests that the officer must have in mind 
when dealing with an application for permanent residence on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds.  Citing another decision – Thiara - the court nevertheless 
concluded that s3(3)(f) of the IRPA does not require that an officer exercising discretion 
under the Act “specifically refer to and analyze the international human rights instruments 
to which Canada is signatory. It is sufficient if the officer addresses the substance of the 
issues raised.”16  What this means remains somewhat unclear, but one would at least 
presume that if officers are required to “bear in mind” international human rights law in 
considering the applications that come before them, their decisions must also be consistent 
                                                        
 
15 Okoloubu v Canada (MCI), 2008 FCA 326 at paras 49-50.  
16 Ibid at para 50, citing Thiara v Canada (MCI), 2008 FCA 151, at para 9. 
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with this body of law or provide compelling reasons based on domestic law for departing 
from it.17 
 
More recently, in a number of cases primarily involving two migrant ships that 
arrived in Canada in October, 2009 and August, 2010, the courts have examined the 
intersections between the IRPA’s organized criminality inadmissibility provisions, its 
criminal sanctions and international instruments on the smuggling of persons, specifically 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and a protocol to that 
Convention, the  Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.18  The 
arrival of these migrant ships – the MV Ocean Lady and the MV Sun Sea – was clearly 
viewed by the government as a profound threat to the integrity of Canada’s borders and the 
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) responded to the arrivals forcefully through 
detention, criminal prosecutions and inadmissibility proceedings.19  In an interesting and 
ill-fated twist to the story, prior to the departure of the MV Sun Sea for Canada, the ship’s 
Thai crew refused to go ahead with the voyage and left the boat.  The organizers of the 
smuggling operation, alleged to be members of the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) group, nevertheless commenced the journey and in so doing recruited some 
of the asylum seeker passengers to help along the way.  Following their arrival (and 
                                                        
 
17 This interpretation would also seem consistent with statements from the Supreme Court of Canada that the 
Charter should be presumed to provide at least as great a level of protection as is found in the international 
human rights documents that Canada has ratified: see Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector 
Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, para 70. 
18 Jointly passed by U.N. General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000 and ratified by 
Canada in May, 2002, referred to hereafter, respectively, as UNCTOC and the Smuggling Protocol. 
19 Both ships carried Tamil asylum seekers fleeing the ongoing, post-civil war violence in Sri Lanka.  The 
initial arrival of the MV Ocean Lady was a relatively modest smuggling operation, carrying aboard 76 
passengers.  The MV Sun Sea carried 492 passengers.  In a memorandum drafted days before the arrival of the 
MV Sun Sea, the Director General for Post-Border Programs for CBSA noted that “[d]etention is an effective 
tool against those who circumvent immigration processes” and that the agency would be “aggressive in 
building evidence and arguing for inadmissibility.”  In contrast to the normally non-adversarial nature of 
refugee proceedings, the memo further outlined that the agency would be active in trying to oppose the 
refugee claims of all Sun Sea arrivals.  The Director stated: “In terms of the approach for refugee 
determination hearings, they will be dealt with aggressively as well. The CBSA will advise the IRB that it 
intends to intervene in each case, however, the IRB's current 84% acceptance rate will be a challenge.”  
Memorandum obtained through Access to Information Request A-2013-03486(10 September 2013), 
provided to the Canadian Council for Refugees and on file with the author.  See also above discussion at 
Chapter 2, note 151 and accompanying text. 
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detention) in Canada, several of the asylum seekers who had helped out with the voyage, 
including some who had merely cooked aboard the ship, were referred to the Immigration 
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board for an admissibility hearing, based on the 
premise that in assisting the smuggling operation, they had engaged in the transnational 
crime of people smuggling, as set out at s 37(1)(b) of the IRPA.  The Immigration Division 
consistently affirmed the allegations of the CBSA in these cases, finding the asylum seekers 
inadmissible under s 37, which has the effect of terminating their claims to refugee status.20 
 
Meanwhile, the suspected masterminds of the MV Ocean Lady operation were 
criminally prosecuted under s 117 of the IRPA on charges attracting a fine of up to 
$1,000,000 and, potentially, to life imprisonment.21 
 
Prior to the commencement of the trial in the criminal prosecutions, the four co-
accused applied for an order declaring that s 117 of the IRPA infringes s 7 of the Charter.  At 
the heart of the application, the accused argued that the provision was unconstitutionally 
overbroad in that it criminalizes a broader range of activities, including humanitarian 
refugee assistance and assistance of family members, than was intended to be caught by 
the provision.   
 
The trial judge accepted that s 117 was overly broad, based in part on the narrower 
scope of the Smuggling Protocol and on the Refugee Convention, which specifically 
prohibits prosecution for illegal entry.  The court noted that the Smuggling Protocol, unlike 
the IRPA provision, specifically limits the ambit of what is considered to be smuggling 
activity to those actions undertaken for some form of profit or personal gain.  The means 
                                                        
 
20 Pursuant to sections 101(1)(f) and 104(2)(a) of the IRPA.  See for example: Canada (PSEP) v. X, 2011 CanLII 
93842 (CA IRB); X (Re), 2011 CanLII 86097 (CA IRB); X (Re), 2012 CanLII 95162 (CA IRB); Canada (PSEP) v X, 
2012 CanLII 93972 (CA IRB). 
21 Since (and in response to) the arrival of these migrant ships, s117 of the IRPA was amended to include 
mandatory minimum sentences, in addition to the already existing possibility of life imprisonment.  The 
minimum sentences are three, five and ten years, depending on the number of persons smuggled, on whether 
the accused smuggler endangered any lives or harmed anyone, and on whether the offence was for profit, or 
was for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization or terrorist group. 
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chosen to achieve the legitimate state objective of combating human smuggling therefore 
captured a broader range of conduct, and persons, than is necessary and, as such, s.117 was 
found to violate the Charter and was therefore of no force or effect.22  On appeal to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, the Crown was permitted to substantially recast its 
argument regarding the objectives of the anti-smuggling provision.  Rather than merely 
fulfilling its international obligation to combat human smuggling, the Crown argued that 
the true objective of s 117 was to “prevent individuals from arranging the unlawful entry of 
others into Canada, thereby securing the secondary goals of enforcing Canadian 
sovereignty; maintaining the integrity of Canada’s immigration and refugee regime; 
protecting the health, safety, and security of Canadians; and promoting international justice 
and security.”23  The Court of Appeal accepted this expanded articulation of the provision’s 
objective, which led to the unsurprising conclusion that s 117 is not overly broad.  The 
court accepted, in other words, that the aim of Canada’s anti-smuggling provision is equally 
to prevent parents from bringing their children into Canada as it is to prevent profiteering 
people smuggling who organize large scale boat arrivals.24  Nevertheless, in arriving at this 
conclusion, the court paid considerable attention to both the Refugee Convention and the 
Smuggling Protocol.25 
 
Both before and after the British Columbia trial court’s decision in Appulonappa, the 
Federal Courts were considering judicial reviews and appeals of the Immigration Division 
decisions on the application of s 37 to the asylum seekers who participated in the MV Sun 
Sea operation.26  In two consolidated appellate decisions, the Federal Court of Appeal 
upheld the findings of the Immigration Division, distinguishing the Appulonappa trial 
decision and concluding that Canada had legitimately decided to incorporate a definition of 
people smuggling that was broader than that which was required under its international 
                                                        
 
22 R v Appulonappa, 2013 BCSC 31 
23 R v Appulonappa, 2014 BCCA 163 at para 5. 
24 Ibid at paras 114, 120-146. 
25 Ibid at paras 121-140. 
26 B306 v Canada (PSEP), 2012 FC 1282; B010 v Canada (MCI), 2012 FC 569; S. C. v Canada (PSEP), 2013 FC 
491; J.P. v Canada (PSEP), 2012 FC 1466; Sivagnanasingam v Canada (PSEP), 2013 FC 604; B006 v Canada 
(MCI), 2013 FC 1033; B072 v Canada (MCI), 2012 FC 899. 
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obligations.27  Leave to appeal both these decisions and the Appulonappa decision was 
granted by the Supreme Court of Canada and the matters were heard together in early 
2015.28 
 
Once again, however, the ultimate conclusions reached by Canadian courts in these 
decisions is ancillary to my larger point, which is that domestic law is presumed to conform 
with international law and the latter has become an important interpretive mechanism by 
which Canadian decision-makers determine the substantive content of domestic 
immigration and refugee law.29   
3.2.2 International law as directly incorporated into Canadian immigration law 
 
The second and most obvious way in which international law is embedded in 
Canadian immigration decision-making is by direct incorporation of key elements of two 
particular international treaties – the Convention Related to the Status of Refugees and the 
Convention Against Torture – into Canadian law.30  Little need be said of the relevance of 
international law to these aspects of Canadian domestic immigration law – in short, 
Canada’s international legal obligations to, amongst other things, recognize Convention 
refugees and prohibit the expulsion of anyone to torture have been fully integrated into 
Canadian law.  That Canada has elevated the status of these international norms to the level 
                                                        
 
27 B010 v Canada (MCI), 2013 FCA 87; Canada (PPSEP) v JP, 2013 FCA 262. 
28 JP et al v Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, SCC Court File Nos.35688, 35685, 35677, 
35958, 35388. 
29 See R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (4th ed.) (Markham: Butterworths, 
2002), at 422; Ian Brownlie,  Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2003) on the incorporation of customary international where it is not expressly contradicted by domestic 
legislation.  For further jurisprudence on the role of international law in interpreting domestic legislation, see 
Slaight Communications Inc. v Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations 
Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; Suresh v Canada (MCI), 2002 SCC 
1 [Suresh]; United States v  Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v 
Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76. 
30 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150, entered into force 
for Canada on June 4, 1969: [1969] Can TS. No. 6 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 85, entered into force for Canada on July 24, 1987: [1987] 
Can TS No 36.  These instruments are referred to hereinafter as the “Refugee Convention” and the “CAT”, 
respectively.  Key provisions of both the Refugee Convention and the CAT are incorporated into sections 96-
98 of the IRPA and are reproduced in a Schedule to the Act. 
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of binding domestic law is not surprising, given that the prohibition on refoulement to 
persecution has taken on quasi-jus cogens status31 and the prohibition on the return to 
torture is fully recognized as a jus cogens, or peremptory norm, from which no derogation 
is permitted.32  As a result, international legal interpretations of these human rights 
doctrines are frequently relied upon; the views of international monitoring bodies are often 
treated as persuasive, if not determinative, and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees periodically intervenes directly in Canadian cases implicating key parts of the 
Refugee Convention.33  This latter point illustrates, perhaps more articulately than anything 
else, the uniquely interwoven nature of immigration regulation and international law in 
this area.  Indeed, there is essentially no other context in which a United Nations 
organization intervenes in litigation in individual domestic cases, albeit those with a larger 
precedent-setting possibility, to ensure compliance with an international treaty.  Of course 
the fact that Canada has incorporated its commitment to these international agreements 
into domestic law does not mean that its interpretation of its obligations is always 
consistent with international law doctrine or with the positions of United Nations agencies.  
There are, for example, numerous instances in which Canadian policy and jurisprudence 
have run directly contrary to the position of the UNHCR on the proper interpretation of the 
Refugee Convention.34 
 
                                                        
 
31 Jean Allain, “The jus cogens nature of non-refoulement” (2001) 13:4 Int J Refug Law 533. 
32 See for example Prosecutor v Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, 10 Dec 1998 at 
paras 153-157.  This said, in the context of previous legislation which had not incorporated the CAT, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh, supra note 29 considered at length the nature of Canada’s obligations 
when considering the deportation of an individual to the likelihood of torture.  And while the court accepted 
the non-derogable nature of the prohibition on torture, it also found (possibly in the still-proximate 
aftershock  of 9/11) that the  “jurisprudence does not suggest that Canada may never deport a person to face 
treatment elsewhere that would be unconstitutional if imposed by Canada directly, on Canadian soil: para 58. 
33 Most recently in two cases involving the exclusion clauses of the Convention: see Ezokola v Canada (MCI), 
2013 SCC 40, UNHCR amicus factum available online: http://www.refworld.org/docid/50ebcf272.html and 
Hernandez Febles v Canada (MCI), 2014 SCC 68, heard before the Supreme Court March 25, 2013, UNHCR 
amicus factum available online: http://www.refworld.org/publisher,UNHCR,AMICUS,,532019774,0.html.  
34 See, most recently, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hernandez Febles, ibid.  For a fascinating 
account of international law and domestic interpretation and compliance, see Jutta Brunnée, and Stephen 
Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 114-121. 
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3.2.3 Migration law as key cite for interpreting international human rights norms 
 
Finally, there is another, almost inverse way in which migration law implicates 
international norms and that is by directly influencing, through litigation, the 
interpretation and therefore the content of international law.  Indeed, in recent years 
migration law has proven to be a key cite for the interpretation of countries’ international 
human rights obligations.  Given the nascent and still relatively non-enforceable nature of 
international human rights law, there remains a relatively small body of international 
authority on the interpretation of various instruments.  This being the case, the 
interpretive process in relation to these instruments has fallen, in some significant 
measure, to domestic courts.  One example of this phenomenon arises from the exclusion 
clause found at Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention, which excludes from refugee 
protection those believed to have “committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a 
crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes.”  Domestic courts, in interpreting this provision, must 
therefore determine the meaning of the clause within the scheme of the Refugee 
Convention, but in giving it definitional form, must also look to other international 
instruments that refer to the prescribed crimes.   
 
In recent years, appellate courts in several countries have considered the 
application of Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention, and in so doing, they have also  been 
compelled to consider and shed light on recent developments in international criminal law, 
most particularly, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court35 and the 
jurisprudence of both the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.36  Moreover, the influence that the decisions may have is not confined to domestic 
                                                        
 
35 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF. 183/9, 17 July 1998 (as amended) [Rome 
Statute].  The International Criminal may hereafter be referred to as the “ICC”. 
36 See for example, the decisions of appellate and Supreme Courts in the United Kingdom: R (JS) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 15; New Zealand: Attorney-General (Minister of Immigration) v 
Tamil X [2010] NZSC 107; Canada: Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40; France: CE, 
14 juin 2010, No 320630 (Conseil d’État); and Australia: SHCB V. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & 
Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 308. 
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refugee law, but also may have an impact on international refugee law, international 
criminal law and international humanitarian law.  Indeed, the Rome Statute specifically 
contemplates that the ICC may take into consideration domestic law on relevant issues.37  
In its own interventions before state courts, furthermore, the UNHCR frequently relies 
upon national decisions that it views as being consistent with the Refugee Convention.38   
 
Additionally, domestic courts and tribunals are frequently influential in the 
development of jurisprudence in other states.  This “transnational judicial conversation” is 
particularly influential in the domain of refugee law, where it has led to a “rich comparative 
jurisprudence” concerning the key principles of international law relative to refugees.39  In 
these ways, domestic immigration law can be viewed as playing a role in the dialogical 
nature of developments in international law, both taking instruction from international 
norms, but also transmitting its own interpretation of such norms back out into the 
international sphere. 
 
Once again, for our purposes, what is important is to recognize that, despite the 
dogged provincialism of immigration law in certain respects, it also remains intimately 
connected with international law.  To further, and more specifically, elaborate on the point, 
I now turn to the ways in which immigration decision-making in the security context also 
engages international law.   
 
 
                                                        
 
37 Albeit, as a matter of secondary preference to international authority: see Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome 
Statute.    
38 See, for example, its amicus factum in intervening in the Ezokola case, supra note 33. 
39 James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status 2d ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) [Hathaway and Foster, “Law of Refugee Status”] at 5, which proposes, in part, a greater 
penetration of transnational dialogue and cooperation in domestic refugee law jurisprudence.  For a 
contrasting view from within the European context, see Guy Goodwin Gill and Helene Lambert, eds, The 
Limits of Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization and Judicial Dialogue in the European Union  
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010). 
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3.2.4 Immigration, Security and International Law 
 
As with the other aspects of immigration and refugee law referred to above, 
decision-makers in the immigration-security arena also regularly engage, albeit sometimes 
unwittingly, in both the discourse and content of international law.  Given the 
extraordinary breadth of the security provision, decision-making in the field touches on a 
number of different themes, many of which have a corresponding plane internationally.  In 
the previous chapter, I discussed the various grounds on which security cases are brought: 
subversion, terrorism, membership, etc.  Below I revisit some of these grounds, and the 
legal issues that arise from them, to cast further light on their international dimensions; 
more specifically I look at the intersections between allegations of subversion and 
terrorism and a response to these allegations, based on the right of self-determination at 
international law.   
Subversion 
 
Recall that an individual who has engaged in the subversion by force of any 
government is inadmissible to Canada pursuant to s34(1)(b) of the IRPA.  Recall further 
that a significant percentage of Canadian security cases arise under s34(1)(b) and that the 
majority of these cases relate to individuals found to be members of secessionist, anti-
colonial or liberation movements. 
 
Subversion as a specific term of art in Canadian security law does not appear to have 
a parallel existence under international legal doctrine.  That said, the acts to which it refers 
– the undermining, often by illicit means and with force, of a government – are at the very 
core of international law as it has developed over the past 60 years.  Given that states 
comprise the basic building blocks of international law, it is not surprising that numerous 
international instruments place enormous emphasis on national stability (frequently 
referred to as ‘territorial integrity’), and contain corresponding prohibitions on the use of 
force.  The cornerstone of this emphasis on peace and stability is the United Nations Charter 
itself, which provides at Article 2(4): 
 177 
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.40 
 
Not surprisingly, however, international law admits of certain exceptions to this 
general prohibition on armed aggression, specifically contemplating rules of engagement 
and situations in which the use of force may be justified.  Indeed the exceptions to the norm 
of territorial integrity have coalesced into an entire field of international law known, some 
say perversely, as the law of armed conflict, which includes as a subset international 
humanitarian law.  The most notable expressions of this area of international law are the 
four Geneva Conventions of 194941 and their two additional protocols of 1977: Additional 
Protocol I42 and Additional Protocol II.43 
 
On the surface these provisions would appear to apply solely to states vis–à–vis their 
relations with other states and to have, as a consequence, little to do with the kinds of 
intra-state conflicts in which liberation movements have typically engaged.  And for a time, 
this was arguably true, however, Additional Protocol I to the Conventions broadens the 
application of the various provisions to certain classes of individuals associated with purely 
domestic conflicts.  More specifically, Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I provides: 
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph [which 
tie the Protocol into the larger Geneva Conventions] include 
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
                                                        
 
40 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (U.N. Charter), Art 2(4). 
41 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field (Geneva Convention No. I), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; 1949 Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea  (Geneva 
Convention No. II), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention No. III), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention No. IV), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
42 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 
43 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.  The Conventions and 
Additional Protocols were both incorporated into Canadian law by the Geneva Conventions Act, RSC 1985, c 
G-3. 
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domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in 
the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
 
The implications of this provision have been much debated, but in broad terms an 
individual may obtain the right under international law to participate in a purely internal 
conflict where two conditions are met: first, the armed conflict must be one in which 
“peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination;” and second, the individual 
must be a member of an "armed force" of a party to the armed conflict.  These 
requirements are rich in both meaning and controversy, but it is clear that, at a minimum, 
Article 1(4) brings internal conflicts of a particular character into the purview of 
international law.   
 
Determining which internal armed conflicts may be justified under international law 
– in other words, determining which conflicts are composed of “peoples” fighting against 
“colonial domination,” “alien occupation” and against “racist regimes” in the exercise of 
“self-determination” – is an immensely complex and fraught task, but the same of course 
could be said of purely international conflicts.  Both involve entrenched interests, highly 
politicized contexts and competing interpretations of history.  The point to recall for our 
purposes is that individuals who have participated in, and fled from, situations involving 
the subversion of a government may often stake the claim that their actions are entirely 
within the bounds of what is permitted at international law.44   
 
                                                        
 
44 And as I shall further set out below, many organizations that have been implicated in security 
inadmissibility matters have made this precise argument: the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI); 
the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Angolan União National para a Independencia Total de Angola 
(UNITA), to name a few. 
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In response, one might ask whether the possible justification of an armed act of 
subversion under international law is at all relevant to domestic questions of admission 
and admissibility.  The answer to this (as I have mentioned and will mention again), is that 
in a legislative landscape as amorphous as the security context, something has to inform 
decision-making if it is to maintain any semblance of consistency and coherence; if it is to 
maintain, in other words, adherence to the rule of law.45  Immigration decision-makers are 
called upon, in a very tangible way, to assess the character of situations of armed conflict 
and to preside over their lawfulness.  Given that liberation struggles for self-determination 
are, in other contexts, clearly in the dominion of international law, it seems only logical to 
assess them from the international perspective. 
Terrorism 
 
As with subversion, the data on Immigration and Refugee Board decisions illustrates 
that a high percentage of cases in the security area relate to allegations of membership in 
terrorist organizations.  Decision-makers therefore frequently have to grapple with what 
has long been, both domestically and internationally, a vexing legal issue – that being the 
definition of a terrorist act.  As I have noted earlier, while terrorism as a concept is relevant 
to several provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, it provides no 
definition of the term.  This being the case, the Immigration Division tends to rely on the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh46 as a starting point for working through 
the meaning of the term and how it plays out in particular situations.  Manickavasagam 
Suresh, a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil descent entered Canada in 1990 and was found to be a 
Convention refugee.  He later applied for permanent residence in Canada,  but the 
application was not finalized because, under processes associated with the former 
Immigration Act, the Solicitor General of Canada and the Minister of Citizenship and 
                                                        
 
45 By ‘rule of law’, I refer again here to the term in the substantive, Fullerian sense, as a set of principles that 
impose substantive requirements on laws to be recognized as such.  This would include the requirement that 
laws, and the application of them, be clear and intelligible, be prospective in nature and be consistently 
applied. 
46 Suresh, supra note 29. 
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Immigration commenced proceedings to deport him on security grounds.  More 
specifically, Canada alleged that Mr. Suresh was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), an organization alleged to have funding networks in Canada and to have 
committed terrorist activity in Sri Lanka.  While the courts noted that the LTTE was 
engaged in a protracted rebellion against the democratically elected government of Sri 
Lanka, it also acknowledged that atrocities were commonplace on both sides of the 
struggle.47  It was also firmly established in the evidence that the use of torture by the 
security forces was widespread, particularly against persons suspected of membership in 
the LTTE. 
 
As a result of Suresh’s perceived leadership role in the LTTE and the World Tamil 
Movement, an alleged front organization for the LTTE, the government commenced the 
somewhat Byzantine process for removing Suresh, given his status as a Convention 
refugee.  This culminated in the issuance of a Ministerial “opinion” (the term used in the 
legislation), that Suresh constituted a danger to the security of Canada and should be 
deported.  Suresh challenged the decision, arguing, inter alia, that the terms “danger to the 
security of Canada” and “terrorism” were unconstitutionally vague.  The decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the matter represented a somewhat tepid victory for refugee 
advocates.  The court determined that, informed by the non-derogable nature of the 
Convention Against Torture, the Canadian Charter “generally” prohibits the deportation of 
an individual to torture.48  The court also found that while the legislative framework for the 
removal of Convention refugees was constitutional, the procedures followed to carry out 
the deportation of Mr. Suresh did not comply with the Charter in so far as they failed to 
provide him with adequate disclosure of the case that needed to be met.  
 
                                                        
 
47 Ibid, at para 10. 
48 Ibid, at paras 76, 78.  Of interest here, of course, is the use of the word “generally” which clearly leaves open 
the possibility that the courts would uphold the removal of an individual to a known risk of torture in certain 
extraordinary, if unspecified, circumstances.  On this point, the timing of the Suresh appeal is also perhaps 
noteworthy; the appeal hearing was heard in May, 2001 just before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York 
and Washington, but the decision was not released some until four months after the attacks, in January 2002. 
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The court further found that, despite difficulties providing definitional form to the 
term “terrorism” it was not unconstitutionally vague.  In a passage worth citing at some 
length, the court first noted: 
One searches in vain for an authoritative definition of 
“terrorism”.  The Immigration Act does not define the 
term.  Further, there is no single definition that is accepted 
internationally.  The absence of an authoritative definition 
means that, at least at the margins, “the term is open to 
politicized manipulation, conjecture, and polemical 
interpretation”… 
 Even amongst those who agree on the definition of the term, 
there is considerable disagreement as to whom the term 
should be attached…Perhaps the most striking example of the 
politicized nature of the term is that Nelson Mandela’s African 
National Congress was, during the apartheid era, routinely 
labelled a terrorist organization, not only by the South African 
government but by much of the international community.49 
  
Yet, having said this and more regarding the elusive nature of the meaning of 
“terrorism”, the court found itself unpersuaded that the term was so unsettled that it could 
not “set the proper boundaries of legal adjudication.”50  This finding was premised on an 
emerging consensus in international law as to an acceptable definition of the term, based 
largely on a two-pronged approach to the definition found in the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.51  The first, or “functional”, approach is to 
simply incorporate certain activities already proscribed in other international instruments, 
described in an Annex to the Convention.52  The second, or “stipulative”, approach is to 
provide an actual definition of terrorist activity, as follows: 
                                                        
 
49 Ibid, at paras 94-95, citing the factum of the intervener, Canadian Arab Federation. 
50 Ibid at para 96.   
51 9 December 1999, GA Res. 54/109 [ICSFT]. 
52 These are: 1) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 December, 1970, 860 UNTS 
105, entered into force Oct. 14, 1971; 2) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation, 974 UNTS 178, entered into force January 26, 1973; 3) Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March, 1988,1678 UNTS 221, entered into force 
March 1, 1992; 4) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, IAEA-INFCIRC/274, Entered into 
force 8 February, 1987; 5) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
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Any . . . act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of 
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, 
or to compel a government or an international organization to 
do or to abstain from doing any act.53 
 
While the court in Suresh acknowledged that “particular cases on the fringes of 
terrorist activity will inevitably provoke disagreement,” it directly adopted the above 
definition of “terrorism,” and found that the use of the term in immigration legislation was 
“sufficiently certain to be workable, fair and constitutional.”54 
 
As mentioned above, in my review of security-related decisions, I have found that 
the Immigration Division tends to provide a relatively shorthand analysis of its 
understanding of terrorism, relying on the Suresh decision and its incorporation of the 
various international instruments that help to delineate the meaning of terrorist activity.  
There is, in other words, a relatively unbroken line connecting international legal 
principles on terrorism and decision-making on immigration security matters in the 
domestic sphere.  Once again, for our purposes, the essential point is that, like subversion, 
there is a clear nexus between the domestic task of determining whether an individual has 
engaged in terrorism and international law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December, 1973, GA Res 3166, UN Doc A/Res/3166 
(XXXVIII) (1974), entered into force 20 February 1977; 6) International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages, G.A. Res. 146 (XXXIV), U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), 
entered into force June 3, 1983; 7) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 15 
December, 1997, GA Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 389, U.N. Doc. A/52/49 (1998), entered 
into force May 23, 2001; 8) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
located on the Continental Shelf, 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304; and 9) Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24 February 1988, UNTS 1990, entered 
into force 6 August 1989. 
53 Supra note 38, at Article 2(1)(b). 
54 Suresh, supra note 29 at para 98. 
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Self-Determination 
 
Above I have discussed the two primary grounds for inadmissibility and their 
connections to international law.  The grounds are also connected with each other in that a 
large number of inadmissibility cases are brought forward on allegations of membership in 
organizations that have engaged in both subversion and terrorism.  As with most situations 
of political conflict, however, subversive acts and acts of alleged terror do not tend to be the 
ends themselves, but are rather the means by which to attain a different end.  For national 
liberation movements, this end is virtually always related to the concept of self-
determination.55  Because self-determination lies at the core of so many inadmissibility 
cases, because it is so misunderstood, and because many lawyers argue that a greater 
understanding of it will lead to better decision-making, I devote considerable attention 
here to the concept, its historical roots, its recent history and its place in the security 
inadmissibility process. 
 
As a principle of international law, self-determination occupies an ambivalent 
position that is at once widely recognized and hotly contested, and yet it remains rather 
poorly understood.56  Its roots can be traced to Enlightenment thinkers, not necessarily in 
its international dimension, but in connoting personal autonomy and, collectively, the right 
to participate in the idea of democratic self-government.  Self-determination flows 
naturally from the Kantian notion of the capacity of individuals to “translate their arbitrary 
impulses and desires into action through rational thought that defines their juridical 
                                                        
 
55 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) [Buchanan, “Justice, Legitimacy and Self-determination”]. 
56 Edward M Morgan, “The Imagery and Meaning of Self-Determination” (1987) 20 N Y Univ J Int Law Polit 
355 [Morgan, "Imagery"] at 355.  Indeed, of the inadmissibility decisions canvassed in the previous chapter, a 
sizeable majority related, in some form or another, to organizations that have asserted as their core objective 
principles of self-determination.  These organizations include narrowly-focused liberation and separatist 
movements such as those of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, Sikh nationalist movements in 
India and independence movements in countries such as Eritrea and Sudan, but also movements that 
espoused a more politically-oriented set of objectives, such as the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) in El Salvador. 
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existence as holders of legal right.”57  Autonomy and the capacity to reason – individual 
self-determination – give rise, by virtue of their universality, to notions of essential equality 
and a shared ability to refrain from “egotistical” impositions on others.58  The seismic 
changes of the following 200 years resulted in the transposition of this classic 
Enlightenment notion of individual autonomy onto the national and international planes, 
frequently fixing discussions about rights to the state-based contexts through which they 
were to be realized.   
 
By the First World War, the notion of national self-determination, or a self-
determination of peoples, had embedded itself into official discourse and (in a sign of what 
would become its highly contentious nature) was equally endorsed by Woodrow Wilson 
and Vladimir Lenin’s Bolsheviks, albeit for very different reasons.59  Self-determination was 
characterized by Wilson as the mechanism by which to deal with the fallout of the 
disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and his infamous “Fourteen 
Points” statement was suffused with self-determination principles.   Even at the time, 
however, there was concern over the ways in which self-determination could become more 
disruptive than ameliorative in the process of dealing with the West’s unsettled 
boundaries.  One of the concerns was that the concept could “get into the wrong hands”, as 
articulated by Wilson’s Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who wrote:  
The more I think about the President’s declaration as to the 
right of ‘self-determination,’ the more convinced I am of the 
danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races.  It 
is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace 
Congress and create trouble in many lands…Will it not breed 
discontent, disorder and rebellion?...The phrase is simply 
loaded with dynamite.60 
                                                        
 
57 Ibid, at 357. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See generally, Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1961) and, specifically, Hurst Hannum, 
Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) [Hannum, Autonomy] at 27-28. 
60 Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921) at 97-98, 
cited also in Morton Halperin and David Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington: 
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For his part, Lenin viewed self-determination through the lens of class struggle and 
while there is no particular philosophical affinity between communism and self-
determination, he recognized the right of peoples to secede from “oppressor nations”: 
The right of nations to self-determination implies exclusively 
the right to independence in the political sense, the right to 
free political separation from the oppressor nation. 
Specifically, this demand for political democracy implies 
complete freedom to agitate for secession and for a 
referendum on secession by the seceding nation. This demand, 
therefore, is not the equivalent of a demand for separation, 
fragmentation and the formation of small states. It implies only 
a consistent expression of struggle against all national 
oppression.61 
 
Without endorsing the rather odious statement of Secretary of State Lansing, he was 
prescient in forecasting the complexities associated with Wilson’s conception of self-
determination.  Nevertheless, with the next wave of geopolitical turmoil following the 
Second World War, the principles first elaborated 25 years earlier became enshrined in the 
founding instrument of the United Nations and acquired, at least notionally, the status of a 
binding rule of international law.  Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter provides:  
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
… 
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen 
universal peace…62 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Carnegie Foundation, 1992) at 17 and wrongfully attributed to Secretary of State Stanton in Buchanan, 
Justice, Legitimacy and Self-determination, supra note 55 at 332. 
61 V.I. Lenin, Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalism (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1950) at 138-9.  
62 U.N. Charter, supra note 40, Art. 1(2).   
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The same guarantee of the right to self-determination of peoples was later included 
in the first articles of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.63   
 
While these documents clearly underscored the centrality of self-determination in 
contemporary international legal discourse, they did little to shed light on the actual 
meaning of the term.  Most importantly, the U.N. Charter was silent on the very nub of the 
problem, which relates not to the meaning of self-determination, per se, but to the question 
of who are the “peoples” that are entitled to it.  As mentioned earlier, the right of a non-
state entity to engage in activities – in the name of self-determination – that threaten 
national borders has always sat uneasily with the concomitant principle of territorial 
integrity but in the post-war period, self-determination was repeatedly endorsed by U.N. 
bodies, primarily in association with the decolonization movement.64  The 1960 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples65 strongly 
affirmed the right of self-determination for all those subject to “alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation” and further prohibited “all armed action or repressive 
measures” directed against dependent peoples in order to enable them to exercise 
peacefully and freely their right to “complete independence.”66  It must be noted, however, 
that even within this widely supported Declaration (it was passed by a vote of 89-0, with 9 
notable, i.e. colonial-power, abstentions) the spectre of territorial integrity was ever-
present.  Article 6 of the Declaration affirmed:  
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is 
                                                        
 
63 G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976 (ICCPR); GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, UN Doc A/6316 
(1966), 993 UNTS 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 (ICESCR). 
64 C. Quaye, Liberation Struggles in International Law (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1991) [Quaye, Liberation 
Struggles] at 214-215 and Hannum, Autonomy, supra note 51 at 33. 
65 GA Res. 1514 (XV) U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684, at 67 (Dec.14, 1960) [1960 
Declaration]. 
66 Ibid, at articles 1, 2 and 4.   
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incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
 
Beyond the inherent limitations (if not contradictions) posed by the self-
determination/territorial integrity dynamic, there were also those who argued that self-
determination, at least in the sense that it was adopted by the United Nations, was limited 
to the decolonization context.67  This view was undermined, however, in another UN 
declaration, the inelegantly worded Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, which is the most recent and perhaps influential statement from the 
U.N. on self-determination.68  The Friendly Relations Declaration, while again affirming the 
principle of territorial integrity, asserted that the right to self-determination applies to any 
people subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation and prohibited states from 
engaging in any forcible action which deprives peoples of their right to self-determination 
and freedom and independence.  In a subtle, but important gesture, the Convention also 
affords to peoples who meet with resistance to their assertion of self-determination the 
right to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter.69   
 
The Friendly Relations doctrine further provided that the principles elucidated in it 
constituted “basic principles of international law” and its affirmation of a right to self-
determination led commentators to conclude that, even in its disputed and ambiguous 
form, it has clearly become a jus cogens principle of international law.70  And while there 
were still claims that the concept had limited application – that the terms “alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation” were still merely shorthand for colonization – an 
                                                        
 
67 See for example, R. Emerson, “Self-Determination” 65 Proc American Soc Int’l Law 459 at 464-466.  
68 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc A/8028, at 123-24 (Oct. 24, 1970) 
[Friendly Relations Declaration]. 
69 Friendly Relations Declaration, ibid, at Preamble.   
70 Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of peoples : a legal reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995) 
[Cassese, Self-determination of peoples] at 171-172. 
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increasingly critical mass of commentators expressed the view that this language did not 
limit the right of self-determination so narrowly.71 
 
Liberation movements were by no means oblivious to these developments in 
international law.  In fact, many of the movements that have given rise to inadmissibility 
findings for its members have actively made the argument that their actions fall within the 
ambit of international humanitarian law.72  And for what it is worth, the international 
community has frequently agreed.  In one UN resolution, for example, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations stated in respect of Namibia: 
Reaffirming its full support for the armed struggle of the 
Namibian people under the leadership of the South West Africa 
People's Organization… 
4. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to 
self-determination, freedom, and national independence in a 
united Namibia…and the legitimacy of their struggle by any 
                                                        
 
71 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990) at 153-174; Martti 
Koskenniemi, “National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice” (1994) 43 Int 
Comp Law Q 241[Koskenniemi, Self-Determination Today) at 247-248 and Quaye, Liberation Struggles at 
212-223.  Support for this view came in part from the broader wording of the Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions, supra note 35, which provided (at Art.1(4)) that it applied to situations in which 
“peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination.”  Koskenniemi notes in this regard: “The definition…is not limited 
to a Third World context but seems to cover all situations where a foreign minority imposes its rule on the 
majority.  It is not difficult to extend this sense to any situation where an ethnic group becomes the object of 
human rights abuses or at least a denial of equal rights.” 
72 In December, 1975, for instance, the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
issued a statement that it would respect international humanitarian law.  A similar declaration was made by 
the Angolan União National para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in 1980.  In the early 1980’s, with 
the adoption of the Additional Protocols, several movements made more formal declarations.  In a 1981 
declaration, for example, the Namibian South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) stated:  
It is the conviction of SWAPO that fundamental rules protecting the dignity 
of all human beings must be upheld at all times. Therefore, and purely for 
humanitarian reasons, SWAPO declares hereby that in the conduct of the 
struggle for self-determination, it intends to respect and be guided by the 
rules of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection 
of the victims of armed conflicts and the 1977 additional Protocol relating 
to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I). 
 
See Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, “Respect for international humanitarian law by armed non-state actors in 
Africa” (2006) 88 Int’l Review of the Red Cross 864 at 906-907. 
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means at their disposal, including armed struggle against the 
illegal occupation of their territory by South Africa…73 
 
There have also been situations in which the use of force in the pursuit of self-
determination has been retrospectively found to be justified by the international 
community following a negotiated secessionist process, such as happened in Eritrea.74   
 
What to make then of the clearly ambivalent place of self-determination at 
international law?  One view is that while the use of force by liberation movements may not 
be explicitly permitted, it is also not prohibited. In the words of Cassese, while liberation 
movements do not have a legal “right” to resort to the use of force, they may have a “legal 
licence” to do so.75  The Cassese argument underscores that liberation movements cannot 
be held responsible for international wrongdoings in relation to their legitimate use of 
force when their actions are in compliance with the laws of armed conflict and are in 
response to the “forcibl[e] deni[al]” of self-determination.76   
 
Some commentators have gone further, suggesting that the right to self-
determination has evolved to incorporate secession rights in a process that has literally 
transformed international law.  Tappe notes in this regard: 
The evidence, which includes recent successful secession 
movements, international declarations, and a reading of 
current scholarly literature, suggests that international law is 
in a process of metamorphosis, characterized by a slow 
acceptance of some right of self-determination in the form of 
secession, both in textual and customary forms.77 
                                                        
 
73 Question of Namibia, 12 December, 1979, GA Res A/34/92/G. 
74 Inge V. Porter, “Two Case Studies in Self-Determination: The Rock and the Bailiwick” (2003) 4 San Diego 
Int’l Law Journal 339 at 355, n.119. 
75 Cassese, Self-determination of peoples, supra note 70 at 154-155.  This passage is based on previously 
coauthored work, see A. Grant, C. Bruce and C. Reynolds, “Out of the Fire and into the Pot: The Eritrean 
Liberation Movement, the Right to Self-Determination and the Over-Breadth of North American Immigration 
Security Provisions” (2010) 25 Georgetown Imm LJ 859. [Grant, Bruce and Reynolds, “Out of the Fire”] at 875. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Trent N. Tappe, “Chechnya and the State of Self-Determination in a Breakaway Region of the Former Soviet 
Union: Evaluating the Legitimacy of Secessionist Claims” (1995) 34 Colum. J. Transnat’l L, 255, 258-59. 
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Perhaps the clearest example of the view that self-determination may permit a 
limited right to engage in secessionist armed struggle, however, also involves the Namibian 
movement to free itself from South African rule.  In its last opinion on the Namibian 
situation, the International Court of Justice acknowledged that the exercise of the 
substantive right to self-determination may legitimately involve the use of violence.  In a 
particularly strong concurring opinion, Justice Ammoun openly questioned whether the 
legitimate right to self-determination could ever have been obtained “if it had not been for 
the heroic fight of peoples aspiring with all their hearts after freedom and 
independence?”78 In further citing Ammoun, Klabbers goes on to note that “[t]he right to 
self-determination, having been written ‘with the blood of the peoples,’ was thus conceived 
as an enforceable, tangible right.”79   
 
But as is so often the case, Klabbers too steps back from unqualified assertions as to 
the right to use force in pursuit of the right to self-determination, preferring instead to 
characterize the right as a seemingly much more innocuous one, that being the right for 
peoples “to be taken seriously.”80  He does so for much the same reason that every U.N. 
pronouncement on self-determination is also accompanied by a corresponding affirmation 
of the principle of territorial integrity – which gets back to its potentially explosive 
character.  As Koskeniemmi puts it, self-determination has always been something of a 
two-headed monster, simultaneously affirming the nation state as the basic recognizing 
principle on which international law is built, while also creating the context and, some say, 
the legal right for peoples (however defined) to undermine, challenge and secede from 
existing states.81  This “revolutionary” sense of self-determination has the potential to turn 
international law on its head, with the result that secessionism can be explained as 
                                                        
 
78 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (21 June) [Namibia 
Opinion] at 74, as cited in Jan Klabbers, “The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in International 
Law” (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 186 [Klabbers, “The Right to be Taken Seriously”] at 192. 
79 Namibia Opinion at 74, as cited in Klabbers, The Right to be Taken Seriously at 192.  
80 Klabbers, The Right to be Taken Seriously at 202. 
81 Koskenniemi, Self-Determination Today, supra note 71 at 245-246. 
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“compliance-and opposing it as an international crime or possibly a breach of a peremptory 
norm of international law.”82   
 
Any in-depth examination of self-determination reveals the accuracy of 
Koskeniemmi’s observation – claims to self-determination have taken on a number of 
different guises, but they generally seek to harness (or create) feelings of communal 
authenticity with objectives that are decidedly statist in nature.  Decolonization efforts did 
not recreate pre-colonial political units, but ‘modern’ nation states, recognized 
internationally as equal players on the world stage.83  Modern liberation efforts have thus 
always been about international law and it is for this reason that they frequently sought to 
justify their actions within the nascent language of the post-war normative universe.84   At 
the same time, it is self-apparent that many, if not most self-determination claims have 
been disputed on the basis that they violate the rights of a differently defined, but 
overlapping group of people, or as Koskiniemmi states: another authentic “self-
determination unit”.  The result of this dichotomous nature of self-determination is all but 
intractable; one group’s national aspirations are generally characterized as inherently 
repressive of the other’s.85 
 
In the end, the indeterminacy of self-determination and its inherent connection to 
often competing political struggles leads Koskiniemmi to the conclusion that it provides 
                                                        
 
82 Ibid at 241. 
83 Which is not to say, of course, that states did not exist in colonized areas before colonization, only that the 
liberation struggles tended to respond to the “erasure” of pre-existing statehoods by mapping themselves 
onto the normative order of the new international law, see Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “After Martyrdom: 
International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa” (2000) 41 Harv 
Int Law J 503 [Okafor, "After Martyrdom"] at 504, 513. 
84 Koskenniemi elaborates on this point in Self-Determination Today, supra note 71 at 256: 
Decolonisation was not accompanied by a challenge to statehood. The self-determination it strived 
for was of the gesellschaftlich and not of the gemeinschaftlich type. The call for authentic communal 
attachment was an ingredient in it but did not determine its essence or its consequences. The 
attempt to create a "modern" developed State after the European model was always a stronger 
legitimating force. 
85 The Balkan example immediately comes to mind here, particularly given the sizeable minority populations 
(Serbs in Croatia and Croatians in Serbia, for example] of minority groups in each of the states of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
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little by way of substantive legal guarantees.  Similar to Klabbers’ ‘right to be taken 
seriously’, however, Koskeniemmi suggests that self-determination rights may offer 
something in the nature of procedures for what he terms “acceptable ad hoc adjustments,” 
in responding to international conflicts over competing self-determination claims.86 
 
Much more could be said about the paradox of self-determination in international 
law, but suffice to say that in spite of it, or perhaps because of it, immigration lawyers in 
both the United States and Canada have recently grasped onto it as one possible means by 
which to challenge the perceived overreach of the security and inadmissibility regime.87  In 
one recent Canadian case,  for example, a former member of the Kurdish Democratic 
Party of Iran (KDPI) – Behzad Najafi – argued that he should not have been found 
inadmissible for engaging in the subversion by force of the Iranian regime because the acts 
of aggression committed by the KDPI were authorized by international law as a justifiable 
use of force by a repressed people in furtherance of its right to self-determination.88  Given 
the express requirement referred to above that the IRPA be interpreted in accordance with 
international law, Najafi argued that inadmissibility determinations should not be based on 
a use of force that is recognized internationally as legitimate.89  In support of his position, 
Najafi adduced affidavits from two international law experts, one of whom suggested that 
the actions of the KDPI were at least notionally justified under international law, while the 
other more provocatively asserted that Canada would be in violation of its international 
obligations if it were to “give support to the unlawful denial [of the right to self-
determination] by [another] state.”90  Without explicitly rejecting the opinions posited by 
                                                        
 
86 Koskenniemi, Self-Determination Today, supra note 71 at 265-266. 
87 Grant, Bruce and Reynolds Out of the Fire, supra note 75. 
88 Najafi v Canada (MPSEP), 2013 FC 876 [Najafi], affm’d 2014 FCA 262. 
89 Ibid at para 4, citing s3(3)(f) of the IRPA, supra note 2.  Similar arguments have been made in a number of 
other cases, see for example: Hagos v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1214 [Hagos]; Canada 
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. X, 2008 CanLII 76254 (CA IRB), Joseph v Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2013 FC 1101; Yamani v Canada (MPSEP), 2006 FC 1457 [Yamani]; Khalil v Canada 
(MPSEP), 2011 FC 1332; Suresh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (1999) 173 FTR 1; FH-T, v. Holder, 
723 F.3d 833 (7th Cir, 2013). 
90 Najafi, supra note 88 at para 76.  The experts who provided the affidavits were Professors Craig Forcese 
and René Provost. 
 193 
 
the experts, the Federal Court in Najafi summarily rejected their applicability to the 
security context: 
Professor Provost constructs an additional argument based on 
the lack of explicit prohibition of the use of force in pursuit of 
the right of self-determination in international law. However, it 
is self-evident that a lack of prohibition of the use of force is 
not the same as a recognized and established positive right 
that should inform Canadian domestic law. I would 
additionally note that the applicability of such a norm to 
Canada, even if it were clearly established, would be uncertain, 
as, on at least one occasion, Canada has voted against a United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution that sought to more 
explicitly recognize the right of peoples to pursue self-
determination (see UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/37/43, “Importance of the universal realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 
granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for 
the effective guarantee and observance of human rights”).91 
 
In Hagos, the court similarly sidestepped the argument that Mr. Hagos’ participation 
in the Eritrean liberation movement should not have led to an inadmissibility finding 
because of its justification under international law.  This argument, the court concluded, 
was more relevant to the question of whether Mr. Hagos was deserving of a Ministerial 
waiver under (the then) s 34(2) of the IRPA, rather than the question of first instance 
inadmissibility.92  A similar finding was made in Yamani.93    
 
It is plainly apparent from these cases that while arguments justifying the use of 
force in the name of self-determination have some normative force internationally, they 
have not, at least to date, gained any traction in the context of domestic immigration-
security proceedings.  At best, it would seem that justifications for the use of force are 
                                                        
 
91 Ibid at para 78.  Note that the reference to UNGA A/Res/37/43 is perhaps somewhat misleading as it was a 
frequently reiterated resolution that, amongst other things, strongly and specifically condemned the state of 
Israel, which was the more likely reason for the Canadian vote against it than any general pronouncements on 
the status of self-determination at international law.   
92 Hagos, supra note 89 at para 65. 
93 Yamani, supra note 89 at paras 41-46. 
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viewed as something akin to defences to admissibility to be considered on a case by case 
basis at the Ministerial waiver stage.  Earlier I have discussed the illusory nature of the 
waiver process, given its political nature, its narrow scope and the extraordinarily long 
wait times for decisions.  The discomfort that the courts have had in incorporating self-
determination principles to the security setting is almost assuredly related to its 
ambivalent position in international law, but is also likely due to the asymmetry between 
the language of self-determination internationally, and the language of subversion and 
terrorism domestically.  It is also due, however, to the sui generis use of the term 
‘membership’ under domestic immigration-security law, a topic to which I now briefly 
return. 
Membership 
 
In the preceding pages, we have discussed the phenomena of subversion, terrorism 
and self-determination and their connections to both migration security decision-making 
and international law.  What does not appear to be connected to international law, or any 
other body of law for that matter, is the concept of membership, as it appears in s34(1)(f) 
of the IRPA.  Recall that virtually all inadmissibility claims are advanced on this ground, but 
what is it precisely?  Unlike terrorism and subversion, membership as a concept cannot be 
construed as malfeasance in itself and does not lead to inadmissibility – the question is 
always membership in what?  To the extent that membership, as it is contemplated in s34, is 
necessarily tied to the other grounds of inadmissibility, it is not so much a crime, but a 
mode of commission.  And as a mode of commission, membership is, as noted above, sui 
generis.  I do not intend here to reiterate the concerns referred to in the previous chapter 
on the concept of membership and its absolute liability characteristics; what is sufficient 
for present purposes is to point out that it is not a concept of any importance to 
international law.  Recall, for example, that liability for the worst kinds of international 
crimes is never assessed internationally based on mere membership, but rather on some 
closer indicia of connection to the crimes in question.  
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This leaves the law of security inadmissibility in an anachronistic position: it 
adjudges behaviour based partly on international legal concepts (terrorism and 
subversion), yet it departs from international law at perhaps the most critical juncture – 
the point at which individual responsibility for violating these concepts must be 
determined.  Indeed, there is something patently contradictory in finding that an individual 
has violated a principle of international law with an approach to culpability that 
international law has emphatically rejected.  The fact of course remains that countries are 
generally free to determine whatever criteria they choose to inform questions of admission, 
be they fully consistent with international legal principles or in direct conflict with them.  
For example, while it may seem wrong for a country to prohibit immigrants based on their 
affiliation with a separatist movement whose actions are fully authorized under 
international law, few would claim that this is legally or jurisdictionally problematic, so 
long as it remains compliant with domestic law.  It is considerably more complex, however, 
when we consider the situation of those who assert that they will be persecuted if returned 
to their country of origin.  In this situation, the receiving state has bound itself to comply 
with international protection principles, subject only to a closed list of exclusions that 
themselves take meaning from international law.94  When a country excludes a broader 
ambit of persons than that which is contemplated internationally, based on a theory of 
personal responsibility that is inconsistent with international norms, the fissures inherent 
in the approach begin to emerge.  Such is the case with Canada’s inadmissibility regime, 
particularly when one considers that, at least in the security context, the majority of cases 
involve those who have asserted a claim to refugee protection.  
                                                        
 
94 For example, Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention permits exclusion only where there are serious 
reasons for considering that the individual seeking protection “has committed a crime against peace, a war 
crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision 
in respect of such crimes.”  To be clear, many countries, including Canada, have incorporated “complementary 
protection” regimes that provide protection against removal, even in the case of inadmissible persons.  While 
such mechanisms generally protect against removal to torture, other forms of inhumane treatment and death, 
they are frequently narrower in scope than the protections provided by the Refugee Convention.  As such, 
these regimes clearly contemplate removal of individuals who may be subjected to persecutory treatment, if 
not other forms of mistreatment contemplated under the complementary protection provisions.  In the 
Canadian context, see s 97 of the IRPA and, more generally, see Hathaway and Foster, Law of Refugee Status, 
supra note 39 at 2. 
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The question then is, would the simple recalibration of security inadmissibility 
proceedings away from membership and toward internationally accepted modes of liability 
bring coherence to the regime?  The simple answer to this question is that it probably 
would.  It would focus the security-admissibility analysis on action rather than association 
and would tend to limit inadmissibility in the security realm to those with some actual 
connection to the perpetration of proscribed acts.  It would bring internal consistency to 
the provision and align it with international instruments aimed at global security.  The less 
simple answer is that such an approach would still not address the preoccupation 
(discussed empirically in the previous chapter) with Southern disputes, and the 
indeterminacy of self-determination movements.  To help with this, I now turn to a 
different approach to international law – the TWAIL approach – to explore whether it could 
facilitate an improved approach to decision-making in the migration-security matrix. 
3.3 TWAIL Mix: Adding a Third World, International Law Perspective to 
the Immigration-Security Setting 
What struck Zerai on October 3rd was the boat’s proximity to 
land.  The drowning of hundreds of people less than a 
kilometre from Lampedusa seemed like a manifestation of 
Europe’s approach to African migration – a hardening of its 
borders coupled with a disturbing indifference to life.  He told 
an Italian news service that the deaths were “the fruit of a sick 
relationship between the north and the south of the world…”95  
 
We have now observed that the migration-security nexus combines a fixation on 
individuals who have had some involvement in discrete Southern conflicts with a partial 
adherence to international legal principles on security, terrorism and individual 
responsibility.  While Canada has departed from international law in important ways, 
neither Canadian courts, nor international fora have determined that the Canadian 
approach to immigration security is in violation of international law.  Put differently, 
                                                        
 
95 Mattathias Schwartz, "The Anchor", New Yorker (April 21, 2014) 76 at 78. [Emphasis added] 
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international law does not prohibit a country from identifying a more expansive cohort of 
individuals for security-related immigration proceedings than would ever be of interest 
under international criminal law or international humanitarian law.  This flows naturally 
from the fact that questions of admission in immigration matters remain largely within the 
purview of states, except in so far as they may have implications on compliance with the 
Refugee Convention.  There is simply no requirement that national security provisions be 
consistent with parallel regimes internationally.  International law is therefore unlikely, on 
its own, to be a corrective to the overbreadth of immigration-security regimes or to the 
skewing of such regimes toward individuals from the Global South.     
 
Taking this as a point of departure, I now turn to an exploration of how a more 
nuanced and Southern-focused incorporation of international law may help to pivot 
immigration decision-making in a more principled direction.  While I do not argue that 
such an approach could realistically transform the normative landscape in which such 
decision-making takes place, I do suggest that absorbing the lessons that TWAIL can teach 
could help to both rationalize and improve security processes.   
 
I begin this section with an overview of TWAIL – its origins, its multiple 
perspectives and its unifying themes.  I will explore how TWAIL scholars have interpreted 
processes of decolonization and conflict, processes which have directly led to the fleeing of 
individuals from the Global South and to the application of security measures against those 
same individuals in countries such as Canada.  I will examine how TWAIL scholars have 
sought to grapple with the difficult questions posed by assertions of self-determination, 
allegations of terrorism and the upheaval of populations.  Finally, I will attempt to apply a 
TWAIL perspective on the security-inadmissibility regime in an effort to demonstrate how 
it could focus attention on criteria that are currently ignored and, as a consequence, 
improve outcomes in this area.96 
                                                        
 
96 At this point, I should situate myself within this analysis.  As will become evident below, an important 
component of the TWAIL raison d’etre is to give voice to Southern perspectives through the work of 
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3.3.1 Third World Approaches to International Law – An Overview 
i) Old Words, New Forms: The use of “Third World” terminology in TWAIL commentary 
 
It is perhaps important to begin this exploration with a note on terminology – a note 
warranted because of the relatively common view that the term “Third World” is both 
unhelpful and obsolete.  Formally, of course, the term dates back to the Cold War as a 
reference to countries that were not aligned with either the Western “First World” or the 
Communist “Second World” but it has also became synonymous with formerly colonized 
states and the poverty that has pervaded them.  The meaning of the term has extended far 
beyond mere geopolitical descriptor, becoming absorbed into the West’s “imagined 
geographies” of the colonized Global South, saturated with undifferentiated connotations of 
poverty, barbarianism and backwardness.97  Of course “Global South”, as a more recent 
term used to describe what is essentially the same geographical space as the “Third World”, 
is similarly subject to appropriation and this fact perhaps speaks to the enduring use of the 
term by TWAIL scholars, who are acutely aware of its historically contingent origins and 
limited descriptive value.  Indeed, as we shall see in the coming pages, awareness of the 
contingency of historical accounts is central to TWAIL and in holding on to the term “Third 
World,” TWAIL and other scholars have injected into it a normativity that it has not always 
possessed.  As Cedric Grant has noted, 
[T]he Third World, as an analytical concept, is likely to retain 
its usefulness so long as the world continues to be riven by 
serious economic and political disparities. The end of the Cold 
War has not been accompanied by a fundamental alteration in 
the international economic system. This system is still rooted 
in the relationships of the colonial age and biased in favour of 
the developed countries of the North. Similarly, the new 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
academics and international lawyers from the Global South.  I am neither an academic nor an international 
lawyer from the Global South.  This said, another objective of TWAIL is to see that it becomes embedded in 
the larger discourse on international law and other areas that “create, foster, legitimize, and maintain harmful 
hierarchies” along global lines: see Makau Mutua, “What is TWAIL” (2000) 94 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 31 
[Mutua, “What is TWAIL”] at 38.  It is in this spirit that I take up the challenge to bring a TWAIL analysis to the 
realm of immigration and security. 
97 The term “imagined geographies” is Edward Said’s, first coined in Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 
to describe Foucauldian discourses that differentiated the West from the rest of the world. 
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political dispensation has not steered international relations in 
the direction of greater democratization. The global changes 
taking place give even greater influence to a few major and 
wealthy developed powers of the world. Moreover, despite the 
end of the Cold War, the majority of the world's people still 
face the basic problem of survival, of defending human dignity 
against the pressure of want, and of increasing the 
opportunities for freedom for themselves as individuals and as 
members of a community. In these circumstances, the existence 
of the Third World is based not so much on shared memories and 
common aspirations as on a sense of what is equitable and just. 
For so long as inequity in international relations exists there will 
be differing perspectives on, and interpretations of, economic 
and social reality between the wealthy and the poor, between the 
powerful and the weak.98 
 
As such, TWAIL has consciously held on to the “Third World” terminology, for as 
Mickelson notes, 
The characterization that is utilized…sees the Third World as 
occupying a historically constituted, alternative and 
oppositional stance within the international system.  The 
"Third World" terminology itself may appear out-of-date, but 
its very contingency, involving an insistence on history and 
continuity, may in fact be one of its strengths.99 
 
Furthermore, Okafor notes that those who question the existence of a cohesive 
“Third World” as a helpful analytical construct tend not live there, and while there certainly 
are valid points to be made, he suggests that the whole argument is “wrongly framed”: 
What is important is the existence of a group of states and 
populations that have tended to self-identify as such-coalescing 
around a historical and continuing experience of subordination 
                                                        
 
98 Cedric Grant, “Equity in International Relations: A Third World Perspective” (1995) 71 Int'l Affairs 567 at 
569-70.  [emphasis added] 
99 Karin Mickelson, “Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse” (1997) 16 Wis 
Int Law J 353 [Mickelson, “Rhetoric”] at 360.  For further self-reflection on the continuing use of “Third 
World” in TWAIL analysis, see Antony Anghie, “International Law in a Time of Change: Should International 
Law Lead or Follow” (2010) 26 Am Univ Int Law Rev 1315 [Anghie, “International Law in a Time of Change”] 
at 1360. 
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at the global level that they feel they share-not the existence 
and validity of an unproblematic monolithic third-world 
category. 
 
It is on the basis of this self-identification and shared experience that TWAIL 
scholars construct their work and it is from this perspective that I too set out to explore the 
TWAIL contribution. 
ii) TWAIL in Two Parts: A Brief History 
 
TWAIL is both new and not new.  That is to say, criticisms and perspectives on 
international law have long emanated from Southern or subaltern voices, but it is only 
more recently that efforts have been made to consolidate such voices into a more 
formalized, if not homogenous, school of thought, network and movement.100  As Okafor 
points out, the pedigree of TWAIL is "part of a long tradition of critical internationalism. Its 
intellectual and inspirational roots stretch all the way back to the Afro-Asian anti-colonial 
struggles of the 1940's- 1960's, and even before that to the Latin American de-colonization 
movements."101  In the main, however, TWAIL is a response to the decolonization processes 
that swept the globe in the decades immediately following World War II.102  It is, at least in 
part, reactive to the international legal order that emerged in the post-war era, viewing it 
as a new kind of “imperial project” that has solidified Western hegemony and helped to 
perpetuate global inequality over this period.103 
 
Some scholars – most notably Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni – have loosely 
categorized the recent history of Southern scholarship on international law into two 
                                                        
 
100 The use of the terms “school of thought”, “network” and “movement” is deliberate, for as we shall see 
TWAIL is, in many respects, all three. 
101 O. C. Okafor, "Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in our Time: A TWAIL Perspective" 
(2005) 43 Osgoode Hall L. J. 171 [Okafor, “Newness”] at 177. 
102 Mutua, What is TWAIL, supra note 96 at 31. 
103 Ibid.   
 201 
 
discrete, if not airtight, phases which they label TWAIL I and TWAIL II.104  TWAIL I, a 
retrospective label, refers to the scholarship of writers in the period during and 
immediately following decolonisation, while TWAIL II is used to describe more recent 
approaches, including those that self-consciously identify themselves as part of a TWAIL 
approach.  Anghie and Chimni are also quick to point out the limitations of a binary 
approach to tracing TWAIL history, but nevertheless find it conceptually useful in tracing 
the evolution of analysis in the area, an evolution that is intimately connected to the 
disappointing historical arc that has followed decolonization. 
 
TWAIL I 
 
Early writing on international law from a Southern perspective was largely 
preoccupied with documenting the Eurocentrism of international law; it asserted that pre-
colonial non-European states were not “strangers to the idea of international law,” and 
sought to expose how the Western tradition of international law was implicated in the 
violence committed against the colonized world.  It specifically interrogated the ways in 
which international law both allowed for and justified colonial rule by excluding non-
European states from sovereignty and authorized spectacularly brutal acts of conquest in 
the colonized world.105   
 
Given that the deprivation of sovereignty for colonized countries was identified as a 
defining characteristic of 19th and early 20th century international law, it is no surprise that 
early TWAIL thinkers were preoccupied with Third World nationalism, liberation and self-
determination and sought to solidify through international law the political gains made 
                                                        
 
104 Antony Anghie & B S Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility 
in Internal Conflicts” (2003) 2 Chin J Int Law 77 [Anghie and Chimni, "Third World Approaches"] at 79, also 
published as Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, "Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflict", in: Steven R. Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds.), The Methods of 
International Law (Buffalo: W.S. Hein, 2004) pp. 185-210. 
105 Ibid at 80-82. 
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through decolonization.  The following statement of Tieya is thus emblematic of the early 
TWAIL position:  
The road to sovereignty for Third World nations was not an 
easy one. For most of them, independence came only after 
bitter struggle. For this reason, sovereignty is considered 
sacred and inviolable. Its preservation is the focal point of all 
their activities. It is only by tenaciously upholding sovereignty 
that the new nations can preserve real self-government; 
protect their legitimate rights and interests on the basis of 
equality; eliminate colonial oppression and exploitation; and 
avoid having to suffer from them again.106 
 
In this approach, one can see both an embrace of a reformed version of international 
law and a desire for the newly formed states of the decolonized world to be embraced by it.  
As Anghie notes, TWAIL commentary really began with an “attempt on the part of the new 
states, those that recently acquired independence, to transform the system of international 
law and turn it into one that reflected the aspirations and interests of the peoples of the 
Third World.”107  To this end, as Anghie and Chimni note, Third World international law 
scholars were aligned with diplomatic efforts to ensure that United Nations resolutions 
reflected the interests of the newly decolonized nations, both in terms of support for 
ongoing liberation struggles and recognition of the sovereign equality of the newly formed 
states.  Early TWAIL scholars also concerned themselves with efforts to overhaul economic 
structures that so clearly delivered advantage to the wealthy countries of the world and 
contributed to the subjugation of the newly independent states.108 
 
TWAIL II 
 
                                                        
 
106 Wang Tieya, “The Third World and International Law” in The Structure And  Process of International Law: 
Essays In Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) at 969, as cited in Mickelson, 
Rhetoric, supra note 99 at note 26. 
107 Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change, supra note 99 at 1360. 
108 Anghie and Chimni, Third World Approaches, supra note 104 at 82. 
 203 
 
TWAIL II is, at least in some respects, a response to the abject failure of the global 
political order to alleviate the daily misery of much of the world’s population.  It has been 
described as a subsequent generation of TWAIL scholarship rather than a repudiation of 
TWAIL I writing, though it would be wrong to suggest that the two are always mutually 
compatible.  Just as younger generations contest, often with good reason, the ideas of their 
parents, so too has recent TWAIL scholarship questioned earlier Southern commentary on 
international law, all the while recognizing its organic connection to it.   
 
TWAIL II scholarship also reflects, and reflects back, developments in postmodern 
thinking and critical approaches to law that have surfaced over the past two decades, but 
more importantly, it calls for new and distinct modes of thought, from a Southern 
perspective, on the structures and methodologies of the international legal order.109  The 
current network of scholars exploring Third World modes of thought about international 
law can be traced back, at least formally, to a 1997 conference at Harvard University that 
produced a vision statement detailing some of the key areas of inquiry and objectives.  The 
statement reads in part: 
We are a network of scholars engaged in international legal 
studies, and particularly interested in the challenges and 
opportunities facing 'third world' peoples in the new world 
order. We understand the historical scope and agenda of the 
dominant voice of international law scholarship as having 
participated in, and legitimated global processes of 
marginalization and domination that impact on the lives and 
struggles of third world peoples.  
Members of this network may not agree on the content, 
direction and strategies of third world approaches to 
international law. Our network, however, is grounded in the 
united recognition that we need democratization of 
international legal scholarship in at least two senses: (i) first, 
we need to context international law's privileging of European 
and North American voices by providing institutional and 
                                                        
 
109 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, 
Methodology, or Both” (2008) 10 Int Community Law Rev 371 [Okafor, "Critical Third World Approaches"]. 
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imaginative opportunities for participation from the third 
world; and (ii) second, we need to formulate a substantive 
critique of the politics and scholarship of mainstream 
international law to the extent that it has helped reproduce 
structures that marginalize and dominate third world peoples. 
Thus we are crucially interested in formulating and 
disseminating critical approaches to the relationships of power 
that constitute, and are constituted by, the current world 
order. In addition, we appreciate the need to understand and 
engage previous and prevailing trends in third world 
scholarship in international law.110 
 
While TWAIL scholarship has since been refined and applied as a methodological 
lens to a panoply of topics,111 the first observation made in the vision statement – that 
international law is not merely agnostic to “global processes of marginalization” but is 
directly implicated in them remains a unifying theme of the network.  It is a theme that 
revisits earlier legal writing on colonialism, recasting it not as a regrettable chapter of 
international legal history, but as central to its very formation.112    In a relatively recent 
work, Al Attar and Thompson describe this unifying theme in the following way: 
TWAIL is an alternative narrative of international law that has 
developed in opposition to the realities of domination and 
subordination prevalent in the international legal apparatus. A 
fundamentally counter-hegemonic movement, TWAIL is united 
in its rejection of what its champions regard as an unjust 
relationship between the Third World and international law.113 
 
Similarly, Eslava and Pahuja describe the common frame of reference used by 
TWAIL scholars as follows: 
                                                        
 
110 As quoted in Karin Mickelson, “Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories” (2008) 10 Int Community Law Rev 355 
Mickelson, "Taking Stock"] at 357-358. 
111 Which include: international human rights law, international environmental law, the law of intellectual 
property, international trade law, international development and, of note for our purposes, the war on 
terrorism, international criminal law and questions of sovereignty and self-determination. 
112 Anghie and Chimni, Third World Approaches, supra note 104 at 84. 
113 Mohsen al Attar & Rebekah Thompson, “How the Multi-Level Democratisation of International Law-
Making Can Effect Popular Aspirations towards Self-Determination” (2011) 3 Trade Law Dev 65 [al Attar and 
Thompson, "Democratisation of International Law"] at 67. 
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Although there is arguably no single theoretical approach 
which unites TWAIL scholars, they share both a sensibility, and 
a political orientation. TWAIL is therefore...defined by a 
commonality of concerns. Those concerns centre around 
attempting to attune the operation of International law to 
those sites and subjects that have traditionally been positioned 
as the 'others of international law'.114 
 
Despite many differences, other common themes have also emerged.  These include, 
in Mickelson’s words:  
o an emphasis on interconnectedness of subject areas, illustrated by an 
unwillingness to draw rigid boundaries between various areas of the law 
(such as economics, human  rights, or the environment). 
 
o an emphasis on considerations of morality, ethics and justice; in other words, 
an unwillingness to separate law from wider concerns or to define law in a 
narrow 'legalistic' fashion.  
 
o an emphasis on history, typified by an unwillingness to look at any problem 
as ahistorical or to separate law from the historical context within which it 
developed.115 
 
To this list, I would add another common register of TWAIL scholars, that being a 
desire to change the frame of international law from one that looks almost exclusively at 
states as the relevant legal actors to one that also looks to localities and the lived 
experience of individuals in trying to think through how international law should be 
confronted and changed.  It is for this reason that some newer generation TWAIL scholars 
have called for TWAIL to engage more explicitly with legal ethnography – to map out how 
international law works in the realm of the quotidian and mundane.116  As is I hope 
apparent, these themes are all of relevance to the context of migration and security and so I 
turn now to delve into each of them in greater detail.  Before I do, however, a brief 
disclaimer: over the past twenty years, a great deal has been written on, and through, 
                                                        
 
114 Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, “Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of 
International Law” (2011) 3 Trade Law Dev 103 [Eslava and Pahuja, "Between Resistance"] at 104. 
115 Mickelson, Rhetoric, supra note 99 at 397. 
116 Eslava and Pahuja, Between Resistance, supra note 114 at 126. 
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TWAIL methodologies.  In the pages that follow, I do not pretend to provide an exhaustive 
review of the entire movement, but rather, to tap into a variety of themes that, to me, bear 
particular relevance to the larger project of exploring immigration and inadmissibility. 
iii) TWAIL Themes 
 
Emphasis on History 
"The most serious blow suffered by the colonized is being 
removed from history and from the community. Colonization 
usurps any free role in either war or peace, every decision 
contributing to his destiny and that of the world, and all 
cultural and social responsibility." 
Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized 
 
To briefly revisit the meaning of the term “Third World,” there are those who 
suggest that it “does not have a nature; it has a history.”117  And to a significant extent, the 
TWAIL endeavour is to explore, on its own terms, the interplay between this history and 
the development of international law.  As noted above, earlier Third World critics of 
international law set out to establish, through detailed historical accounts, the various and 
complex international laws of pre-colonial states.118  More recent TWAIL scholarship has 
sought to question – and oppose – the mainstream view that colonialism was a discrete, 
almost incidental or aberrational feature of international law.119 This is strikingly apparent 
in the work of Antony Anghie who, in Gathii’s words, established that the doctrines of 
international law were “constructed around a series of contrasting national identities, 
races, and languages with European ones at the apex.  Hence, international law was less 
                                                        
 
117 Mickelson, Rhetoric, supra note 99 at 409, citing José Ortega y Gasset, History as a system and other essays 
toward a philosophy of history (New York: Norton, 1961). 
118 See for example, T.O. Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law. (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972) 
and R. P. Anand, Confrontation or Cooperation?: International Law and the Developing Countries (Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). 
119 For an elucidating dialogue on this issue, see James Thuo Gathii, “Neoliberalism, Colonialism and 
International Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy” (1999) 98 Mich 
Law Rev 1996 [Gathii, “Decentering”], followed by Brad Roth, “Government Illegitimacy and Neocolonialism: 
Response to Review by James Thuo Gathii” (1999) 98 Mich Law Rev 2056, which is in turn followed by James 
Thuo Gathii, “Rejoinder: TWAILing International Law” (1999) 98 Mich Law Rev 2066 [Gathii, “Rejoinder”].  
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about how order was created among sovereign states than how it managed order among 
entities of completely different cultural systems.”120 
 
It is, of course, important to underscore that TWAIL is not simply concerned with 
history per se, but with particular histories or, better put, with exploring histories from a 
globalized, and in some cases, decidedly Third World perspective.  It is, at least in part, 
TWAIL’s “methodological insistence” on a globalized historical account that gives it its 
perspective on international legal discourse and enables it to uncover the troubling 
normativity of many aspects of international law.121  It is also through detailed historical 
analysis and connecting this analysis with the contemporary plight of the majority world 
that TWAIL scholars obtain a vantage point on the ongoing nature of subjugation and 
inequality.  This is readily apparent, for example, in Okafor’s “After Martyrdom: 
International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in 
Africa,” in which he explores how international law was a participant in the “erasure and 
(de)legitimization” of African statehood and compellingly traces these processes of erasure 
to the serious and ongoing state-building problems that African states continue to face.122   
 
There is, at least to some, a danger in fastening upon the ongoing influence of 
colonial forces on the contemporary world and that danger lies in creating an almost 
paralytic sense of historical determinism, succumbing to what Aijaz Ahmad has phrased the 
“infinite aftermath” of the post-colonial era.123  For Ahmad, at least in the Indian context, to 
distil the consequences of colonialism, separated from precolonial conditions and now after 
over a half-century of postcolonial history is too complex a task to be worthwhile.124   
                                                        
 
120 Gathii, decentering, ibid, at 2021, citing Antony Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and 
Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law” (1999) 40 Harv. Int’l LJ [Anghie, “Finding the 
Peripheries”], but see also Antony Anghie, “Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law” 
(1996) 5 Soc. & Legal Stud. 321 [Anghie, “Vitoria”].  
121 Okafor, Critical Third World Approaches, supra note 109 at 377 and Okafor, Newness, supra note 101. 
122 Okafor, After Martyrdom, supra note 83 at 504. 
123 Aijaz Ahmad, The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality, (1995) 36 Race and Class 3 at 7. 
124 Ibid.  It should be noted, however, that Ahmad’s commentary comes from the fields of literary and political 
theory; he was not referring explicitly to law, which has its own distinct relationship with history.  
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My sense, however, is that TWAIL scholars for the most part avoid the pitfalls of 
Ahmad’s “infinite aftermath” by refraining from sweeping statements about the ongoing 
reverberations of colonialism 50 years after the last formal vestiges of it disappeared and 
by rather drawing careful connections between colonial rule and the structures that 
continue to hold significant sway in international law.   
 
To TWAIL scholars, the fact of Western dominance and the projection of its laws 
onto the global plane simply cannot be divorced from its intimate corollary, the subjugation 
and exploitation of Southern lands and people.  TWAIL, in other words, is as much about 
coming to terms with the provenance of Western dominance as it about giving voice to 
Southern perspectives.  They are, in fact, two sides of the same coin.  In Mickelson’s words,  
An equally important theme, however, is the extent to which 
the colonial encounter also constituted the First World.  There 
is an insistence in all of these writers on seeing how the Third 
World, its resources and peoples, were harnessed in the drive 
to create the modern Western industrialized state--and thus 
played an essential role in the achievement of Western 
privilege. This is a move from seeing the Third World as 
essentially marginal within the international system to seeing 
it as an integral part of that system.125 
 
Another, somewhat unrelated implication of TWAIL's insistence on revealing untold 
histories is to call into question universals - not universals per se, as the strong normative 
strain that runs throughout TWAIL embraces certain unifying goals - but rather the flawed 
universals that emerge from the partial telling of a story.  Identifying the contingent nature 
of the Western metanarrative is almost ubiquitous in TWAIL writing, but from it also 
springs a guarded optimism – an optimism borne of the notion that more inclusive 
universals can be found and that that which is need not have been, and need not be in the 
future.  Eslava and Pahuja refer to TWAIL’s unifying objectives as a kind of “open 
                                                        
 
125 Mickelson, Rhetoric, supra note 99 at 403. 
 209 
 
universality” that requires a “commitment to constantly re-engage with the promise(s) of 
international law.”  In seeking out universality, however, “certainty should give way to 
dialectics, and affirmation to multiple assertions.”  And in thinking about universals, the 
authors underscore the importance of viewing international law as a “set of concrete 
practices that express themselves in the material world, as well as about international law 
as a normative or ideological project.”126   
 
This brings us to another key feature of TWAIL scholarship, which is that despite its 
observation that colonialism is essentially immanent in international law and despite being 
deeply critical of the ways in which international law operates to the detriment of maligned 
peoples, it remains committed to the idea of international law, albeit of a reinvented kind.  
Anghie and Chimni articulate the reasons for this ongoing commitment to the project of 
international law as being twofold: first, they suggest that TWAIL scholars continue to 
believe in the “transformative potential of international law and in the ideal of law as a 
means of constraining power.”  TWAIL scholars recognize the role that power continues to 
play in international relations, but they steadfastly hold on to the view that this is not, at 
least by definition, ordained.  And while the power of a good, historically-based argument 
will not necessarily “control action,” it can in many instances prevail.127  Second, and more 
pragmatically, Anghie and Chimni suggest that even though TWAIL arguments may not 
prevail when pitted against the raw power of international relations, the alternative to 
engagement with international law – call it critical disengagement – is a luxury the Third 
World cannot afford.  They note: 
[T]here are dangers in conceding the entire arena of 
international law to other methodologies and actors in the 
aspiration to find a more powerful discourse which would 
render injustice with such clarity and persuasion that it would 
compel the changes in international relations which TWAIL 
seeks. To the extent that CLS suggests this course of action, it 
runs the risk of merely supporting, if not furthering the status 
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quo...TWAIL simply cannot afford this because international 
law has now become an extraordinarily powerful language in 
which to frame problems, suggest fault and responsibility, 
propose solutions and remedies. International law rules matter 
and must be taken seriously. It is not simply a distinctive style 
of argumentation but has serious consequences for how 
ordinary people live.128 
 
In this statement, we see a clear if somewhat ambivalent point of intersection 
between TWAIL and other critical approaches to legal theory, a topic to which I will return 
below.  For the moment, however, it is simply important to recognize the various ways in 
which TWAIL scholars have marshalled history to expose the injustice of international law 
and to remake it from a globalized perspective. 
 
Emphasis on Lived Experience 
 
Perhaps the area in which TWAIL II differs most from TWAIL I, and perhaps its most 
radical departure from mainstream international law lies in its insistence on looking at the 
situation of individuals in thinking through the legitimacy of international law and 
international legal principles.  TWAIL I scholars understandably focused much of their 
attention on condemning mainstream international law’s embrace of colonialism and on 
advocating for the recognition and equal treatment of the nascent states of the decolonized 
world.  But the truth is, for a whole myriad of reasons – some of which are tied directly to 
international law, some less so – many of these states have fared poorly over the past 40-50 
years and the majority of people in these countries have borne the brunt of this poor 
showing.  As such, TWAIL II, interrogates the actions of nation states – of both the First and 
Third World – to address the very basic deprivations that continue to plague much of the 
global population.   
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But beyond this, and much more profoundly, TWAIL II scholars also question the 
basic legitimacy of states as constituting the sole relevant actors in the formation and 
enforcement of international law.  The state, as Gathii succinctly notes, is not a “neutral or 
even universal ideal.”129  And while there is a general truth to this assertion, it is 
particularly resonant to the situation of Third World states, many of which were created 
either arbitrarily, or worse, with the specific aim of combining what had previously been 
distinct polities.  As Okafor notes, the illegitimacy of many Third World states “has 
derived…from their lack of affinity with constituent sub-state groups and their origins as 
external impositions rather than organic entities created through an internal process of 
consensus-building.”130  As such, many TWAIL scholars look to other entities – social 
movements, global civil society organizations and “transnational advocacy networks to 
name a few – in exploring the impact of international law on the people of the Global South 
and to propose alternatives.  The TWAIL emphasis on lived experience is, not surprisingly, 
derived from an acute sense of both the historical degradation of people during colonialism 
and the widespread betrayal of these same people under many states of the decolonized 
world.  As Chimni and Anghie note: 
For TWAIL scholars, international law makes sense only in the 
context of the lived history of the peoples of the Third World. 
Two important characteristics of TWAIL thinking emerge from 
this. First, the experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism 
has made Third World peoples acutely sensitive to power 
relations among states and to the ways in which any proposed 
international rule or institution will actually affect the 
distribution of power between states and peoples. Second, it is 
the actualized experience of these peoples and not merely that 
of states which represent them in international fora, that is the 
interpretive prism through which rules of international law are 
to be evaluated.131 
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Many have written about the all-too-common post-colonial reality whereby 
nationalist elites of the colonized world simply stepped into the place of the former colonial 
masters, replacing the domination of colonialism with the despotism of the new Third 
World.  From Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, to Naipaul’s Mimic Men to the work of Homi 
Bhabha and Edward Said, the tendency of Third World states and statesmen (for the vast 
majority have been men) to replicate, or “mimic” the structures of the colonial world has 
been both long and well-documented.132  TWAIL scholars incorporate these observations 
into the realm of law which is, at least in part, what gives rise to their emphasis on lived 
experience.  But to state it this way is too simple, for recent TWAIL commentary also (and 
often simultaneously) recognizes that there are situations that continue to call for the 
support of Third World states as states in the ongoing evolution of international law.  This 
ambivalence is, I believe, what Antony Anghie was referring to when he stated the 
following in his Grotius lecture: 
For all of us, however, the dualities of TWAIL present an 
ongoing challenge. We are for Third World sovereignty and yet 
also against it; sometimes for human rights and sometimes 
critical of human rights; for international law at times, and 
suspicious of it at others. The enduring riddle we confront is 
how to formulate a position that is neither imperial, on one 
hand, nor narrowly nationalistic on the other. Both 
imperialism and the pathologies of the post-colonial state have 
caused immense suffering to the peoples of the Third World. 
The challenge for TWAIL is to articulate an alternative to these 
two very powerful realities.133 
 
Focusing on the experience of Third World peoples as the “interpretive prism” 
through which to examine international law means, above all, listening to their “resistance 
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to, or acceptance of, international rules and practices” and taking these reactions as “strong 
evidence of the justice or injustice of those rules and practices.”134  It also means that a 
contextualized process must be used in assessing the actions of individuals engaged in 
political conflict in the Third World, one that does not merely attribute responsibility for 
the conflict because of an individual’s proximity to it. 
 
Again, however, we must avoid a superficial reading of TWAIL scholarship because 
to state that TWAIL supports looking at international law through the lens of individual 
experience could be interpreted simply as an endorsement of a rights-based approach to 
international law.  As Anghie’s above statement suggests, however, it is not.  There is by 
now a relatively fulsome and varied body of TWAIL scholarship on human rights and 
international law and, to come back to a word used frequently in this chapter, its stance on 
the liberal rights agenda may best be described as ambivalent.  On the one hand, there is 
the view that international human rights norms are fundamentally similar to other areas of 
international law in that they are constituted by an ethnocentric and deeply colonial view 
of the world that invariably, if subtly, places Western countries and peoples at the top of a 
hierarchy and Third World peoples at the bottom.135  Citing the example of the former 
Yugoslavia and the ease with which claims to self-determination, human rights and liberty 
were manipulated by parties to atrocities, Gathii argues that these “abstract but cherished 
principles are not necessarily emancipatory” and that “viewing them as antidotes to the 
violence of ethnicity and illiberal nationalism only downplays the tragic role they have at 
times been mobilized to serve.”136  Recognizing this fact, Gathii continues, makes it easier to 
“drop the presumption that international law and norms act in the ‘interests of human 
rights, democracy and the people, while local institutions, actors or cultures are seen as 
posing a threat to these values.’”137  Note the conditional nature of Gathii’s statement, 
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questioning the presumption that international law protects the interests of Third World 
peoples.  This is not to say that it never acts in their interests, but it is meant to question the 
sanctity of the view that international human rights law is inherently protective of the 
people of the Global South.  And if this is the case, the solution to Third World problems is 
not, as is frequently presumed by international lawyers, ‘more law,’ but a different 
conception of law: one that recognizes its emancipatory potential for individuals, but also 
scrutinizes its relationship with power and its claims to universality.  Anghie and Chimni 
note that TWAIL II scholars: 
…have examined whether and how international human rights 
norms may be used to protect Third World peoples against the 
state and other international actors.  By simultaneously 
examining the Third World state critically and recognizing the 
possibility of using international law to promote the interests 
of Third World peoples, these TWAIL II positions on 
international human rights law differ from either mainstream 
or critical Northern views on human rights as well as from the 
views of Third World states themselves.  One of the major 
difficulties confronting TWAIL scholars arises precisely 
because it is sometimes through supporting the Third World 
state and at others, by critiquing it, that the interests of Third 
World peoples may be advanced.138 
   
While not directly associated with TWAIL scholarship, many TWAIL scholars have 
looked to the work of legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos to help sort through the 
complex relationships between global justice, individual rights and an international law 
dominated by neoliberalism.  First, Santos argues that there are essentially two forms of 
globalization: neoliberal globalization and what he calls “counter-hegemonic globalization,” 
the latter having arisen in parallel, and in opposition, to the former.139  Counter-hegemonic 
globalization he defines as the “vast set of networks, initiatives, organizations, and 
movements that fight against the economic, social, and political outcomes of hegemonic 
globalization, challenge the conceptions of world development underlying the latter, and 
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propose alternative conceptions.”140  Second, Santos argues that from this parallel process 
of globalization, a new form of cosmopolitan engagement has also emerged, what he terms 
a “subaltern cosmopolitan politics and legality.”141  
 
This new cosmopolitanism, which Santos views as being most clearly illustrated in 
the proceedings of the World Social Forum, remains closely connected with the localized 
struggles of individuals in the Global South, but is able to project those struggles onto 
different planes: international, local, transnational, state.  As is evident from the very label 
Santos uses to describe this form of cosmopolitanism, it also rejects legal and political 
distinctions, viewing the struggles of Third World peoples as being primarily political in 
nature but containing important legal components.142   
 
Building on Santos’ conception of a ‘counter-hegemonic globalization’ and on the 
work of those who call for a globalized parliamentary system,143 Attar and Thompson 
suggest that injecting the rule of law and popular participation into international law-
making is central to the TWAIL project and its aims of alleviating global inequality.144  And 
in this view, we interestingly come back around to the work of Catherine Dauvergne and 
her parallel call for the “unhinging” of the rule of law from its domestic moorings in dealing 
with the securitization of international migration.145  While I will return to this connection 
between TWAIL and migration below, for now I simply refer to the rule of law issue as a 
further indication of the emphasis that TWAIL places on the connection between 
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international law and the lived experience of Third World peoples.  Now, however, I turn to 
another central organizing principle of TWAIL scholarship – its openness to, and indeed its 
focus on looking to the scholarship of other domains to help inform its positions on 
international law.   
 
TWAIL as Interdisciplinary Normative Project 
 
From the outset, TWAIL II scholarship has been explicit about the need to take into 
consideration multiple narratives to demonstrate the ways in which international law has 
contributed to, and reflects contemporary problems in the Third World.  This broad 
approach, this “unwillingness to draw rigid boundaries” occurs both within and outside 
what is typically viewed as legal scholarship.146  And in this, we can glimpse both the 
purpose and the method of TWAIL.  Its purpose is an unashamedly normative one – to 
expose the ideology and injustice of the current international legal order and to (sometimes 
radically) ameliorate it by proposing alternative and more globally participatory 
conceptions of international law.  Its method, or at least one of its methods, is to use the 
various analytical tools at its disposal – from across a number of disciplines and schools of 
thought – to achieve its purposes. 
 
Within the law, TWAIL is frequently described as sharing characteristics with the 
various critical approaches that have emerged over the past twenty five or so years, 
specifically feminist legal studies, critical legal studies and its international corollary, New 
Approaches to International Law (NAIL).  While TWAIL certainly shares features with these 
other critical legal approaches, many TWAIL scholars have deliberately distinguished the 
TWAIL approach.  As I described above, TWAIL generally accepts the view – one central to 
critical perspectives – that language and legal reasoning are both indeterminate and deeply 
intertwined with power.  TWAIL recognizes that international law is both a product and 
producer of an ideology that favours the powerful and it therefore questions international 
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law’s particular claims to universality.  TWAIL openly rejects assertions of the neutrality of 
international law, frequently framing its primary task as being the exposition of 
international law’s historically contingent and highly subjective nature.147  As such, TWAIL 
also rejects many of the rhetorical flourishes that are frequently used to describe the 
current international legal order – language which tends to characterize international law 
as a kind of pre-ordained and idealized panacea that, through mere adherence to it, can 
solve all problems.148 
 
At the same time, TWAIL scholars tend to reject, categorically, the sense of paralysis 
and nihilism that is often associated with critical approaches, although it should be 
acknowledged that TWAIL has itself been subject to precisely this kind of criticism.149 
Recall the words of Anghie and Chimni, recognizing that law, with all of its imperfections, 
its subjectivity and its tendency to reflect the views of the powerful also has the unique 
capacity, rarely fully realized, to constrain power and is therefore not a domain that the 
Global South can afford to cede.  This belief in the potential of law, together with its focus 
on individual experience and case study clearly distinguish TWAIL from other critical 
perspectives, notwithstanding their somewhat common genealogy. 
 
Beyond the strict domain of law, TWAIL also draws from the field of post-colonial 
studies.  As Mickelson notes,  
It is essential to bear in mind that the Third World approach to 
international law must be seen as lying at the intersection of 
two different discourses. One is the discourse of traditional 
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international law and international legal scholarship. Here, it is 
part of the story of the development of international law. The 
other discourse is that of decolonization: the full, broad 
panoramic view of a history of oppression and transformation. 
Here, it can be seen as a part of the story of anti-colonial and 
post-colonial struggle.  In some ways, a Third World approach 
to international law is the untold part of both these stories; 
that which has remained somewhat marginal, while not 
entirely overlooked.150 
  
TWAIL’s affiliation with post-colonial studies is closely related to its relationship 
with the work of historians, which I have described above, but it builds on these historical 
accounts to expose the ways in which the reverberations of the colonial encounter continue 
to be felt – politically, economically and culturally.  It should be noted that post-colonial 
studies is itself a heterogeneous field of inquiry, but generally speaking it concerns itself 
with the politics of knowledge and knowledge creation inherent in colonial and neo-
colonial encounters.  It does this through various methods and in a number of ways, 
employing elements of anthropology, sociology, human geography and critical theory.  
Within post-colonial studies, TWAIL is frequently described as sharing both a lineage and 
an evolution with the subaltern studies collective, which, as Eslava and Pahuja observe, has 
followed a similar narrative arc as that described by Chimni and Anghie in their description 
of the shift from TWAIL I to TWAIL II.  That is, subaltern studies began as an effort to write 
the histories of Third World peoples into official accounts, but evolved into a far more 
critical analysis of “the colonial and post-colonial production of knowledge,” just as TWAIL 
evolved from an exercise of claiming international law for colonized peoples to the more 
critical writings of TWAIL II on the immanent nature of colonialism within the basic 
structures of our current international legal regime.151  And to Mickelson, these TWAIL II 
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insights into the nature of international law are explicitly derived from taking into 
consideration multiple (previously ignored) narratives: 
In terms of legal doctrine itself, the Third World approach 
expands the debate about particular legal issues or areas by 
forcing a confrontation with the full panoply of historical, 
political, economic and cultural debates which surround them, 
and thus offers an enriched understanding of the discipline as a 
whole.152 
 
Other TWAIL scholars, however, do not resort (at least explicitly) to the theoretical 
offerings of the subaltern studies collective, but look to other thematic domains such as 
Women Studies and Feminist Legal Theory, Environmental Studies and Economics.  
Employing the TWAIL prism in each of these domains helps to reveal the myriad ways in 
which international law and regulation penetrate the lives of Third World Peoples.153  
Common to all of these approaches, however, is a desire to situate law in the context of a 
global regime that continues to be dominated by power and imposition.  And in this we also 
see the strongly normative strain that runs through virtually all TWAIL scholarship.  It’s 
recourse to other domains and disciplines flows from a common purpose, that being a    
shared ethical commitment to the intellectual and practical 
struggle to expose, reform, or even retrench those features of 
the international legal system that help create or maintain the 
generally unequal, unfair, or unjust global order. They 
accomplish this through a commitment to centre the rest 
rather than merely the west, thereby taking the lives and 
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experiences of those who have self-identified as Third World 
much more seriously than has generally been the case.154 
 
The normative, “avowedly political” goal of TWAIL lies, then, in exposing (and 
proposing alternatives to) the normativity of the current international legal regime.155  The 
ways in which TWAIL seeks to reveal international law’s lack of neutrality vary across 
platforms, disciplines and perspectives, but as a common objective, it seeks to peel back the 
layers of international law to reveal its normative stance toward the Global South, exposing 
the myth of neutrality in a manner reminiscent of Anatole France’s famous words: “In its 
majestic equality, the [international] law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, 
beg in the streets and steal loaves of bread.”156   
 
That questions of morality should guide legal analysis is of course not unique to 
TWAIL.  It is, as Mickelson notes, the “defining characteristic” of natural law and the irony 
of TWAIL’s embrace of this quintessentially Western view of the law is not lost on TWAIL 
scholars.157  But what TWAIL scholars tend to propose is a new kind of normativity – one 
that is globally representative and that therefore gives rise to a tentative, yet more 
legitimate universality.  Such representative universality then justifies an international 
legal order, albeit one of a profoundly different character.  Thus, to Mutua, TWAIL is a 
“reconstructive movement that seeks a new compact of international law,” requiring a 
broad, multileveled consideration of all “factors that create, foster, legitimize, and maintain 
harmful hierarchies.”158   
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As I shall set out in greater detail below, the immigration-security regime, at least in 
its current form, can be viewed as a site of false neutrality and “harmful hierarchies,” 
particularly in respect of its treatment of people from the Global South.  It is for this reason 
that I find TWAIL to be a useful prism through which to examine the regime, which I turn to 
now. 
3.4 TWAILing Immigration and Security 
We are now at the point where we can take the principles of TWAIL discussed above 
and apply them to the situation of immigration decision-making in the security context.  
Bearing in mind the principles we explored in the first chapter, this involves a 
reconsideration of immigration from the outside in, as I title this chapter, or to be more 
specific, a rethinking of how security is used as a basis for exclusion in immigration and 
refugee law.  I explore these issues through four overarching considerations: 
a) Historicizing and contextualizing Refugee Production 
and Border Control 
b) Centring the Refugee – Individualized decision-making 
in immigration and security 
c) Interrogating Security 
d) Replacing Political Power with the Rule of Law in 
Immigration Decision-Making 
 
I suggest that examining immigration and security through TWAIL inflected 
categories could help accomplish a number of objectives.  First, it could help to inculcate in 
decision-makers a sense of connection between the geopolitical forces that create refugees 
and Western states’ connection to those forces. Second, it could encourage a culture of 
discourse in assessing the security claims that arise in refugee matters.  And finally, in 
focusing on the situation of individuals as players in the geopolitical events that create 
refugees, a TWAIL approach would help to focus the process not on those with loose 
affiliations to any given faction in a historically complex realm of social upheaval, but to 
those who have actually played a role in the commission of acts that have harmed people.  
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This, I argue, is a key component of a globalized understanding of the rule of law.  
Accomplishing all of these objectives, I conclude, will bring a more nuanced approach to the 
blunt force that defines current security concerns; it will enhance a broadly-defined 
conception of security and will refocus the security analysis on the plight of individuals 
caught in the machinery of armed conflict. 
 
3.4.1 Historicizing and Contextualizing Refugee Production and Border Control 
The Original Forced Migration – Indigenous Peoples and European Settlement 
 
Any historicized account of immigration in North America must begin, if not end 
with the first influx of individuals to the original polities of the continent – that of its 
indigenous peoples.  Of course, this is often done with superficial platitudes, but I believe it 
is an important starting point, one that sets the discursive trajectory away from an 
unwarranted nativism, for lack of a better word, and toward a recognition of the role that 
immigration has always played in post-contact North America.  It also happens to coincide 
with the TWAIL notion that the law is embodied by the colonial encounter.  For what is 
colonialism, one may ask, other than a sort of ‘forced migration’ of a different kind?  Law 
was used to justify the Europeans’ migration into indigenous lands, forays that became 
incursions when the intrepid explorers were met with resistance.  This was described by 
Anghie in his examination of Vitoria, who viewed rights to travel into the lands of others 
much like Kant (as I described in the first chapter), as a natural law of man: “it was 
permissible from the beginning of the world (when everything was in common) for any one 
to set forth and travel wheresoever he would.”159  Indians, for what it was worth, were also 
imbued with this right, but this was a particularly pernicious form of equality, for as Anghie 
notes, 
While appearing to promote notions of equality and reciprocity 
between the Indians and the Spanish, Vitoria’s scheme finally 
                                                        
 
159 Anghie, Vitoria supra note 120 at 326, citing Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de ivre Belli Relectiones 
(Washington DC: The Carnegie Institute, 1917) at 151. 
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endorses and legitimizes endless Spanish incursions into 
Indian society. Vitoria’s apparently innocuous enunciation of a 
right to ’travel’ and ’sojourn’ extends finally to the creation of a 
comprehensive, indeed inescapable, system of norms which is 
inevitably violated by the Indians. For example, Vitoria asserts 
that ‘to keep certain people out of the city or province as being 
enemies, or to expel them when already there, are acts of war’. 
Thus any Indian attempt to resist Spanish penetration would 
amount to an act of war which would justify Spanish 
retaliation. Each encounter between the Spanish and the 
Indians therefore entitles the Spanish to ’defend’ themselves 
against Indian aggression and, in so doing, expand Spanish 
territory.160 
 
With this actualized threat of foreign invasion, one could hardly have begrudged 
Indigenous peoples had they implemented an expansive security scheme of their own.  But 
this was not, for the most part, what transpired.161  To be certain, there was resistance to 
European incursions, but whether through conquest or commerce, the slow trickle of 
European colonists to North America in the 16th and 17th centuries was followed by a 
steady stream of arrivals, which in turn led to large influxes of immigrant populations over 
the past 150 years.  This, together with the decimating effects of diseases introduced by the 
European newcomers, created the conditions for a profound reconception of the North 
American continent as a settler society.162  The point for our purposes is that sitting behind 
and buttressing European expansion of its North American colonies was a bedrock of 
justification – philosophical, religious and ultimately legal – that set the stage for large scale 
and largely unimpeded displacement of indigenous peoples and colonization of the 
                                                        
 
160 Ibid. 
161 Jeremy Webber, “Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community 
between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law J 623 at pp 632-635. 
162 Sherene Razack, ed., Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (Toronto: Between the 
Lines, 2002) at pp 1-4.  See also Catherine Dauvergne, “The End of Settler Societies and the New Politics of 
Immigration” (Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences Big Ideas Lecture Series, delivered at Brock 
University, May 28, 2014, online: http://www.fondationtrudeau.ca/en/themes/publications/end-settler-
societies-and-new-politics-immigration [Dauvergne, the End of Settler Societies]. 
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continent.  The ensuing societies viewed immigration as a necessary aspect of the nation 
building exercise and adopted mythologies about the taming of harsh and savage lands.163   
 
And as time passes and the indigenous society takes on an ever diminished role in 
the national psyche, settlers “become the original inhabitants and the group most entitled 
to the fruits of citizenship.”164 One such “fruit” includes the authority of contemporary 
society to control entry into the formerly ‘open’ spaces of the nation in a manner that the 
initial settlers never experienced.  To Dauvergne, North America, together with New 
Zealand and Australia, are experiencing the end of settler society, as it is slowly replaced by 
a new nativism that leads naturally, if not inexorably, toward a restrictive and 
unwelcoming immigration politics.165 
 
As we move on in our discussion on TWAIL and what it might have to say about 
immigration and refugee law, it is important to think back to Vitoria and to the original 
legal justifications for the traversing of borders into lands that were inhabited and 
governed by others.  Imagine a contemporary global order, for example, in which the 
Western world’s restrictive migration policies would be viewed themselves as acts of 
aggression, contrary to principles of natural law.  I say nothing further on this issue, but 
from this vantage point, let us move forward to the contemporary world of migration and 
border control.  While I do not intend here to engage in a comprehensive history of modern 
migration, it is essential to highlight a couple of historical strands in understanding the 
security-migration regime.   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
163 Razack, ibid. 
164 Razack, ibid at 2. 
165 Dauvergne, “The End of Settler Societies”, supra note 162. 
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Borders and Nations – The Decolonized Nation-State and Refugee Production 
 
The first strand is about borders themselves.  TWAIL scholars, particularly Okafor, 
have had much to say about the borders of the contemporary post-colonial world, noting 
that there is nothing ‘natural’ about them; they are historically contingent manifestations of 
power that have directly, in many instances, led to conflict.  It is an uncontroversial fact 
that many of the borders of the colonized world were, at best arbitrary.  At worst, they 
were the opposite of arbitrary, representing deliberate attempts to “paper-over” 
indigenous statehoods to create powerful, but internally illegitimate centralized states.166  
 
In the post-colonial era, these historical facts created immense challenges, for as 
Okafor notes: 
As heirs to the colonial legacy, these leaders faced the crucial 
question of what to do with Africa's inherited colonial borders. 
Because the borders were mostly arbitrary, they had forcibly 
aggregated diverse pre-colonial polities into single political 
units. All too often these borders also resulted in the division of 
one cohesive group among two or more of the new states.167 
   
While it is an interesting historical phenomenon that the states, as drawn up, have 
remained relatively unchanged, Okafor remarks on how the external stability of the states 
has not been mirrored internally: 
                                                        
 
166 Okafor, After Martyrdom, supra note 83.  In tracing the historical illegitimacy of many (African) states, 
Okafor is careful not to engage in nostalgia for a mythical pre-colonial African statehood.  On the contrary, he 
refers to the violent and expansionist agendas of certain African states that preceded colonial rule and to the 
ongoing impact that they have had on contemporary geopolitical problems in Africa.  Nevertheless, he 
concludes:  
While its violent nature was not excusable, the campaign had been part of a 
very slowly evolving process of state-building that was rooted in the 
internal dynamics of African politics. It thus had a better chance of allowing 
slow-paced formation of less deeply fragmented states much as European 
states formed (at p.507). 
167 Ibid at 512.  See also Makau wa Mutua, “Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry” (1995) 
16 Mich J Int’l L 1113 [Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa]. 
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As African and international studies literature has much 
celebrated, this historic approach to the boundaries question 
dramatically and almost totally eliminated inter-state conflict 
in Africa.  Despite this remarkable record, however, the post-
colonial African state has faced internal crises virtually since 
the very moment of its independence. By the end of the 1960s, 
when the euphoria of independence had subsided, the little 
legitimacy that the new states had secured from the deeply 
embedded commonality of the anti-colonial struggle had 
already begun to fade.  For many African states, the moment of 
independence was also a moment of crisis because the post-
colonial state was a direct successor and inheritor of the 
colonial state.168 
 
The illegitimacy of many post-colonial borders, combined with the iron rule of the 
“mimic men” who steadfastly insisted on maintaining them has been a potent and violent 
combination.  It is of no surprise that from these historical phenomena there have arisen 
various efforts to recalibrate Africa’s geopolitical reality – some extremely violent, some 
less so; some involving secessionist desires to revamp borders, others remaining entirely 
domestic affairs.   
 
International law, according to Okafor, has played a key role in this “coercive nation-
building” process because it prioritizes external state-recognition processes over internal 
processes that would tend to yield more subjectively legitimate state structures.  This 
approach, Okafor concludes, has been successful in creating states “in the European nation-
state image, but in almost complete disregard for the input of the cohesive groups who 
inhabit the territory of each of these states.”169  The pride of place that international law 
gave to external recognition in the decolonized world led directly to efforts to repress 
questions of internal legitimacy, but has not generally been able to extinguish them, which 
has frequently led to violence. 
 
                                                        
 
168 Okafor, After Martyrdom, supra note 83 at 513. 
169Ibid at 522. 
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   International law also encouraged the homogenization of colonial populations 
based on the Western ideal (at least one that was pervasive throughout the decolonization 
period) of a unitary and unfragmented nation-state dominated by a centralized 
government structure.170  This has led directly to the widespread and frequently violent 
repression of minority groups by states, much of which has been provided cover by 
international law and its emphasis on the sanctity of the state, regardless of its internal 
legitimacy.  And while there have been examples of successful “nation-building,” the results 
in many countries have ranged from dismal to cataclysmic.  
 
Layered on top of all of this was the Cold War, which served to prop up nationalist 
(and often violent) regimes along ideological lines and repress legitimate exercises of self-
determination.  One of the defining features of the post-Cold War period – most visible in 
the states of the former Yugoslavia – has been the collapse of such regimes and the 
renewed assertion of independence movements.171 
 
And throughout this long period of upheaval spanning colonial rule and post-
colonial, Cold War inflected nationalism, civilians have frequently borne the brunt of 
conflict.  There is obviously no justification for this, but understanding the nature of post-
colonial conflict cannot begin or end with broad and undifferentiated statements about the 
nature of violence in the Third World.  Rather, such violence is part of a historical 
continuum that in some instances may have preceded colonial rule, but in virtually all of 
them was exacerbated by it.  The colonial state was defined by violence and coercion.  
TWAIL scholars have gone to significant lengths to demonstrate how such structures of 
violence and coercion have been replicated in the post-colonial state, with the complicity of 
Western-based international law.  At times the coercion of the colonized world (and the 
                                                        
 
170 Ibid at 523 and Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa, supra note 167 at 1151. 
171 The success of the Eritrean independence movement, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
perhaps the clearest example of this fact in the developing world, but the creation of Southern Sudan several 
years later is another. 
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post-colonial one that replaced it) was met with resistance, a resistance that has also 
veered in many cases toward the violent. 
 
Violence and coercion.  External recognition amidst internal illegitimacy.  
Repression and resistance.  These are dangerous binaries and it is of no surprise that they 
have produced many, if not most of the world’s refugees.  Indeed, inscribed in the lives of 
many refugees, one can frequently trace a historical path from colonial rule, to the creation 
of arbitrarily demarcated nation-states, to repression and resistance within those states, to 
the need to flee.  In this context, one can hardly cast aspersions on forced migrants for 
questioning, in the act of fleeing and the desire for safety, the legitimacy of the borders of 
our world – both those that imprisoned them in their home countries and those that they 
must traverse in search of sanctuary.172   
 
In situations of pervasive violence and abject oppression, one must also hesitate to 
cast broad judgment on the actions of those who have taken a stand.  Even in mainstream 
conceptions of international law, harm to civilians has never been used as the sole arbiter 
in determining whether the use of force is justified.173  And yet, as I have described earlier, 
this is precisely what the blunt tool of the security-inadmissibility regime does, essentially 
rendering inadmissible (at least in principle) anyone who has had any affiliation with an 
organization that has ever itself been affiliated with violence.  It is an explicitly anti-
                                                        
 
172 As immigration-security matters tend to involve individuals who have fled political conflict, I focus here on 
the ways in which international law has historically facilitated such conflict.  An equally interesting TWAIL 
analysis could be made of the ways in which international law, and particularly the rulemaking of 
international financial institutions has contributed to economic circumstances that have also fuelled 
international migration – on a TWAILIAN view of international financial institutions and international trade 
law, see M. Sornarajah, "The Case against a Regime for International Investment Law" in Leon Trakman (Ed.), 
Regionalism in International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); M. Sornarajah, 
“Mutations of Neo-Liberalism in International Investment Law” (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Int’l Dev 203.  
173 To provide a recent example: in his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize, President Barack Obama 
devoted considerable attention to justifications for the use of force, noting that during World War II more 
civilians died than soldiers and specifically endorsing principles of “just war” theory, suggesting that war is 
“justified only when certain conditions were met:  if it is waged as a last resort or in self-defense; if the force 
used is proportional; and if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence.”  See Barack Obama, 
Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009) online: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize. [Emphasis 
added]   
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contextual approach, imposing judgment on those that it captures in a way that is entirely 
removed from their understanding of the historical reality of their places of origin.  This is 
why Salvadoran journalists who merely connected their Western colleagues to FMLN 
operatives, why those who donated pittances to Eritrean humanitarian efforts and why 
Iranians who opposed the current regime, amongst many others, are all so equally 
bewildered to be found security threats to Canada. 
 
What the historically-situated TWAIL approach delivers in the immigration context 
is a sense of interconnectedness, of shared moral responsibility and historical nuance in 
understanding the geopolitical forces that have given rise to conflict and the global 
movement of peoples.174  This is, in my view, a crucial framing gesture in thinking about 
forced migration and the responsibility of Western countries towards refugees from 
conflict zones – a responsibility that, on a strictly numerical basis, they have demonstrably 
failed to take seriously.175  Infusing a TWAILian sense of history into the security process 
would help to ameliorate the disjuncture between the application of the security provisions 
and the histories of those seeking to migrate to Canada.  It would also encourage a critical 
engagement with the irrationality and bias of the current regime, calling out the hypocrisy 
                                                        
 
174 One may ask at this point whether TWAIL principles inevitably lead to an ‘open borders’ conception of 
immigration law, which is to say, to the end of immigration law as it is presently conceived.  While relatively 
little has been written about TWAIL and migration, the commentary that does exist suggests a less radical 
orientation.  For example, B.S. Chimni argues for a fundamental revamping of the international refugee 
protection regime that would prioritize global dialogue over unilateral action, but does not suggest that states 
cede their right to determine questions of admission, see B.S. Chimni, “Reforming the International Refugee 
Regime: A Dialogic Model” (2001) 14 J Refug Stud 151.  This makes sense.  Recall the profound, yet ultimately 
practical, approach generally adopted by TWAIL scholars who do not tend to call for the dismantling of 
Westphalian sovereignty, but instead advocate a more subtle recalibration and democratization of 
international law.  As I have stated before in other contexts, this is not a question that I need resolve here, 
given my focus on security, for I do not believe that any element of TWAIL scholarship would suggest an open 
borders approach in respect of those who have either participated in atrocities in the Global South, or who 
pose a legitimate security threat to the host country. 
175 Any cursory glance at refugee-related statistics confirms this, and the disparity in refugee reception rates 
between countries of the South and Northern industrialized states is only growing.  According to the UNHCR, 
the proportion of the world’s refugees being resettled or hosted in developed regions has diminished in the 
face of massive surges in displacement to the countries of developing regions.  The most recent UNHCR 
statistical update provides: “At the end of 2013, developing regions hosted 10.1 million or 86 per cent of the 
world’s refugees, the highest value for the past 22 years. The Least Developed Countries alone provided 
asylum to 2.8 million refugees or 24 per cent of the global total.”  See War’s Human Cost: UNHCR Global Trends 
2013 (2013) online: UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html at 16-17.  
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of its preoccupation with Southern conflicts and the corresponding blind eye it turns to 
conflicts in which Western countries have engaged.    
 
As I have outlined above, the security process employs a healthy dose of discretion 
on the part of immigration and enforcement officers.  In this context, injecting a TWAILian 
sense of history into the process would lead to decisions that, I believe, more aptly reflect 
our opinions about moral responsibility for conflict and would lead to more intelligent 
decisions as to who actually constitutes a threat to national security, even on a broad 
definition of the term.  It is also, I suggest, not as abstract as it may at first appear.  As I shall 
set out in greater detail below and in the next chapter, where officers in administrative 
regimes exercise discretion, they do so based on guidelines, directions and institutional 
cultures, which are in turn guided by particular normative orientations.  Importing a 
TWAILian pedagogy into this orientation would, I believe, yield tangible results.  It would 
encourage officers to focus, not on historical conflicts per se, but on the larger context 
surrounding such conflicts.  Most importantly, it would focus the officer’s attention on the 
particular role that the individual whose fate he/she must determine has played in the 
unfolding of political conflict.   
 
History and Memory: Recalling Immigration History as Exclusionary Policy 
 
In the previous chapter I provided a brief historical account of Canadian security 
and inadmissibility provisions, a history that appears, today, to be more or less appalling.  
Former inadmissibility regimes were explicitly racialized and sought to exclude particular 
classes of individuals as “undesirables”.  Such exclusion lay at the foundation of 
immigration policy, which itself was viewed as a bedrock of sovereignty.  And while today’s 
inadmissibility provisions may appear more facially neutral, the undeniable discrepancy in 
their application as between people from the North and South calls this apparent neutrality 
into question.  As several TWAIL scholars have noted, another principal aspiration of 
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TWAIL is to uncover the subtle normativity of apparently neutral provisions that tend to 
disproportionately prejudice Third World peoples.176   
 
The (mis)use of contemporary security provisions appears to be a prime example of 
precisely this kind of false neutrality.  While in the past questions of admission were 
strictly the domain of national prerogative, this is no longer the case, at least in respect of 
international obligations toward refugees.  And this is the hook on which TWAIL grasps 
hold.  Refugee protection has become a core domain of international law and so, to the 
extent that national policies on immigration may impact upon these international 
obligations, a TWAILian perspective on histories of exclusion is important to consider.  And 
just as TWAIL narratives have tended to reveal how colonial structures have been 
replicated in the post-colonial state, so too it would appear have the tendencies toward 
racialized exclusion in immigration law been replicated in the operation of contemporary 
security provisions.  The point, ultimately, is that any historical perspective on Canadian 
immigration-security concerns, would tend to encourage a critical engagement with its 
present, particularly in the current climate of almost overwhelming preoccupation with 
security, a preoccupation that is almost entirely directed at individuals from the Global 
South.   
 
3.4.2 Centring the Refugee – Individualized decision-making in immigration and 
security 
 
As noted above, TWAIL scholars have demonstrated the various ways in which both 
the colonial state and its post-colonial successor have failed the people of the Global South.  
This fact is perhaps most graphically manifested in the lives of refugees who, by definition, 
have experienced an almost total disregard for their most basic of rights.  The failures of 
                                                        
 
176 Okafor, Newness, supra note 101 at 178, citing Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, "The Asian Perspective to 
International Law in the Age of Globalization" (2001) 5 S.J.I.C.L. 284 at 285.  See also, Chikeziri Sam Igwe,  
Dehumanising International Law or Responding to a New Reality?: A Critical Analysis of Post-9/11 Suggested 
Changes to the Laws of War (PhD Dissertation, York University, 2009) at  32 [unpublished]. 
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the past 50 or so years have led TWAIL scholars to argue that any reformulated approach 
to international law must subordinate the interests of the powerful to the concerns of Third 
World peoples and that their “resistance to, or acceptance of, international rules and 
practices which affect their lives offers strong evidence of the justice or injustice of those 
rules and practices.”177 
 
At this point, it is important to recall that in security cases, immigration 
enforcement officers make determinations that are typically in the domain of international 
law: the use of force and its justification, assertions of self-determination, allegations of 
subversion, espionage and terror.  We must also recall that the empirical evidence suggests 
that, notwithstanding the immense breadth of the security provisions, those caught by 
them tend overwhelmingly to be from the Global South, in respect of relatively contained 
Southern conflicts. 
 
While enforcement officers generally have some basic familiarity with the 
international legal principles that undergird their decisions, I contend that they also need 
to be imbued with the contexts and historicism proposed by TWAIL scholars and by an 
emphasis on understanding how these larger themes map onto the individuals whose lives 
are, in some sense, in their hands.  Decision-making in the migration-security matrix is an 
archetypal example of raw state power, as exerted over individual lives – a power that 
confers on officers the right to characterize and objectify those subject to it.  And while 
such decision-making in the current Canadian regime is, in the formal sense, individualized, 
in that an individual decision is made in every case, the data suggests that such decisions 
are based, at best, on notions of collective responsibility, operationalized through the 
“membership” rubric of s.34(1) of the IRPA.  The result, I contend, is a skewed sense as to 
who constitutes a security threat, based in large measure on the “imaginative geographies” 
of the Global South as a single place of undifferentiated violence and savagery.178   
                                                        
 
177  Anghie & Chimni, Third World Approaches, supra note 104 at 78. 
178 Again, the reference is to Said, Orientalism, supra note 97 . 
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A TWAIL approach to the security-migration question would dispel such 
imaginative geographies, recognizing that the mere fact of coming from a conflict zone or 
even taking a position in a conflict does not, in itself, say anything about security or 
individual moral or criminal responsibility.  A quick and simple example can, I think, help 
to illustrate the point.  Think for a moment at how the current security regime would have 
operated had it been in effect in the period 1935-1945.179  Of course it would have captured 
Nazi war criminals and any members (and many supporters) of the Nazi party.  It would 
equally, however, have captured anyone who supported armed resistance to the Nazis.  The 
immoral equality with which the security regime would have operated could be averted, 
however, by requiring immigration officers to engage in individualized decision-making 
based on context, based on an informed engagement with relevant historical forces and 
based on a meaningful inquiry into the actions of those who came before them.  In this 
thought experiment, it is easy to recognize that the difficulty of segregating Nazis from 
resisters would provide no justification for excluding everyone from obtaining asylum.  It is 
also easy to recognize that immigration matters take place in a normative universe and that 
decision-makers must, in some senses, descend into the fray to make decisions that make 
sense to our own legal and moral framework.  Finally, this example demonstrates that the 
mere fact of “taking sides” in a conflict, even an immensely bloody one in which many 
civilians are killed, is not generally enough to inform coherent judgment in security 
matters.   
 
To close the bracket on this example, I do not suggest that the task of looking into 
the (often grainy) past of those who flee situations of conflict in search of asylum is an easy 
one.  What I propose is that however murky a situation of political conflict may appear, 
decisions on security cannot be based on that murkiness or on a removed position of 
                                                        
 
179 The immigration regime that was in place at the time has been the subject of extensive criticism, both for 
its propensity to allow Nazi war criminals to resettle in Canada and its “None is Too Many” approach to 
Jewish refugees. The reference is, of course, to Abella and Troper, None Is Too Many (Toronto: Lester & Orpen 
Dennys 1983). 
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unprincipled neutrality.  And while sorting through the various (and there are often many) 
players in a conflict can be immensely complex, what is not so complex, I argue is the task 
of evaluating the specific acts of individuals who have fled such conflict.   
 
Emphasizing contextualized histories and a willingness to engage with difficult 
normative questions in assessing the justice of a given situation are, as noted above, both 
important TWAIL principles.  I suggest that these principles should be deployed to help 
individualize the migration-security process and that doing so would: i) improve the 
consistency and fairness of decision-making in this area; ii) diminish the sense that the 
security regime operates arbitrarily; and iii) focus the analysis on those who have actually 
committed the kinds of crimes intended to be caught by the security process.  A TWAIL 
approach to considering security would largely abandon membership (and its attribution 
of collective responsibility) as a category of inadmissibility and would instead encourage 
an approach similar to that used for determining exclusion under the Refugee Convention.  
That is, in considering admissibility, officers should examine whether those seeking 
admission (from all countries) have personally contributed in a meaningful way to the 
commission of proscribed acts.180 
 
In the short to medium term, it is unlikely that the governments of Western 
countries will change legislation in a manner that could be construed as narrowing security 
considerations.  As such, I imagine that membership, as a category of inadmissibility, will 
remain on the books for the foreseeable future.  In the absence of formal legislative change, 
                                                        
 
180 A TWAIL approach on this issue would see no principled basis for applying membership-based security 
criteria to either immigrants or refugees.  This is primarily because a TWAIL perspective would also recognize 
that the reasons that animate individuals to leave their homelands to immigrate to other places are often just 
as connected to inequality in the international order as are those forced to flee as refugees.  A TWAIL 
perspective would query the distinction between refugee and migration rubrics in the first place, 
interrogating the circumscribed nature of the refugee definition and highlighting the often just as compelling 
situation of so-called ‘economic migrants.’  The plight of these individuals may not amount to persecution, but 
may be just as compelling as those of refugees and just as relevant to the TWAIL account of global inequity.  
That said, I maintain the focus here on refugees both because this represents the majority of individuals 
caught domestically by the security regime and because of the interlocking international legal obligations that 
accrue to refugees, further to the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture.   
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however, decision-makers maintain a discretion as to whether to proceed with 
admissibility determinations.  I suggest (and explore further below) that in the domain of 
this administrative discretion, meaningful if not transformative change is possible through 
exposing decision-makers to a TWAILian pedagogy aimed at individualizing the process 
and attenuating its troubling outcomes.181  Such an approach would not only seek to imbue 
decision-makers with a deeper understanding of international law, but would attempt to 
do so from the perspectives of those most commonly subject to security proceedings – 
individuals from the Global South.  The approach would encourage an openness to 
grappling with the complexities and injustices of the global political order and foster an 
individualized approach, all with a view to understanding how the actions of the 
individuals subject to security processes fit into the larger context of conflict in the Global 
South.   
3.4.3 Interrogating Security and Terrorism 
 
There is a small but important body of TWAIL scholarship on security and terrorism 
in the post 9/11 era and the “new normativity”182 that it has unleashed, much of which is 
relevant to our present context.  As a deconstructionist movement, the first task for TWAIL 
scholars has generally been to unpack the meaning of the term “terrorism”, as it has been 
used (and overused) in recent years.  They point to the long history of political violence 
amongst state and non-state groups and respectfully question the “newness” of the 
geopolitical order that gave rise to the “war on terror”.   
 
Ikechi Mgbeoji, for example, points to the fact that international law has failed to 
provide a coherent definition of terrorism and suggests that this failure has had profound 
                                                        
 
181 I do not intend here to explicate a detailed description of how a TWAIL pedagogy would operate in this 
setting, but rely on the basic contours of an approach to TWAIL pedagogy within law schools, as proposed by 
Mohsen Al Attar and Vernon Ivan Tava, TWAIL Pedagogy - Legal Education for Emancipation, SSRN Scholarly 
Paper ID 1438325 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2009) [Al Attar and Tava "TWAIL 
Pedagogy]. 
182 Upendra Baxi, “War on Terror and the War of Terror: Nomadic Multitudes, Aggressive Incumbents, and the 
New International Law - Prefatory Remarks on Two Wars” (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law J 7 Baxi, "War on 
Terror"] at 34. 
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implications on the rule of law.183  How can the crime of terrorism be applied in a 
consistent and lawful manner, Mgbeoji asks, if we cannot derive a common understanding 
of the term, let alone any coherent criteria for establishing guilt under it?184 
 
For Mgbeoji, the failure to define the law in respect of terrorism has rendered it 
little more than a tool of the powerful and suggests that only through a “rigorous and 
dispassionate examination of what constitutes terror can modern international lawyers 
and international institutions escape…blinding rhetoric and righteous nationalistic 
indignation.”185  The lack of definition has created a “propagandistic narrative,” Mgbeoji 
continues, that virtually always favors those in power, rendering law little more than the 
will of the sovereign.186  The pervasiveness of this narrative – one which constantly posits 
and reinforces notions of insecurity – results in the installation of the exception as the rule, 
the diminution of rights and the wholesale labelling of entire categories of  individuals as 
security threats.   
 
TWAIL scholars, however, are not alone in pointing to the amorphous nature of 
“terrorism” and the troubling manner in which it has been deployed.  Recall, as but one 
example, the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Suresh decision: “[o]ne searches 
in vain for an authoritative definition of ‘terrorism’” and acknowledging that the absence of 
such definition renders it particularly vulnerable to “politicized manipulation, conjecture, 
and polemical interpretation.”187  Where I suggest a TWAIL approach would part ways with 
                                                        
 
183 Ikechi Mgbeoji, “The Bearded Bandit, the Outlaw Cop, and the Naked Emperor: Towards a North-South 
(De)Construction of the Texts and Contexts of International Law’s (Dis)Engagement with Terrorism” (2005) 
43 Osgoode Hall Law J 105 at 113.  Mgbeogi notes (at 109) that efforts to define terrorism have resulted in 
“twenty-two categories of international crimes of terrorism, representing over three hundred international 
instruments enacted between 1815 and 1992. Yet, none of the international instruments offer a generic 
definition. Ironically, states strongly disagree on how to define the term and who should be identified as a 
terrorist.” 
184 Ibid, at 113. 
185 Ibid, at 111. 
186 Ibid at 111, citing Christopher Blakesley, (book review) State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, 
Political, and Economic Dimensions by John Murphy (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. 428 at 429-30. 
187 Suresh, supra note 29 at paras 94-95. The court’s brief review of the literature shed further light on its 
recognition that the term “terrorism” can be viewed as essentially meaningless:  
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the views of the Court is in the Justices’ conclusion that, notwithstanding the above, a 
sufficiently workable definition of “terrorism” could be incorporated into the procedurally 
stripped down realm of security decision-making and still comply with the rule of law.   
 
Another TWAIL insight into the discourse on terrorism involves the questioning of 
an international legal regime that frequently turns a blind-eye to civilian death when 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
One searches in vain for an authoritative definition of “terrorism”.  The 
Immigration Act does not define the term.  Further, there is no single 
definition that is accepted internationally.  The absence of an authoritative 
definition means that, at least at the margins, “the term is open to 
politicized manipulation, conjecture, and polemical interpretation”: factum 
of the intervener Canadian Arab Federation (“CAF”), at para. 8; see also W. 
R. Farrell, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an 
Effective Strategy (1982), at p. 6 (“The term [terrorism] is somewhat 
‘Humpty Dumpty’ — anything we choose it to be”); O. Schachter, “The 
Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases” (1989), 11 Houston J. 
Int’l L. 309, at p. 309 (“[n]o single inclusive definition of international 
terrorism has been accepted by the United Nations or in a generally 
accepted multilateral treaty”); G. Levitt, “Is ‘Terrorism’ Worth Defining?” 
(1986), 13 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 97, at p. 97 (“The search for a legal definition of 
terrorism in some ways resembles the quest for the Holy Grail”); C. C. 
Joyner, “Offshore Maritime Terrorism: International Implications and the 
Legal Response” (1983), 36 Naval War C. Rev. 16, at p. 20 (terrorism’s 
“exact status under international law remains open to conjecture and 
polemical interpretation”); and J. B. Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic 
Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (1978), at p. x (“The very word 
[terrorism] becomes a litmus test for dearly held beliefs, so that a brief 
conversation on terrorist matters with almost anyone reveals a special 
world view, an interpretation of the nature of man, and a glimpse into a 
desired future.”) 
Even amongst those who agree on the definition of the term, there is 
considerable disagreement as to whom the term should be attached: see, 
e.g., I. M. Porras, “On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw” 
(1994), Utah L. Rev. 119, at p. 124 (noting the general view that “terrorism” 
is poorly defined but stating that “[w]ith ‘terrorism’ . . . everyone means the 
same thing.  What changes is not the meaning of the word, but rather the 
groups and activities that each person would include or exclude from the 
list”); D. Kash, “Abductions of Terrorists in International Airspace and on 
the High Seas” (1993), 8 Fla. J. Int’l L. 65, at p. 72 (“[A]n act that one state 
considers terrorism, another may consider as a valid exercise of 
resistance”).  Perhaps the most striking example of the politicized nature of 
the term is that Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress was, during the 
apartheid era, routinely labelled a terrorist organization, not only by the 
South African government but by much of the international community. 
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caused by state actors, but vilifies non-state movements that may have a valid justice aim, 
but who similarly resort to violence.  Above I described TWAIL’s acknowledgment that 
many Third World states have devolved into highly repressive places.  What I did not 
describe is that many of these states justify their repression internationally by suggesting 
that they are merely defending themselves against terrorism. 188  The point here is not to 
justify the targeting of civilians, but to expose the asymmetry of the regime and its 
problematic consequences.  Baxi notes in this regard: 
But at no stage does "state terrorism" emerge as a figuration of 
thought in the evolution of the genres of the international law 
of war and humanitarian law, the customary and conventional 
right to self-defence, and the limits of conduct of belligerent or 
military occupation. Unsurprisingly, the term "state terrorism" 
is, as yet, not a term of art in either international law diction or 
the United Nations' official epistemology; at best some 
communities of human rights activists use it.189 
 
This privileging of state over non-state violence is sewn into the very fabric of 
international law, for as Anghie notes, Grotius himself was so preoccupied with order and 
stability on the state level that he refused to recognize any right of people to rebel against 
tyranny, even when that tyranny took on the form of brutalizing slavery.190  And while, as 
noted above, various international instruments now specifically authorize peoples’ 
resistance to tyranny, the residue of state privilege persists.  The problem with this 
privileging is that, as TWAIL scholars have observed, in many (though certainly not all) 
conflicts in the Global South, it is the non-state groups that have the clearer claim to moral 
legitimacy than their state-based adversary.  In this context, the labelling, stigmatizing and 
vilifying of non-state actors as “terrorists” simply tells a skewed version of the story, 
Nelson Mandela’s example being clearly the most revealing example.   
                                                        
 
188 The most recent example likely comes from Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad has essentially 
labelled all of those in opposition to him as terrorists.  Interestingly, Canadian immigration law would tend to 
agree with Assad, as anyone engaged in the Syrian uprising would, at least on paper, be inadmissible on 
security grounds.   
189 Baxi, War on Terror, supra note 182 at 24. 
190 Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change,  supra note 99 at 1322, citing Hersch Lauterpacht, "The 
Grotian Tradition in International Law" (1946) Brit YB INT‘L L 1 at 43-44. 
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All of this is highly germane to the immigration-security context.  If allegations of 
terror need to be addressed critically because they may be laden with assumptions, half-
truths and political agendas, than this is particularly the case in immigration proceedings 
defined by low burdens of proof and relaxed standards of evidence.  And yet, I suggest that 
in the hyper-securitized contemporary context, in fact, the opposite has happened such that 
essentially any conflict that has resulted in any civilian casualties is considered terrorist in 
nature, thereby justifying the exclusion of anyone with any proximity to it.   
 
Virginia Held has suggested that “all terrorism is awful, just as all war is awful” and 
that the difference between the two cannot lie merely in the targeting of civilians because 
they are targeted in both, though far more civilians have died in wars than in terrorist 
attacks.191  A TWAILian approach to migration and security would accord with this view, 
recognizing the dynamics of power that frequently drive the distinction between “just” 
wars and terrorist acts.  As in our World War II example, a TWAILian approach would 
recognize that allegations of terrorism in a context of larger state violence doesn’t actually 
say very much about either “security” or about the justice of a particular outcome.  When 
we pull back the distinction between state violence and terror, what is revealed is a more 
complex and far less Manichean context in which it would be simply inappropriate to 
impose harsh legal consequences on the sole basis of association.  Rather, as Baxi notes, 
“context sensitive distinctions ought to guide our reflexive labours,” distinctions that seek 
to separate those who have personally contributed to the hardship and suffering of Third 
World peoples from those who are, at root, simply fleeing such hardship.192  In their work 
on assessing individual criminal responsibility, Anghie and Chimni demonstrate for us one 
important way that decision-makers can arrive at context sensitive distinctions.  They 
propose that, as much as possible (and recognizing the complexities) the views of the 
people from the state in which alleged crimes took place, should help guide the 
                                                        
 
191 Virginia Held, How Terrorism is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence (New York: Oxford UP, 2011) at 23. 
192 Baxi, War on Terror, supra note 182 at 18. 
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determination of individual responsibility.193  Would, for example, the majority of El 
Salvadorans view a journalist with loose connections to the FMLN as a terrorist?  Given that 
the FMLN is now the democratically elected ruling party in the country, the answer would 
likely be no.  Would an Eritrean who, in 1977, donated the equivalent of $20 to the 
liberation movement for humanitarian aid be viewed in Eritrea (or Ethiopia for that 
matter) as a terrorist?  Again, the answer appears clear.   
 
Is violence ever justifiable?  That is perhaps one of the most vexing questions one 
can ask.  Its answer ultimately lies not within the domain of law, but rather in the realms of 
moral philosophy, perhaps politics and, for some, religion.  What is not justifiable, and what 
I contend a TWAILian approach would help avoid, is the reductionist labelling of 
individuals as terrorists in situations that cry out for a careful consideration of context, 
history, justice and individual intent.   
 
3.4.4 Replacing Political Power with the Rule of Law 
 
One of the many paradoxes of TWAIL is this: in its call for a reinvention of 
international law, it essentially seeks the global entrenchment of values strongly associated 
with the West, most notably democracy and the rule of law.  Its insistence on injecting 
participatory approaches into international law could be construed, in point of fact, as a 
simple call for the transposition of social democratic values onto the international level.  
And this is why TWAIL is frequently referred to – in the same breath – as both reformist 
and radical.  It is reformist because what it calls for internationally is something that many 
people take for granted domestically – equality amongst parties, meaningful discourse and 
curbs on raw expressions of power.  It is radical because such principles remain in 
disturbingly short supply in international legal and political orders. 
 
                                                        
 
193 Anghie & Chimni, Third World Approaches, supra note 104 at 95. 
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One example of TWAIL’s call for an internationalized rule of law lies in its insistence 
that any engagement with the global legal/political order must be undertaken objectively 
and consistently.  Anghie and Chimni refer to the failure on the part of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to fully investigate and prosecute 
allegations of war crimes related to the NATO campaign of (allegedly indiscriminate) 
airstrikes as evidence of the selectivity of international law; a selectivity that tends to 
privilege the people and actions of the West.194  So it is in the security-inadmissibility 
regime, where, for example, those who have engaged in Western acts of subversion are, 
quite literally, never subjected to admissibility proceedings notwithstanding the fact that 
the law makes no distinction between these acts and ones committed in the Global South, 
which are frequently the subject of admissibility hearings. 
 
This leads me to anticipate one possible reaction to my position, which is that my 
critique of the current immigration-security regime and my suggestion that the breadth of 
the security net be reconsidered would both weaken security and “go easy” on Southern 
despots and war criminals.  My response is that, in fact, the opposite would be the case.  
First, encouraging consistency in the application of the law is hardly a controversial view, 
but is rather central to the most basic principles of legality.195  Second, suggesting that 
those who flee disputes should be treated individually and on the basis of their own actions 
is not the same as proposing impunity; to the contrary what I am proposing is merely a 
more nuanced approach to the question of who constitutes a security threat, taking into full 
consideration the fractured worlds from which people flee.  This, I suggest, would only help 
to focus and refine questions of security, taking it away from the realm of top-down 
assertion of power (where I suggest it currently resides) and into the realm of law.196  In 
the process, I suggest, the security process would shed its peculiar preoccupation with 
                                                        
 
194 Ibid at 91-92. 
195 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) at 39.  Of note, the 
consistent application of the law is also considered an important, if frequently unfollowed, principle of 
international law: see for example Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York : Rinehart, 1952) 
(New York : Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966) (Clark, New Jersey : Lawbook Exchange, 2003). 
196 Again, I refer to “law” here in the Fullerian sense, see note 45, above, and accompanying text, in addition to 
Section 1.3.2, above. 
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those who have fled internal disputes in the global south and focus instead on those who 
genuinely pose a threat to Canadian and international security.  
 
It is not, in my view, a coincidence that states tend to view both immigration and 
international relations through political, rather than legal lenses.  They are, in some senses 
mirror images of each other – the one projecting out, the other reflecting in – both helping 
to define national sovereignty.  What Western states have failed to recognize however, is 
the interconnectedness of the two.  They have failed to recognize that the histories of 
colonization, the generations of subjugation and the decades of using international law as 
thin cover for political power have had their consequences, one of which is the arrival on 
their shores of those who have fled the ensuing fallout.  I suggest that the rule of law has a 
role to play in both international and immigration law.  Ironically, introducing it into the 
former would diminish many of the pressures on the latter. 
Conclusion 
“Tra il dire e il fare c’è in mezzo il mare,” she remarked.  Between words and deeds 
there is a sea.197 
 
Immigration law and international law are intimately connected.  Immigration 
decision-making is necessarily influenced by international legal principles and both 
domains are closely linked to notions of national sovereignty and autonomy.  In the 
preceding pages I have described a Third World approach that seeks to transform the 
global order by questioning the historical legitimacy of international law and replacing it 
with a new normative order, one that places the interests of individuals into the analysis 
and is based on discursive and participatory interactions between all parties.  From this 
vantage point, I sought to illustrate how transposing TWAIL onto the migration-security 
realm would focus the process on the actions rather than the associations of individuals 
                                                        
 
197 Schwartz, supra note 95 at 85. 
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and bring to it a coherence and fairness that it currently lacks.  With this in mind, I turn to 
similar conversations from the realm of administrative law – about dialogue, participation 
and the rule of law – and examine how a progressive interpretation of administrative 
discretion could help turn words into deeds and contribute to a more coherent and 
justified approach to security matters.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCRETIONARY DECISION-MAKING 
AND DIALOGUE IN IMMIGRATION AND SECURITY: 
FORGING LEGITIMACY 
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Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the intersections between immigration 
and international law and argued that applying a TWAIL lens to security matters 
could help bring them into closer conformity with basic principles of legality.  In this 
chapter, I focus on a domestic domain – that of administrative discretion – within 
which, I suggest, TWAIL principles could be deployed.  What I hope to illustrate in 
the process is that a conception of discretion in security matters as a dialogical and 
participatory space that situates those affected by administrative decisions at the 
centre of the process is perfectly suited to, and perhaps even requires, a 
consideration of TWAIL principles.  I argue that pairing TWAIL with this discursive 
approach to administrative decision-making could accomplish the (modest) project 
of bringing security laws, even in their current state, into closer conformity with 
basic principles of legality.   
 
This approach is consistent with TWAIL’s radical, yet ultimately reformist 
agenda of working within the law to cultivate an approach to decision-making that 
is both cognizant of, and sensitive to the experiences of those from the global south.  
Recognizing that discretion is not, in itself, an inherently benevolent decision-
making mechanism, I nevertheless argue that it is inevitable and that its existence 
provides an opportunity for the consideration of Southern perspectives in a manner 
that could materially affect outcomes for those unnecessarily caught in the security-
inadmissibility apparatus.  Infusing TWAIL perspectives into administrative 
discretion in the security sphere does not ultimately challenge the exclusionary 
nature of state security practices, but it does require that such practices be carried 
out in nuanced and coherent ways that are reflective of Southern realities. 
 
My project here, if it is not already apparent, is an unapologetically 
normative one.  I am of the view that discretionary authority that affects the very 
right of individuals to seek asylum from persecution, such as that related to security 
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measures, needs to be interpreted narrowly, individually and in context.  I am 
comforted in taking this position by the view offered by some, and with which I 
agree, that questions about public administration are almost inherently tinged by 
politics.  This is because, as Sossin notes, administration itself “is not and has never 
been a science - it is and has always been normative.”1   
 
I also acknowledge in the following pages that discretion is both inevitable 
and potentially, but not necessarily, helpful in this normative agenda.  It is 
unrealistic in the fortress-like mentality of contemporary Western states to suggest 
that security measures – in the form of the ‘laws on the books’ – be relaxed or that 
the executive handcuff itself from a relatively wide degree of latitude in matters of 
security.  The only place where more nuanced, fair and coherent outcomes can be 
realized, then, is in the spaces left open by an otherwise overly broad security 
regime; in other words, in the realm of discretion.  The only way for discretion’s 
potential to be realized, I contend, is through a reconfiguration of who makes such 
decisions and a reconception of how they are made, elevating the perspectives of 
those who are subject to them and recognizing that such individuals need to be 
listened to in order to properly assess both their desire and eligibility for admission.  
To help illustrate these points, I refer toward the end of this chapter to several 
conversations I have had with inadmissible persons and with the lawyers who 
represent them.  Before getting to their stories, however, it is important to first back 
up a few paces and sketch out a brief history of discretion, a topic to which I now 
turn. 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
1 Lorne Sossin, “From Neutrality to Compassion: The Place of Civil Service Values and Legal Norms in 
the Exercise of Administrative Discretion” (2005) 55 Univ Tor Law J [Sossin, Neutrality to 
Compassion] 427 at 428. 
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Discretion and the law as dramatic foils: A brief history 
The interplay between discretionary decision-making and the rule of law goes to 
the very core of administrative law – it raises questions about the role of the 
executive and the independence of tribunals, and more fundamentally, about the 
place of law within the administrative state.  As David Strauss has noted, “[t]he 
dilemma of rules and discretion is ancient and intractable, and it is ubiquitous in the 
law.”  Discretion means many different things in many different contexts.  In the 
words of Richard Lempert, the discretion that law grants “may be examined as a 
quality of rules, as a quality of behavior, or as a sense that people have of their 
freedom to act.”2  In this chapter, I predominantly refer to discretion in terms of the 
role it plays in legal landscapes, while recognizing that many of the problems 
associated with discretion are not created by law, and cannot be corrected by law 
alone.  This type of formal legal discretion, as Sossin and Pratt observe, “arises when 
an official is empowered to exercise public authority and afforded scope to decide 
how that authority should be exercised in particular circumstances.”3  Such 
discretion, which usually finds its genesis in permissive statutory language, thus 
involves the granting of a power to choose between options, but “within a context 
set by law.”4  Discretion in this sense may thus be viewed as freedom and constraint, 
both rooted in the law.5 
4.2.1 Discretion, the will of the Sovereign and the rule of law 
 
Conversations about the role that discretion plays in administrative decision-
making have been around as long as administrative decision-making itself.  These 
conversations have evolved in fascinating ways over the years, tracking a larger and 
                                                        
 
2 Richard Lempert, “Discretion in a Behavioural Perspective: The Case of a Public Housing Eviction 
Board”, in K. Hawkins, ed., The Uses of Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) [Hawkins, The Uses 
of Discretion] at 185. 
3 Anna Pratt & Lorne Sossin, “A Brief Introduction of the Puzzle of Discretion,” (2009) 24 Can JL & Soc 
301. 
4 Lempert, supra note 2, at 186. 
5 Ibid. 
 248 
 
more general commentary about the rise of the modern administrative state.  Many 
scholars from the first part of the last century, most notably A.V. Dicey, viewed 
unfettered discretion as being anathema to the rule of law and an exercise of 
executive (or sovereign) power that needed to be constrained by the judiciary.  As 
Cartier notes, citing Willis, this view may at least in part be attributed to the 
institutional memory of the judiciary on the role that it had played in defending the 
commons against the tyranny of the king.6  Others situate the views of Dicey and 
others within the laissez faire liberal economic model that prevailed at the time: 
governments should do little and what they do should be subject to review by the 
courts and the courts alone.   
 
Regardless of its historical antecedents, this view of administrative discretion 
construed it as a threat to liberty and a vehicle for the expression of arbitrary 
executive power.  Adherents to this school of thought were highly skeptical of the 
capacity of administrative agencies to compose themselves and to behave in a 
manner that comported with the rule of law, unless closely leashed by the courts.  
Indeed, to Dicey and others, this had to be the case since the very concept of law was 
inextricably linked to the judiciary.7 
 
4.2.2 Discretion and the imperatives of the administrative state 
 
Later, with the rise of the welfare state, executive action and the discretion 
through which it was channeled came to be viewed with less suspicion.  On the 
contrary, discretion in the nascent administrative state was seen as a key 
mechanism for ameliorating inequality and addressing broad policy goals in the 
public interest.  Thus a generation of administrative law scholars shifted their focus 
                                                        
 
6 Genevieve Cartier, “Administrative Discretion as Dialogue: A Response to John Willis (or: from 
Theology to Secularization)” (2005) 55 Univ Tor Law J 629 [Cartier Discretion as Dialogue]. 
7 A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution  (London: Macmillan, 1885), 10th ed., 1959, E. C. S. Wade, 
editor (repr. 1965) at 40.  Dicey could not have been more explicit on this point – he defined law 
simply as “any rule which will be enforced by the courts…” 
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away from shielding individuals from the excesses of the state, and instead 
embraced the value of broad discretionary latitude in the promulgation of public 
policy. 
 
In Canada, John Willis is frequently credited with leading the charge away from 
Dicey’s inherently suspicious approach to administrative discretion.  For Willis, the 
first stage in the analysis was to acknowledge the reality, indeed the centrality, of 
the administrative framework in the modern state.  Given this reality, Willis 
reasoned, the most important task is to fit the administrative realm into our 
constitutional structure.  This, Willis continued, was best achieved through a 
functional approach to determining both “who is best fitted to exercise a discretion” 
and “to what extent and by what type of persons shall the exercise of the discretion 
be supervised."8  Willis emphatically believed that in the administrative realm, the 
executive was more suitably fitted to exercise this discretion.  Indeed, to Willis, 
discretion was a central feature of administrative action, one that had to exist 
essentially outside the realm of law, or perhaps more to the point, outside the 
gnarled grasp of the judiciary. 
 
And just as Dicey’s approach can be situated within the larger economic and 
political ideologies that prevailed at the time, so too can the approach which 
followed it.  In the decades following World War I there emerged a strong belief in 
both the obligation and capacity of government to address all social problems.  This 
approach was intimately tied to a growing faith in science and the capacity of 
experts to bring science and scientific reasoning to virtually every aspect of life, and 
governance was no exception to this.  Writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1937, 
Robert Cooper observed, 
                                                        
 
8 Cartier, Discretion as Dialogue, supra note 6 at 632, citing John Willis, “Three Approaches to 
Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the Functional” (1935) 1 U Toronto LJ 53, at 
59. 
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The administration of general legislation by technical 
experts, skilled and trained in specialized fields, is "the 
contemporary answer to the challenge to bridge the gap 
between popular government and scientific 
government."9 
 
And to a very significant extent, this approach made sense at the time.  
Governance was becoming a vastly more complicated endeavour and it was 
increasingly clear that neither the legislature, the executive, nor in particular the 
courts, had the scientific or technical capacity to define policy and make decisions in 
key areas of government regulation.  The complexity in these areas was instead 
navigated through the creation of bodies such as security and exchange 
commissions, labour relations boards and other regulatory bodies populated by 
experts in their respective fields. 
 
While administrative regulation certainly existed before this era, its prominence 
as an integral component of the political landscape can certainly be traced back to 
this period.  Indeed, to some, administrative governance was the defining feature of 
the era.  In commenting on the shift towards the administrative, Roscoe Pound, 
while Dean of Harvard Law School, observed, "as the eighteenth and the forepart of 
the nineteenth century relied upon the legislature and the last half of the nineteenth 
century relied upon the courts, the twentieth century is no less clearly relying upon 
administration.”10 
 
Most commentators tended to recognize, begrudgingly perhaps, that 
administrative discretion had to be subjected to some minimal form of judicial 
scrutiny, but the encroachment of the court into the administrative arena was 
viewed with criticism bordering on hostility.  Willis wrote of it being “confining and 
                                                        
 
9 Robert M Cooper, “Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion” (1937) 47 Yale L J 577 at 583, 
citing Dickinson, J. "Judicial Control of Official Discretion" (1928) 22 AM. Pol. Sci. Rev., 275 at 277. 
10 R. Pound, “The Administrative Application of Legal Standards” (1919) 44 A.B.A. Report 445, at 446. 
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inadequate” to look at the administrative process from the viewpoint of the sporadic 
court cases on judicial control, particularly given its fixation on “that slippery eel, 
the rule of law.”11  Or as Cooper put it,  
No adequate reason has ever been advanced to explain 
why judges, apart from their individual capacities, are 
the "only suitable custodians of administrative honor 
and decorum" or "by what strange process…judges 
become more trustworthy than" administrative 
officials."  It is hardly reasonable to assume that a 
judiciary, completely untrained in the problems of 
public administration, is more capable or more likely to 
reach proper results than experienced administrators 
selected primarily for their specialized knowledge, 
technical competence, and thorough familiarity with the 
intricacies of modern governmental policies."12 
 
And what of the rights of individuals under the scientific administration of the 
modern state?  The preoccupation of Dicey was all but abandoned on the premise 
that the public good was the paramount concern:   
In a certain sense the recent tendency to invest 
administrative agencies with a discretionary authority 
                                                        
 
11 John Willis, “The McRuer Report: Lawyers’ Values and Civil Servants’ Values” (1968) 18 Univ Tor 
Law J 351 at 355-356 [Willis, McRuer Report]. 
12 Cooper, supra note 9 at 595.  Cooper later describes judicial and other intervention as almost 
inherently distorting of the administrative project: 
[T]he primary purpose of investing the instruments of 
administration with a discretionary authority was to place the 
enforcement of legislative policies in the hands of officials who 
presumably possess a technical competence and specialized 
knowledge in their particular fields of governmental activity. In this 
respect the exercise of discretion is synonymous with the 
operation of a scientific government. Consequently, the efficiency 
of administration in performing its functions is reduced to the 
extent that its operations are controlled by external force which 
does not possess this indispensable degree of specialized ability. 
Whether the discretionary function is subject to a supervisory 
control by the judiciary or by any other non-expert body, the 
ultimate result is a perversion of the entire process of 
administration. 
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is a belated recognition of the paramountcy of the 
public over private interests. To this extent the 
principles of public law repudiate the older theory that 
administrative justice must be meted out in accordance 
with the traditions of the common law, for in view of the 
present responsibilities of the modem State the rights 
and interests of the private citizen can no longer be 
placed above or on an equal basis with the privileges 
and interests of government. The sound exercise of 
discretionary authority is the answer to the demand 
that administration be accorded a freedom to determine 
what the national interest requires in any situation 
within its control.13 
 
The scientific rationalism and open-ended faith in public administration that 
dominated this view is replete with criticism of liberal legality which, the argument 
went, not only skewed the fair and efficient running of government, but also 
underestimated the built-in safeguards of “fairminded civil servants, a vigilant press, 
and a 'watch that government' atmosphere in the general public.”14 
4.2.3 Where law ends: discretion or tyranny? 
 
If the middle part of the century was something of a science experiment in 
technocratic discretionary decision-making, it can fairly be said that its underlying 
hypothesis was first, or at least most notably, questioned with the publishing of K.C. 
Davis’ Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry in 1969.15  Davis argued that the 
administrative system, such as it was at the time, was riddled with examples of 
discretion gone wrong.  Davis focused primarily on the discretionary powers of 
police and prosecutors, noting that they were amongst the most important policy 
makers in society and yet their decisions were inherently vulnerable to 
arbitrariness and were entirely beyond the scope of judicial or other review.  The 
                                                        
 
13 Cooper, supra note 9 at 588. 
14 Willis, McRuer Report, supra note 11 at 353. 
15 K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 1969) [K.C. 
Davis, Discretionary Justice]. 
 253 
 
book was not, however, confined to the broad discretion found in the criminal 
justice system.  Indeed, Davis pointed to myriad examples of unfettered discretion 
within the administrative state that were essentially beyond the power of law to 
control.   
 
But Davis was no Dicey.  He recognized both the inevitability of discretion and 
the central role that it had come to play in the modern state.  Indeed, Davis 
commences Discretionary Justice by referring to the Lockean axiom that “where law 
ends tyranny begins,” but suggests that, in reality, where law ends discretion begins 
and that this discretion may mean “either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or 
injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness.”16  I shall return below to this idea 
of the normative character of discretion, but for now the point is simply Davis’ 
recognition of its ubiquity in the modern state.  What Davis lamented was the 
proliferation of what he termed unnecessary discretionary power and the lack of 
structure and checks applied to those remaining areas of discretion deemed 
necessary.  Properly conceived, however, Davis appreciated the potential of 
discretion to tailor justice to the inherently unpredictable circumstances of the 
individual.  Indeed in many circumstances, Davis acknowledged, the mechanical 
application of a rule with no recourse to discretion results in injustice.  For as 
Edward Chase noted in an early review of Discretionary Justice, “[t]he necessity of 
discretion is a manifestation of our condition as limited, thoroughly historical 
beings. No rules or principles laid down yesterday or today can hope to foresee, 
much less control and regularize, the profusion of event and personality which 
tomorrow will thrust upon us. We cannot divine, much less subdue, the future. Some 
discretion…is necessary, always.”17 
 
                                                        
 
16 Ibid at 3.  Davis appears to wrongfully attribute the axiom to William Pitt, though it seems that it 
first appeared in Locke’s "Of Tyranny" in Book II, § 202 of Chap. XVIII of the Two Treatises of 
Government. 
17  Edward Chase, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (book review) (1969) 44 Tulane Law 
Rev 649. 
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To Davis what was needed, and what administrative bodies were to strive for, 
was individualized justice; that is, justice that to the “appropriate extent” was 
tailored to the needs of the individual, which could only be accomplished through 
the proper balance of rules and discretion.18  Writing of Davis in 1979, Harry 
Arthurs posed the dilemma in these terms: 
What, then, is the proper relationship between law and 
discretion? Davis defines the problem as finding “the 
optimum point on the rule-to-discretion scale,” a task 
which is said to be inevitable because “[e]very rule 
involves some discretion and every discretion involves 
some limitation.”19 
 
The problem, to Davis, was not with discretion itself, but with the abuse of 
discretion, which was avoidable through confining it to necessary contexts, through 
structuring the manner in which it is exercised and by ‘checking’ it through a variety 
of oversight mechanisms.  Approached in this way, Davis suggested that discretion 
could be transformed from a mechanism of arbitrary state power to a facilitator of 
the kind of bespoke justice that he envisioned.   
 
Central to Davis’ conception of how discretion should be structured was the idea 
of openness, both to the individuals who are the subjects of administrative 
proceedings and to the larger public.  As we shall see in the coming pages, the 
aspiration that discretion be conceived of as a space for dialogue is predicated on, 
and to some small extent, owes its existence to this call for openness in the realm of 
administrative action.  The call for openness and fairness toward those affected by 
administrative decisions can also be discerned from the evolution of jurisprudence 
on discretion, a topic to which I turn below. 
 
                                                        
 
18 K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra note 15, at 19. 
19 H W Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall 
Law J 2 at 25. 
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Before doing so, however, two further points should be made.  The first relates 
to the difficulty in devising any unifying theory of discretionary decision-making.  
The difficulty lies, at least in part, in the breadth and diversity of the endeavour 
itself.  It is trite, of course, that administrative law governs everything from broad 
and relatively esoteric policy propagating bodies to highly adversarial and curial-
type adjudicating tribunals.  Supreme Court of Canada Justice Louis Lebel described 
the large tent of administrative law in the following, amusing way: “[N]ot all 
administrative bodies are the same.  Indeed, this is an understatement.  At first 
glance, labour boards, police commissions, and milk control boards may seem to 
have about as much in common as assembly lines, cops, and cows!”20 
 
To some extent at least, differing opinions on the topic of discretion seem to turn 
on which end of the administrative law spectrum is most prominent in the mind of 
the commentator.  If, in one’s mind’s eye, administrative law consists primarily of an 
array of policy-setting experts seeking to bring order to the complexity of the 
modern state, a relatively permissive approach to the question of discretion makes 
sense.  Those, on the other hand, who begin from the position that administrative 
law is primarily a kind of ‘court-lite’ that adjudicates the fundamental rights of 
individuals, are more likely to emphasize the need for tight judicial constraint over 
discretion.  Harlow and Rawlings label this the “model of law-model of government” 
distinction.21  In defining this distinction, Cartier notes: 
A model of law defines administrative law as a set of 
rules and principles designed to control the 
administrative state. It focuses on the ability of courts to 
control administrative exercises of power and to 
protect individual liberty.  By contrast, a model of 
government views administrative law as facilitating 
government action and promoting the public interest.22 
                                                        
 
20 Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 SCR 307, 2000 SCC 44 at para 158. 
21 See Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 
1997) at 69ff. 
22 Cartier, supra note 6 at 638, emphasis in original. 
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This dichotomy can be observed throughout the commentary on discretion.  It 
influenced Dicey’s critique of discretion and in turn coloured Cooper and Willis’ 
criticism of Dicey; it inspired Davis’ cri de coeur against unfettered discretion and 
finally it influenced subsequent criticism of Davis.23 
 
Second, it is a mistake to look at the evolution of commentary on administrative 
discretion, as superficially described above, as being defined by a series of discrete 
periods.  Dicey had his successors, and his views can still be discerned in some of the 
more interventionist judgments that emanate from the courts.  The contributions of 
Willis and others similarly continue to reverberate throughout the administrative 
law world, as do those who have swung the pendulum back towards a more rights-
based orientation.   
4.2.4 Discretion and Canadian law in three parts: Roncarelli, Nicholson and 
Baker 
 
While it is well beyond the scope or ambition of this chapter to trace Canadian 
jurisprudential history on discretion in administrative law, it is important to provide 
a brief sense of this history to both elaborate on the relationship between discretion 
and law and to outline the role of the courts in creating the conditions for a 
dialogical approach to administrative decision-making. 
 
 
Roncarelli v. Duplessis24 
 
A decade before the publication of Davis’ Discretionary Justice, the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Roncarelli v. Duplessis marked a shift, if not a sea 
                                                        
 
23 The most notable perhaps being that of D.J. Galligan, see Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of 
Official Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) [Galligan, Discretionary Powers] at 110. 
24 [1959] S.C.R. 121 [Roncarelli]. 
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change, between the previous era of “untrammeled” administrative discretion and 
an emerging focus on individual rights and judicial oversight.  While there remains 
debate as to the degree to which discretion has become “trammeled” in the post-
Roncarelli era, it is certainly clear that the Court’s decision marked an important 
development.25  
 
The case involved a decision by then-Quebec premier Maurice Duplessis to 
revoke the liquor licence of Frank Roncarelli for reasons related to his faith as a 
Jehovah’s Witness and, more specifically, because Roncarelli frequently provided 
bail for fellow members of his faith who were being arrested for handing out 
Jehovah’s Witness literature, a practice which irked the local city prosecutor.26  The 
liquor licence revocation eventually caused Roncarelli to close down his restaurant 
and he sued for damages.  He prevailed at trial, but that decision was overturned on 
appeal to the Court of Queen’s Bench.   
 
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada reinstated the trial decision, 
concluding that Duplessis had wrongfully caused the revocation of Roncarelli's 
liquor licence and increased the damages owing to him.  While three separate set of 
reasons were provided by the majority, it is really only the decision of one judge – 
Justice Rand – whose reasons called into question the conception of discretionary 
power as constituting an area of non-justiciable executive prerogative. 
 
Justice Rand notably pointed out that, even where broad statutory discretion is 
conferred on government officials, their decisions must nevertheless conform to the 
statutory purpose that gives rise to their authority.  No legislative act, Justice Rand 
continued, can “be taken to contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power exercisable 
                                                        
 
25 See for example Lorne Sossin, “The Unfinished Project of Roncarelli v. Duplessis: Justiciability, 
Discretion, and the Limits of the Rule of Law” (2010) 55 McGill L J 662. 
26 Of interest, the arrests were carried out under a local ordinance which, after the licence 
cancellation, but before the Supreme Court’s decision in Roncarelli, was declared unconstitutional – 
see Saumar v The City of Quebec, [1953] 2 SCR 299. 
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for any purpose, however capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or 
purpose of the statute.”27  Therefore even where seemingly unfettered discretion is 
conferred upon state officials, there is always an implied limit on its exercise, a limit 
that is demarcated by the purpose of the statutory framework involved and by the 
interests of individuals subject to that framework.28  Discretion, to put it differently, 
“necessarily implies good faith in discharging public duty.”29 
 
The limits on discretionary power, Justice Rand concluded, were disregarded in 
the revocation of Roncarelli’s liquor licence for reasons “totally irrelevant” to the 
sale of liquor, but rather because of unrelated activities – those related to his 
religion – that he had an absolute right to engage in.   
 
Justice Rand’s effort to define the outer limits of discretionary power, together 
with his emphasis on good faith decision-making in matters affecting individual 
rights did not instantly transform administrative law, but they did represent a first  
crack in the wall that had previously sealed off discretionary decision-making from 
judicial oversight.   The jurisprudence that followed Roncarelli remained largely 
deferential of discretionary decisions but the shift in judicial orientation was 
notable – it was no longer to be assumed that discretionary power was a lawless 
space, entirely immune from the judiciary.  At the very least, the courts began to ask 
tentative questions about whether obligations related to fair procedures, if not 
substantive outcomes, had been met in the discretionary domain.   
 
Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police30 
 
                                                        
 
27 Roncarelli, supra note 24 at 140. 
28 Ibid at 141. 
29 Ibid. 
30 [1979] S.C.R. 311 [Nicholson]. 
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This distinction between process and substance has preoccupied legal scholars, 
if not always the courts, for decades, particularly in the wake of the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Baker, discussed at greater length below.  Years prior to 
Baker, however, the Supreme Court first determined in Nicholson v. Haldimand-
Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police that the fulcrum on which 
procedural obligations rest is not a rigid classification of the decision-making setting 
(i.e. judicial, quasi-judicial or discretionary) but is determined, rather, by the rights 
at stake. 
 
Nicholson was a police officer who, after 15 months of employment for the 
county of Haldimand, was terminated without an opportunity to be heard and 
without any reason given.  The employer claimed that as Nicholson was still within 
an 18 month probationary period created by the Ontario Police Act, he was 
essentially an office holder “at pleasure” and his termination disclosed no grounds 
for review.  Nicholson argued that he had a common law right to be treated fairly 
and be notified of the reasons for his termination.  A majority of the Supreme Court 
ultimately agreed, finding that the proliferation of administrative action into 
virtually every area of life meant that the simple classification of a decision as being 
discretionary was no longer sufficient in determining whether the common law duty 
to act fairly arose.  Rather, the consequences of the administrative action for the 
individual subject to such action were to be considered in determining the content 
of the duty of fairness in a given setting: 
What rightly lies behind this emergence is the 
realization that the classification of statutory functions 
as judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative is often very 
difficult, to say the least; and to endow some with 
procedural protection while denying others any at all 
would work injustice when the results of statutory 
decisions raise the same serious consequences for those 
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adversely affected, regardless of the classification of the 
function in question…31 
 
As Cartier rightly notes, the effect of the court’s decision in Nicholson was to 
continue the process, started in Roncarelli, of softening the judicial interpretation of 
discretion from that of a pure top-down expression of state power to a process that 
includes and must take into consideration the interests of those affected by such 
decisions.32  And as many scholars have further pointed out, this process of centring 
individual interests in discretionary decision-making reached its apex in Baker, a 
decision to which I now turn. 
 
Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 33 
 
The decision of Justice Claire L’Heureux Dubé in Baker v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) was seminal for a variety of reasons and it marked an 
important evolutionary moment in both the characterization and the content of 
public law in Canada.  The decision is multifaceted, but here I focus on the way in 
which it profoundly called into question distinctions that had previously been 
assumed – distinctions between law and discretion and between procedure and 
substance.34  Breaking down these distinctions carries with it the potential to 
reformulate administrative law by recognizing that discretionary decisions are 
more than mere exercises of executive power and by affirming that the interests of 
those subject to administrative decisions matter, while simultaneously recognizing 
the imperatives of the administrative state.  Cartier describes this as the potential to 
reconceive discretion as a process of dialogue rather than an exercise in top-down 
                                                        
 
31 Ibid at 325, citing, Mullan, Fairness: The New Natural Justice (1975), 25 Univ of Tor LJ 281. 
32 Genevieve Cartier, supra note 6 at 642. 
33 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker]. 
34 Ibid at para. 54 and see generally, David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the 
Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v Canada” (2001) 51 Univ Tor Law J 193 [Dyzenhaus & Fox-
Decent, “Rethinking"]. 
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exertions of state power.  And it is precisely a reconception along these lines that I 
contend below should also emerge in the immigration-security setting. 
 
The facts in Baker have been recounted dozens of times, and so I restate them 
here only briefly.  Mavis Baker was a Jamaican citizen who had resided in Canada for 
several years and who had four Canadian-born children.  She herself had no legal 
status in Canada and was eventually ordered deported.  In order to avoid 
deportation, she submitted an application for permanent residence on humanitarian 
and compassionate (H&C) grounds.  The application was refused and Ms. Baker 
challenged the refusal, arguing, amongst other things, that the refusal was unlawful 
because the immigration officer had failed to adequately consider the best interests 
of her children.   
 
In the decision of the majority in Baker, Justice L’Heureux Dubé characterized 
discretion in the following terms: 
[T]he concept of discretion refers to decisions where 
the law does not dictate a specific outcome, or where 
the decision-maker is given a choice of options within a 
statutorily imposed set of boundaries.35 
 
Justice L’Heureux Dube noted that, to that point, courts tended to hold a 
“dualistic” view of administrative decision-making; that is, there was a distinction, a 
dualism, between jurisdictional issues (over which the courts presided) and non-
jurisdictional issues such as policy-making and discretionary decision-making (over 
which government tribunals held expertise).  Baker appeared to fundamentally 
question this dualism by concluding that virtually all decisions contain within them 
a measure of discretion and to this extent, the courts had to determine the 
                                                        
 
35 Baker, supra note 33 at para 52. 
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appropriate level of scrutiny they should apply in reviewing substantive aspects of 
discretionary decisions.36   
 
The questioning of the law-discretion distinction was a profound change, most 
notably because it cleared the path to a substantive review of discretionary 
decisions based on the reasonableness standard.  Thus notwithstanding the “choice 
of options” granted to decision-makers, and the deference that will be afforded the 
choices made, discretionary decisions could be reviewed for their substantive 
reasonableness, based on several factors: 
However, discretion must still be exercised in a manner 
that is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin 
of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in 
accordance with the principles of the rule of law…in line 
with general principles of administrative law governing 
the exercise of discretion, and consistent with the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms…37 
 
To the court in Baker, judicial review is not limited to merely defining the legal 
limits of discretion, but much more fundamentally, it may delve directly into the 
decision to determine its reasonableness.  And reasonableness in this context means 
that discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the 
statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the 
fundamental values of Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.  This is 
perhaps the most important insight of the Baker decision – the insight that 
Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent refer to as the “principle of legality.”  That is, the idea 
that “legal principles, of which the duty of fairness is an important example, control 
the spaces in which both the judgment of administrative tribunals and the exercise 
of discretion take place.”38 
                                                        
 
36 A determination that they should make through what was then termed the “pragmatic and 
functional” approach: Baker, supra note 33 at para 55. 
37 Ibid, at para. 53, citations omitted. 
38 Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent, Rethinking, supra note 34 at 218. 
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In then assessing, substantively of course, whether or not the officer’s decision 
to refuse Baker’s application was reasonable, Justice L’Heureux Dubé looked at 
whether or not it adhered to the values underlying the grant of discretion.  The 
grant of discretion was, in this case, inseparable from the humanitarian and 
compassionate nature of the application, and required as such, that officers 
approach the matter in a humanitarian and compassionate manner.  The values 
underlying the grant of discretion were also found to lie in general statements found 
within the Immigration Act, in international law and in soft law Ministerial 
Guidelines meant to assist officers in their discretionary deliberations.  In taking 
these factors into consideration, Justice L’Heureux Dubé concluded that the officer’s 
decision was inconsistent with the values underlying the grant of discretion 
primarily because the officer failed to give sufficient consideration and weight to the 
best interests of Baker’s children.39 
 
The Baker decision has had a profound impact, not necessarily on H&C 
application outcomes, but on the manner in which immigration officers are expected 
to exercise their discretion (particularly in cases involving the interests of children) 
and on the openness of lower courts to consider whether officers have meaningfully 
engaged with the evidence put before them.  The willingness of the court in Baker to 
peer into the substantive reasonableness of the immigration officer’s decision 
carved out a dialogical space between applicant and decision-maker that does not 
dictate outcomes, but does frame the process in a way that gives voice to the 
perspective of H&C applicants.  As we shall see in the coming pages, however, the 
Baker decision represents a clear high water mark in the court’s willingness to 
engage substantively in administrative decisions and has come to sit in sharp 
contrast to the court’s approach to cases involving migration and security.  Before 
                                                        
 
39 The court also found that the comments of one of the officers involved in the case gave rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of bias, which itself warranted granting the appeal.   
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exploring this issue, however, I delve a little more deeply into a central issue at play 
in the Baker decision – that is, the precise nature of the relationship between law 
and discretion. 
Debunking the Law-Discretion Binary 
As can be seen from the above, in the evolution of the administrative state, 
discretion and law have frequently been cast as dramatic foils, the presence of one 
signifying the absence of the other.  As I further alluded to above, this dynamic finds 
its origin in the move toward modern governance in which constraining state power 
by law was viewed, for better or worse, as the antidote to the discretionary whims 
of the sovereign.  While this idea of the discretion-law dichotomy has taken on a 
modern form under liberal democracies, it has been around since antiquity, for as 
Aristotle noted, 
Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; 
and personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single 
person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only 
in those matters on which law is unable, owing to the 
difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, 
to make an exact pronouncement.40 
 
The most cited contemporary articulation of this view is that of Dworkin, who 
described discretion as being like the hole in a doughnut, as something that does not 
exist, in other words, “except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of 
restriction.”41  Traditional debates about discretion, such as those outlined above, 
start from Dworkin’s assumption – that there is a negative correlation between law 
and discretion – but disagree on the question of whether, on this understanding, 
discretion is a good thing.   
 
                                                        
 
40 Aristotle, E. Barker (trans), The Politics, book III, (New York: Oxford UP, 1998) at 112. 
41 R. Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1977), at 31. 
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In recent years, several scholars, mostly from the social sciences, have 
reformulated the law/discretion binary, suggesting that the concepts exist not in 
opposition to each other, but as parallel expressions of government power.  Seen in 
this light, the existence of discretion is not merely a “residual category of law,” but is 
rather an essential component of liberal governance that may either ameliorate or 
exacerbate law’s exclusionary tendencies, depending on the circumstances of the 
particular case.42   
 
Discretion, to such scholars, is both ubiquitous and inevitable and is best 
understood not as a threat to the rule of law, but as a central process by which legal 
abstraction is translated into concrete reality by legal actors.43  This interpretive 
exercise is inevitable because of the indeterminacy of language, the infinite variety 
of circumstances in which law must operate and the (sometimes intentional) 
ambiguity of legislative intent.44  In this context, the primary contribution of the 
social sciences has been to point out that the exercise of discretion is influenced by a 
range of factors outside the law itself.  This is not to suggest that law is irrelevant; it 
will generally impose a Dworkinian-like framework upon discretionary decisions, 
but within that superstructure, social and organizational factors often play a far 
more immediate and meaningful role in influencing discretionary decisions.45  
Rather than the hole in the doughnut, consider for a moment another analogy.  
Imagine the lives of two ants living inside a matchbox and the extent to which their 
                                                        
 
42 See generally, Anna Pratt, Securing Borders: Detention and Deportation in Canada, (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2005) [Pratt, Securing Borders] at 57. 
43 Keith Hawkins, “The Uses of Discretion: Perspectives from Law and Social Science” in Hawkins, The 
Uses of Discretion, supra note 2 at 11. 
44 Galligan, Discretionary Powers, supra note 23 at 1. 
45 This would include various soft law instruments – bureaucratic guidelines, policies and the like – 
but would certainly not be limited to them.  It would also include any number of larger sociological 
norms: on the influence of soft law, see Lorne Sossin & Charles Smith, “Hard Choices and Soft Law: 
Ethical Codes, Policy Guidelines and the Role of the Courts in Regulating Government” (2003) 40 
Alberta Law Review 867.  On other factors see for example MP Baumgartner, “The Myth of 
Discretion” in Hawkins, The Uses of Discretion, supra note 2 [Baumgartner, The Myth of Discretion] 
at 129 (on discretion and discrimination) and Richard Lempert, “Discretion in a Behavioural 
Perspective: The Case of a Public Housing Eviction Board” supra note 2 (on discretion and 
behavioural factors). 
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lives are constrained, determined and influenced by the four walls of that box.  Now 
move those ants into a football stadium and consider the role that the stadium plays 
in their lives.  To be sure it encloses them and frames, in some very general way, the 
outer parameters of their experience, but for such ants, a panoply of other factors 
will become far more relevant to their existence.  This is one observation of recent 
scholarship; law provides some outer scope of meaning, but for many decision-
makers and for the individuals subject to discretionary decisions, other factors are 
far more immediate. 
 
The suggestion that a variety of non-legal factors is central to discretionary 
decision-making is not, however, to suggest that such decisions are arbitrary.  In 
fact, social scientists frequently argue the opposite; that discretionary decision-
making is highly predictable, but not by recourse to legal doctrine.  Discretion is not, 
from this perspective, an amorphous zone of unpredictable administrative action 
but is rather a domain of social organizing as amenable to scrutiny as any other.46  
Indeed, the “social context” of administrative matters – influenced by various factors 
including the patterned forms of behaviour and social backgrounds of decision-
makers and the perceived “respectability” and social status of the parties – often 
provides a very clear picture of why discretionary decisions are made.47  
Baumgartner goes on to explain the implications of this view of discretion: 
All of this requires not only a new conception of 
discretion, but also a new appreciation of its 
consequences.  The traditional view that saw 
discretionary decision-making as a very personal, 
situational, and idiosyncratic affair implied an image of 
random judgment in which the fate of all citizens alike 
hinged on largely unknowable factors.  Uncertainty of 
outcomes fell equitably across the citizenry some 
people – perhaps many people – might end up being 
                                                        
 
46 Geneviève Bouchard & Barbara Wake Carroll, “Policy-making and administrative discretion: The 
case of immigration in Canada” (2002) 45 Canadian Public Administration 239. 
47 Baumgartner, The Myth of Discretion, supra note 45 at 130-1. 
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treated more favorably than stipulated by the written 
law, but for reasons of chance, emotion, or caprice that 
no one could take for granted and that might as well 
have worked against them or on behalf of someone else.  
The sociological reality of discretion reveals something 
quite different.  How individuals fare in the legal system 
turns out not to be mysterious, and, what is more, not 
random.  People enter the legal process with very 
different prospects, depending upon their own social 
characteristics as well as those of their opponents, 
supporters, and the officials who deal with them.  
Officials may answer to the dictates of their conscience, 
but their conscience consistently comes to different 
conclusions depending on the social circumstances of 
the case.  Left to their own devices, agents of the law 
routinely favor some sorts of people over others.  
Discretion, in practice, amounts to what is commonly 
known as discrimination.48 
 
In the context of immigration enforcement, Pratt comes to much the same 
conclusion, albeit from a distinct theoretical perspective, calling out the fallacy of 
the autonomous, free-thinking decision-maker and illustrating how discretionary 
power “facilitates the translation of shifting societal anxieties and priorities into 
exclusionary immigration law and policy.”49 In arriving at this conclusion, Pratt 
traces the unseemly history of decision-making concerning archetypal ‘undesirable 
immigrants’ from previous preoccupations over race, religion and morality to 
contemporary fixations on criminality and security.50  Also, with the shift in 
decision-making authority to border security agencies, it seems clear that the 
                                                        
 
48 Ibid at 157. 
49 Anna Pratt, “Dunking the Doughnut: Discretionary Power, Law and the Administration of the 
Canadian Immigration Act” (1999) 8:2 Social and Legal Studies 199 at 200. 
50 Pratt, Securing Borders, supra note 42 73-91.  Pratt further suggests that in recent years, the 
concept of national security has considerably expanded, encapsulating concerns over certain forms 
of criminality and organized criminality to form a ‘crime-security’ nexus that significantly blurs the 
lines between criminal justice and immigration.  See “Wanted by the CBSA” in Deborah Brock, et al 
(eds)  Criminalization, Representation, Regulation: Thinking Differently About Crime (Toronto: UofT 
Press, 2014) and "Immigration Penality and the Crime-Security Nexus: The Case of Tran Trong Nghi 
Nguyen" in Karim Ismaili, et al (eds), Canadian Criminal Justice Policy: A Contemporary Reader 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012).   
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decisions they make are not merely a translation of social concerns about security, 
terrorism and risk, but a reflection of a metastasized and, in many cases, distorted 
version of them. 
 
But to suggest that administrative discretion frequently acts as a conduit for the 
expression of social prejudices is not, at least for many social scientists, to call for 
more law.  On the contrary, the understanding of law and discretion as 
complementary components in an overarching regulatory scheme suggests that the 
layering on of more law would not alter its fundamental nature.  Criticism of 
particular forms of discretion should also not be understood as criticism of its 
essential quality because, to many, it does not have an essential quality, at least not 
in the normative sense.  To borrow Willis’ colourful metaphor, it is not just the rule 
of law, but also administrative discretion that is a ‘slippery eel’, a shapeshifter, 
capable of both jealously protecting executive control and dispensing individual 
justice, frequently at the same time.  Within Canadian immigration law one can 
readily see both forms of discretion in action – the Minister always possesses 
discretion to exempt individuals from the hard application of the IRPA on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds where such application would result in 
unusual hardship.51  Elsewhere, the IRPA provides the Minister with extraordinarily 
broad discretion to restrict the rights of asylum seekers by designating their arrival 
as “irregular”.52  Within the same legislation we see the two faces of discretion in 
action – discretion as a quality of mercy and as a repository of executive authority.  
Both forms of discretion, however, reinforce the notion that the power to decide 
resides with the sovereign, which in turn leads to the observation that law and 
                                                        
 
51 IRPA, s 25(1).  As I note in the pages that follow, however, this discretion in the specific context of 
the IRPA’s security provisions was recently circumscribed by the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals 
Act, SC 2013, c 16 [FRFCA], s 9. 
52 IRPA, s 20.1. 
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discretion are not truly oppositional, but “mutually constitutive” pieces to the puzzle 
of state power.53 
 
The ubiquity of discretion in the modern state, together with a recognition of its 
normative neutrality have lead many scholars to avoid sweeping claims about how 
and when it should be deployed, but to seek instead to understand it in the 
particular contexts in which it is wielded.  As Pratt further explains: 
To view discretion as a form of power promises to 
provide a way out of the dichotomous impasse imposed 
by the law/discretion binary. This view encourages 
different questions about discretion. Rather than asking 
why it is used, how it can be eliminated, curtailed or 
expanded, made more fair or just, the guiding question 
becomes how does this power work in specific empirical 
contexts? What are its practical purposes and effects? 
What are the historically specific discourses that inflect 
and justify its use? What social, political, legal, and 
economic preoccupations and processes influence its 
operations? What organizational and institutional 
networks, channels, and techniques are at play?54 
 
In other words, the challenge posed by recent scholarship on discretion is not to 
eliminate it, as Dicey would have done, and nor is it to eliminate law’s encroachment 
on administration, as Willis would have had it, but to examine, closely and with 
nuance, the expressions of discretion in particular circumstances.  Going beyond 
this, Handler calls not only for administrative action to be examined in context, but 
for it to be thought about creatively and with an awareness that there is a moral 
dimension to discretion – namely, as I have previously described, that those who are 
                                                        
 
53 Pratt, Securing Borders, supra note 42 at 57, citing Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law, 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1992). 
54 Pratt, Securing Borders, supra note 42 at 72. 
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subject to decisions have a moral right to participate in them, if not dictate their 
results.55   
 
In the pages that follow, I take up Pratt and Handler’s challenge to think about 
discretion in context, creatively and from a dialogical perspective and consider the 
possibilities and implications of dialogical approaches in the top-down world of 
immigration-security decision-making.  In doing so, I readily acknowledge many of 
the claims that I have superficially outlined above concerning the law-discretion 
dichotomy.  Such claims have profoundly amplified the conversation about 
administrative action but they do not, to me, suggest that law has no role to play.  In 
the following sections, I examine the extent to which law can help to carve out the 
conditions in which a new and more positive conception of discretion may take root. 
  
Discretion, democracy and communication: Discretion as dialogue 
 
As noted above, the traditional debates over discretion have tended to be 
preoccupied with its relationship to law and, more specifically, with the extent to 
which legal standards should constrain its exercise.  As Pratt and Sossin point out, 
this process of narrowing the scope of discretion has given rise to a wave of 
scholarship on discretion as a mechanism for dialogue, democratization, and the 
enhancement of human dignity.56  These contributions have come both from legal 
scholars and from social scientists, who have in recent years paid increased 
attention to the place of discretion within public policy.  In the words of Cartier, new 
approaches to discretion tend to emphasize a “bottom up” analysis, starting from 
                                                        
 
55 Joel F Handler, “Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic 
Community” (1987) 35 UCLA Law Rev 999 [Handler, Dependent People] at 1076 and Joel Handler, 
“Discretion: Power, Quiescence, and Trust” [Handler, Power, Quiescence, and Trust] in Hawkins, The 
Uses of Discretion, supra note 2 at 334. 
56 Pratt and Sossin, A Brief Introduction of the Puzzle of Discretion, supra, note 3 at 303. 
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the individual affected by decision-making and moving out from there.  This 
approach, Cartier observes, was essentially set in motion by the concern expressed 
by Justice Rand in Roncarelli for the perspective of the individual.57 
 
According to Cartier, the Baker understanding of the rule of law in discretionary 
decision-making further paved the way for a substantive understanding of 
administrative law, based on what she terms “discretion as dialogue.”58  This term is 
derived in no small measure from the work of Sossin and Handler, who also call for 
a conception of administrative discretion based on good faith processes of 
communication between decision-makers and those affected by the decisions.  In 
developing their theories on discretion, these authors in turn look to principles of 
democratic governance, cooperative procedure and communicative action to 
undertake the ambitious project of “transforming citizenry from the object to the 
subject of government…”59 
 
While calls for injecting administrative discretion with communicative processes 
are not entirely new, they have not generally prevailed, in part Sossin argues, 
because of the commonly made distinction between politics and discretion.  In the 
political realm, dialogue is associated with democracy and is consequently expected.  
In the bureaucratic realm, which is, at least in theory, simply an ‘in the trenches’ 
actualization of political will, there is no such association, and dialogue is frequently 
viewed with suspicion.  Sossin notes  
That administrators do or should act out of a sincere 
belief in what is good and just, and that such a belief 
should be developed out of dialogue with groups 
                                                        
 
57 Cartier, Discretion as Dialogue, supra note 6 at 639. 
58 Genevieve Cartier, Discretion as Dialogue, supra note 6; see also Genevieve Cartier, “Reconceiving 
Discretion: From Discretion as Power to Discretion as Dialogue”, PhD Dissertation, University of 
Toronto, 2004 [Cartier Dissertation]. 
59 L. Sossin "The Politics of Discretion: Toward a Critical Theory of Public Administration" (1993) 36 
Can. Pub. Admin. 364 [Sossin, Politics of Discretion] at 365;  J.F. Handler, The Conditions of Discretion- 
Autonomy, Community, Bureaucracy (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986). 
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affected by those actions, rarely has played a role in 
these analyses.60 
 
For Sossin, the key to providing a normative justification for bureaucratic 
decision-making comes from questioning the distinction between administration 
and politics.  On this view, the relationship between law and discretion is not merely 
a “particular form of authority” but is rather a “potential forum for politics.”61  
 
As noted, in Cartier’s view, discretion as dialogue calls for a “bottom-up” 
approach to discretionary decision-making, rather than traditional approaches 
which view discretion from the top-down, as “one way projections of state 
authority.”  In her 2004 PhD dissertation, Cartier set out her view of dialogic 
discretion as follows: 
The central argument of my thesis is that administrative 
discretion must be approached from a bottom-up 
perspective and conceived as a "dialogue" between the 
individual affected by the decision and the public 
authority making that decision.  This notion of 
"discretion as dialogue" is different from what I term 
"discretion as power", that is, discretion exercised from 
a top-down perspective or as a "one-way projection of 
authority" where discretionary powers were seen as 
"direct descendants of what were once considered to be 
unreviewable or unjusticiable executive prerogatives…” 
The "dialogue" that is implied in my conception of 
discretion is not just procedural fairness.  Procedural 
fairness creates spaces, venues for communication, 
while dialogue relates to the content of that 
communication. Dialogue consists of a meaningful 
exchange between the decision maker endowed with 
discretionary powers and the individual affected by the 
decision.  Meaningful exchange requires that 
participants to the dialogue have the ability to put 
                                                        
 
60 Sossin, Politics of Discretion, ibid at 377. 
61 Lorne Sossin, “Redistributing Democracy: An Inquiry into Authority, Discretion and the Possibility 
of Engagement in the Welfare State” (1994) 26 Ott Law Rev 1 [Sossin, Redistributing Democracy]. 
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themselves in the shoes of the other participants, to 
understand their perspective and to contribute to the 
making of a decision that is both responsive to the 
substance of the exchange and in line with legislative 
intent and public interest. Therefore, to view discretion 
as a dialogue requires that discretion be both exercised 
at the close of a meaningful and authentic 
communication between the parties involved, and 
justified in the light of the content of that 
communication. Stated differently, the discretionary 
decision is justified if it is a genuine reflection of the 
dialogue that took place.  Dialogue is not merely 
explanatory: it affects the outcome in that it conditions 
the justification of the decision. It does not always or 
even often guarantee any particular outcome, but 
guarantees a justified outcome.62 
 
As mentioned, Cartier’s call for a view of discretion based on dialogue borrows 
from, and has much in common with Sossin’s conception of communicative 
discretionary decision-making; the one real distinction, she asserts, is that she 
would apply her approach to all discretionary decision-making, rather than to the 
narrower subset of decisions contemplated by Sossin involving vulnerable 
individuals.63  
 
Rather than focusing on the strictly legal project of confining and controlling 
bureaucratic discretion (a project that has only achieved a modicum of success in 
improving the situation of the disempowered), Sossin argues that it is necessary to 
“seek new ways of legitimating bureaucracy as an independent political 
institution.”64  The way to do this, Sossin asserts, is through a process of engagement 
imbued with dialogue between those who make decisions and those who are 
affected by them.  Sossin grafts Habermas’ theory of communicative action onto the 
                                                        
 
62 Cartier Dissertation, supra note 58 at 9.  
63 Cartier Dissertation, supra note 58 at 312.  While Sossin clearly focuses on developing a theory of 
discretion that takes into account the vulnerable, it would appear less clear that he would limit his 
call for legitimating discretionary decision-making to situations involving vulnerable persons. 
64 Sossin, The Politics of Discretion, supra note 59 at 365.  
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administrative sphere in order to address a deficit of legitimacy that the 
administrative realm has always confronted in relation to both the judiciary and 
representative officials.65  Referring to Habermas, Sossin suggests that legitimacy 
arises “in earnest” only from practical discourse and not merely from public 
acquiescence.66   
 
Sossin further argues that a discursive conception of administrative law based 
on mutual engagement is meant not only to create spaces for dialogue, but also to 
create a situation of interdependence between decision-makers and those affected 
by discretionary decisions.67  It is, Sossin continues, only through such a process of 
engagement that a truly democratic form of administrative discretion can be 
salvaged.  He states: 
What I term the "theory of engagement" focuses legal 
and political discourse on the content of discretion 
rather than its jurisdictional boundaries, in the hope of 
fostering a discursive space for reflecting on the nature, 
scope and purposes of administrative judgments. To the 
degree that this would enmesh a more diverse set of 
interests in the administrative process, and a principle 
of interdependence and mutuality in administrative 
relations, I believe it would counter the alienation 
which has become synonymous with how we think of 
"bureaucracy" in the welfare state.68 
 
The need for such discourse is based at least in part on the notion that the 
legitimacy of democratic administration rests with its ability to empower people “to 
be persuasive, and have equal access to the resources needed to convey 
argument.”69  I do not suggest here that the democratic obligation to confer 
discursive tools exists at large, but rather, that it arises in the sense contemplated by 
                                                        
 
65 Ibid, at 382-383. 
66 Ibid, at 382 
67 Sossin, Redistributing Democracy supra note 61 at 4. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Sossin, The Politics of Discretion, supra note 59, at 379. 
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scholars such as Benhabib and Abizadeh, when and on whom the state aims to 
exercise its coercive power.70  This is particularly clear in the cases of Convention 
refugees and individuals seeking refugee protection who, at least potentially, 
possess rights against removal.  In these circumstances, I assert that the legitimacy 
of democratic administration does require discursive and participatory approaches.  
To Handler, facilitating this ‘power to be persuasive’ is the central feature in 
overcoming the failure of adversarial approaches in addressing the needs of the 
powerless.  He notes: 
Discretion contemplates a conversation within a 
normative framework, but dependent people – the poor, 
minorities, the uneducated, and unsophisticated – are 
often at a serious disadvantage.  They lack the 
information, the skills, and the power to persuade.  The 
official has the unfair advantage.71 
  
To Handler, then, it is not merely dialogue that is required, but dialogue within a 
certain context; that is, a cooperative context free of the strictures of the liberal 
adversarial model.  Handler, like Sossin, speaks to the importance of fostering an 
interdependent approach to discretionary decision-making, an approach that 
cannot arise in an adversarial system fixated with procedural over substantive 
fairness concerns.  He notes: 
These limitations should not be surprising.  Lawyers 
especially put too much faith in the relevance and 
durability of process, but process is always molded by 
substantive events…The task is to discover the 
conditions which will facilitate the creation and 
nurturing of empowerment in discretionary dependent 
                                                        
 
70 See Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (West Nyack NY: Cambridge 
UP, 2000) at 47-48 and Arash Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to 
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relationships, not to search for some magical procedural 
formula.72 
 
 Handler and Sossin also argue for the need to move beyond the idea of the 
administrative decision-maker as an almost infallible source of technical expertise.  
Indeed, to Sossin (again channeling Habermas) the predominance of the 
technocratic decision-maker whose decisions are based solely on a detached view of 
instrumental reason is in large measure responsible for the disengagement of 
individuals from the public sphere.  Instead, Sossin calls for a different approach, an 
approach based on dialogue and “communicative rationality” to create the 
conditions for “intersubjectivity.”  And it is through such an approach, the argument 
continues, that individuals subject to administrative discretion become, in a sense, 
the subjects of democratic discourse, rather than mere “objects to be 
administered.”73 
 
The objectification of those subject to administrative decisions is also of concern 
to Cartier, who sees top-down expressions of discretion as having created a 
significant legitimacy gap in administrative law.  This gap can only be bridged, she 
suggests, by recognizing that grants of discretion must be consistent not only with the 
specific expression of legislative intent that creates them, but also with the core 
democratic values that undergird the broader legal system.  Viewed from this 
perspective, discretionary decisions can only make a claim on legitimacy if they are 
made at the end of a process of meaningful engagement with the persons affected by 
those decisions.   This idea of discretionary decision-making as a location for the 
expression of democratic values is important because of the breadth and 
importance of administrative law in modern democracies and because access points 
for democratic participation in decision-making are extremely limited.  Injecting 
democratic values into discretionary decision-making would therefore bring 
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democratic legitimacy to such decisions.  In this sense, it would also turn the 
traditional Diceyan view of discretion entirely on its head, transforming it from a 
threat to democratic principles into a process that actively improves the democratic 
nature of administrative decision making.74 
 
Despite what appear to be the profound changes proposed by Handler, Sossin 
and Cartier in the way administrative discretion is conceived, none of these 
commentators suggest that discretion should be eliminated or that it should be 
entirely detached from law.  First, both Handler and Sossin point to the above-
discussed ubiquity of discretion and recognize that its existence is not, in itself, a 
normative issue.  The goal is not to eliminate discretion, but, as Cartier notes, is 
rather to reconceive of it as a potential tool to help achieve the goals of a very 
particular legal order – one that “enhances the autonomy, dignity, and responsibility 
of the participants.”75 
 
This project of reconceiving discretion as a location for democratic engagement 
preserves an important role for law, recognizing that it can help to create the 
conditions for dialogue to flourish, even if it cannot bring it about on its own.  Put 
differently, I do not take it as the position of those who advocate a dialogical 
approach to administrative discretion that we return to the pre-Roncarelli era of 
unchecked administrative power.  Nor do they argue against the use of law to clearly 
define, and narrow, the scope of discretion in particular contexts.  They do not, in 
other words, celebrate the existence of discretion per se, but argue that where it 
exists, and it will always exist, it ought to be wielded in a particular way, respectful 
of basic values of democratic accountability and justification.  This then brings us 
back around to the role of law and the courts, which have increasingly in the years 
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since Baker understood their role in reviewing administrative decisions as one that 
searches for justification.  Indeed, in the years since the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision in Dunsmuir, the very definition of a reasonable decision 
has come to mean one that is justified, transparent and intelligible.76  A reasonable 
decision, Cartier suggests, is not simply one that is bounded by the law, but is also 
one that is justified because it arises from a genuine process of participation.77  In 
this way, hinging discretion to dialogue can serve to fill the spaces left open by law 
with deliberative democratic principles.  Law and legal rights on this view do not 
end conversations related to public decisions, they begin them.  
 
If law can help to encourage a dialogical approach to discretion but is not on its 
own sufficient, the question is what more is needed to bring this approach about.  
The answer, in short, is the reform, and in some cases the transformation, of public 
service agencies.  Again building on Habermas, Handler calls for legal institutions in 
the welfare state to alter their self-image from ones based on legal abstraction and 
the perception of individuals as objects to be legally administered, to bodies that 
facilitate communicative action to accomplish particular goals.78  This can only 
happen, Handler continues, through both will and trust, not simply on the part of 
administrative agencies, but also on the part of those subject to their decisions.  The 
“foundational condition of dialogism,” Handler notes, “lies in the predisposition of 
the parties-they must want to and be able to enter into a conversation.”79  
Grounding Handler’s analysis are three separate case-studies – informed consent in 
medical ethics, special education, and community care for the elderly poor – in 
which he views dialogical approaches as having taken root.  This said, Handler 
readily accepts that this dialogical approach has not typically defined administrative 
agencies, particularly in contexts involving power imbalances between the parties.  
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He also recognizes the role that ideology plays in social relations and that a 
“monologue by the powerful to the powerless” has typified administrative action far 
more than any principle of dialogue.80    
 
Nonetheless, Handler implicitly questions the historical determinism of critical 
legal studies and the nihilistic conclusions it tends to draw.  Drawing from a wide-
range of sources and from various disciplines, he instead puts forward a conception 
of administrative relations based on communitarian feminist values with the ideals 
of trust and good will at its very centre.  With dialogism as a “regulative ideal,”81 
Handler then considers how it could become embedded in public institutions.  In 
this, he sees a role for law, as noted above, but focuses on the role of professional 
norms and “practice ideologies.”82  These ideologies arise, in some measure, because 
of the latitude provided to administrative agencies to determine how, and in many 
circumstances, upon whom, to do their work.  The choices made by these agencies, 
or in Hasenfeld’s words, the “technologies” they choose to employ, are of 
fundamental importance in determining how the organization will operate and 
interact with its clients.  The choices are, furthermore, frequently moral ones – in 
Handler’s words: 
Clients are vested with moral and cultural values that 
define their status vis-a-vis the agency. Personal 
characteristics are not only "objective"; they are also 
statements about social and moral status. The 
organization's pattern of intervention is crucially 
shaped by the staff's moral evaluation of the client. 
…The moral system incorporated in the technology 
encompasses, either explicitly or implicitly, a 
conception of human nature that provides the moral 
justification for the agency… 
                                                        
 
80 Ibid at 1074-5, citing Terry Eagleton’s critique of hermeneutics in Literary Theory: An Introduction 
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81 A term he borrows from Richard Bernstein in Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983) at 163. 
82 Another borrowed term, this from Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Human Service Organizations (Englewood 
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…At the same time, the technology of human service 
organizations is indeterminate. This indeterminacy 
places human service organization practitioners in a 
dilemma – they have to respond to people and meet 
their needs. Even though the available technologies are 
uncertain, they have to develop a coherent set of beliefs 
upon which to base their actions. They respond to these 
dilemmas, says Hasenfeld, by adopting "practice 
ideologies.”83 
 
Handler then goes on to examine how the pre-conditions for dialogue – good will 
and trust – can be fostered, suggesting key and interrelated areas in need of reform: 
professional norms, client empowerment and fostering a positive approach toward 
discretion.84  The first area is easily described, if less easily accomplished: dialogism 
must become a central tenet of the professional norms and ideologies that guide 
agencies’ front line work.85  Handler recognizes that in his case-studies, dialogism 
was consistent with professional norms, and that this will certainly not always be 
the case.  To illustrate that collaborative administrative norms can prevail, he then 
moves on to a somewhat surprising source: historical scholarship on American 
social welfare agencies from the New Deal era.86   The professional norms that 
emerged from these agencies embraced interdependence, dialogue and recourse to 
legal rights, not for their own sake, but as a means to facilitate conversation.87  
Handler goes on to note that “the enforcement of rights helped people to define and 
effectuate their goals and to foster a general sense of self-respect and autonomy. Clients 
were to be made to feel comfortable and treated with respect. They were presumed to be 
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eligible.”88  As we shall see below, this presumption of eligibility is highly relevant to the 
determination of status in immigration and refugee law.   
 
Sossin also discusses the importance of professional norms – in his terms “civil 
service values” – and their ability to elaborate on, rather than simply implement 
important legal norms.89  Central to Sossin’s approach is the fundamentally 
important premise that civil servants owe duties beyond those owed to the 
government of the day, but also ultimately to the public.90  In this sense, Sossin 
continues,  
while administrative decision makers take on their 
authority through statutory provisions, civil service 
values may extend beyond the content and purpose of 
particular decision making powers - these can be 
expressed as simply as that all civil servants have a 
mandate to 'act in the public interest' and to 'uphold the 
rule of law.'91 
 
The primary mechanism by which administration is able to comply with this 
larger conception of its duties is through the civil service value of neutrality.  Sossin 
then goes on to demonstrate how this value of neutrality can itself lead to the 
elaboration of legal norms such as independence, fairness, and trust.92  Of interest 
for our purposes, Sossin examines this interplay between law and administration in 
the context of humanitarian decision-making under immigration legislation.  
Elsewhere, Sossin has explicitly criticized the formalist legal frameworks imposed in 
this same decision-making context as thwarting an approach that would foster 
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“intimate” or genuinely communicative relationships.93  Once again, the language of 
law, rights and judicial review are not entirely rejected, but Sossin points once more 
to the obligations of the civil service to the public, and particularly to the vulnerable, 
as providing a potentially more fruitful approach to realizing meaningful forms of 
fairness, impartiality and reasonableness in administrative decision-making.  Here, 
Sossin refers to fiduciary relationships and specifically to the jurisprudence on 
fiduciary duties owed by the Crown to aboriginal peoples.  While quick to 
acknowledge that administrative law in respect of the vulnerable cannot solely be 
viewed through the lens of fiduciary relationships, what I believe Sossin suggests is 
that public obligations toward individuals should not be an either-or proposition; 
there is a spectrum of obligations that may arise and civil servants’ relationships 
with the vulnerable ought to be mapped toward the fiduciary end of that 
spectrum.94   
 
As with Handler, the goal of this approach to administrative decision-making is 
to foster relationships between the civil service and those subject to their decisions, 
not of dependence, but of mutual trust and interdependence.  For powerful private 
actors, this relationship is easily achieved – oil extraction, for example, is subject to a 
series of regulatory approvals and the oil industry does not appear to have difficulty 
in obtaining a meaningful and interdependent process of dialogue in relation to 
these administrative decisions.  Civil service obligations toward the powerless, 
however, may require an entirely different operational approach.  The point is not 
that vulnerable parties should get “special benefits” but that in dealing with 
individuals who do not possess the resources to be persuasive, different approaches 
may be needed to ensure fairness.  Put simply “acting fairly, impartially and 
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reasonably toward vulnerable parties may require additional considerations than 
those same standards require in other contexts.”95 
 
Ultimately, the aim of interdependent administrative law relationships is, in 
Sossin’s words, “to shift our focus from the form to the substance of participatory 
rights,” and in this sense, it is not dissimilar from the “thick” conception of the rule 
of law that I earlier described.96  Sossin continues, 
In other words, an intimate approach asks: What would 
administrative decision-making look like if citizens and 
bureaucrats had a genuine opportunity to know each 
other outside the limitations of legal strictures? What if 
all important exercises of administrative discretion 
were purposive, disclosing not just the scope of the 
discretion, but the social, economic, moral, political, 
remedial and policy goals that the statutory power was 
intended to further? 
What if the obligation to provide reasons meant the 
actual reasons for a decision, not just reasons which 
meet the applicable legal standard? What if decision-
makers had a chance to know the people whose lives 
they shape, rather than the pieces and fragments of 
those lives which appear in application forms and case 
files?97 
 
These questions articulately express the aspirations of an engaged and dialogical 
approach to administrative decision-making, aspirations that Sossin suggests may 
be achieved not simply out of good will, but from what he refers to as a progression 
of regulatory devices, the first (and perhaps most important) stage of which would 
involve an elaboration of the mutual expectations of decision-makers and affected 
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with the bureaucracy for this purpose, such as Convention refugees.  Once again, the key for 
triggering administrative obligations is defined by the asserted rights of the individuals and the 
spectre of coercive state action.   
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parties, but would also include internal review mechanisms aimed not at 
supplanting legal rights, but at “suffusing” them with meaning.  Ultimately, Sossin 
notes, “while it is important for affected parties to possess the right to be heard…it is 
more important to develop the capacity for those parties and decision-makers to 
listen to each other.”98 
  
This distinction between the easily conferred, but far too hollow “right to be 
heard,” and what I like to call the “right to be listened to” gets to the nub of much of 
the criticism of administrative decision-making and its relation to law.99  The 
question that remains for our purposes, and the topic to which I now turn, is 
whether an approach to administrative decision-making as dialogue is possible in 
the immigration-security context.  This context, perhaps more than any other, is 
defined by top-down expressions of state power and an extremely vulnerable group 
of individuals over whom decisions are made.  Thinking through a dialogical 
approach to discretion in this area is interesting because, to my mind, it puts the 
principles and theory that underpin the approach to the ultimate stress test.   
Discretion, Security and Inadmissibility 
"What we have is the growth of governmental power, so 
that law becomes the vehicle by which the government 
delegates back to itself the power to make policy for 
which it will be accountable only at the next election. 
Rather than legislative supremacy, we have executive 
supremacy."100 
                                                        
 
98 Ibid, at 854-5. 
99 The right to be heard – otherwise known as the Audi alteram partem doctrine – is, of course, a basic 
principle of fundamental justice, one guaranteed by most legal systems, including Canada under both 
common law principles and s 7 of the Charter.  In Singh v. Canada (MEI), [1985] 1 SCR 177 [Singh, 
1985], this right was recognized in the context of the right of refugee claimants to a full and fair 
hearing of their claims to refugee status.  When I point to a ‘right to be listened to,’ I simply refer to a 
thick, or substantive understanding of the right to be heard, one which encourages good faith 
engagement between decision-maker and those affected by their decisions. 
100 David Dyzenhaus, “Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and the Adjudication 
of National Security” (2003) 28 Austl J Leg Phil 1 at 21. 
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For administrative law scholars interested in national security issues, the past 
decade has been a fascinating period.  On the one hand, this period has been witness 
to a clear shift in the courts’ view of discretion and the deference it should be 
afforded in fashioning just decisions on fundamental issues.101  The increasingly 
sparing use of the correctness standard is a clear example of this shift.102  At the 
same time, however, the post 9-11 era has seen an explosion in raw expressions of 
executive power, applied against individuals in a manner that would have made 
Kenneth Culp Davis shudder.  In many ways, national security cases in the 
immigration context represent the antithesis of a dialogic approach to discretionary 
decision-making.   
 
As I outlined above in Chapter One, Catherine Dauvergne sees a close 
relationship between the discretionary spaces within law and securitization.  To 
Dauvergne, the bedrock of discretionary mechanisms that undergird immigration 
law is a reflection of one of her central claims - that the basic questions of admission 
and exclusion that form migration law are themselves constitutive of the liberal 
state.103  Discretion, in this view, is a contemporary iteration of the supremacy of 
sovereign power on questions of admission, a holdover (at least in common law 
states) from the period when questions of entry were firmly a matter of royal 
prerogative.104  And it is precisely because this is the case that discretion can be 
                                                        
 
101 See for example Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, in which the Supreme Court of Canada 
found that the standard of review of administrative decisions relating to an individual's Charter 
rights is "reasonableness". 
102 See Alberta (Information& Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 for 
a recent review of the few remaining circumstances in which the correctness standard is still said to 
apply.  
103 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008) at 94-96 and Catherine Dauvergne, “Security and Migration Law in 
the Less Brave New World” (2007) 16 Social and Legal Studies 533 at 540-1.  See also above, at 
Section 1.3.1.  
104 Ibid. 
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manipulated in times of perceived exception, ramping up its exclusionary 
tendencies.  Dauvergne continues: 
All of these factors result in a legal structure which is 
highly malleable and closely tied to shifting political 
winds.  It has the appearance of law, but is changed so 
rapidly (either through amendment or policy shift) that 
its adherence to rule of law principles has been easily 
suspect. Some of the best evidence of this malleability is 
provided by the shifts in migration law provisions in 
prosperous Western states following the events of 
September 2001. Many of these shifts were 
accomplished without any change in the law, it was 
rather discretionary practices, already permissible, that 
were used to achieve significant alterations in the effect 
of the law.105 
 
It is for this reason that the national security debate, pitting as it does core 
liberty interests against equally core state interests in determining admission, 
represents something of a stress test for democratic and dialogic approaches to 
administrative discretion.  In the pages that follow, I examine the existence of 
discretion in national security matters and describe the various ways in which it 
(not surprisingly) lacks most, if not all dialogical properties.  Discretion in this 
context looks far more like Dyzenhaus’ grey holes, than a domain of reciprocal 
communicative relationships.  While acknowledging the strong incentive on the part 
of the executive to consolidate control over this domain, I nevertheless assert that 
certain changes are possible that would enhance both the democratic nature and the 
quality of decision-making in this area.   
4.5.1 Locating Discretion in National Security Cases 
 
As mentioned earlier, section 44 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
provides a double-dip of discretion in determining whether to proceed with the 
inadmissibility process.  For ease of reference, the provision states:   
                                                        
 
105 Ibid. 
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44. (1) An officer who is of the opinion that a 
permanent resident or a foreign national who is in 
Canada is inadmissible may prepare a report setting out 
the relevant facts, which report shall be transmitted to 
the Minister. 
 
(2) If the Minister is of the opinion that the report is 
well-founded, the Minister may refer the report to the 
Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing, 
except in the case of a permanent resident who is 
inadmissible solely on the grounds that they have failed 
to comply with the residency obligation under section 
28 and except, in the circumstances prescribed by the 
regulations, in the case of a foreign national. In those 
cases, the Minister may make a removal order. 
 
The first discretionary decision is made by an officer, the second by the Minister 
(in reality a Minister’s Delegate).106  It is also important to recall here the 
amorphous, but undeniably low threshold required to trigger the s 44 process.  
Section 33 of the IRPA mandates this threshold, providing that the facts that 
constitute inadmissibility under sections 34 to 37 include facts “for which there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may 
occur.”107 
 
 In the national security context, then, an officer (and subsequently a 
Minister’s delegate) must only have reasonable grounds to believe that an individual 
is described in s 34 of the IRPA in order to initiate the inadmissibility process.108 
                                                        
 
106 It also should be noted that this discretionary triggering process for admissibility determinations 
applies to more than just national security concerns, which are set out at s.34 of the IRPA, but also for 
example to admissibility arising from potential human rights violations (s.35), criminality (s.36) and 
organized criminality (s.37). 
107 IRPA, s 33. 
108 Again, for ease of reference, s 34 states: 
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for 
(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic government, 
institution or process as they are understood in Canada; 
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 As we explored above, the breadth of the s 34 inadmissibility provision is 
striking.  It extends well beyond those who pose a threat to Canadian security, 
capturing within its net anyone who has engaged in espionage against a democratic 
government and any person who has engaged in the subversion by force of any 
government.  Most strikingly, the provision also captures anyone who has been a 
member of an organization that has undertaken these kinds of activities, regardless 
of one’s personal involvement in them.  
 
 In most cases, after a report under s 44 is written, it is referred to the quasi-
judicial Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board for a hearing.  
The Immigration Division then renders a decision based on the same inadmissibility 
criteria.  But it is significant to note that, unlike in the referral process, the 
Immigration Division possesses no discretionary powers.  If it concludes that an 
individual is described by s34 of the IRPA, it must issue the applicable deportation 
order.  It is thus an ironic, but perhaps unsurprising feature of the inadmissibility 
context that the location of discretion (the s44 process) is without independence 
and the location of independence (the IRB) is without discretion.  
 
Additionally, built into the process is yet another site of discretion contained at s 
42.1 of the IRPA, which provides that the matters referred to in, amongst other 
provisions, s 34(1) will not render a person inadmissible if, in a separate 
application, that person satisfies the Minister that their presence in Canada “is not 
contrary to the national interest.”109 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government; 
(c) engaging in terrorism; 
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada; 
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in 
Canada; or 
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, 
has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c). 
109 Ibid, s.42.1. 
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As I discussed in Chapter Two, the jurisprudence on inadmissibility 
determinations has endorsed an extremely broad approach to determining who 
may be subject to a discretionary report under s 44.  Recall that, pursuant to s 33 of 
the IRPA, the courts have repeatedly found that there is no temporal limitation to 
inadmissibility determinations under s 34.110  In other words, inadmissibility 
findings may arise in relation to membership in an organization that once engaged 
in subversion by force of a government, but has long since disavowed the use of 
violence.  Inadmissibility could also arise where an officer finds there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that an organization will, at some point in the future, engage in 
the use of force.  In the former scenario, an individual is inadmissible under s 34, 
even if she joined the organization long after it renounced the use of force.111  In the 
latter scenario, it would not seem to matter if the individual severed her ties with an 
organization before it took up subversive activities.112 
 
Recall also that officers are not particularly constrained from exercising their 
discretion to allege inadmissibility in relation to acts committed by individuals 
while they were still children.  While noting that there is some sliding scale of moral 
responsibility for acts committed by minors, the courts have nevertheless upheld 
inadmissibility findings against them.113 
 
There are several other examples of the role that the courts have played in 
authorizing an extremely broad understanding of the discretion exercised under 
sections 34/44 of the IRPA, but I will refer here to only one more: the meaning of 
the term “membership.”  The jurisprudence on the meaning of membership 
endorses (not inappropriately) the fact that it can take on myriad forms, particularly 
                                                        
 
110 Al Yamani v Canada (MCI), 2006 FC 1457 at paras 11-12. 
111 Gebreab v Canada (MPSEP), 2010 FCA 274. 
112 Al Yamani v Canada (MPSEP), 2006 FC 1457. 
113 Poshteh v Canada (MPSEP), 2005 FCA 85. 
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in the amorphous structure of terrorist organizations.  To reiterate the oft-cited 
passage from the Federal Court in Singh, Justice Rothstein (as he then was) 
characterized the membership issue as follows: 
The provisions deal with subversion and terrorism. The 
context in immigration legislation is public safety and 
national security, the most serious concerns of 
government. It is trite to say that terrorist organizations 
do not issue membership cards. There is no formal test 
for membership and members are not therefore easily 
identifiable…I think it is obvious that Parliament 
intended the term "member" to be given an unrestricted 
and broad interpretation.114 
 
In addition to authorizing a virtually limitless scope of discretion with respect to 
concepts such as membership, as I shall explore below, the courts have provided 
very little guidance in the security context as to how that broad discretion should be 
exercised. 
 
The final locus of discretion that requires mention is one that no longer exists.  
As I set out above, discretion can equally be construed (and used) as a tool for 
excusing individuals from the overly harsh consequences of inflexible laws and, 
contrastingly, as a repository of state power that facilitates unilateral action.  In 
immigration law, the most obvious way in which individuals seek to access the 
former, ‘emancipatory’ nature of discretion is through an application for relief on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds, pursuant to s 25 of the IRPA.  Until 
recently, this was an option available to those found inadmissible under s34 of the 
IRPA and it was viewed as a particularly important one because of the perceived 
overbreadth of s 34 and the futility of the Ministerial waiver provision.  With the 
passage of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act115 in 2013, the government 
                                                        
 
114 Singh v Canada (MCI), (1998), 151 F.T.R. 101, 1998 CanLII 8281 (FC) at para. 52, emphasis added. 
115 FRFCA, supra note 51 at s 9. 
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eliminated this option entirely, excluding from the ambit of s 25 any individual 
found inadmissible under sections 34, 35 and 37 of the IRPA.   
 
All that remains in the discretionary realm, then, is the broad power to initiate 
proceedings under s.44 and the circumscribed and rarely invoked authority to 
relieve individuals from inadmissibility under s42.1. 
 
4.5.2 Diminishing Baker: Suresh, Agraira and Discretion in Security 
Cases 
 
Following the promising approach taken by the Supreme Court in Baker, the first 
indication that things are simply different in the security field arose in the decision 
of the court in Suresh.116  At first blush, the Supreme Court’s decision in that case 
appears to contain strong language about the substantive protection of core human 
rights values.  On closer inspection, however, the differences between the court’s 
approach in Baker and Suresh become readily apparent.  Such differences, I suggest, 
reflect the view that some forms of executive power should remain relatively 
immune to substantive judicial control.117 
 
 Recall that in Suresh, the Immigration and Refugee Board had found Mr. 
Suresh, a Sri Lankan Tamil, to face a well-founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka 
should he be returned to that country.  He was consequently found to be a 
Convention refugee and later applied for permanent residence.  Over the course of 
this application, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) received a report from 
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) indicating that Suresh had been a 
member and fundraiser for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an 
organization alleged to have been involved in terrorist activities in Sri Lanka.  As a 
result of this report, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration formed the opinion 
                                                        
 
116 Suresh v Canada (MCI), 2002 SCC 1, discussed above at Section 2.3.4. 
117 Cartier dissertation, supra note 58 at p.267. 
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that Suresh constituted a danger to the security of Canada and ordered him to be 
deported, notwithstanding his Convention refugee status.  Suresh unsuccessfully 
challenged the decision that he posed a security threat in the Federal Court and the 
Federal Court of Appeal, on the basis that the procedures set out in the legislation 
exposed him to the risk that he would be deported to torture, contrary to both the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Convention Against Torture.   
 
 In granting Suresh’s appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the impugned provisions, but concluded that the procedural safeguards chosen to 
ensure that he was not deported to torture were inadequate.  At the same time, 
however, the court did not foreclose the possibility that s 7 of the Charter could in 
rare circumstances permit deportation to torture.  The court also considered the 
expansive scope of s 19 of the former Immigration Act, the predecessor to s 34, and 
concluded that its breadth was justified, in part, because of the availability of a 
discretionary Ministerial exemption mechanism, the predecessor to the current s 
42.1 of the IRPA.  In an important passage, the court noted: 
We believe that it was not the intention of Parliament to 
include in the s. 19 class of suspect persons those who 
innocently contribute to or become members of 
terrorist organizations.  This is supported by the 
provision found at the end of s. 19, which exempts from 
the s. 19 classes “persons who have satisfied the 
Minister that their admission would not be detrimental 
to the national interest”.  Section 19 must therefore be 
read as permitting a refugee to establish that his or her 
continued residence in Canada will not be detrimental 
to Canada, notwithstanding proof that the person is 
associated with or is a member of a terrorist 
organization.  This permits a refugee to establish that 
the alleged association with the terrorist group was 
innocent.  In such case, the Minister, exercising her 
discretion constitutionally, would find that the refugee 
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does not fall within the targeted s. 19 class of persons 
eligible for deportation on national security grounds.118 
 
While not admitting as much, the court in Suresh also clearly backed away from 
the approach adopted by Justice L’Heureux Dube in Baker on the substantive review 
of discretionary decision-making, at least in the context of national security.  Indeed, 
the court affirmed the almost unfettered discretion of the executive to weigh the 
relevant factors in determining what constitutes a threat to national security, 
limiting the role of the courts to ensuring that the relevant factors were indeed 
taken into account.119  Dyzenhaus’ observation in this regard is apposite:   
Suresh largely pays lip service to Baker on review of 
substance, since it diminishes scrutiny of substance to a 
check list of factors which the minister has to take into 
account, and it restores in all but name the distinction 
between review of administrative interpretation of the 
law and review of discretion.120 
 
In Baker it was the willingness of the court to engage in substantive review of 
the weighing of factors that created the conditions for a communicative approach to 
decision-making, at least in respect of humanitarian and compassionate 
applications.  While the court in Suresh recognized the need for a relatively robust 
set of procedural protections in the context of national security, its refusal to engage 
substantively in the weighing of relevant factors affirmed the sense that dialogue in 
the national security context is not required.  And as we shall see, this sense has only 
been reinforced in the years since the Suresh decision. 
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed at some length the extremely deferential approach of 
the courts in reviewing security decisions, including those related to Ministerial 
                                                        
 
118 Suresh, supra note 116 at para 110. 
119 David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law” 
(2001) 27 Queens Law J 504 at 506.  See also Cartier Dissertation, supra note 58 at 268. 
120 Ibid, at 507. 
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discretion, most notably, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Agraira v 
Canada.121  While I do not intend to revisit these decisions in detail, it is important 
to glimpse back at the Agraira decision in the present context to illustrate the ways 
in which the courts have, in my view, declined to foster dialogue in national security 
cases.  Recall that in Agraira, the appellant sought a discretionary waiver of a finding 
of inadmissibility that arose because of his affiliation with the anti-Ghaddafi Libyan 
National Salvation Front (LNSF).  The Minister’s response to the waiver request was 
summarily dismissive.  In refusing to exercise his discretion, the Minister 
determined that “It is not in the national interest to admit individuals who have had 
sustained contact with known terrorist and/or terrorist-connected 
organizations.”122  The rationale of the Minister effectively renders the exemption 
clause redundant: the applicant required Ministerial relief because he was 
inadmissible and the Minister’s responded by refusing the application based on the 
very inadmissibility from which relief was sought.  Recall further that the Supreme 
Court ultimately upheld the Minister’s decision even though it readily admitted that 
it could not determine, at least with finality, the actual reasoning of the Minister in 
rejecting the waiver request.123  Instead, the court attributed to the Minister an 
interpretation of the national interest exemption that admittedly included a 
humanitarian and compassionate dimension, but one virtually devoid of tangible or 
enforceable meaning.124  In concluding as it did, the court gave short shrift, in my 
view, to the principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility and radically 
departed from its Baker-era emphasis on substantive reasonableness.  Importantly, 
                                                        
 
121 Agraira v Canada (MPSEP), 2013 SCC 36. 
122 Ibid at para 13. 
123 Ibid at para 58 and see above discussion in Section 2.3.7.  
124 The Supreme Court’s finding that humanitarian and compassionate considerations were relevant 
to the Ministerial relief provision, and had adequately been considered in the case at bar, became 
more or less moot with the passage of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act, supra note 51, 
which formally eliminated humanitarian and compassionate considerations from the national 
interest determination and barred inadmissible persons from the general H&C provision found at s 
25 of the IRPA.  The FRFCA came into force on June 19, 2013.  The Supreme Court’s decision was 
released on June 20, 2013.   
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it also hollowed out the very same provision that, as noted above, it had relied upon 
in Suresh to uphold the breadth of immigration law’s security provisions. 
 
4.5.3 Discretion and the Power Not to Act 
 
It is clear that immigration officers (and Minister’s delegates) have been granted 
broad discretionary authority to determine who may be inadmissible under s.34(1) 
of the IRPA, and that the courts have been loathe to interfere with such 
determinations.  It is, however, interesting (if not surprising) that the discretionary 
authority of officers to not initiate inadmissibility proceedings has been narrowly 
interpreted by both the courts and the soft law instruments meant to assist officers.  
In Cha, a case involving allegations of criminal, rather than security inadmissibility, 
the court recognized that the use of the word may in s.44 of the IRPA created a band 
of discretion within which officers could consider inadmissibility cases, but at the 
same time, the court found that the discretion to refrain from initiating proceedings 
was exceedingly narrow.  Most notably, the court found that it was not open to the 
Minister’s delegate (in respect of the s 44(2) determination) to consider either the 
nature of the allegations against the individual or other details regarding his 
personal circumstances.125     
 
The relevant immigration manual contains language that similarly emphasizes 
the narrowness of officers’ discretion to forego admissibility proceedings.  It states: 
The fact that officers have the discretionary power to 
decide whether or not to write an inadmissibility report 
does not mean that they can disregard the fact that 
someone is, or may be, inadmissible … 
                                                        
 
125 Canada (MPSEP) v Cha, 2006 FCA 126. Cha was a case that arose in relation to the criminal 
inadmissibility provisions of the IRPA (s 36), rather than the national security context.  While there 
are some differences in the way that the two types of inadmissibility cases are handled, the point 
made in Cha essentially holds true for cases under s 34: the discretion to refrain from initiating 
proceedings against someone who is caught by the broad statutory language is narrow.    
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Rather, this discretion gives officers flexibility in 
managing cases where no removal order will be sought, 
or where the circumstances are such that the objectives 
of the Act may or will be achieved without the need to 
write a formal inadmissibility report under the 
provisions of A44(1).126 
 
 In his study of immigration enforcement at the United States-Mexico border, 
Josiah Heyman notes that the power not to act reveals as much about discretion as 
more formal decisions to initiate enforcement action.127  In their work on front-line, 
or “street-level” bureaucrats, Hawkins and Lipsky have also commented on the 
central importance of early decisions not to take action.128  The subtlety of non-
action can make it difficult to assess in any quantifiable way, but the essential point 
to recall is that a decision not to act is a decision nonetheless, one that is often 
deeply revealing about power, privilege and the operating assumptions that guide 
the decision-making body.   
 
 Commencing with Pratt’s emphasis on risk as a central organizing premise of 
contemporary border enforcement, Heyman focuses on the inverse but equally 
important role of trust in guiding front-line decisions about admission.  Trust is 
particularly important in examining border decisions because of the large number 
of decisions that must be made every day and because most of those who formally 
approach borders are granted admission.  In this context, the grouping of 
individuals into groups deemed trustworthy is common.  Heyman notes: 
                                                        
 
126 Citizenship and Immigration Canada.  Manual ENF 5 “Writing 44(1) Reports” (20 August, 2013) 
online: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/.   
127 Josiah Heyman, “Trust, Privilege, and Discretion in the Governance of the US Borderlands with 
Mexico” (2009) 24 Can J Law Soc 367 [Heyman, Trust, Privilege and Discretion]. 
128 See respectively, Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory 
Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Michael Lipsky’s seminal Street-Level 
Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russell Sage, 1980).  
Observations about police work and the decisions made by officers to refrain from invoking the law 
have been made for some time, see for example Joseph Goldstein, “Police Discretion Not to Invoke the 
Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice” (1960) 69 Yale Law 
Journal 543. 
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The existence of non-acts is best seen, in the places I 
will discuss, in the "sorting" of individuals as members 
of assumed social groups.'  Sorting is central to border 
policing because officers in this region (which is not just 
the literal boundary but, rather, a deep layer of 
inhabited territory) confront not a well-defined set of 
individuals but, rather, a complex web of people flowing 
throughout a variegated space of ordinary activities. 
Officers, faced with so many people and activities that 
they could be acting on, sort individuals into categories: 
riskier actors who are worth additional action 
(questioning, request for identification, search, initial 
detention)-versus actors who are trustworthy and are 
thus not acted on any further.129 
 
Heyman’s reasoning can be directly transposed to the context of decision-
making under s 34 of the IRPA.  Contrary to the apparent view of the courts and, to 
some extent, contrary to the soft-law manuals that guide officers’ actions, 
discretionary decisions not to invoke s 34 proceedings are made constantly, if often 
unconsciously.  This is directly revealed by the striking breadth of the provision 
which, as I have noted above, unambiguously captures large numbers of individuals, 
as contrasted by the relatively few cases under this provision that are actually 
initiated.    Recall, for example, that the wording of the relevant inadmissibility 
provisions renders any member of the United States military or intelligence 
agencies inadmissible to Canada.  Recall further that a plain reading of the provision 
also leads, quite inexorably, to the conclusion that any member of the Democratic 
and Republican parties in the U.S., or for that matter, the Labour Party in Britain 
would also be inadmissible.130   
 
                                                        
 
129  Heyman, Trust, Privilege and Discretion, supra note 127 at 369. 
130 As noted in Chapter Two, this was recognized by the Federal Court in Oremade v Canada (MCI), 
2005 FC 1077, most explicitly in the court’s suggestion in that case (at para 17) that George 
Washington, Eamon De Valera, Menachem Begin and Nelson Mandela all could be deemed 
inadmissible to Canada. 
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But of course, inadmissibility proceedings do not typically occur against such 
individuals.  Instead, as I sought to illustrate in Chapter Two, border security 
officials seem to have engaged in the kind of grouping that Heyman describes – 
focusing their attention under s 34 on those who have any kind of affiliation with 
subversive movements from the Global South, while turning a relatively blind eye to 
those who may similarly meet the definition of subversion from Western countries.   
 
Viewed from a TWAILian perspective, these discretionary decisions not to act 
are born of, and serve to reinforce, the power and prestige of individuals from the 
West at the expense of those from the Global South, whose struggles and actions are 
subjected to an undeniably closer degree of scrutiny.  And as Heyman observed from 
the United States-Mexico border, this privileging of those deemed trustworthy 
provides an important illustration of the “invisible power” of those who benefit from 
non-action, whose daily comings and goings across borders are rarely subjected to 
the kinds of “delays and indignities” that others frequently experience.131  
4.5.4 The Consequences and Shortcomings of Monologue: Documenting the 
experiences of inadmissible persons 
 
The immigration-security context reveals the limitations – both moral and 
conceptual – of discretionary decisions that are dominated by one-way expressions 
of executive power.  These decisions are defined by an institutional predisposition 
toward unilateralism; little or no advanced notice is provided to individuals subject 
to them, notwithstanding the factual complexities on which they are based and the 
profound implications that they may have.132   
                                                        
 
131  Heyman, Trust, Privilege and Discretion, supra note 127 at 370. 
132 The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act distinguishes between foreign nationals, citizens and 
permanent residents.  Foreign nationals include visitors, those without any formal status and, 
notably, refugee claimants.  In Hernandez v Canada (MCI), 2005 FC 429, the court recognized an 
obligation to at least inform permanent residents of s 44 proceedings, but it remains to be seen 
whether this obligation also extends to foreign nationals.  In Awed v Canada (MCI), 2006 FC 469, for 
example, the court found that an officer erred in failing to notify the applicant of the s 44 process, but 
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As I described at the outset of this dissertation, in seeking to provide a multi-
faceted perspective on the Canadian security-inadmissibility apparatus, I 
interviewed several individuals who have become enmeshed in s34 proceedings.  I 
did not seek to conduct an exhaustive number of interviews, nor to engage in a 
sustained legal ethnography.  My objectives, rather, were first to layer personal 
narratives over the quantitative data that I outlined in Chapter Two in an effort to 
bring some of the conclusions drawn in that chapter into sharp relief.133  The 
second, and equally important objective, was to create a space, modest though it is, 
for the voices of inadmissible persons to be heard.  Put in a different way, my aim in 
speaking with such individuals was to employ in the research process a dialogue that 
I suggest is lacking in the legal processes used to make security-related decisions.  
Over the coming pages, I weave into the analysis some of the perspectives of these 
individuals in the hope that, in so doing, we might capture a glimpse of a more 
participatory approach to decision-making, one that I contend would yield more 
legitimate results.134 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
nevertheless denied judicial review on the basis that the error would likely have had any appreciable 
impact on the proceedings.  
133 Nataliya Ivankova, John W Creswell & Sheldon L Stick, “Using Mixed-Methods Sequential 
Explanatory Design: From Theory to Practice” (2006) 18:1 Field Methods 3 at 10. 
134 In total, I conducted interviews with nine individuals over the span of roughly one year, though I 
spoke with numerous other individuals who were uncomfortable commenting publicly on their 
cases, even with the assurances of anonymity that were outlined to them.  Once again, I make no 
claims that the experiences of this small group of individuals are necessarily representative of all of 
those subjected to the security-inadmissibility regime.  Rather, I provide their perspectives for the 
reasons outlined above and to demonstrate how at least some individuals have experienced the top-
down security regime.  I met the individuals with whom I spoke in a number of different ways.  As I 
mention below, a couple of the individuals were former clients.  Some were clients of lawyer 
colleagues, while I was put in touch with others through refugee advocacy networks.  I should 
acknowledge that over the course of this dissertation I did not speak with many individuals for 
whom discretion was exercised not to commence inadmissibility proceedings.  The reason for this is 
simple: these acts of discretion are generally invisible; people do not necessarily know when they 
have benefitted from positive acts of discretion in the s 44 process.  There is one exception to this – 
the experience of K.G. – whose story I describe below. 
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First, however, recall that for those seeking protection in Canada, the initiation 
of admissibility proceedings means an automatic suspension and possible 
termination of the refugee claim process.135  Recall further from Chapter Two that 
the clear majority of individuals subjected to inadmissibility proceedings are 
refugees or refugee claimants.  The law does not require advanced notice of a 
section 44 report for claimants and there is no formal process for responding to it.  
Claimants simply receive notice that their claim has been suspended pending an 
admissibility hearing.  If, following the admissibility hearing, the allegations against 
the individual are upheld, the refugee claim is terminated.136  For many refugee 
claimants that I have spoken with, the process was dizzying; one moment they were 
awaiting the adjudication of their refugee claims, hopeful of their new and safe 
future in Canada, the next their claims were terminated and they were labelled as 
security threats.  After experiencing tremendous hardship on their journey, a legal 
channel once seemingly open, is unceremoniously closed.137   
 
Take, for example, the situation of A.K., a former client, whom I interviewed for 
the purposes of this study in November, 2013.138  A national of Eritrea, he arrived in 
Canada with his wife and six children from Saudi Arabia where he and his wife had 
lived in exile for the previous thirty years, and where all of his children were born.  
The danger he and his family face in Eritrea – one of the worst human rights 
offenders in the world – is palpable and they were tired of living at risk of removal 
in Saudi Arabia, which essentially bars all foreigners from obtaining permanent 
residence.  A.K. and his family were initially granted refugee status by the 
Immigration and Refugee Board.  That decision was subsequently overturned by the 
Federal Court and, days prior to the rehearing of their claims, the Minister of Public 
                                                        
 
135 See IRPA s 103(1). 
136 IRPA s 104. 
137 The situation could not be more reminiscent of Kafka.  As the doorkeeper in The Trial says to the 
countryman: “'No one but you could gain admittance through this door [into the Law], since this door 
was intended for you. I am now going to shut it.’” Franz Kafka, The Trial, (New York: Vintage Books 
ed., 1969) at 269. 
138 Interview with A.K. November 5, 2013. 
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Safety provided notice that the hearing was suspended as A.K. had been referred to 
the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board for an admissibility 
hearing under s 34 in relation to small donations he had made, in 1977, to the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).    
 
A.K. did not deny having made the donations – they in fact formed the basis of 
his claim to be at risk in Eritrea – but he asserted from the outset that the donations 
had been for humanitarian purposes as the ELF had been providing de facto social 
services to Eritreans for several years in the 1970s as a result of a brutal state 
crackdown on Eritreans by the authoritarian Ethiopian regime that controlled 
Eritrea at that time.  Because A.K. did not deny that he had made the donations in 
question and because there was evidence of rights violations committed by the ELF, 
the outcome of his admissibility hearing was a foregone conclusion – he was found 
to be inadmissible and his refugee claim was therefore terminated.139  Where 
discretion had existed – in the writing of the s 44 report, prior to the referral of the 
matter to the Immigration Division – it was exercised before A.K. even knew about 
it.  As A.K. told me,  
As long as my family is safe they can do whatever they 
like with me.  I just wish that I could have told my story 
at the right time, then they would see I am a peaceful 
man.  I have never held a gun, I would probably hurt 
myself if I did hold one.140 
 
The tension between a broad grant of discretion to find individuals inadmissible 
and a poorly communicated discretion to waive or overlook inadmissibility has led 
to numerous decisions that are at best awkward, and at worst perverse.  And as I 
sought to reveal quantitatively in Chapter Two, this top-down approach to section 
                                                        
 
139 Recall that the decision of the Immigration Division is not discretionary – its responsibility is 
entirely confined to the often mechanical process of determining whether the facts alleged amount to 
inadmissibility.  The points of discretion come before, in the s 44 process, and after in the Ministerial 
relief process under s 42.1. 
140 Ibid. 
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34 decision-making is no theoretical matter.  It has affected hundreds of individuals 
– from numerous African National Congress members who have been summarily 
denied visas under section 34141 to numerous others engaged in similarly 
sympathetic movements, the flaws inherent in a one-way process of discretionary 
decision-making have been exposed. 
 
Another example of the shortcomings of monologue was provided to me by A.M., 
an Iranian individual found to be inadmissible in relation to his passing affiliation 
with the Iranian opposition group the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), who told me: 
For them [CBSA] to say that I am a threat just means 
that they did not speak to me, get to know me.  You 
know I would love for someone to do some surveillance 
on me, then they would see what I do.  I married a 
Catholic woman, my kids go to Catholic schools.  I don’t 
even spend time with Persians.  I know that culture, I 
wanted to learn about other cultures.”142 
 
It is telling that individuals subject to the inadmissibility regime are left wishing 
for surveillance as a means of conveying their case.  While I contend below that we 
can aim higher than employing surveillance to assess inadmissibility, it is not 
difficult to understand A.M.’s perspective.  Embedded within it is an assertion not 
only that he has nothing to hide, but that any detailed inquiry into who he actually is 
would reveal that he should not be subject to security measures.  More subtly, I 
suggest that what is discernible in A.M.’s statement is a desire to communicate, even 
if unwittingly, with those who hold the power to make decisions that will 
profoundly alter his life.   
 
                                                        
 
141 See for example Matthew Little, “Anti-apartheid heroes denied visa to Canada”, The Epoch Times 
(28 Feb.  2012), online: Epoch Times http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/canada/anti-apartheid-
heroes-denied-visas-to-canada-197204.html. 
142 Interview with A.M. March10, 2013. 
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More broadly, what was apparent in the views of all of the individuals with 
whom I spoke was a respectful disagreement with the process used by CBSA and an 
unwavering belief that things would have been different had they genuinely been 
listened to in the discretionary decision-making process.  No one with whom I spoke 
questioned either the authority or the responsibility of the Canadian government to 
inquire into their backgrounds.  Similarly, no one questioned the authority of the 
government to impose consequences on those who either engaged in human rights 
abuses or truly constituted a threat to the security of Canada.  What was questioned 
by all, however, was the legitimacy of decisions to find them inadmissible when 
there seems to have been open acknowledgment that they have neither engaged in 
human rights violations, nor constitute a security threat.  It is this perverse situation 
that is so fundamentally troubling to these individuals.  Another individual, J.G., 
made precisely this point to me in describing his dismay at being found inadmissible 
for his involvement as a young student with El Salvador’s FMLN, a leftist opposition 
movement at the time, but now that country’s ruling party.  When I spoke with J.G. 
he had been living in Canada for over 17 years, but had spent the previous year in 
sanctuary in a church as he struggled to avoid deportation.  Recognizing the 
inconsistency with which section 34 allegations appear to be brought and the 
seeming absurdity of declaring him inadmissible for his involvement in El Salvador’s 
ruling party, J.G. told me: “If the law is going to be applied fairly it should be applied 
equally to everybody…I have not committed any wrongdoing and they even 
recognize that and they are basically punishing me harsher than a criminal…”143  J.G. 
also lamented the unwillingness of CBSA to genuinely listen to his story and, more 
generally, the collective inability of immigrants to assert their rights because of the 
powerlessness of their situation: 
The thing is that the law as it is being interpreted and 
applied by CBSA officers is totally unfair and many 
immigrants basically we don’t have the means to fight 
                                                        
 
143 Interview with J.G., May 6, 2014. 
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against it.  It is frustrating because we try to explain the 
situation and what happens is that many other 
immigrants are in the same situation because they don’t 
have an understanding of the system they feel fear to 
come forward and fight against it…This is a fight that 
has to be done legally, but also using political means.  
That’s how I feel about this, it is violating the rights of 
my family and I am very strong on saying that, and that 
is probably why they want me out of Canada.  I speak 
too much, but either I fight or I am deported and 
separated from my family.  I don’t have any other 
options.144 
 
In this statement we can see J.G.’s hope for a substantively positive outcome in 
his case, but once again, we can also discern a strong desire simply to be heard.  But 
as J.G. has experienced, such is not the current reality and the experiences of those 
with whom I have spoken tend to confirm my suggestion that decision-making in 
the immigration-security context represents the antithesis of a dialogic approach to 
administrative discretion.  Far from placing the individual affected by security 
decisions at the centre of the process, such individuals are frequently informed of 
the decision only once it has been made.  There are also indications, the most 
notable example of which arose in the Galloway case, that the administration of the 
inadmissibility provisions is not immune to overt executive influence.145   
 
In Chapter Two, I outlined some of the problematic trends that have arisen in 
relation to decision-making under section 34.  These problems, together with the 
extreme delays in attending to s 34 cases, have had wrenching consequences on 
those subject to them.  First, many individuals with whom I spoke lived in constant 
                                                        
 
144 Ibid. 
145 Galloway sought judicial review of the notice that he received alerting him to the fact that he may 
have been found inadmissible if he were to have approached the Canadian border.  The record in 
respect of the judicial review proceedings revealed direct involvement of the office of the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration in the determination as to how to respond to Galloway’s proposed visit.  
See Toronto Coalition to Stop the War v Canada (MPSEP), 2010 FC 957. 
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fear that they would be permanently separated from their families.  As another 
individual, J.M. told me: 
The trauma this will cause on my family is the most 
complicated, my wife will have a choice, stay here with 
the kids or come with me…The kids are not going, they 
cannot go back to my country, this is the hard thing…146 
 
A.K. spoke similarly of the wrenching hardship that the inadmissibility process – 
now entering its eighth year – has had on him and his family: 
Headache, stress, very stressful.  First of all, reporting 
every month for years for, you know, what did I do? 
Secondly, I don’t have rights, renewing the work permit 
all my life.  Also in general, the papers itself, now and 
then, is [just causing] stress by itself, it’s not easy that’s 
why I go so many times to my family doctor…but the 
main thing now is my mother, that is the worst, I don’t 
like my mother to cry…She is waiting until now, but still 
whenever I [talk to her] she cries.147 
 
In a passage worth reproducing in its entirely, a refugee lawyer with whom I 
spoke described the experience of her clients similarly: 
The way in which Canada’s inadmissibility provisions 
are applied makes me so angry.  The vast majority of the 
clients that I have represented are not terrorists; they 
are heroes.  They risked their lives trying to bring 
justice, democracy and the rule of law to countries 
governed by tyrannical rulers responsible for massive 
human rights violations.   Not a single one of the clients 
I have represented ever used arms.   Every one of the 
clients I have represented abhors violence, and never 
has, and never would, sanction the use of violence 
against civilians.   That said, all of my clients believe that 
the use of arms is justified to overthrow tyrannical 
regimes, when all attempts at a peaceful resolution have 
                                                        
 
146 Interview with J.M. March 28, 2014. 
147 Interview with A.K. November 5, 2013. 
 306 
 
failed.  These are views that are shared by most 
Canadians:   Canada is not, after all, a pacifist 
country.    So why are my clients being labelled as 
terrorist, while Canadian soldiers who have fought in 
Afghanistan are called heroes?  What kind of hypocrisy 
is this? 
The effect of being labelled as a terrorist, or a security 
risk to Canada, especially in the post 9/11 world is 
profound.    Many of my clients arrived in Canada 
seeking safety because they were persecuted simply for 
trying to improve the human rights situation in their 
homelands.  For these people, many of whom have 
already experienced torture, to be subjected to an 
unwarranted admissibility process is almost unbearably 
difficult.  It is stigmatizing.  It labels people with terms 
that are completely contrary to how they view 
themselves, and how they ought to be viewed. It is 
degrading and humiliating.   
Beyond the shame and the degradation inherent in 
being labelled as a terrorist, security inadmissibility 
findings have other devastating consequences.   Many of 
my clients had to flee from their countries suddenly, 
and were forced to leave their spouse and minor 
children behind.  An inadmissibility determination 
prevents my clients from ever sponsoring their families 
to come to Canada. The result is that minor children are 
indefinitely separated from one of their parents, parents 
from their children, and spouses from each other.      
Most of my clients are stunned by the treatment that 
they have received at the hands of the Canadian 
government. They believed Canada to be a beacon of 
fairness and tolerance, a country where human rights 
are upheld, and a country devoid of racism.  That is why 
they sought refuge here.  The shattering of this image is 
profoundly disturbing for them.   As their 
representative, I struggle myself when trying to explain 
a system which is as indefensible to me as it is to my 
clients.148 
 
                                                        
 
148 Interview with lawyer H.D., April, 2015. 
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In the pages that follow, I contend that the legitimacy that inadmissibility 
decisions currently lack, and the often unnecessary hardship that they impose, can 
be largely remedied by embracing dialogue. 
Discretion, Dialogue and the Security Regime 
Before making the case for injecting dialogue into the decision-making process 
in national security cases, I should perhaps reiterate and clarify precisely my 
starting position.  Recall that at the outset of this dissertation, I suggested that 
regardless of the merits of Carens’ open-borders approach, it is commonly accepted 
that states have, at the very least, the authority to restrict entry in situations 
involving public safety and security.149  At the same time, however, international law 
creates obligations towards those within a country’s jurisdiction who have asserted 
a right to remain because of a risk of persecution, subject once more to certain 
security based exclusions.150  There is, then, conceptual symmetry between states’ 
baseline authority to exclude and the limitations on its corresponding obligation to 
admit.  There is also broad theoretical and practical consensus as to the legitimacy 
of these binary propositions.  But the consensus only holds so far as the exclusions 
on security grounds accord with those permitted at international law.  It disappears, 
in other words, when a country adopts an approach to security that effectively 
excludes a broader ambit of individuals than is contemplated at international law. 
 
                                                        
 
149 As was explicitly acknowledged by Carens himself, see Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for 
Open Borders” (1987) 49:2 Rev Polit 251 at 258-9 and see the discussion above at Chapter 1, notes 
42-44 and accompanying text.  I note that in much of Carens’ later work, he too has simply decided to 
move beyond the impasse created by the open borders debate, and has instead focused on the 
legitimacy of state removal practices in particular contexts, see for example, Immigrants and the 
Right to Stay, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). 
150 Most notably, those found in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Can. TS 1969 No. 6, 
Article 1F, entered into force April 22, 1954, entered into force for Canada  September 2, 1969 and 
the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267, entered into force October 4, 1967, 
entered into force in Canada June 4, 1969 [“Refugee Convention”] at Articles 32 and 33. 
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Within this broad framework, countries have to create procedures for 
determining who may legitimately be excluded for security reasons and who should 
be permitted to remain, at least in so far as their claim to refugee status is well-
founded.  The Refugee Convention requires that these procedures accord with “due 
process of law.”151  In Canada, furthermore, the jurisprudence has clearly 
established that refugee claimants are entitled to the protections of s.7 of the 
Charter in the determination of their rights under the Convention.152  These facts, 
taken together with the consequences of removal and the state coercion implicit in 
deportation, create the conditions for a thick conception of procedural rights, one 
that I argue is best actualized through dialogue. 
 
There are two questions that may fairly be posed at this point.  The first relates 
to Canada’s Pre-Removal Risk (PRRA) program, which guarantees that persons – 
even security threats – will not be removed to torture or to a risk to their life or a 
risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.153  Why, the question goes, does 
this program not provide sufficient protection for at-risk individuals?  My response 
is that there is neither conceptual nor pragmatic synonymy between the rights of 
refugee claimants under the Refugee Convention154 and those granted to persons 
under s97 of the IRPA.  First, protection against persecution and the PRRA 
protections are not the same and to suggest otherwise is to read redundancy into 
sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA.  Persecution is a broader concept than the forms of 
mistreatment protected by the PRRA.  Consider the common situation of a political 
activist in a repressive country who faces not extreme sanction, but repeated and 
                                                        
 
151 Refugee Convention, Article 32(2). 
152 See Singh, 1985, supra note 99, in which the Supreme Court concluded that refugee claimants are 
entitled to fundamental justice in the determination of their claims to refugee status and that the 
principles of fundamental justice include, at a minimum, the notion of procedural fairness. 
153 See s 97 of the IRPA.  Of note, for those found to be inadmissible for, inter alia, security reasons, a 
finding of risk under s 97 results in a temporary stay of removal that may be revoked whenever the 
situation of risk has diminished, see the combined effect of sections 112(3), 114(1)(b) and 114(2) of 
the IRPA.  In short, then, protection afforded under these provisions is temporary; there is no path to 
permanent residency for such individuals. 
154 As incorporated into Canadian law by s 96 of the IRPA. 
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withering arrests and detentions as a result of her political activity.  She is not 
tortured during these detentions, nor is she detained for lengthy periods of time, but 
she is conveyed an ominous and threatening message about her ability to 
participate in political life, one that clearly infringes core liberty interests.  This 
mistreatment is a textbook example of persecution and yet, it does not generally 
meet the threshold for protection under s97 of the IRPA.  Or consider the situation 
of an individual who is subjected to systemic discrimination in his country of origin 
because of his ethnicity.  The discrimination is pervasive; the individual was forced 
out of school before he learned to read, he cannot find work, which makes it almost 
impossible to provide food and shelter for his family.  Once again, such individuals 
are clearly entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention definition of 
persecution, but would receive no corresponding protection from deportation 
under s97 of the IRPA.   
 
These facts are further exacerbated by the fact that Canadian courts have 
incorporated a stricter legal test for the granting of protection under the PRRA 
regime than applies to claims to refugee protection.155  Finally, those subject to 
protection under s97 of the IRPA do not benefit, as do refugees under international 
refugee law, from the expectation that they be naturalized.156  The reality, as 
illustrated by several of the individuals with whom I spoke, is that if they are lucky 
and receive a positive risk assessment under s97, they then enter into a period of 
indefinite limbo with no assurances that they will be permitted to work, to receive 
healthcare or other social services and with the spectre of removal constantly 
hanging over their heads.  In these circumstances, the suggestion that Canada’s pre-
                                                        
 
155 The test utilized under s96 of the IRPA involves a determination as to whether there is a 
“reasonable chance” that the refugee claimant will face persecution if returned to their country of 
origin, while applicants under s97 of the IRPA must establish the risks they face on the higher 
balance of probabilities standard.  See, respectively, Adjei v Canada (Minister of Employment & 
Immigration), [1989] 2 FC 680 and Li v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 1. 
156 See Article 34 of the Refugee Convention, supra note 150. 
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removal screening measures are a reasonable facsimile for Canada’s international 
obligations toward refugees is simply inaccurate.  
 
The second question relates to the fact that the inadmissibility cases that I have 
examined over the course of my research have all arisen following an oral hearing 
by an independent, quasi-judicial tribunal.  What clearer expression of 
administrative dialogue, one may ask, can there be than this?  My answer to this 
question touches upon the location of discretion within the decision-making scheme 
under the IRPA.  I do not deny that the hearing that takes place into inadmissibility 
at the IRB has, in the formal sense, all the appearance of a dialogical process.  As I 
have discussed, the problem is that there is no discretion at this stage in the process, 
which is instead defined by the mechanical application of a set of facts to an 
exceptionally broad set of inadmissibility criteria.  Where discretion does exist – at 
the s44 report-writing stage of the process – there is little concern for procedural 
fairness and correspondingly no requirement to engage in dialogue.  The 
administrative dissonance that flows from this scheme frames the discretionary 
process as a one way process of executive decision-making and completely 
undermines the value of any dialogue that takes place in the tribunal process that 
follows.  It is, in the end, precisely the kind of situation contemplated by Dyzenhaus 
as a legal grey hole.  The scheme maintains the optics of legality, but upon peeling 
back the layers, we see that optics can be deceiving and compliance with a 
substantive interpretation of fairness principles is illusory. 
 
I should also at this point clarify and qualify my starting position on what 
dialogue can accomplish in an administrative regime: I do not believe that dialogue 
is in itself a panacea and I do not believe that it can cure bad laws.  A benevolent 
dictator is a dictator nonetheless, even if he takes into consideration the views of 
those over whom he lords power.   Similarly, a law that provides no tangible 
meaning to those who will be subject to it is flawed, even if those charged with 
administering the law do so in deliberative and dialogical ways.  Consider a law that 
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stated: “The Minister can remove any non-citizen for any reason, upon taking into 
consideration the non-citizen’s perspective.” It is doubtful that such a law would 
comply with even the most basic principles of legality, even though it does require 
some form of dialogue.157 
 
In the inadmissibility context, it is similarly doubtful that the breadth of s 34 
complies with Fullerian principles.  As I set out in Chapter Two, the provision is 
unpredictable, unwieldy and subject to whimsy, manipulation and retroactive effect.  
As I further set out in Chapter Three, section 34 has been utilized in alarmingly 
asymmetrical ways, almost entirely against those from the Global South.  This being 
the case, one may question why I have devoted such attention to the exercise of 
discretion under s 34, if the provision itself is of questionable legitimacy.  The 
answer to this question lies mainly in the nature of security concerns in the 
contemporary world.  To be clear, it is my view that there are concerns with the law 
such as it is, or at the very least, with the interpretation of s 34 that has emanated 
from the courts.  But that does not end the analysis.  In the present context, security 
laws are universally cast in broad strokes.  There are no exceptions.  To my 
knowledge, no country in the world is without a broadly cast provision in its 
immigration statutes related to national security and/or public order.158  I do not 
suggest that the particulars of a given law are unimportant, or that the ability to 
make inadmissibility findings should be unconstrained by law.  The point, however, 
is that states will likely always reserve to themselves the right to make decisions 
related to security and insist on some considerable degree of latitude, some 
discretion, in making those decisions.  As such, the question of discretion is likely to 
remain ubiquitous.  And if this is the case, the question as to how discretion is 
wielded comes back into focus.   
                                                        
 
157 For example, those expounded by Lon Fuller in The Morality of Law, revised ed. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969) at 39, as described above in Chapter One. 
158 As but a few examples, see s 10(d) and 73(b) of the Norwegian Immigration Act (2008); Chapter 5, 
s 1 of the Swedish Aliens Act (2005); and s 202 of the Australian Migration Act (1958). 
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4.6.1 Why Dialogue? 
 
The case for dialogue in the context of security decision-making can be made 
with relative brevity given the ground that we have already covered.  Recall that the 
principal rationale for dialogical approaches is that in democratic states, the 
legitimacy of coercive state action is tied to, and contingent upon, the extent to 
which it reflects democratic values.  Central to these values and to a substantive 
understanding of the rule of law are principles of communication and participation, 
particularly in relation to those who are directly and meaningfully affected by the 
particular state acts in question.  These are central concerns to many of the scholars 
with whom I have engaged over the course of this project – from Carens, Benhabib 
and Dauvergne in Chapter One, to Sossin, Handler and Cartier in the present 
chapter.   
 
The goal of discretionary decision-making in democratic states is, therefore, to 
exercise public authority in a manner that is democratically legitimate or as Cartier 
puts it, to develop modes of decision-making that are authoritative, rather than 
authoritarian.159  In the security context, those who are implicated in state decisions 
are deeply affected by them.  These are not minor decisions; they are ones of almost 
indescribable importance to those subject to them.  In the section above, I referred 
to some of the consequences that individuals have experienced in seeking to 
navigate the security regime: they are wrenching, invasive and frequently 
permanent.  They include the possibility of permanent separation of families, 
removal to persecution and deprivations of rights within Canada related to work, 
access to social services and healthcare.   They have, in other words, a direct and 
coercive impact on rights – life, liberty, security of the person – that are at the very 
                                                        
 
159 Genevieve Cartier, Discretion as Dialogue, supra note 6 at 646, citing Joseph Vining, The 
Authoritative and the Authoritarian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
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foundation of liberal democracies.  Just as the relative importance of a decision to 
the individual affects the content of the duty of fairness, so too should it heighten 
expectations over dialogue.160  Democratic values do not necessarily dictate that I 
have a right to engage in dialogue with the parking enforcement officer who tickets 
my car, but they do require that I be given participatory agency over administrative 
decisions – i.e.  removal to political persecution – that may be anathema to those 
very values. 
 
Furthermore, the only factor that could conceivably be viewed as justifying a 
more unilateral approach – that these cases involve potentially existential threats to 
the state – is simply not borne out by the empirical evidence referred to in Part Two, 
above.  Recall that virtually no cases brought under s 34 actually relate to 
individuals who are even alleged to constitute a threat to Canadian national 
security.   
 
Finally, security decisions, particularly those related to lower level participants 
in discrete, localized contexts, generally depend on information and disclosure from 
the individual concerned.  Given the breadth of the security provisions, context and 
motive are important factors in determining whether to proceed with 
inadmissibility allegations.  Take the example that we referred to above of British 
M.P. George Galloway.  As I described above, Mr. Galloway was alleged to be 
inadmissible in relation to his donations to the governing authority in the Gaza Strip, 
which is dominated by the Hamas group.  Hamas was and remains a listed terrorist 
entity.  While it is not difficult to make a connection between that government 
authority and terrorist acts, Galloway asserted, and it was not disputed, that his 
donation was used to buy incubators and pediatric dialysis units for a Gaza 
                                                        
 
160 See Baker, supra note 33 at para 25; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504 at para 
42. 
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hospital.161  This is, one would imagine, highly relevant to the determination as to 
whether Mr. Galloway constituted a threat to Canadian security and yet it was 
information that only could have emanated from him.  As a relatively privileged 
individual, Mr. Galloway was able to convey this information to Canadian 
authorities, not because the process required any process of dialogue, but because 
he had ready access to legal counsel and the media. 
 
Another example of the importance of dialogue arises in the case of A.K.  One of 
the consequences of the inadmissibility decision made against him is that he has to 
report regularly to a Canada Border Services office to confirm his address.  A.K. 
reported to me that his frequent trips to the CBSA office were generally pleasant, 
that the people there had gotten to know him and treated him well.  After some 
time, one CBSA officer admitted to A.K. that his situation was not fair.  As A.K. told 
me:  
He [the officer] said that I did not deserve this and I 
should not be considered as inadmissible.  He saw I was 
just a family man, trying to work for my kids.  He saw I 
am peaceful.  He knew I had another application [for 
Ministerial relief] and wished to me good luck. 
 
Unfortunately this CBSA officer is not the one who will make the decisions that 
will fundamentally alter A.K.’s life.  Those officers continue to go about their work 
with the remoteness, alienation and objectification that Sossin laments as having 
“impoverished administrative law.”162  A.K.’s relationship, his “intimacy,” with the 
reporting officers, on the other hand, is precisely what Sossin contemplates when he 
calls for an inclusion of the “personal dimension” in administrative relationships.163  
                                                        
 
161 Toronto Coalition to Stop the War v Canada (MPSEP), supra note 145 at para 18. 
162 Sossin, Intimate Approach to Fairness, supra note 93 at 811. 
163 Ibid. 
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The resulting relationship, even in this highly stigmatized security context, proved 
to be one “capable of engendering mutual respect and trust.”164 
 
Those who suggest that dialogical processes can help to legitimate 
administrative decisions do not tend to limit or qualify the contexts in which 
dialogue could be introduced.  As was illustrated by A.K.’s experience, I contend that 
there is little principled reason why those subject to immigration-security measures 
should not be afforded a meaningful opportunity to communicate with those whose 
discretionary decisions are so important to them.  I similarly do not see it as 
particularly onerous to require of immigration decision-makers that their decisions 
clearly reflect the content of that dialogue.  With this in mind, I turn now to what I 
consider to be some of the preconditions for dialogical principles to take root in the 
migration-security context.   
 
4.6.2 Demystifying Security 
 
Assuming that security provisions are likely to remain broadly cast, subject to 
discretionary exemption processes, demystifying and destigmatizing security 
inquiries is an important first step to fostering dialogue.  In other words, decision-
makers must recognize that a necessary corollary to an expansive security regime is 
the reality that those caught by the regime are not necessarily a threat.  Rather, 
those notionally described by the security provisions are simply those for whom 
dialogue must commence in earnest.  This need for further dialogue, however, 
should not be viewed as displacing a presumption of eligibility.  Handler describes 
the importance of this presumption in his discussion of New Deal social agencies,165 
but it also finds application in the immigration context, where jurisprudence has 
firmly established that the stories of refugee claimants are presumed to be true, 
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165 Handler, Dependent People, supra note 55 at  1096. 
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absent clear and articulable reasons for questioning their truthfulness.166  The 
presumption of admissibility is crucial as it represents a distillation of the trust that 
many commentators suggest is at the very foundation of dialogical approaches.167   
It is also central to destigmatizing those subject to security measures as it requires 
that decision-makers refrain from making judgments about the moral character of 
individuals, at least until they have listened to their story from their perspective.   
 
This calls to mind the situation of another person with whom I spoke.  K.G., also 
from Eritrea, was accepted by Canada as a Convention refugee in the early 2000’s 
following which his application for permanent residence floundered.  He was 
notified that there were concerns in relation to his admissibility to Canada and for 
years he was really provided no further information.  His application was neither 
accepted nor rejected and he lived in a constant state of anxiety that he would be 
returned to Eritrea, a country that he had not been to since he was a minor, as he 
had spent many years in the United States before coming to Canada.  Finally, he was 
notified by Citizenship and Immigration Canada that he might be considered 
inadmissible in relation to nominal donations that he had made while in the United 
States to another Eritrean political party, and he was given the opportunity to both 
make submissions and appear for an interview.  Following the interview – and a full 
decade after arriving in Canada – it was determined that K.G. was not inadmissible.  
His application for permanent residence was later accepted and he eventually 
became a Canadian citizen.  As K.G. sees it, getting the chance to meet with the 
individuals who were deciding his case was crucial.  He told me: 
This all took too long.  Too long.  All they had to do was 
to meet me to know that I am not a political person and 
that I was always just trying to do the right thing for my 
country.  They asked lots of questions, lots about 
individuals who I never heard of.  I told them honestly, 
                                                        
 
166 Maldonado v Canada (MEI), [1980] 2 F.C 302 (C.A.) at 305. 
167 Handler, Dependent People, supra note 55 at 1076, citing Annete Baier, “Trust and Antitrust” (1986) 
96 Ethics 231; and generally Handler, Power, Quiescence and Trust, supra note 55.  
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“I don’t know these people, I have never heard of them” 
and they could tell that I was telling the truth.  Once 
they talked to me they see that I believe in all these 
things, peace and democracy and freedom of religion 
and all these other things.  They see that I am just like 
them.168 
 
K.G.’s story illustrates, all too belatedly, the benefit of dialogue and the changed 
course that discretionary matters can take when individuals are given the power to 
persuade.  K.G.’s case need not have been accepted.  He did contribute to and join a 
political party that could be construed as having taken part in activities described 
under s 34 of the IRPA.  But when given the opportunity to converse with those who 
possessed the discretion to decide his case, any notion of him being a person of 
actual concern appears to have disappeared.  The offer to interview K.G. was clearly 
predicated on the possibility that, notwithstanding his political affiliations, he was 
not necessarily a ‘terrorist’ and not necessarily a person on whom the admissibility 
regime had to be imposed.  To engage in dialogue there needed to be an openness to 
looking beyond the security-threat label that was being considered.  And it was this 
openness and the dialogue that ensued that lead to the determination that K.G. was 
of no concern to Canadian society.  In this, then, we can see that dialogue not only 
depends upon demystifying security concerns, but it also contributes to this 
demystification.   In short, recognizing that security provisions do not necessarily 
involve existential questions about the actual security of Canada, tamps down the 
rhetoric associated with security matters and puts them on a plane similar to other 
more mundane admissibility matters.   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
168 Interview with K.G. June 17, 2014. 
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4.6.3 Abandoning membership as a proxy for security concerns 
 
In liberal democracies, the law tends to attach consequences to an individual in 
relation to action (or inaction) deliberately taken by that person.  Put differently, it 
is a generally held principle that individuals should not be subjected to serious state 
imposed legal censure for acts or events over which they have no individual agency.  
This connection between agency, action and consequence is ruptured in security 
matters related to membership under section 34 of the IRPA.  Recall some of the 
absurdities that may arise because of the broad interpretation attached to the 
concept of membership.  Individuals can be found inadmissible for membership in 
an organization that engaged in proscribed activity only after the individual left the 
organization.  They can similarly be found inadmissible for joining an organization 
that denounced such activity decades earlier.  And in the case of two individuals 
with whom I spoke – J.M. and M.C. – they can be suspected of membership in an 
organization simply for writing accounts (albeit sympathetic ones) of their 
activities.  
 
M.C. is a Colombian human rights advocate who was found to be a Convention 
refugee in 2003 after he was forced to flee Colombia due to threats from that 
country’s paramilitary groups.  Prior to leaving Colombia, M.C. had been a vocal 
critic of the human rights abuses of the country’s paramilitary groups and their 
connections with the national government.  He reported and published on the topic 
and came to support a leftist political party, in return for which, the paramilitary 
threatened him, his wife and four year old son.169  Twelve years after his arrival and 
recognition as a Convention refugee, Canada has still not made a decision on his 
application for permanent residence, nor explained the delay.  It is clear to M.C. and 
                                                        
 
169 As was documented in calls for M.C.’s immediate protection by both Amnesty International in an 
“Urgent Action” communique and by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights in a formal 
request to the Colombian government.    
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his lawyer, however, that the delay is related to a suspicion that his actions while in 
Colombia constituted membership in the FARC guerrilla group.170   
 
J.M.’s experience was very similar – he was found inadmissible in relation to his 
work as a journalist in El Salvador primarily it seems because he acted as an 
intermediary between foreign journalists and FMLN rebels during that country’s 
prolonged civil war.171  J.M. describes his actions in the following terms: 
I was never a member of the guerrilla, but I went to the 
front to make stories.  At that moment, what you had to 
do was just say the truth.  The media of El Salvador 
favoured the right, and we said, just say the truth.  Yes 
this was good for the guerrillas, but this was also good 
for journalism.172 
 
The problem with membership as a ground for establishing inadmissibility is its 
total lack of connection to any personal acts – those set out at paragraphs 34(1)(a) 
to (c) –  that actually animate security concerns.  Basing inadmissibility on 
amorphous notions of membership obviates the need to hear from the individual, as 
the analysis is almost entirely directed at the actions of the organization in question 
rather than those of the individual.  Once the broad criteria for membership are 
satisfied, there is very little room for the inadmissible individual’s perspective: the 
complexities and nuances of their own personal history and the fractured history of 
the countries that they have left become irrelevant.  One can immediately see how 
this concept of membership is at odds with a TWAILian perspective, but for present 
purposes, I also contend that it forecloses the possibility of meaningful dialogue.  
Instead, it has created a kind of guilt by association free-for-all that has been 
                                                        
 
170 Interview with M.C. October 16, 2014. 
171 Interview with J.M. March 28, 2014.  Of interest, the United States has implemented a general 
waiver of inadmissibility for FMLN members who did not directly engage in terrorist activity, see 
Exercise of Authority Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 78, Fed. Reg. 24225 (April 13, 2013). 
Canada has implemented no such waiver. 
172 Ibid. 
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specifically rejected in other immigration contexts173 and is at odds with principles 
of both domestic and international criminal law.174  Membership does not concern 
itself with a person’s own culpable conduct, but rather with the conduct of others 
for whom the person cannot, and often does not wish to speak.  This is why 
membership as a proxy for personal or knowing connection to security related 
actions forecloses dialogue.  If individual agency is unimportant to the matter, there 
really is no basis on which to engage in a meaningful discursive exchange.  
 
It is indeed notable that even the United States, which not surprisingly also 
adopts a broad approach to security-related immigration matters, has recognized 
that loose criteria oriented towards group affiliation rather than personal action is 
problematic.  The U.S. does not impose immigration liability for mere membership.  
What is required, rather, is evidence that an individual provided “material support” 
to an organization engaged in terrorist or other proscribed activity.175  Responding 
to criticism that the “material support bar” similarly held people responsible for the 
wrongdoing of others, the Department of Homeland Security has recently 
implemented a series of waivers for those whose contributions were insignificant, 
were related to routine social or commercial transactions, humanitarian assistance 
or arose out of “substantial pressure that does not rise to the level of duress.”176  
These exemption provisions provide to individuals the raw material with which to 
present their perspective and, at least in theory, with a meaningful opportunity to 
                                                        
 
173 Most explicitly in the context of refugee status determination and the application of the Refugee 
Convention’s exclusion clauses for acts amounting to complicity in war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, as elucidated in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ezokola v Canada, 2013 
SCC 40 at para 3. 
174 As further noted in the Ezokola case, ibid, at para 82: “guilt by association violates the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility.  Individuals can only be liable for their own culpable 
conduct…”[citations omitted]  Domestically, criminal code provisions concerning terrorism, while 
also exceptionally broad, are oriented towards prohibiting acts that facilitate terrorist activity rather 
than mere membership in an organization that may be implicated in such activity: see Criminal Code 
of Canada, RSC, 1985, C-46, s 83.  
175 See section 212(a)(3)(B) of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B). 
176  The waiver provisions were implemented by discretionary authority under s212(d)(3)(B)(i) of 
the INA: 79 Fed. Reg. 6913 (Feb. 5, 2014) online: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-02-
05/pdf/2014-02353.pdf and http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-02-05/pdf/2014-02357.pdf. 
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persuade decision-makers that they do not pose a security threat.  Just as 
importantly, these provisions also inform decision-makers that the blunt instrument 
of inadmissibility based on association is at times in need of nuance and that the 
‘right’ decision in such matters is one that, whichever way it goes, is rooted in 
context.  In short, these provisions create the possibility for meaningful and 
substantive dialogue, a possibility that simply does not exist under the Canadian 
approach to membership. 
 
4.6.4 Changing the Decision-Makers and their Practice Ideologies 
 
As I alluded to above, the “practice ideologies” that suffuse the work of 
discretionary decision-makers are essential in determining whether they will apply 
dialogical approaches to the processes over which they preside.  I argue here that 
the transfer of decision-making responsibility for those flagged for security 
concerns from Citizenship and Immigration Canada to the Canada Border Services 
Agency makes the creation of dialogical practice ideologies virtually impossible.  
This is the concern expressed by Dauvergne when she describes the “differing 
governing ethos” associated with the shift in decision-making responsibility from an 
agency responsible for admission, to one whose primary task is enforcement and 
removal.177   
 
Whether it is a differing “governing ethos” or a new set of “practice ideologies,” 
the implication of the shift to border control is clear: the end game of security 
matters is removal and in this game, dialogical processes are superfluous at best and 
counterproductive at worst.  It is indeed, very difficult to conceive of a set of 
conditions by which an enforcement agency such as CBSA could ever engage in truly 
good faith dialogue with those over whom it holds such totalizing power.  Handler 
                                                        
 
177 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008) at p 169 and see discussion, above, at Chapter 1. 
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notes that there are many potential barriers to developing trusting relationships 
between decision-makers and individuals – “lack of resources, working conditions, 
staff characteristics,” but the crucial one, he continues, is “the construction of the 
client's moral character, which…is pre-determined by the organization's dominant 
moral system – specifically, are clients to be treated as subjects or objects?”178  The 
overarching CBSA construction of the moral character of inadmissible persons is 
that they are law-breakers and criminals who threaten public safety and state 
security interests.  They are dangerous objects to be contained and processed, and 
the processing, it hardly need be mentioned, is removal.179 
 
This is not to say that decision-makers will never side with individual applicants, 
or that they are necessarily unsympathetic towards those whose cases they decide.  
But it is unrealistic to expect an organization with an enforcement mandate and a 
top-down, command and control approach to truly absorb the elements of trust, 
dialogue and attention to historical nuance that I suggest are integral to any agenda 
of reform in security-related decision-making.  For these reasons, I believe it is 
imperative to transfer decision-making in all admissibility cases back to agencies 
that view admission as an integral part of their mandate – those being Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada and, as I will describe below, the Immigration and Refugee 
Board.  
 
                                                        
 
178 Handler, Dependent People, supra note 55 at 1056, again citing Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Human 
Service Organizations, supra note 82. Once again, of relevance here is the literature on New 
Institutionalism which explores and seeks to understand the ways in which social interaction, 
institutional logics, norms and rules guide the behaviour of individuals within organizations.  See the 
discussion at Chapter One, note 94 and, in particular Victor Nee and Paul Ingram, “Embeddedness 
and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure” in Mary Brinton and Victor Nee, The New 
Institutionalism in Sociology (New York: Russell Sage, 1990) at 19-20.  The refusal of CBSA to engage 
in personal interviews makes it difficult to precisely assess how these factors play out within the 
Agency.  For the purposes of this project, I merely mention this strand of research in recognition of 
its relevance in explaining organizational decision-making cultures. 
179 Nowhere is this construction of the moral character of inadmissible persons by the CBSA made 
more evident than in its creation and energetic promotion of its “Most Wanted List”, which closely 
mimics criminal ‘wanted lists’.  The list can be viewed online at: http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/wc-
cg/menu-eng.html.   
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In addition to changing the location of decision-making in this area, a new 
“governing ethos” needs to be cultivated amongst those charged with making 
admissibility assessments and determinations, an ethos built on the following: 
 
? A presumption that those seeking admission have come in good faith; 
? A desire to engage with these persons, born of the recognition that 
“good” decisions – those that are transparent, intelligible and justified 
– are ones based on information that can usually only be obtained 
following two-way processes of dialogue; 
? A recognition that while the stories of those seeking admission may be 
complex and their pasts intermingled with conflict, these facts alone 
do not constitute a threat to national security; 
? A further recognition that security is not enhanced, but in fact 
compromised by focusing on an overly broad cohort of individuals; 
? A renewed focus on the actions of individuals, rather than on vague 
and unhelpful indicia of group affiliation; 
? A TWAILian sense of the histories that have led to Southern conflicts, 
the patterns of forced migration that these histories have created and 
the asymmetrical ways that security provisions have typically been 
applied to those fleeing from conflict zones in the Global South. 
 
Returning decision-making responsibility for security matters to immigration 
officials will not on its own institute the above practice ideologies.  They must be 
proactively introduced, inculcated and reinforced through a number of strategies 
and instruments.  As Sossin notes, these include but are not limited to: soft law 
instruments, judicial vigilance, leadership, supervision and the fostering of civil 
service values.180  What are these values?  I suggest that they include Sossin’s 
conception of the value of neutrality which, as mentioned above, is defined by a 
                                                        
 
180 See most particularly Sossin, Neutrality to Compassion supra note 1 at 430. 
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willingness to balance competing obligations that may include those owed to the 
government of the day, but extend to include duties toward applicants, to the 'public 
interest' and to 'uphold the rule of law.'181  This balancing of multiple interests is 
particularly important in an area implicating security and terrorism, given the 
politically supercharged nature of the issues and the omnipresent temptation on the 
part of political actors to curtail liberties in the name of protecting security.    
 
Sossin also examines civil service values through the lens of legal norms such as 
independence, fairness and trust: these norms are important in creating the 
conditions for substantive dialogue.182  More specific to our present context, I 
suggest that well-established international legal norms to which Canada has 
acceded, most particularly the principle of non-refoulement, must also play a role in 
all decision-making involving individuals who have asserted a fear of persecution if 
removed to their country of origin.  The 1951 Refugee Convention is a 
comprehensive scheme with provisions related to the protection of refugees,183 but 
also to the exclusion of those who have engaged in serious and international 
crimes184 and to the ineligibility of those few individuals who pose a threat to the 
security of the host state.185  These provisions define Canada’s international 
obligations toward refugees.  They formalize the commitment of the Canadian 
public to the protection of the human rights of non-citizens and they make clear to 
refugee claimants the limits of this commitment: it does not extend to those who 
have themselves engaged in human rights abuses and it does not apply to those who 
present a security threat to Canada.  Put somewhat differently, the Refugee 
Convention defines the terms of engagement – the terms of dialogue – between its 
signatories and those seeking protection under it.  I suggest that these parameters 
must be central in the minds of decision-makers exercising discretion under s34,  
                                                        
 
181 Ibid at 428-430. 
182 Ibid at 439. 
183 See Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra 150. 
184 Ibid at Article 1F. 
185 Ibid at Articles 32, 33. 
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particularly because the ambit of that provision is, as we have seen, potentially 
broader than the limited set of exclusions found in the Refugee Convention.   
 
Internalizing knowledge of the Refugee Convention and understanding how its 
obligations are woven into security matters is relatively straightforward.  More 
difficult, but no less important, is the need to expand the scope of practice ideologies 
to include a sensitivity to the global dynamics that have created protracted 
situations of conflict in the global south and the waves of forced migration that have 
ensued.  As I have mentioned above, if large swaths of the global population are at 
least notionally captured by broad security provisions, it is crucial that discretionary 
decisions about admission be informed by context, an appreciation for history and a 
corresponding focus on the actions of individuals, rather than their mere proximity 
to conflict.  This is central to the TWAILian perspective that I previously explored, 
but it is also central to a coherent approach to security.  In this vein, I propose that 
decision-makers receive training on the history and context of political conflicts that 
have created most of the world’s refugee-producing situations.   
 
In an engaging and provocative paper, Mohsen al Attar and Vernon Tava provide 
a conceptual and practical approach to incorporating TWAIL principles into legal 
pedagogy, particularly in the teaching of international law.186  The central goal of the 
approach is, of course, to expose students to southern perspectives on international 
law.  But of particular interest for our purposes is that the authors propose not 
merely to introduce students to TWAIL scholarship, but to do so through a ‘dialogic 
teaching-learning experience’ aimed at fostering genuine student engagement.187  
This approach is a direct response, claim the authors, to the alienation caused by 
traditional legal pedagogy, an alienation that arises because law students are 
                                                        
 
186 Al Attar, Mohsen & Vernon Ivan Tava, "TWAIL Pedagogy - Legal Education for Emancipation" 
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1438325 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2009) [Al Attar 
and Tava, "TWAIL Pedagogy"].  See also, Diane Otto, “Handmaidens, Hierarchies and the Crossing of 
the Public/Private Divide in the Teaching of International Law” (2000) 1 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 35.  
187 Al Attar and Tava, TWAIL Pedagogy, ibid, at note 68, citing Otto, ibid, at 40-44. 
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virtually compelled to sever justice claims from the application of legal principle.188  
This in turn “yields a generation of jurists, judges, and legislators unmoved by the 
plight of the poor and unequipped to tackle the oppression our international legal 
corpus produces.”189  By way of contrast, the authors suggest that deploying TWAIL 
principles – as both international law theory and legal pedagogy – encourages 
students to become more conscious of themselves and their place in the world and 
to think independently about the law, the Western world and its role in the 
problems of the Global South.190    
 
It is, of course, unrealistic to expect governments to provide critical legal 
pedagogy to those they entrust to uphold the current legal order.  This is not what I 
propose.  What I do propose is that officers be encouraged to reflect in their training 
on the histories and inequities that drive global migration and to weave this 
perspective into an approach to discretion that emphasizes transparency, 
participation and non-discrimination.  One of the ways in which officers may begin 
this reflection is by consideration of the following scenarios191: 
 
Scenario I 
 
Applicant A donated the equivalent of $60 in 1976 to an organization that asserted 
independence from a regime that Canada has designated as one that engaged in 
widespread human rights violations.  The successful independence movement was 
immediately recognized as legitimate by both the United Nations General Assembly and 
by Canada individually. 
 
Scenario II 
 
                                                        
 
188 Al Attar and Tava, TWAIL Pedagogy, supra note 186 at 22. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid at 39. 
191 I include these scenarios as an illustration of the kind of thought experiment that I believe officers 
should be encouraged to undertake.  I leave for another day a more fleshed out training curriculum. 
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Applicant B is the spouse of a politician who was a member of a non-violent, 
ethnically-based political party that urged negotiations between a militant organization 
and the federal government.   
 
Scenario III 
 
Applicant C engaged in the subversion by force of a government in the last ten years.  
He was directly involved in armed confrontations.  The subversion led to the falling of 
the government and the failing of the state, which is now dominated by militants who 
have subsequently made direct threats against Canada. 
 
 
Of course the provocative feature of these scenarios is that the more or less 
innocuous examples of Applicants A and B are based on actual findings of 
inadmissibility, while the far more concerning Applicant C is a hypothetical 
American soldier who participated in the Iraq war.  The intent of such an exercise 
would not be to encourage officers to find American soldiers inadmissible, but 
would rather be to encourage officers to reflect carefully about their perceptions as 
to who constitutes a security threat and to focus their minds on the commission of 
acts that trigger security concerns, rather than on discriminatory views of those 
who seek admission from conflict zones in the global south.  
 
The prospect of translating Al Attar and Tava’s approach to teaching TWAIL in 
law schools into an approach to training immigration decision-makers about the 
international dimensions of their work is intriguing for reasons related to both 
process and product.  From a process perspective, Al Attar and Tava’s approach 
suggests that the method by which individuals learn about legal relationships 
informs how they will later engage in such relationships.  On this understanding, a 
dialogical approach to training about the international issues that arise in security 
decisions can only help to foster a dialogical approach to the decision-making itself.   
With respect to content, I believe that an engaged exploration of the root causes of 
political conflicts, taking into consideration TWAILian perspectives on international 
 328 
 
legal issues such as colonial rule, foreign domination and the legitimacy of self-
determination efforts would help bring nuance to the process, focusing it on 
individuals who have meaningfully contributed to proscribed activities.192 
4.6.5 The Role of the Judiciary 
 
The suggestion that legal norms have a role to play in considering civil service 
values brings to the fore the role of the judiciary in reforming and refining the 
security process.  While I accept on a fairly theoretical level the suggestion that 
judicial control in administrative law does not necessarily improve outcomes and 
can, in fact impede dialogical processes, I have come to view immigration matters in 
general and security matters in particular as an exception to this rule.  The 
vulnerability of security decision-makers to overt, top-down political suasion, 
combined with the extremely high stakes of these decisions require, in my view, 
some form of oversight from a body more structurally detached from politics and 
narrowly oriented toward rule of law considerations.193     
 
                                                        
 
192 British scholar Satvinder Juss proposes a somewhat similar approach to discretionary 
immigration decision-making that he refers to as “cultural jurisprudence.”  It is, in large measure, an 
approach to dialogical discretion in the immigration context that attempts to take seriously the 
perspectives of those seeking admission and to reform immigration law along non-discriminatory 
lines.  The result, I suggest, provides insight into a similarly promising possibility for decision-making 
in the migration-security context.  In addition to calling for a process based on participation, respect 
for dignity and trust, Juss’ conception of cultural jurisprudence emphasizes the importance of 
contextual socio-political and cultural knowledge in crafting appropriate discretionary immigration 
decisions.  See Satvinder Juss, Discretion and Deviation in the Administration of Immigration Control 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 5-6, 14-15. 
193 In this, I share the view of Daniel Kanstroom, who notes: 
Immigration law differs in important respects from many other 
areas of administrative law, however. Too Olympian, transcendent, 
or even policy-based a perspective in this arena can put many 
individuals at grave risk. A sort of theoretical triage, in which 
abstract intellectual purity may have to be sacrificed in the service 
of more immediate law reform is therefore justified. 
See D Kanstroom, “Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in US 
Immigration Law” (1997) 71 Tulane Law Rev 703 at 730. 
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In a recent public lecture, McGill University professor and United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants François Crépeau provocatively noted 
that in its increasing use in matters of security, detention and removal, 
administrative law has become “the most dangerous law in the land,” as invasive on 
matters of human liberty as the criminal law, yet devoid of the protections that 
criminal courts have developed over the centuries.194  Crépeau went on to note that:  
In many countries that do not have the death 
penalty…the administrative judge today is the only 
domestic judge who can send people to face 
extrajudicial execution, torture or arbitrary detention. It 
is a heavy burden to shoulder. Immigration regulations, 
proceedings, and policies now "mimic" the criminal 
justice system in many ways…However, these shifts 
have not been accompanied by increased legal 
safeguards of the kind found in criminal law.  The 
continued insufficiency of human rights guarantees 
within administrative proceedings relating to migration, 
coupled with the increasing use of punitive sanctions 
and regimes akin to criminal law, often place irregular 
migrants in a very precarious position.195 
 
In flagging a judicial role for preserving rule of law principles in migration-
security matters, I am not suggesting that decision-makers be stripped of all latitude 
in determining how best to go about their work.  What I do suggest, however, is that 
if legislation is to cast security matters in sweepingly broad terms, than the 
processes for determining questions of admission and expulsion must contain 
mechanisms for ensuring that the individuals subject to security decisions are 
listened to in good faith and that they are afforded the opportunity to persuade 
independent decision-makers that they pose no security threat.  In short, migration-
security matters need their “Baker moment” and in a context in which political 
                                                        
 
194 François Crépeau, “From Enforced Closure to Regulated Mobility: The Need for a Paradigm Shift in 
Migration Policies”, Public Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association for Refugee and 
Forced Migration Studies, Toronto, Canada, May 13, 2015.  
195 Ibid. 
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actors seek to secure advantage by entrenching perceived links between migration 
and insecurity, it would appear that such a moment can only emanate from the 
courts.   
 
Another, and perhaps more compelling reason that the courts maintain an 
important role in the security-migration nexus is that this area is not one solely 
relating to executive discretion, but it also implicates important legal entitlements.  
These entitlements derive from a complex interplay of international and domestic 
law – the right against refoulement and the non-derogable right not to be returned 
to torture amongst them – that are firmly within the decision-making expertise of 
the courts. 
 
This raises a different angle on the notion of dialogue than that which we have 
discussed, that being the dialogue that may take place, not between decision-maker 
and individual, but rather between the decision-maker and the judiciary.  Above, I 
referred to the potential that the Baker decision held out for a shift to a more 
dialogic approach to decision-making in humanitarian and compassionate 
applications.  It was predicted that Baker would have an impact, not necessarily on 
the outcomes of H&C applications, but much more fundamentally, on the way in 
which such applications are considered by immigration officers, a prediction that 
has to a significant extent at least, been born out.196  Sossin refers to the changes in 
soft law instruments that were implemented as a result of the Baker decision and 
the impact of the decision can also be observed, still frequently, in decisions of lower 
courts sitting on judicial review of H&C decisions.197 
 
                                                        
 
196 See Lorne Sossin, “The Politics of Soft Law: How judicial decisions influence bureaucratic 
discretion in Canada” in Marc Hertogh and Simon Halliday, eds., Judicial Review and Bureaucratic 
Impact : International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: Cambridge UP, 2004) at 150. 
197 The examples are myriad, but see for example Paul v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 1081 and Damte v 
Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 1212. 
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Similar change needs to occur in the migration-security context.  To reiterate a 
point I made earlier, this is not a normative call for a more “lenient” approach to 
discretionary decision-making in this area.  It is, rather, a call for substantive review 
of inadmissibility decisions in the hopes that it will foster a more nuanced, engaged 
and individualized process.  It is a call to bring individuals affected by such decisions 
into the mix and to recognize that this is central to the legitimacy of the decision-
making process. 
 
4.6.6 Reform the Discretionary Ministerial Relief Provision 
 
As I illustrated in Part Two of this study, the theoretical availability of a 
discretionary exemption for inadmissibility found at s42.1 of the IRPA is all but 
illusory given the delays associated with it and the truly minimal level of 
engagement that it requires of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness.198  However, I do not view the availability of a backend discretionary 
relief mechanism to be inherently problematic; first of all, in a risk averse world, it is 
likely inevitable that governments will choose to err on the side of caution on 
questions related to security and admission.  In this context, the availability of a 
discretionary waiver of inadmissibility can provide an important safeguard against 
overly broad inadmissibility decisions. 199  
 
                                                        
 
198 I refer specifically here to the fact that applications for Ministerial relief frequently remain 
undecided after 8-10 years, and to the more or less “boilerplate” reasons for denying relief that were 
upheld as sufficient by the Supreme Court of Canada in Agraira, supra note 121. 
199 Though to be clear, I do not suggest that after-the-fact waivers of admissibility are a sufficient 
curative to an otherwise overly broad security regime.  Just as courts have rejected the notion that 
prosecutorial discretion can ameliorate constitutionally impaired criminal provisions, so too (in my 
estimation) should they reject arguments that a Ministerial discretion can cure an otherwise infirm 
inadmissibility regime: see for example R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 at paras 86-88.  As I have 
noted above, however, in matters of security, states will virtually always seek to maintain the 
flexibility that a discretionary regime provides and it is on this basis, rather than on the basis of an 
endorsement of the current discretionary regime, that I make these comments. 
 332 
 
Secondly, if designed properly – that is, if designed to provide timely, impartial 
and justified decisions – a discretionary relief mechanism can form an important 
part of an overall scheme that takes national security concerns seriously without 
compromising the state’s international human rights obligations.  Recall that it was 
the very availability of such a mechanism that the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Suresh decision relied upon to uphold the legality of the security provisions then in 
place.200 
 
Unfortunately, the promise of the Ministerial exemption provision has wilted out 
of neglect, to the point that it should now be viewed as an entirely ineffective 
administrative mechanism.   One can see why elected politicians, particularly the 
Minister responsible for public safety, would want to avoid making the politically 
charged decision to grant rights to those already found to have engaged in acts such 
as terrorism and subversion of foreign governments.  And yet, given the seemingly 
innocuous forms of involvement of many of these individuals, a significant 
percentage of the applications for Ministerial relief will be strong on the merits.  The 
result, it seems, is avoidance.  Successive Ministers have confirmed through their 
(in)action that they simply want no part of this process, and so I would propose that 
they be granted their wish.  I would instead place responsibility for waiver decisions 
in the hands of the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board, a body that already possesses considerable expertise balancing, in the 
criminal context, concerns over public safety and security with the rights of 
individuals.201  Recall from earlier in our discussion that the review of 
inadmissibility findings at the Immigration Division of the IRB is asymmetrical – the 
Minister may appeal Immigration Division decisions to the IAD, but the individual 
found to be inadmissible may only seek leave and judicial review before the Federal 
Court.  I would propose to allow both parties to appeal inadmissibility findings 
                                                        
 
200 Suresh, supra note 116 at para 110. 
201 The IAD hears appeals of criminal inadmissibility matters pursuant to its authority under sections 
62-71 of the IRPA and may grant relief to appellants on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. 
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under s34 to the IAD, and to grant the IAD the residual discretionary authority to 
waive inadmissibility in appropriate cases.  It is imperative that in considering these 
security cases, the IAD be required to act expeditiously and to conduct hearings, as it 
does in the other appeals that come before it.  This, of course, is the key element of 
any discretionary regime built around dialogical principles, for it is at this moment 
of literal dialogue that the decision-maker must listen to the individual whose future 
is in their hands and it is frequently at this moment, I contend, that the individual 
ceases to simply be a terrorist or a spy or a security threat and instead becomes a 
person whose past actions may be adjudged on their own merits. 
 
Transforming the process along these lines would breathe life into the relief 
provision – it would attain a degree of insulation from political rhetoric and give 
inadmissible individuals a sense that they are active participants in a process that is 
fundamentally important to them.  Public safety considerations would still be 
prominent in the process and the Minister would retain avenues of recourse to 
respond to decisions with which s/he disagrees.  What would end, however, is the 
indefinite period of waiting that most inadmissible persons endure, only to be 
followed by a boilerplate decision that merely reiterates the original basis of the 
inadmissibility determination.   
 Conclusion 
The use of discretion is ubiquitous and controversial.  In its many incarnations it 
has been both praised and criticized; it has been viewed as essential to a progressive 
state and as a troubling deviation from the rule of law and individual rights.  The 
paradox of administrative discretion is that it is at once an expression of state power 
and a limitation on it.  It is exercised in contexts in which the state possesses the 
power to establish the parameters of acceptable choice.  At the same time, the 
existence of discretion implies a ceding of state control to the administrative realm 
which balances multiple duties beyond those owed to the government of the day.  In 
the preceding pages, I have argued that for states to exercise this power in 
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justifiable ways, it must approach discretion as a location of democratic action.  This 
requires, at a minimum, that those who are affected by expressions of discretionary 
state power be placed at the centre of the processes by which it is exercised.  This, I 
suggest, is as true in the context of migration-security determinations as it is in any 
other domain.   
 
The reality of discretion in security matters is, however, very far removed from 
any principle of dialogism and instead resembles a classic iteration of top-down 
executive power.  The result is a security regime that is suspicious of context and 
skewed to ensnare those who have fled conflict in the global south.  This is a 
problem from a TWAIL perspective, but it is also a problem from the perspective of 
a coherent and legitimate security regime.  The solution, I propose, is to recalibrate 
the approach of decision-makers so that they meaningfully engage with the 
individuals affected by their decisions and consider carefully both the content of 
their actions and the context in which they occurred.  Given the rights at stake in 
these matters and the fundamentally legal nature of them, I believe that the courts 
should preserve an important role in the security context, but one that is mindful of 
the complex weighing of interests in the discretionary process.  While rights must be 
preserved, the courts also play an important role in creating the conditions for 
dialogue.  There are times, as in the example of Baker, when the courts must take it 
upon themselves not to end a conversation, but to begin it.   
 
In the end, then, what I have proposed in the above pages is rather modest: I do 
not suggest that individuals within Canada should not be subject to some form of 
security screening process.  I do not suggest that such individuals have a right to any 
particular form of substantive outcome.  But what I do suggest is that where these 
individuals assert that their core rights will be affected by removal, they should be 
entitled to a rich procedural process that focuses on the security threat that they 
may pose in an individualized, dialogical and good faith process, and which takes as 
sacred Canada’s commitment to comply precisely with its international obligations.
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As the final stages of this dissertation were being completed, public interest in 
the Syrian refugee crisis exploded following the viral image of a young boy who 
drowned, together with his brother and mother, in their efforts to seek asylum in 
Europe.  This tragic event created a renewed push to prioritize the resettlement of 
refugees, yet even in these solemn circumstances, the security discourse surged to 
the front of the agenda.  In refusing to commit to admitting more refugees, Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper asserted that his political rivals were not capable of 
making the tough national-security decisions required of a prime minister.  He 
continued: “Our opponents are simply not up to it. Thomas Mulcair and Justin 
Trudeau will not even call jihadist terrorism what it is. But if you cannot call jihadist 
terrorism by its name then you cannot be trusted to confront it and you cannot keep 
Canadians safe from it.”1  In an instant, Mr. Harper sought to reframe the national 
conversation from one about refugees and the common call of humanity to one that 
unsubtly cast refugees as security threats.   
 
At roughly the same time, the American Migration Policy Institute published an 
interesting commentary, revealing that in the 14 years since September 11, 2001, 
the United States has resettled 784,000 refugees.  Of those refugees, precisely two 
have been arrested for planning terrorist activities and, the report goes on to note, 
neither of these individuals were planning an attack on the United States.2 
 
These two stories, and the geopolitical context from which they emerge, help to 
frame the debate that I have explored over the preceding pages.  They illustrate the 
tensions of the securitized state, brought into sharp relief in the context of a refugee 
crisis of historical proportions.  As Syrian refugees converge on European borders, 
                                                        
 
1 Tonda MacCharles, “Conservative Leader Stephen Harper discounts meeting with other party 
leaders to discuss refugee crisis, holds to 10,000 more admissions from Syria, Iraq in next three 
years”, The Toronto Star (7 September 2015), online: The Toronto Star <http://www.thestar.com>. 
2 Kathleen Newland, “The U.S. Record Shows Refugees Are Not a Threat”, Migration Policy Institute 
(October, 2015), online: Migration Policy Institute http://migrationpolicy.org. 
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they implicitly question the legitimacy of closing borders to those who face danger 
at home.  In this, they are backed by international law, but not necessarily by the 
states tasked with receiving them, many of which are reconsidering (in highly non-
theoretical ways) the twin imperatives of the liberal democratic state: ensuring the 
security of citizens while respecting the universality of human rights.   
Revisiting the Analysis 
 
This brings me to some concluding remarks about security, inadmissibility and 
migration.  Over the course of this exploration, I have endeavoured to identify an 
approach to security in immigration matters that would be generally acceptable to a 
wide spectrum of observers, ranging from those who propose a generally open 
borders approach, to those who defend the sovereign orthodoxy of contemporary 
migration law.   
 
As I have noted at various points along the way, exclusionary migration policies 
are relatively uncontroversial where they are legitimately tied to matters 
implicating the security of the host community.  It is equally uncontroversial that 
states owe certain obligations to non-citizens within their territory, at the very least 
where removal of such individuals would result in their persecution.  In the space 
between these principles, decisions on security must be made and in the securitized 
context of this era, states are tempted to leave this space largely unencumbered by 
any substantive notions of legality.  It is, I have argued, an example of a legal grey 
hole – one that contains superficial trappings of legality but in reality remains a zone 
of virtually unfettered executive power.  I have argued that states ought to resist the 
temptation to create such grey holes.   
 
My arguments in this regard have proceeded in a number of steps, all with an 
emphasis on the Canadian context.  In the first step, I examined some of the 
prevailing debates on issues germane to my topic: migration, security, the rule of 
law and exclusion in times of perceived exception.  After a brief ‘first principles’ 
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review of scholarship on liberalism, migration and security, I moved on to outline 
the arguments of scholars such as Benhabib and Dauvergne who make the case, in a 
variety of ways, for a thick conception of the rule of law, one that applies to citizens 
and non-citizens alike and even in times of perceived exception.  The position is not 
dissimilar to that of Joseph Carens who, in his recent work, has proposed a version 
of liberalism that that “takes rights seriously without making them absolute,” and at 
the same time is sensitive to context and history.3  At the very least, Carens notes, 
liberal states should take seriously the moral claims of outsiders within a political 
community who would like to remain.4  Exclusion, Carens concludes, “has to be 
justified.”5  While I do not, in this dissertation, attempt to settle the argument as to 
whether this process of justification is owed to all persons outside a political 
community who may seek entry into it, I do assert one very basic fact that is of 
central importance to my later argument: justification is required in relation to 
those already within a community who assert a risk to themselves if removed.  As I 
later explore in the first chapter, this position is consistent with other scholars who 
write, more generally, about principles of legality and the rule of law.  As Dyzenhaus 
notes, “the constraints of legality are the constraints of adequate justification.”   
 
With this frame in mind, I moved on in the second step to an examination of the 
Canadian decision-making regime in immigration security cases.  In doing so, I made 
reference to the various periods of exclusion in Canadian immigration law and to 
the current preoccupation with security as a basis for inadmissibility.  I also outlined 
the broad legislative language applicable to these cases and the correspondingly 
broad and deferential approach adopted by Canadian courts in reviewing security-
related decisions.  The result, I suggested, is that Canadian law renders inadmissible 
not just those thought to pose a security threat to Canada, but a significantly 
                                                        
 
3 Joseph H Carens, “A Reply to Meilaender: Reconsidering Open Borders” (1999) 33:4 Int Migr Rev 
1082 at 1083.  
4 Joseph Carens, Immigrants and the Right to Stay (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010).  
5 Ibid. 
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broader ambit of individuals.  To further explore this observation, I then turned to a 
quantitative assessment of Canadian decision-making in security cases, revealing 
that such cases: a) virtually never relate to actual security threats against Canada or 
its allies; b) virtually never involve allegations related to the actual commission of 
crimes, but rather to membership – broadly defined – in organizations alleged to 
have committed crimes; and c) are generally made against individuals from the 
Global South who wish to make, or have made, a claim to refugee status in Canada.  
The reality, I conclude, is that Canada’s security-migration regime appears to be 
primarily focused on a surprising cohort of individuals: those with some connection 
to localized, Third World (and frequently anti-colonial) movements.  This 
preoccupation is not only empirically unconnected to actual security concerns, but it 
also has important and, I assert, unjustified consequences for those subject to 
security measures. 
 
In the third step, I incorporated a TWAIL perspective to help explain – and 
ultimately resolve – the deficits in justification identified in the preceding chapter.  A 
paradox of immigration law lies in the fact that it is a domain of both insular state-
based policy and intimate connection to international law.  At the outset of the 
chapter I sought to illustrate the myriad ways in which domestic migration law is 
both informed and constrained by international law and, inversely, how migration 
law also transmits legal principles onto the international plane.   
 
With this in mind, I set out to explore how a third world perspective on 
international law can help us to think differently about some of the central themes 
of this study.  I argued that TWAIL’s emphasis on reading history and context into 
the law, its focus on the rights of individuals rather than states, its critical stance on 
the war on terror and its insistence on a substantive place for the rule of law are all 
important ingredients in improving decision-making in the migration-security 
realm.  I also sought to illustrate how transposing TWAIL onto the migration-
security realm would require the adoption of discursive and participatory 
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interactions between all parties and focus the security analysis on the actions rather 
than the associations of individuals, bringing to it a sense of justification that it 
currently lacks.   
 
Building on this TWAIL analysis, I turned in the final chapter to an examination 
of similar conversations from the realm of administrative law – about dialogue, 
participation and the rule of law – and examined how a progressive interpretation 
of administrative discretion could assist in bringing a greater sense of justification 
to security-based immigration decisions.  After briefly tracking the ebb and flow 
history of discretionary decision-making in administrative law, I focused in on 
recent approaches that assert that for discretionary authority to produce results 
that are viewed as both legitimate and justified, they must engage in meaningful 
dialogue with those over whom it is exercised.  Dialogue and justification are 
reinforcing concepts: a legal culture that aspires to justification is one that 
emphasizes dialogue as the principle mechanism by which to attain it.  Fostering 
such a legal culture is particularly important when dealing with individuals who 
lack the ability to assert their own voice; who lack the power, in other words, to 
assert their version of the story that has placed them under the authority of the 
administrative decision-maker.  It is all the more so in legal domains where the 
decision at issue is one that affects important rights.   
 
Foreign nationals, particularly those alleged to have taken part in activities that 
raise national security concerns are perhaps the prototype of such individuals.  They 
lack political voice and frequently face obstacles in asserting legal rights.  And for 
many such individuals, the discretion exercised in determining how their case will 
proceed is perhaps the most important administrative decision that they will ever 
confront.  At this point in the analysis, I again addressed a central question: what 
obligates states to engage in dialogue with non-citizens?  The answer, at least for 
present purposes, lies in two facts.  The first is that, as I illustrated in my empirical 
research, the vast majority of those subject to the security mechanisms in Canada 
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have asserted a well-founded fear of persecution if removed to their countries of 
origin.  The second is that the cases that I examined over the course of this study 
involved persons already present in Canada who were asserting a right to stay.  As 
such, processes to determine their legal entitlements are necessarily also processes 
that define state authority to exercise coercion over such individuals.  State coercion 
is an important trigger for the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, and it also, I assert, triggers obligations to engage in dialogue. 
  
Given that the actors in this legal context also tend to assert rights under 
international law, most notably the Refugee Convention, this is also where TWAIL 
commentary converges with dialogical approaches to administrative law.  As noted 
above, TWAIL principles support the use of discursive approaches when considering 
the rights of Third World peoples, but it also provides direction, guidance and 
context on the question of how that dialogue should take place.  It provides 
substantive meaning, in other words, to administrative dialogue in a manner that 
comports with the reality of those affected by security-based decisions.  At the end 
of this final step, I therefore sought to articulate an approach to decision-making 
that incorporates both TWAIL perspectives and dialogical principles as two 
ingredients that, I suggest, would remedy many of the ailments that presently 
plague decisions in this area.   
A TWAILian, Dialogical Model of Decision-Making 
 
In the end, I suggest that taking principles derived from TWAIL scholarship and 
combining them with dialogical approaches to administrative law creates a 
promising formula for enhancing the legitimacy and justification of security related 
decisions.  It would accomplish this by issuing a number of prescriptions for reform 
of the current process that I outlined in the previous chapter.  To briefly reiterate, 
the most important changes that this approach would dictate include the following:    
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? Demystifying Security – A prescription born of the realization that 
security provisions will inevitably be cast in broad legislative language, 
reserving to decision-makers the authority to distinguish cases of true 
concern from those that are not.  While immigration policy cannot be an 
avenue of impunity for international crimes, nor too can it become a 
vehicle for recasting all activity related to foreign instability as a security 
threat.  Measures must be taken to instil in decision-makers an 
understanding of the complexity and context of global geo-political 
instability and a general recognition that many cases flagged under the 
broad security legislation do not raise existential questions about the 
actual security of the state.  Where a person is found to be notionally 
described by the security legislation, this merely triggers the requirement 
to engage in good faith dialogue, taking into consideration relevant 
TWAIL factors, such as colonial history and post-colonial repression.  And 
as I illustrated by reference to one individual, engaging in dialogue at this 
level fosters the demystification of security as a necessarily more 
threatening form of inadmissibility than any of the others. 
 
? Abandoning membership as a proxy for security concerns – This 
prescription aims to bring inadmissibility determinations in security 
cases, at least in respect of refugee claimants, into conformity with the 
Refugee Convention and with commonly accepted principles of individual 
criminal responsibility.  In Chapter Two, I revealed that mere 
membership in groups alleged to have committed proscribed acts is the 
most frequent ground of security-related inadmissibility.  This has 
occurred over a period of time in which appellate courts around the 
world have firmly rejected membership as a form of liability in 
international refugee law.  Recalling that the vast majority of individuals 
subject domestically to the security provisions are asylum seekers or 
Convention refugees, it is a simple and incontrovertible fact that the 
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membership criterion places Canada outside its international legal 
obligations.  I suggest that security-related decisions be based instead on 
the concept of complicity, a ground of secondary liability that has been 
both well-developed internationally and widely recognized as a 
legitimate basis on which to assess individual responsibility for illicit 
group activity.   
 
? Changing the Decision-Makers and their Practice Ideologies – In the binary 
world of immigration law, evaluating inadmissibility is as much about 
admission as it is exclusion.  This being the case, I further proposed that it 
is inappropriate for front-end decision-making in this domain to be 
undertaken by a government agency whose principal raison d’etre is 
enforcement and removal.  As such, I argued that decision-making 
authority for security-related inadmissibility determinations be entirely 
returned to Citizenship and Immigration Canada.   
 
? The Role of the Judiciary – I also contended that courts must maintain a 
role in ensuring the legitimacy of security-related decisions, given both 
the complex domestic and international law issues that arise and the 
core, protected legal rights at stake.  Processes of dialogue, such as those 
that now routinely take place in the context of refugee determination 
proceedings and humanitarian and compassionate applications are 
frequently generated and maintained by a backdrop of legal entitlement. 
 
? Reform the Discretionary Ministerial Relief Provision – Finally, I proposed 
that the mechanism for providing relief for inadmissibility be reformed 
by shifting it away from the Public Safety Minister and placing it instead 
within the framework of an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division of 
the Immigration and Refugee Board.  This would not only bring parity to 
the appellate processes under the IRPA’s inadmissibility regime, granting 
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to individuals that which the Minister already possesses, but it would also 
situate dialogue and discretion in the same decision-making location.  
This is in contrast to the current regime which confers discretion in a 
process (the s44 report) that does not require dialogue and then confers 
dialogue in a location with no discretion (the Immigration Division 
hearing).   
Agenda For Future Research 
 
While this dissertation touches upon a variety of themes, its central objective is a 
relatively modest one: to enhance the legitimacy and justification of security-related 
decisions within one particular decision-making regime.  Several interesting 
questions remain unaddressed, which gives rise to a research agenda that includes 
the following issues: 1) the use of security provisions in overseas immigration 
applications, particularly applications for refugee status submitted from abroad; 2) 
a detailed analysis, beyond that which could be provided here, of the particular 
kinds of groups that attract scrutiny from a security perspective; 3) further 
international comparative research on how other countries determine 
inadmissibility for security purposes; and 4) a consideration of the contributions 
that a TWAIL approach might make to other immigration contexts, most notably, the 
present global refugee crisis.  I now briefly expand on these topics: 
1) Inadmissibility and Overseas Immigration Applications 
 
The empirical work that I have undertaken in this dissertation concerns two 
sights of decision-making on inadmissibility: decisions of the Immigration Division 
of the Immigration and Refugee Board and decisions on Ministerial relief made by 
the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.  There remains another 
area of decision-making that this dissertation does not touch upon: overseas 
immigration applications determined by Citizenship and Immigration Canada.  
While I endeavoured to collect data on these decisions – I spent over a year in back 
and forth communication with CIC on various Access to Information Requests – I 
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was repeatedly frustrated in my efforts and was ultimately told that this data could 
not be captured without absorbing exorbitant fees.  Nevertheless, as an area of 
inquiry, I continue to believe in the importance of collecting information on these 
decisions.  In the procedurally stripped down world of immigration law, overseas 
immigration applications represent a certain kind of nadir: the Charter is of limited 
application, procedural safeguards are minimal and judicial deference of such 
decisions is at its highest.  In particular, I would be keenly interested to find out how 
many overseas applications for refugee protection are refused by Canadian officials 
on the basis of s34 of the IRPA.  The rights at stake in such applications are at least 
equal to many of those individuals in Canada whose cases were included in this 
study and yet decision-making in this area is virtually devoid of scrutiny.    
2) International Comparative Research 
 
While I have briefly referred over the preceding pages to migration-security 
practices internationally, a more sustained comparative analysis of comparable 
security regimes in other refugee-receiving countries would be of clear assistance in 
evaluating the Canadian approach.  In particular, it would be interesting to delve 
into the recent waivers implemented in the United States, which represent an 
apparent recognition of the overbreadth of their security-related inadmissibility 
criteria.  It would also be helpful to explore whether countries distinguish between 
immigrants and refugees in the application of their security criteria and, if this is the 
case, whether security measures applied vis-à-vis refugees are consistent with the 
Refugee Convention.  
3) Analysis of Inadmissible Groups 
 
As I noted in my empirical analysis of s34 decisions, it was beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to delve deeply into the nature of the organizations that become 
embroiled in security proceedings.   While I have looked into this elsewhere in the 
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particular context of one country,6 a more in-depth analysis of the various 
movements, organizations and groups would be of considerable value in shedding 
further light on the motivations that drive security decisions.  This vein of potential 
research could help us understand whether there are any particular kinds of groups 
that attract sanction; whether it matters if such groups are considered Canadian 
allies or whether the question of current engagement in armed conflict is truly 
considered to be an irrelevant consideration.   
4) TWAIL in other Immigration Contexts 
 
I have found TWAIL to provide a useful lens through which to examine my 
dissertation topic.  As I have argued, it can help to bring nuance and sensitivity to 
legal domains not known for these traits.  It can help to convey an understanding of 
broad, macro-political phenomena as they are embodied in the lives of the 
individuals who have been affected by them in ways that are highly relevant to legal 
proceedings.  And as many TWAIL scholars have argued, it is an approach that is 
readily transposable to many areas of legal enquiry.  In the realm of immigration 
and refugee law, I suspect that a TWAIL approach could provide interesting insights 
into a variety of areas, including: i) the application of the exclusion clauses under the 
Refugee Convention; ii) the assessment of the bona fides of spousal sponsorships 
under immigration legislation; iii) the assessment of credibility in relation to 
refugee determination proceedings; iv) the selection of skilled workers for 
immigration and the subsequent accreditation processes that follow immigration. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
6 Angus Grant, Catherine Bruce & Catherine Reynolds, “Out of the Fire and into the Pot: The Eritrean 
Liberation Movement, the Right to Self-Determination and the Over-Breadth of North American 
Immigration Security Provisions” (2010) 25 Georgetown Imm Law J 859 at 870. 
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5) Exploring the Role of Institutions in Migration-Security Decisions 
 
As I have mentioned at various points, the influence of institutions in shaping 
the discretionary decisions of their employees is an area of inquiry that is both 
immensely important and, unfortunately, difficult to undertake in an era of guarded 
access.  Nevertheless, further research on the internal dynamics of various 
institutional players – CBSA, CIC and the IRB – and the role they play in influencing 
security-related decisions would represent a helpful further contribution.7  
 
More specifically, it would be interesting to examine how both formal 
“norms-building" exercises such as training and less formal social relationships 
serve to differentially inform the decision-making processes of CBSA enforcement 
officers, CIC immigration officers and IRB adjudicators.  Because circumstances arise 
in which individuals from all three agencies make essentially the same 
determinations, it would be particularly informative to explore whether, and to 
what extent, their different institutional structures lead to different approaches to 
the question of security.8 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
7 Once again, I refer here to the literature on New Institutionalism, which could prove particularly 
insightful in thinking about how to improve decision-making in security matters, given its emphasis 
on issues related to institutional change and inertia.  See once again Mary Brinton and Victor Nee. The 
New Institutionalism in Sociology (New York: Russell Sage, 1990) at pp 32-33 and see Helen Marie 
Williams, “Examining the Nature of Policy Change: A New Institutionalist Explanation of Citizenship 
And Naturalisation Policy in the UK and Germany 2000-2010”, PhD Dissertation, University of 
Birmingham, 2011. 
8 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “The Political Economies of Immigration Law” (2012) 2 UC Irvine 
Law Review 1 at 46, who devotes considerable attention to the fragmentation of immigration law and 
policy in the United States and to the disparate institutional players within the system that, when 
working at odds, may compromise the “coherence and practical viability of immigration policy.”  Any 
engaged assessment of Canadian institutions that engage in security-related decisions would have to 
confront the same possibility. 
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Conclusion 
 
“There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which 
specified that a concern for one's safety in the face of 
dangers that were real and immediate was the process 
of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be 
grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he 
did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly 
more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions 
and sane if he didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly 
them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; 
but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to.9 
 
In a very recent decision of the Federal Court of Canada, the court was 
confronted, once again, with its own version of a Catch-22 when it considered 
whether an individual had reasonably been found inadmissible for his opposition to 
the Soviet-backed regime that ruled over Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992.  This was 
also a regime that Canada has designated as one that committed gross human rights 
violations or war crimes.  In finding that it had no choice but to uphold the decision 
finding the applicant to be inadmissible for security reasons, the court expressed its 
discomfort, but nevertheless stated:  
Although I am highly sympathetic to the Principal 
Applicant’s position and recognize the potential 
absurdity in denying refugee status to an individual on 
the basis of his efforts to combat organizations that 
Canada opposed as well, I am nonetheless bound to 
apply the jurisprudence of our Court of Appeal. 
… 
There is therefore a Catch-22 quality to the outcome for 
Mr. Maqsudi vis-à-vis subversion.10 
 
                                                        
 
9 Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961) at 32. 
10 Maqsudi v Canada (PSEP), 2015 FC 1184. 
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In this dissertation, I have sought to demonstrate that the above catch-22 
situation is by no means confined to that case, but is in fact pervasive in the realm of 
migration-security laws.  I have also argued that this need not be the case.  I have 
done so by drawing upon commentary on migration and the rule of law, TWAIL 
scholarship and a dialogical conception of administrative law.  The confluence of 
these distinct areas of legal inquiry can, I have argued, help us to conceive of an 
approach to security in immigration matters that takes seriously the concerns of the 
receiving state, while ensuring that inadmissibility findings are both justified and 
limited to those who truly constitute a security threat.   
 
I close with a final example of the problematic, and in some instances self-
defeating, security regime.  In recent days, it emerged that the CBSA detained and 
refused entry to Mourad Benchellali, a well-known Muslim anti-radicalization 
activist.  Benchellali had been an inmate at the U.S. Naval Base in  Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba but this was not the end of his story; in the years following his release in 2004 
he had become engaged in educational programs aimed at preventing the 
radicalization of young Muslims, highlighting the dangers of ISIS and calling into 
question the glamour of armed Jihad.  Benchellali was seeking entry into Canada to 
participate in a documentary on deradicalization and to speak to school groups.  
Instead, he was deemed inadmissible under s34 and promptly returned to his native 
France.11  In its efforts to secure Canada’s borders, the CBSA refused entry to 
someone whose chief ambition is to diminish the imposing spectre of global 
terrorism and insecurity.  A Catch-22 of the highest, and most unjustified order.
                                                        
 
11 Nicholas Keung, “Anti-radicalization activist to return to France after arrest at Pearson” The 
Toronto Star (05 November, 2015) online: Toronto Star http://www.thestar.com.  
 
350 
 
APPENDIX A – Data on Inadmissibility 
Determinations at the Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada 
  
Inventory List 24/10/2015
Year Country Individual concerned IRB File No./Locator IRPA Section
Proscribed 
Organization Organization Type Outcome
Refuge
e Claim Board Member
IRB 
Region
Judicial 
Review Comments Counsel
2002 India Redacted 2p.1 34(1)(f)(c) (BK) Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Ladouceur Montreal Unknown Sikh org.
2002 Turkey A2-02062/Tor.2p.84 34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c) HADEP Political Movement Admissible Yes Dennis Paxton Toronto Unknown Dismissed HADEP-PKK connection Timothy Leach
2003 Eritrea A2-00882/Tor.1p.1
( )( )(
c) ELF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes M.A. Stoddart Toronto 2004 FC 283 Aaron Weinstock
2003 Pakistan Redacted A2-02220/Tor.2p.113 34(1)(f)(c) ISO/TJP Religious Admissible n Vlad. Tumir Toronto Unknown Note: contemp. case on TJP with opp. Conc. Robert Blanshay
2003 Pakistan Redacted A2-02084/Tor.2p.99 34(1)(f)(c) ISO/TJP Religious Inadmissible Yes I. DeCarlo Toronto Unknown Imamia Students Org./Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan M. Berger/Orman
2003 Sri Lanka Redacted A2-02739/Tor.2p.125 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible n Aina Martens Toronto Unknown Accepted recanting of LTTE membership Lorne Waldman
2003 Sri Lanka Redacted A3-00040/Vanc.2p.30 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes M. Tessler r Unknown Rejected PCs airport admission to LTTE member.
2003 Sri Lanka Redacted A3-02442/Tor.2p.229 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes Vlad. Tumir Toronto Unknown Min fail to estab. LTTE as terror. and PC as mem. Unknown
2003 Iran ) A2-02052/Tor.2p.64 34(1)(f)(c) MEK Political Movement Inadmissible n Marilou Funston Toronto 2005 FCA 85 Premature Charter; No age limitation, broad mem. Avi Sirlin
2003 Germany A2-00439/Vanc.1 p.4 34(1)(f)(a)(c) STASI Government agency Inadmissible No Irene Dicaire r No
2004 India Redacted A4-00008/Tor.2p.240 34(1)(f)(c) BTF Separatist/Liberation Admissible n M.A. Stoddart Toronto Unknown Fail to estab. Balwinderwal Tiger Force as terror. R. Addinall
2004 United States Redacted A4-00251/Vanc.1 p.10 34(1)(c) Earth Liberation Front Environmental Admissible No Leeann King r Unknown But found inad. under 36(1)(c)
2004 Colombia A4-00623/Vanc.2p.102 34(1)(f)(c) FARC Political Movement Inadmissible susp. Irene Dicaire r No
2004 Sri Lanka Redacted A3-00661/Tor.2p.147 34(1)(f)(a)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. Dennis Paxton Toronto Unknown Rejected recanted LTTE membership Robert Blanshay
2004 Sri Lanka Redacted A4-00253/Tor.2p.259 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Denied J. Walkinshaw Toronto Unknown ID reject bias alleg. against US DOS K. Sriskanda
2004 Sri Lanka Redacted p.11 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible n Beauchamp Montreal Unknown Membership not made out
2004 Sri Lanka Redacted A4-00028/Tor.2p.247 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible n Marilou Funston Toronto Unknown Accepted recanting of LTTE membership M. Crane
2004 Sri Lanka Redacted A2-01163/Tor.2p.32 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes Vlad. Tumir Toronto Unknown See notes re retracting admission and Min burden Ian Hamilton
2004 Pakistan A4-00291/Vanc.2p.46 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible Denied M. Tessler r 2005 FC 1053 JR Denied.
2004 Not stated A4-00221/Tor.2p.255 34(1)(f)(c) Not stated Not stated Admissible Denied C. DeCarlo Toronto Unknown ID accepts RPD lack of cred. finding re member M. Herman
2005 Iran A4-00552/Vanc.2p.66 34(1)(f)(c) Fedayan-e Khalq Political Movement Admissible Denied O. Nupponen r not of this GREAT re meaning of 34 and discretion - notes.
2005 India A4-00754/Vanc. 2p.140 34(1)(f)(c) ISYF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible 1996 M. Tessler r No Relied on CC listing of ISYF, rather than evidence
2005 Pakistan A4-00685/Vanc.2p.114 34(1)(f)(c) JKLF Separatist/Liberation Admissible CR Leeann King r No Jammu Kashmir Lib Front/Accepted b/c temporal
2005 Pakistan A4-0074S/Vanc.2p.133 34(1)(f)(c) JKLF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Denied M. Tessler r No JR of Ref Claim - 2000 Canlii 15299
2005 Russia Redacted A4-00550/Vanc.1 p.148 34(1)(a)(f) KGB Government agency Admissible No O. Nupponen r No See notes multi-faceted org.
2005 India A4-00248/Tor.2p.1360 34(1)(f)(c) KLF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. Leeann King Toronto No 1st JR granted: 2003 FC 1022; also inad under 35&36 C. Elgin
2005 Sri Lanka Redacted A3-02249/Tor.2p.179 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. Aina Martens Toronto Unknown Rejected recanted LTTE membership Ron Poulton
2005 Pakistan A5-00065/Vanc. 2p.151 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Admissible Denied O. Nupponen r 2007 FC 1049 Temporal distinction/Minister's IAD and JR denied
2005 Pakistan A5-00256/Vanc.2p.174 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Admissible* n Leeann King r 2008 FC 610 Overturned by IAD, which was upheld by FC.
2005 Philippines Redacted A3-02428/Tor.2p.202 34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c) NPA Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Douglas Toronto Unknown New People's Army - Military wing of Com Party Helen Kim
2005 Lebanon 94-00306/Tor.2p.6 34(1)(f)(c) PFLP Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible No C.A. Simmie Toronto 2006 FC 1457 PR since 1985 - Foundational 34 temporal case B, Jackman
2005 Pakistan A5-00305/Vanc.2p.240 34(1)(f)(c) SSP Religious Inadmissible Yes O. Nupponen r No Sipah-e-Sahaba.  Dismissed s.35 allegations
2005 Angola A7-02227/Tor.2p.1 35(1)(a)** UNITA Political Movement Admissible 1995 W. Willoughby Toronto Unknown NOTE: Seems to be limited to 35 allegations M. Korman
2006 El Salvador A4-00577/Vanc.2p.79 34(1)(f)(c) FMLN Political Movement Inadmissible Denied D. Shaw Dyck r No
2006 Russia A4-00778/Vanc.1 p.52 34(1)(a)(f) KGB Government agency Inadmissible No Irene Dicaire r 2007 FC 43 34(2) decision: 2009 FC 942
2006 Nigeria A6-00680/Vanc.2p.424 34(1)(f)(c) MAD Political Movement Admissible Yes D. Shaw Dyck r No Movement for Advance.Democracy/ Hijacking
2006 Pakistan A5-00762/Vanc.2p.380 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Admissible* CR O. Nupponen r IAD appeal Overturned by IAD: 2007 CanLII 68319 (IRB)
2006 Pakistan A5-00730/Mtl2p.19 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible n Louis Dube Montreal 2007 FC 478 Applies complicity anal.
2006 Pakistan Redacted A5-02189/Tor.2p.370 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible Yes J. Walkinshaw Toronto Unknown R. Pannu
2006 Pakistan A2-01501/Tor.2p.41 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible susp. S. Gratton Toronto Unknown But jr of PRRA 2011 FC 221 Jack Davis
2006 Lebanon Redacted A5-00895/Tor.2p.1349 34(1)(f)(c) PLO Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes S. Gratton Toronto Unknown Joined as minor - poshteh cited… Eziefule
2007 India A7-00191/Vanc.2.p.447 34(1)(f)(c) AISSF/ISYF Separatist/Liberation Admissible Denied M. Tessler r No Accept recanted story/No memb. through temple
2007 Jordan Redacted A5-01856/Tor.2p.340 34(1)(f)(c) Arab Lib. Front Liberation/Political Inadmissible Yes C.A. Simmie Toronto No Joined as student, simple donations student activ. G. Levesque
2007 Spain A7- 00473/ Vanc.1 p.75 34(1)(c)(f) ETA Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible No D. Shaw Dyck r No Friend of Sancho
2007 El Salvador Redacted A5-00146/Tor.2p.282 34(1)(f)(c) FMLN Political Movement Inadmissible Yes M.A. Stoddart Toronto Unknown Allegations not brought on subversion… None listed
2007 Pakistan Redacted A6-01465/Tor.2p.518 34(1)(f)(c) JKLF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible 1997 J. Walkinshaw Toronto Unknown contra A6-01120, connect b/w Indian&Pak JKLF D. Barker
2007 Pakistan Redacted A6-01120/Tor.2p.468 34(1)(f)(c) JKLF Separatist/Liberation Admissible 2003 C. DeCarlo Toronto No ID rejects connection b/w JKLF Indan and Pak. Lani Gozlan
2007 Sri Lanka Redacted A5-01011/Tor.2p.300 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Marilou Funston Toronto Unknown Rejected recanted LTTE membership/ Ian Wong
2007 Iran A6-02505/Tor.2p.557 34(1)(f)(c) Mahdaviyat Religious Inadmissible Yes S. Gratton Toronto DR Not inad per s.36 - group cmtd. one act of terror None listed
2007 Iran Redacted A7-00389/ Vanc.1 p.68 34(1)(f)(c) MEK Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Leeann King r Unknown Youth when joined MEK
2007 Pakistan A5-00761/Mtl2p.25 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Ladouceur Montreal No
2007 Pakistan Redacted A6-01490/Tor.2p.526 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Douglas Toronto Unknown Ref. to Siddiqui re consistency; A35 alleg. Denied Jack Davis
2007 Nigeria Redacted A6-02450/Tor.2p.541 34(1)(f)(c)
p
Cong. Political Movement Inadmissible Yes C.A. Simmie Toronto No Also inadmiss per A35. Johnson Babaloa
2007 Sudan A6-01328/Tor.2p.508 34(1)(f)(c) SPLA Political Movement Admissible Yes Douglas Toronto No Min. Counsel recommended a finding of admiss. Aaron Weinstock
2008 Eritrea Redacted AB-00369/Tor.1p.103 34(1)(f)(c) ELF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. K. Thomson NF No A.Grant
2008 Ethiopia Redacted A6-00947/Tor.1p.12 34(1)(f)(c) EPRP Political Movement Inadmissible n R. Stratigopoulos Toronto Unknown Reject. Min sub that PC was lying re: mem. E.Brown/J.Phipps
2008 Spain 1p.1 34(1)(c)(f) ETA Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Louis Dube Montreal No
2008 Palestine Redacted A5-02375/Tor.2p.380 34(1)(f)(c) Fatah/PLO Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. DeCarlo/Simmie Toronto No Also inadmiss per 35; temporal - terror after left Ed Corrigan
2008 Sri Lanka Redacted A6-00310/Tor.2p.395 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. Marilou Funston Toronto No Membership not made out - little CBSA int. notes Ian Hamilton
2008 Iran 00711/Mtl2p.44 34(1)(f)(c) MEK Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Marco Gaetani Montreal 2009 FC 141 RefClaim was accepted
2008 Niger Redacted A8-01194/Tor.2p.833 34(1)(f)(b) MNJ Political Movement Admissible Yes Harold Shepherd Toronto No Mvmt of Nigerians for Justice - Accept recant mem. Sandra Zaher
2008 Mongolia Redacted A5-01959/Tor.2p.353 34(1)(a)(f) Mongolia/China Government agency Inadmissible susp. C.A. Simmie Toronto No Double agent for Mongolia/China spied on fugees? Clifford Luyt
2008 Pakistan A7-00971/Tor.2p.634 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible 1997 Bill Willoughby Toronto Of 34(2) dec. See notes re: acontextual nature of ID decisions Chantal Desloges
2008 Pakistan A5-00684/Vanc.2p.267 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Admissible* Yes O. Nupponen r Red. '07 FC 6 Overturned by IAD: 2010 CanLII 68719 (IRB)
2008 Pakistan 00230/Mtl2p.40 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Isabel Germain Montreal No RefClaim was accepted
2008 Pakistan Redacted A8-00335/Tor.2p.805 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible Yes R. Stratigopoulos Toronto Unknown Joel Sandaluk
2009 India A9-00743/Vanc.2.p.559 34(1)(f)(c) AISSF Separatist/Liberation Admissible n Geoff Rempel r IAD appeal
pp
Reasons@588
2009 Bangladesh Redacted A8-02587/Tor.2p.925 34(1)(f)(c) Bang. Freedom Party Political Movement Admissible Yes A. Seifert Toronto No ID rejected Min evidence re BFP - int. re: temporal S. Ashamalla
2009 Nigeria Redacted A9-00297/Vanc.2p.522 34(1)(f)(c) Biafran/Ogoni Orgs Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes Geoff Rempel r Unknown Was in US when said to work for orgs
2009 Namibia Redacted A8-02764/Tor.2p.953 34(1)(f)(b) Caprivi Lib. Army Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Harry Adamidis Toronto 2010 FC 308-den See notes, no dispute over minimal role of PC Edoh
2009 Namibia A8-01053/Vanc.2p.467 34(1)(f)(b) CLM Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Leeann King r 2009 FC 1260 Caprivi Liberation Movement
2009 Eritrea A8-01933/Tor.1p.32 34(1)(f)(c) ELF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible 2004 Ama Beecham Toronto No Jack Davis
2009 Ethiopia Redacted p.122 34(1)(b)(f) EPRDF Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Geoff Rempel r Unknown Oremade re: Mandela
IRPA s.34(1) Decisions
Inventory List 24/10/2015
Year Country Individual concerned IRB File No./Locator IRPA Section
Proscribed 
Organization Organization Type Outcome
Refuge
e Claim Board Member
IRB 
Region
Judicial 
Review Comments Counsel
2009 Ethiopia p.109 34(1)(f)(b)(c) EPRP Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Geoff Rempel r No See also re temporal 
2009 Ethiopia Redacted A8-01009/ Vanc.1 p.94 34(1)(f)(b)(c) EPRP Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Geoff Rempel r Unknown See notes re: temporal
2009 China Redacted A7-01067/Tor.2p.642 34(1)(f)(c) ETLO Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. Jennifer Harnum Toronto No East Turkistan Liberation Organization - Uygur org Brian Cintosun
2009 Colombia Redacted A9-01668/Tor.2p.1129 34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c) FARC Political Movement Admissible susp. L. Del Luca Toronto No int'l Sikh Youth Federation John Grice
2009 El Salvador A7-01850/Tor.2p.721 34(1)(f)(b) FMLN Political Movement Inadmissible 2000 M. Hayes Toronto No Joined RedX as youth, then FMLN as medic M. Melvin
2009 El Salvador Redacted A7-01324/Tor.2p.651 34(1)(f)(b) FMLN Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Ama Beecham Toronto 2010 FC 246-den Helped father as youth, then stayed member P. Bhardwaj
2009 El Salvador A7-00358/Tor.2p.1335 34(1)(f)(c) FMLN Political Movement Inadmissible 2004 L. Lasowski Toronto No Rejected duress argument Jonathan Jurmain
2009 . A9-01155/Tor.2p.1002 34(1)(f)(a) KGB Government agency Inadmissible 2000 M. Hayes Toronto No PC was crypto. for KGB, but not against democ. None listed
2009 Iran A8-00771/Tor.2p.811 34(1)(f)(c) MEK Political Movement Inadmissible CR Marilou Funston Toronto No Counsel admitted inadmissibility Ed Corrigan
2009 Pakistan A8-01383/Tor.2p.841 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible CR C.A. Simmie Toronto No Low level worker for MQM - Rejected S.35 J. Gill
2009 Pakistan A7-02748/Tor.2p.762 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible 1998 M. Hayes Toronto No PC denied any MQM involve. In terror-rej. None listed
2009 Pakistan Redacted A7-02749/Tor.2p.782 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible 1999 O. Kowalyk Toronto Unknown PP - 34(2) refused as in A7-02748 A. Naqvi
2009 Pakistan Redacted A6-01259/Tor.2p.483 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Harold Shepherd Toronto Unknown s.35 alleg. rejected Max Sultan
2009 Pakistan Redacted A8-01943/Tor.2p.852 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible Yes R. Stratigopoulos Toronto Unknown Rejected s.35 allegations Peter Wuebolt
2009 n Redacted A8-01297/Vanc.2p.482 34(1)(a)(d) n/a n/a Admissible n M. McPhalen r Unknown espionage but not against democracy
2009 Nigeria Redacted A7-02397/Tor.2p.737 34(1)(f)(c) NDV Political Movement Inadmissible Yes A. Laut Toronto No Niger Delta Vigilantes - See notes re memb. Stella Anaele
2009 Nigeria Redacted A6-02796/Tor.2p.569 34(1)(f)(b) Force Political Movement Admissible Yes A. Laut Toronto No ID rejects PC's credibility wrt early claim of mem J. Jubenville
2009 Ethiopia A8-00912/Tor.1p.19 34(1)(f)(c) OLF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Harold Shepherd Toronto 2010 FC 198 JR dismissed Alyssa Manning
2009 Pakistan Redacted A7-00748/Tor.2p.622 34(1)(f)(c) L. Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Harry Adamidis Toronto No Pakistan Muslim League and Muslim Student Fed Peter Wuebolt
2010 DRC Redacted A9-00692/Vanc.2p.534 34(1)(f)(b) AFDL Political Movement Inadmissible n O. Nupponen r Unknown All. des Forces Democ. pour la Lib. du Congo-Zaire
2010 India B0-00544/Tor.2p.1250 34(1)(f)(c) AISSF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes S. Kim Toronto No Also member of Damdami Taksal and SADAM S. Chera
2010 India 01324/Mtl2p.120 34(1)(f)(c) AISSF/ISYF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible CR Me Marisa Musto Montreal No All India Sikh Student Federation (AISSF) and/or the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)
2010 Macedon./Albania Redacted A9-01189/Tor.2p.1016 34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c) Army Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. Ama Beecham Toronto No ANA, not an actual army: ID rejected recanted memb. Randal Montgomery
2010 Libya B0-00392/Tor.2p.1204 34(1)(f)(c) Al-Haramain Religious Inadmissible CR Harry Adamidis Toronto No Allgd Qaeda link; s.35 alleg. rej, see notes delay&AofP Jacqueline Swaisland
2010 Iran Redacted A9-01127/Tor.2p.977 34(1)(f)(a)(c) Basij Forces Government agency Inadmissible Yes A. Seifert Toronto Unknown See notes: also part of Min. of Iran Intel and Sec. S. Morris
2010 Iran A9-01137/Tor.2p.995 34(1)(f)(c) Basij Forces Government agency Admissible Yes C.A. Simmie Toronto Unknown ID accepts PC claim not to have admit. mem. @ POE Michael Korman
2010 India A8-01252/Vanc.2p.474 34(1)(f)(c) BTF Separatist/Liberation Admissible 1993 O. Nupponen r No Bhindranwale Tiger Force/post-stroke interview
2010 Eritrea Redacted A9-01456/Tor.1p.73 34(1)(f)(b)(c) ELF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. L. Del Luca Toronto Unknown Patrick Roche
2010 Eritrea p.131 34(1)(f)(c) EPLF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible n Leeann King r No Terrori/war crimes def.
2010 Colombia Redacted A6-00892/Tor.2p.402 34(1)(f)(c) FARC/M19 Political Movement Inadmissible susp. Ama Beecham Toronto Unknown Prelim motion re: disc. and R to C. - reject kidnap Leigh Salsberg
2010 El Salvador Redacted A9-01356/Vanc.2p.612 34(1)(f)(c) FMLN Political Movement Inadmissible CR M. McPhalen r Unknown
2010 El Salvador A9-01353/Vanc.2.p.598 34(1)(f)(c) FMLN Political Movement Inadmissible n O. Nupponen r No
2010 India B0-01468/Vanc.1 p.1 34(1)(f)(c) ISYF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible n Leeann King r No Int'l Sikh Youth Federation
2010 Sudan Redacted A9-01424/Tor.2p.1056 34(1)(f)(b)(c) Mvmt Political Movement Inadmissible Yes S. Kim Toronto acc ID rejects recanted PIF, distinction b/w JEM &JESML Aaron Weinstock
2010 Sri Lanka A9-02910/Tor.2p.1193 34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible No S. Kim Toronto No ID rejects recanted admiss. made b/c of schizophren. K. Sriskanda
2010 Sri Lanka B0-00511/Tor.2p.1224 34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Inel. L. Del Luca Toronto No ID rejects recanted LTTE mem claim from France Max Berger
2010 Sri Lanka Redacted A8-02353/Tor.2p.859 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes I. Kohler Toronto No Also rej. A35/Accepted recanting LTTE membership Ian Hamilton
2010 Sri Lanka Redacted A8-02994/Tor.2p.959 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes John Grant Toronto No ID accepted recanting of LTTE mem.. from UK claim L. Vasan / L. Waldman
2010 Sri Lanka Redacted A7-01631/Tor.2p.703 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Harold Shepherd Toronto 2011 FC 339-den ID Denied duress re membership, upheld Waikwa Wanyoike
2010 Sri Lanka Redacted A9-01358/Tor.2p.269 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes John Grant Toronto Unknown Husband & wife contradict-wife inad for inad. Fam Robert Blanshay
2010 Sri Lanka Redacted A5-01713/Tor.2p.319 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. I. Kohler Toronto Of prev dec. Redet. of prev. inadmis hearing based on psych John Grant
2010 Nigeria Redacted A9-01649/Tor.2p.1121 34(1)(f)(b)(c) MASSOB Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Harry Adamidis Toronto No See Canlii for MASSOB cases where no Inad. brought Bola Adetunji
2010 Nigeria Redacted A9-01860/Tor.2p.1162 34(1)(f)(b)(c) MASSOB Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. Ama Beecham Toronto No ID rejects recanted PIF / See Canlii for RPD MASSOB S. Orjiwuru
2010 Iran Redacted B0-00268/Vanc.2.p.644 34(1)(f)(b)(c) MEK Political Movement Admissible susp. Geoff Rempel r Unknown PC on US MEK  list, but was MEK prisoner: duress
2010 Iran 00890/Mtl2p.62 34(1)(f)(c) MEK Political Movement Inadmissible CR Louis Dube Montreal No Temporal issue
2010 Pakistan 01585/Mtl2p.73 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible CR Louis Dube Montreal No 11yr delay bw ref and inadmiss
2010 Afghanistan Redacted A8-01302/Vanc.2p.497 34(1)(f)(c) Muslim World League Religious Admissible Yes O. Nupponen r Unknown MWL (or IWL) alleged Al Qaeda funder
2010 Iraq Redacted A3-00236/Vanc.2p.38 34(1)(f)(b)(c) Pat.Union.Kurd. Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Geoff Rempel r No PC arrived 2003, ref claim, IH suspended for 34(2)
2010 Cameroon Redacted B0-00240/Vanc.2p.628 34(1)(f)(b) SCYL Political Movement Inadmissible susp. Geoff Rempel r 2011 FC 409 Rejected account of South Cam.Youth League factions
2010 Sudan Redacted A6-02902/Tor.2p.588 34(1)(f)(c) Sudan Lib Move. First Separatist then Political Inadmissible Yes A. Seifert Toronto No SLA not same as SPLA from A6-01328 A. Weinstock
2010 Sri Lanka 00136/Mtl2p.82 34(1)(f)(c) Move. Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible n Cote Montreal No World Tamil Movement (WTM) front for LTTE
2011 Colombia C/Vanc.2p.638 34(1)(f)(c) AUC Political Movement Inadmissible Yes Leeann King r 2011FC1013 Defence of duress not made out - JR denied.
2011 Sudan A9-01759/Tor.2p.1136 34(1)(f)(b) Beja Congress Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Harold Shepherd Toronto No No (1)(c) re: targeting of pipeline but accept 70s coup Aaron Weinstock
2011 Ethiopia Redacted B1-00592/Tor.1p.94 34(1)(f)(b)(c) EPRP Political Movement Admissible susp. A. Laut Toronto Unknown ID accepts recanted memb'ship claim; see notes P. Vandervennen
2011 El Salvador B1-00206/Vanc.2p.1
( )( )( )( )(
c) FMLN Political Movement Admissible 1991 L. Ko r No
j (p )
process (p.13-26 )
2011 Iran Redacted 01330/Vanc.2p.1010 34(1)(f)(b) Komala Political Movement Inadmissible susp. M. Tessler r 2012 FC 131 JR dismissed
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00989/Vanc.2p.952
( )( )( )( )(
c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. Leeann King r Unknown Ref. to sign IOM waiver; IRPA s.16; Con Inf.- see notes
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00897/Vanc.2p.739
( )( )( )( )(
c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. L. Ko r Unknown UK claim based on LTTE memb. Rejected = not inad.
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00896/Vanc.2p.728
( )( )( )( )(
c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. Leeann King r Unknown Bad cred., s.35 charge rejected as well for help to army
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00878/Vanc.2p.716
( )( )( )( )(
c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. Leeann King r Unknown As in B0-00847, no inadmiss. for work in LTTE comp.
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00911/Vanc.2p.764 34(1)(f)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. M. McPhalen r Unknown No inadmiss. for work in LTTE comp. to avoid LTTE
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00925/Vanc.2p.779 34(1)(f)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. M. McPhalen r Unknown Posted LTTE material on FB, lent motor., wife contra.  
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00955/Vanc.2p.822 34(1)(f)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. Leeann King r Unknown See notes.  Use of CI; on int'l list from IOM
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-01106/Vanc.2p.979 34(1)(f)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. L. Ko r Unknown Reject. CI ev. and prev. admiss of LTTE memb.
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00940/Vanc.2p.800 34(1)(f)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. M. McPhalen r Unknown Admitted member "by accident", rejected coercion arg.
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00953/Vanc.2p.807 34(1)(f)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. Geoff Rempel r Unknown SunSea admitted LTTE member, also inadmiss per 35
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00988/Vanc.2p.870 34(1)(f)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. M. McPhalen r No
p ,
know pass. didn't have papers: p.942
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-01101/Vanc.2.p.967 34(1)(f)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. Geoff Rempel r Unknown Heavily redacted; PC was actor in LTTE film
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-01188/Vanc.2p.998 34(1)(f)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. D. Shaw Dyck r No Admitted membership in LTTE
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00844/Vanc.2p.676 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. M. Tessler r Unknown SL newspaper associated with LTTE
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00847/Vanc.2p.690 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. M. Tessler r Unknown See notes: work for LTTE company OK in context
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00866/Vanc.2p.708 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. M. McPhalen r Unknown As in B0-00847, no inadmiss. for work in LTTE comp.
2011 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00972/Vanc.2.p.836 34(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. M. Tessler r Unknown Dec.p863-Worked and paid by LTTE
2011 Nigeria Redacted B0-11458/Tor.2p.1287 34(1)(f)(b)(c) MASSOB Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes J.M. McCabe Toronto No Insuff evidence of MASSOB - same rec as other cases R. Amadi
2011 Nigeria Redacted B0-02641/Tor.2p.1299 34(1)(f)(b)(c) MASSOB Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. A. Laut Toronto No ID rejected recanted MASSOB membership story K. Kwan Anderson
Inventory List 24/10/2015
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Proscribed 
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2011 Nigeria Redacted B0-00517/Tor.2p.1242 34(1)(f)(c) MASSOB Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes R. Stratigopoulos Toronto No ID rejected 34(1)(a) and (b) allegations M. Akinyemi
2011 Iran Redacted B0-00438/Vanc.2p.651 34(1)(f)(b)(c) MEK Political Movement Inadmissible n Geoff Rempel r Unknown Disting. From B0-00268 - similar facts, not coerced
2011 nd Redacted B1-00301/Vanc.1 p.140 34(1)(f)(b)(c) Army Political Movement Inadmissible n M. Tessler r Unknown
2011 Pakistan Redacted A7-00723/Vanc.2p.455 34(1)(f)(c) MQM Political Movement Inadmissible CR M. McPhalen r Unknown Disbelieved distinction b/w MQMs
2011 Afghanistan A8-02510/Tor.2p.884 34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c) Mujahedeen Political Movement Inadmissible Yes M. Hayes Toronto Pending S. notes re: subv&JR: IMM-6362-11.  Also inad per A35 Leigh Salsberg
2011 Iran Redacted B1-00360/Tor.2p.1315 34(1)(f)(b)(c) NCRI Political Movement Admissible Yes J.M. McCabe Toronto No ????????????????????????????????????????? Timothy Leach
2011 Liberia B0-00545/Tor.2p.1261 34(1)(f)(b)(c) NPFL Political Movement Inadmissible susp. C.A. Simmie Toronto 2012 FC 317-den ID rejected recanted story and defence of duress P. Vandervennen
2011 . 01108/Mtl1p.13 34(1)(f)(c) PFLP Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes Dianne Tordorf Montreal No
2011 Sudan Redacted B1-00362/Tor.2p.1326 34(1)(f)(b)(c) SLM First Separatist then Political Admissible Yes Harry Adamidis Toronto No Admission of membership not enough/insuff evidence Howard Eisenberg
2011 Sri Lanka A9-01567/Tor.2p.1070 34(1)(f)(c) TNA-LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. O. Kowalyk Toronto Leave-denied MC withdrew 35 alleg.; TNA-LTTE rel. - See notes Raoul Boulakia
2012 Lebanon 00846/UPDATE/p.22 )(c) 35 (1)(a) Brigade/AMAL Religious Inadmissible Yes Louis Dube Montreal Richard Lage
2012 India Redacted 00758/UPDATE/P.59 (34)(1)(f)(c)
(
faction) Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes O. Nupponen Montreal Mentions PIF! Giovanna Allegra
2012 Lebanon Redacted 00041/UPDATE/p.559 (34)(1)(f)(c) Amal Religious Inadmissible Yes Ken Thomson Niagra N/A
2012 Colombia 00767/UPDATE/p.656 (34)(1)(f)(c) AUC Political Movement Inadmissible Yes M. Tessler r Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia Robin Bajer
2012 Ethiopia Redacted 03051/UPDATE/p.414 (34)(1)(f)(b) 7/EPPF/CUD Political Movement Inadmissible susp. O. Kowalyk Toronto A. Brouwer
2012 Palestine Redacted 00804/UPDATE/p.684 (34)(1)(f)(c) Hamas Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes Geoff Rempel Edmonton S. Yu
2012 Lebanon 00947/UPDATE/p.709 (34)(1)(f)(c) Hezbollah Political Movement Inadmissible n Geoff Rempel Edmonton S. Binder
2012 Sudan Redacted 01424/UPDATE/p.240 c) Mvmt Political Movement Inadmissible susp. I. Kohler Toronto
j p g
JEM Barbara Jackman
2012 Iran 00322/UPDATE/p.636 (34)(1)(f)(b) KDPI Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible 1999 Geoff Rempel r Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran P. Larlee L. Waldman
2012 Sri Lanka Redacted 01914/UPDATE/p.353 c)(42)(b) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes I. Kohler Toronto
g g
national, other than a protected person, is inadmissible N. Mithoowani
2012 Sri Lanka Redacted 00341/UPDATE/p.47 (34)(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible n Marisa Musto Montreal training (coersion) successfully proven. Refers to CBSA Ethan Alan Friedman
2012 Sri Lanka Redacted 00889/UPDATE/p.209 a)(b) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible n R. Stratigopoulos Toronto
, , j g g y
argued re: c L. Waldman
2012 Sri Lanka Redacted B0-00824/Vanc.2.p.661 34(1)(f)(b)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. L. Ko r Unknown Forced to transport items for LTTE.  Not membership.
2012 Colombia 00770/UPDATE/p.667 b) M-19 Political Movement Inadmissible Yes L. King r R. Kincaid
2012 Nigeria Redacted 66 a) MASSOB Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. A. Beecham Toronto R. C. Amadi
2012 Nigeria Redacted 01950/UPDATE/p.186 c) MASSOB Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. Harold Shepherd Toronto Sina Ogunieye
2012 Nigeria Redacted 00176/UPDATE/p.675 c) MASSOB Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes L. King r
g g
subversion by force of Nigerian government. G. Badh
2012 Iran Redacted 002336/UPDATE/p.222 (34)(1)(f)(c) MEK Political Movement Inadmissible Inel. L. Del Duca Toronto
, y
previously. K. Kostadinov
2012 Pakistan 00269/UPDATE/p.101 35)(1)(a) MQM (MQM-A) Political Movement Inadmissible 1999 O. Nupponen Montreal 341fa founded alllegation 35 unfounded Mark Gruszczynski
2012 Turkey Redacted 96 b) PKK Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. L. Del Duca Toronto C. Acikgoz
2012 Palestine 00303/UPDATE/p.2 35(1)(a) PLFP Separatist/Liberation Admissible n Yves Dumoulin Montreal Razur Rahman
2012 Tunisia Redacted 01145/UPDATE/p.81 1)(a) RCD Party Government agency Inadmissible Yes Yves Dumoulin Montreal
y y
inadmissible under section 351a, government did not Kamel Balti
2012 India Redacted 02216/UPDATE/p.510 (34)(1)(f)(a) Redacted Not stated Inadmissible Yes Marilou Funston Toronto E. C. Roth
2012 Lebanon Redacted 00137/UPDATE/p.72 (34)(1)(f)(c) SSNP Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes Dianne Tordorf Montreal Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party Anthony Karkar
2012 Pakistan Redacted 00530/UPDATE/p.696 (34)(1)(f)(c) SSP Religious Inadmissible Yes T. Cook r G. Murtaza
2012 Afghanistan Redacted 00137/UPDATE/p.451 (34)(1)(f)(c) Taliban Political Movement Inadmissible susp. O. Kowalyk Toronto Unsuccessfully tried to argue coersion. E. Sehatzadeh
2012 Sri Lanka Redacted 02470/UPDATE/p.311 35)(1)(a) TNA-LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes S. Kim Toronto Found TNA and LTTE same group. S. Boyd
2012 Sri Lanka Redacted 01126/UPDATE/p.624 (37)(1)(b) Inadmissible Yes L. King r
p p gg g g
Sun Sea. Sadrehashemi
2013 India Redacted 00449/UPDATE/p.168 (34)(1)(f)(c) AISSF Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes Cote Montreal
g
Singh Gill faction of the AISSF was or is engaged in Giovanna Allegra
2013 India Redacted 00612/UPDATE/p.497 (34)(1)(f)(c) AISSF Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible Yes A. Seifert Toronto K. Kostadinov
2013 India Redacted 02368/UPDATE/p.537 b)(36)(1)(c) BKI Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible susp. M. Mokbel Toronto Babbar Khalsa International S. Bharati D.S. Jammu
2013 Sri Lanka Redacted 01115/UPDATE/p.523 (34)(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Inadmissible n A. Seifert Toronto B, Jackman
2013 Sri Lanka Redacted 01189/UPDATE/p.598 (34)(1)(f)(c) LTTE Separatist/Liberation Admissible susp. Geoff Rempel r Minister failed to prove he was a de facto member. P. Edelmann
2013 Sri Lanka Redacted 01079/UPDATE/p.591 (34)(1)(f)(c) LTTE/TRO Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes M. Tessler r Rehabilition Organization was tied to the LTTE. Came G. Chand
2013 DRC Redacted 000763/UPDATE/p.137 (34)(1)(f)(b) MLC Political Movement Inadmissible susp. Cote Montreal Marie-Josee L'Ecuyer
2013 DRC 01019/UPDATE/p.124 35)(1)(b) MLC Political Movement Inadmissible 1999 Louis Dube Montreal Movement for the Liberation of Congo Jacques Beauchemin
2013 Iraq Redacted 00161/UPDATE/p.609 c) PUK/CTG Separatist/Liberation Admissible Yes L. Ko r Counter Terrorism Group G. Badh
2013 Peru Redacted 02956/UPDATE/p.583 b) Shining Path Political Movement Inadmissible n Statigopoulos Toronto Campbell
????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
????????? ?????????????? ????????????????????????????
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